World Congress of the Game Theory Society |
|---|
Summary of All Sessions |
| # | Date/Time | Location | Title | Papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | July 13, 2008 8:30-9:50 | G45 | Behavioral Theory I | 3 |
| 2 | July 13, 2008 8:30-9:50 | G40 | Bounded Rationality I | 3 |
| 3 | July 13, 2008 8:30-9:50 | G27 | Updating | 3 |
| 4 | July 13, 2008 8:30-9:50 | G05 | Roommate and Marriage models | 2 |
| 5 | July 13, 2008 8:30-9:50 | G43 | Learning and Groups | 3 |
| 6 | July 13, 2008 8:30-9:50 | 160 | Consensus and Agreement | 3 |
| 7 | July 13, 2008 8:30-9:50 | 101 | Awareness II | 3 |
| 8 | July 13, 2008 8:30-9:50 | 2245 | Beliefs and Incomplete Information | 3 |
| 9 | July 13, 2008 8:30-9:50 | 276 | Bargaining and Applications | 3 |
| 10 | July 13, 2008 8:30-9:50 | G44 | Implementation II | 3 |
| 11 | July 13, 2008 8:30-9:50 | 1246 | Lobbying | 3 |
| 12 | July 13, 2008 8:30-9:50 | G42 | Fair Division | 3 |
| 13 | July 13, 2008 8:30-9:50 | G36 | Dynamics, Objective Functions, and Games | 3 |
| 14 | July 13, 2008 8:30-9:50 | G03 | Large Games I | 3 |
| 15 | July 13, 2008 10:00-10:30 | Coon Forum | Welcome Remarks and Game Theory and Computer Science Prize Announcement | 0 |
| 16 | July 13, 2008 11:00-12:20 | G42 | Networks IV | 3 |
| 17 | July 13, 2008 11:00-12:20 | G43 | Bounded complexity | 3 |
| 18 | July 13, 2008 11:00-12:20 | G45 | War | 3 |
| 19 | July 13, 2008 11:00-12:20 | G05 | Political Competition and Dynamics | 3 |
| 20 | July 13, 2008 11:00-12:20 | G44 | Experiments and Methods | 3 |
| 21 | July 13, 2008 11:00-12:20 | G36 | Mechanism Design VI | 2 |
| 22 | July 13, 2008 11:00-12:20 | 160 | Strategy-Proofness | 3 |
| 23 | July 13, 2008 11:00-12:20 | G27 | Incentives | 3 |
| 24 | July 13, 2008 11:00-12:20 | G40 | Learning, communication, coordination. | 3 |
| 25 | July 13, 2008 11:00-12:20 | 1246 | Algorithms and Games | 3 |
| 26 | July 13, 2008 11:00-12:20 | 101 | Strategic Communication III | 3 |
| 27 | July 13, 2008 11:00-12:20 | G03 | Large Games II | 3 |
| 28 | July 13, 2008 11:00-12:20 | 276 | Rationalizability | 3 |
| 29 | July 13, 2008 13:45-14:30 | 1246 | Semi-Plenary A5 | 2 |
| 30 | July 13, 2008 13:45-15:15 | Norris 202 | Semi-Plenary A2 | 2 |
| 31 | July 13, 2008 13:45-15:15 | Norris 101 | Semi-Plenary A3 | 2 |
| 32 | July 13, 2008 13:45-15:15 | Jacobs G40 | Semi-Plenary A4 | 2 |
| 33 | July 13, 2008 13:45-15:15 | Norris McKormick | Semi-Plenary A1 | 2 |
| 34 | July 13, 2008 15:25-17:10 | G40 | Ambiguity and Risk | 4 |
| 35 | July 13, 2008 15:25-17:10 | 160 | Legislative Bargaining | 3 |
| 36 | July 13, 2008 15:25-17:10 | G42 | Networks I: Learning | 4 |
| 37 | July 13, 2008 15:25-17:10 | G43 | Agency | 4 |
| 38 | July 13, 2008 15:25-17:10 | 1246 | Uncertainty, Decisions, and Games | 4 |
| 39 | July 13, 2008 15:25-17:10 | G44 | Game Experiments I | 3 |
| 40 | July 13, 2008 15:25-17:10 | G03 | Auction and Market Experiments | 4 |
| 41 | July 13, 2008 15:25-17:10 | G05 | Mechanism Design and Markets | 2 |
| 42 | July 13, 2008 15:25-17:10 | 2245 | Large Games III | 3 |
| 43 | July 13, 2008 15:25-17:10 | 101 | Investment and Research | 4 |
| 44 | July 13, 2008 15:25-17:10 | 276 | Applications and Matching theory | 3 |
| 45 | July 13, 2008 15:25-17:10 | G27 | Mechanism Design VIII | 4 |
| 46 | July 13, 2008 15:25-17:10 | G36 | Allocation Rules | 4 |
| 47 | July 13, 2008 15:25-17:10 | G45 | Information and adverse selection | 4 |
| 48 | July 13, 2008 17:30-18:30 | Coon Forum | Plenary - Presidential Address: Peyton Young | 0 |
| 49 | July 14, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G45 | IO and Markets | 4 |
| 50 | July 14, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G40 | Dynamics, learning and memory | 4 |
| 51 | July 14, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G36 | Awareness I | 4 |
| 52 | July 14, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G27 | Networks II: Formation | 4 |
| 53 | July 14, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G03 | Auctions | 3 |
| 54 | July 14, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 101 | Repeated Games | 4 |
| 55 | July 14, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G43 | Discrete matching models | 4 |
| 56 | July 14, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G05 | Mechanism Design IV | 4 |
| 57 | July 14, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 2245 | Game Theory | 4 |
| 58 | July 14, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G44 | Game Experiments II | 4 |
| 59 | July 14, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 1246 | Voting with Incomplete Information | 4 |
| 60 | July 14, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 160 | Strategic Communication I | 4 |
| 61 | July 14, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 276 | Strategy-Proofness | 4 |
| 62 | July 14, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G42 | Coalitional games, monotonicity, and social welfare | 4 |
| 63 | July 14, 2008 10:45-12:15 | Norris 202 | Semi-Plenary B2 | 2 |
| 64 | July 14, 2008 10:45-12:15 | Norris McKormick | Semi-Plenary B1 | 2 |
| 65 | July 14, 2008 10:45-12:15 | Norris 101 | Semi-Plenary B3 | 2 |
| 66 | July 14, 2008 10:45-12:15 | Jacobs G40 | Semi-Plenary B4 | 2 |
| 67 | July 14, 2008 13:30-14:45 | Coon Forum | Plenary - 2005 and 2007 Nobel Prize Panel: Robert Aumann, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson and Thomas Schelling | 0 |
| 68 | July 14, 2008 15:15-17:00 | 276 | The Dynamics of Information | 4 |
| 69 | July 14, 2008 15:15-17:00 | 1246 | Theoretical Industrial Organization | 4 |
| 70 | July 14, 2008 15:15-17:00 | G03 | Auction Experiments | 4 |
| 71 | July 14, 2008 15:15-17:00 | 2245 | Culture, Persona, and Self-Sorting in Equilibria | 3 |
| 72 | July 14, 2008 15:15-17:00 | G27 | Mechanism Design II | 4 |
| 73 | July 14, 2008 15:15-17:00 | G43 | Dynamic and Stochastic Games II | 4 |
| 74 | July 14, 2008 15:15-17:00 | G45 | Power and public goods | 3 |
| 75 | July 14, 2008 15:15-17:00 | 101 | Repeated Game Experiments | 4 |
| 76 | July 14, 2008 15:15-17:00 | G40 | Markets and Competition | 3 |
| 77 | July 14, 2008 15:15-17:00 | G42 | Coalitional Games | 3 |
| 78 | July 14, 2008 15:15-17:00 | 160 | The Belief Space | 4 |
| 79 | July 14, 2008 15:15-17:00 | G36 | Networks III: Formation | 4 |
| 80 | July 14, 2008 15:15-17:00 | G44 | Labor Markets | 4 |
| 81 | July 14, 2008 15:15-17:00 | G05 | Deliberation, Information, and Voting | 4 |
| 82 | July 14, 2008 17:30-18:30 | Coon Forum | Plenary - President-Elect Address: Sergiu Hart | 0 |
| 83 | July 15, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 276 | Strategic Communication IV | 4 |
| 84 | July 15, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G45 | Matching and Assignments | 3 |
| 85 | July 15, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G40 | Decision Theory and Preferences | 4 |
| 86 | July 15, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 2245 | Theory | 4 |
| 87 | July 15, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G36 | Assignment game and extensions | 4 |
| 88 | July 15, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G42 | Coalition structures | 4 |
| 89 | July 15, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G05 | Mechanism Design III | 4 |
| 90 | July 15, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 160 | Social Preferences and Institutions I | 4 |
| 91 | July 15, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 1246 | Values of cooperative games | 3 |
| 92 | July 15, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G03 | Auctions and Mechanism Design | 4 |
| 93 | July 15, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G44 | Industrial Organization II | 4 |
| 94 | July 15, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 101 | Public Goods and Taxation | 4 |
| 95 | July 15, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G43 | Dynamic and Stochastic Games I | 4 |
| 96 | July 15, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G27 | Networks IX | 3 |
| 97 | July 15, 2008 10:45-12:15 | Norris 202 | Semi-Plenary C2 | 2 |
| 98 | July 15, 2008 10:45-12:15 | Norris 101 | Semi-Plenary C3 | 2 |
| 99 | July 15, 2008 10:45-12:15 | Jacobs G40 | Semi-Plenary C4 | 2 |
| 100 | July 15, 2008 10:45-12:15 | Norris McKormick | Semi-Plenary C1 | 2 |
| 101 | July 15, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 5 |
| 102 | July 15, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 5 |
| 103 | July 15, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 4 |
| 104 | July 15, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 4 |
| 105 | July 15, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 3 |
| 106 | July 15, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 5 |
| 107 | July 15, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 4 |
| 108 | July 15, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 4 |
| 109 | July 15, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 5 |
| 110 | July 15, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 3 |
| 111 | July 15, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 1 |
| 112 | July 15, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 3 |
| 113 | July 15, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 5 |
| 114 | July 15, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 5 |
| 115 | July 15, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G43 | Dynamic Games | 4 |
| 116 | July 15, 2008 15:00-16:45 | 160 | Stable strategy sets | 4 |
| 117 | July 15, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G45 | Politics and conflict | 4 |
| 118 | July 15, 2008 15:00-16:45 | 276 | Stochastic Games | 4 |
| 119 | July 15, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G40 | Cost-Sharing Mechanisms | 4 |
| 120 | July 15, 2008 15:00-16:45 | 101 | Social Preferences and Institutions II | 3 |
| 121 | July 15, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G27 | Networks V: Communication and Beliefs | 4 |
| 122 | July 15, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G44 | Industrial Organization | 3 |
| 123 | July 15, 2008 15:00-16:45 | 1246 | Strategic Communication II | 4 |
| 124 | July 15, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G36 | Biology and Economics | 4 |
| 125 | July 15, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G05 | Mechanism Design I | 4 |
| 126 | July 15, 2008 15:00-16:45 | 2245 | Theory I | 4 |
| 127 | July 15, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G42 | Decision Procedures | 4 |
| 128 | July 15, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G03 | Auctions IV | 4 |
| 129 | July 15, 2008 17:00-18:00 | Coon Forum | Plenary - Morgenstern Lecture: Jean Tirole | 0 |
| 130 | July 16, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G03 | Auctions V | 4 |
| 131 | July 16, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 1246 | Repeated Games | 3 |
| 132 | July 16, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G42 | Core and nucleolus | 4 |
| 133 | July 16, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G45 | Electoral Competition 1 | 3 |
| 134 | July 16, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G44 | Dynamics and convexity | 4 |
| 135 | July 16, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 2245 | TU Coalitional Games | 3 |
| 136 | July 16, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G43 | Cost Sharing | 4 |
| 137 | July 16, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 101 | Endogenous Participation | 3 |
| 138 | July 16, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 276 | Politics and information | 4 |
| 139 | July 16, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G27 | Networks VI: Games | 4 |
| 140 | July 16, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G40 | Behavioral Theory II | 2 |
| 141 | July 16, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G05 | Mechanism Design IX | 3 |
| 142 | July 16, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 160 | Equilibrim Concepts | 4 |
| 143 | July 16, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G36 | Bargaining I | 4 |
| 144 | July 16, 2008 10:45-12:15 | Norris McKormick | Semi-Plenary D1 | 2 |
| 145 | July 16, 2008 10:45-12:15 | Norris 101 | Semi-Plenary D3 | 2 |
| 146 | July 16, 2008 10:45-12:15 | Jacobs G40 | Semi-Plenary D4 | 2 |
| 147 | July 16, 2008 10:45-12:15 | Norris 202 | Semi-Plenary D2 | 1 |
| 148 | July 16, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 5 |
| 149 | July 16, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 4 |
| 150 | July 16, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 2 |
| 151 | July 16, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 4 |
| 152 | July 16, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 4 |
| 153 | July 16, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 4 |
| 154 | July 16, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 2 |
| 155 | July 16, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 4 |
| 156 | July 16, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 4 |
| 157 | July 16, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 2 |
| 158 | July 16, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 4 |
| 159 | July 16, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 4 |
| 160 | July 16, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 5 |
| 161 | July 16, 2008 13:45-15:00 | poster | poster | 3 |
| 162 | July 16, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G05 | Multi-Unit Auctions | 3 |
| 163 | July 16, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G36 | Contracts and Tournament Theory | 4 |
| 164 | July 16, 2008 15:00-16:45 | 1246 | Resale in Auctions | 4 |
| 165 | July 16, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G42 | Bargaining II | 4 |
| 166 | July 16, 2008 15:00-16:45 | 2245 | Politics, Governments and Policies | 4 |
| 167 | July 16, 2008 15:00-16:45 | 160 | Evolution and Learning | 4 |
| 168 | July 16, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G40 | Behavioral Models of Intertemporal Choice | 4 |
| 169 | July 16, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G44 | Cooperative Theory and Applications | 4 |
| 170 | July 16, 2008 15:00-16:45 | 276 | Implementation I | 3 |
| 171 | July 16, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G03 | Mechanism Design V | 3 |
| 172 | July 16, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G27 | Networks VII: Bargaining and Allocations | 4 |
| 173 | July 16, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G43 | Communication and games | 4 |
| 174 | July 16, 2008 15:00-16:45 | G45 | Electoral Competition 2 | 4 |
| 175 | July 16, 2008 15:00-16:45 | 101 | Equilibrium Computation | 4 |
| 176 | July 16, 2008 17:15-18:15 | Coon Forum | Plenary - von Neumann Lecture: Abraham Neyman | 0 |
| 177 | July 17, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G43 | Common Value Auctions | 4 |
| 178 | July 17, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 2245 | Implementation | 3 |
| 179 | July 17, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G42 | College admissions approaches | 3 |
| 180 | July 17, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G44 | Existence of Equilibrium | 3 |
| 181 | July 17, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 1246 | Group Formation and Bargaining | 4 |
| 182 | July 17, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 160 | Games and Computing | 3 |
| 183 | July 17, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G05 | Networks VIII | 4 |
| 184 | July 17, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G03 | Resource Allocation and Mechanisms | 4 |
| 185 | July 17, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 101 | Fair Division and Claims | 3 |
| 186 | July 17, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G36 | Collective Choice | 4 |
| 187 | July 17, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G45 | Experimental and behavioral models | 3 |
| 188 | July 17, 2008 8:30-10:15 | 276 | Gerrymandering and Immigration | 4 |
| 189 | July 17, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G27 | Bargaining III | 4 |
| 190 | July 17, 2008 8:30-10:15 | G40 | Behavioral Game Theory and Experiments | 4 |
| 191 | July 17, 2008 10:45-11:45 | Coon Forum | Plenary - Shapley Lecture: Tim Roughgarden | 0 |
| 192 | July 17, 2008 12:00-13:20 | G45 | Incomplete Information | 2 |
| 193 | July 17, 2008 12:00-13:20 | G36 | Beliefs and Behavior | 3 |
| 194 | July 17, 2008 12:00-13:20 | G44 | Global Games | 3 |
| 195 | July 17, 2008 12:00-13:20 | G27 | Bargaining | 3 |
| 196 | July 17, 2008 12:00-13:20 | 160 | Auctions and Markets | 3 |
| 197 | July 17, 2008 12:00-13:20 | G43 | Learning | 2 |
| 198 | July 17, 2008 12:00-13:20 | G03 | Imperfect monitoring | 3 |
| 199 | July 17, 2008 12:00-13:20 | 276 | Population dynamics | 3 |
| 200 | July 17, 2008 12:00-13:20 | G42 | Fairness and Allocations | 3 |
| 201 | July 17, 2008 12:00-13:20 | 101 | Segregation | 3 |
| 202 | July 17, 2008 12:00-13:20 | G40 | Incentives II | 2 |
| 203 | July 17, 2008 12:00-13:20 | 1246 | Imitation and Adjustment | 3 |
203 sessions, 668 papers |
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World Congress of the Game Theory Society |
|---|
Complete List of All Sessions |
Session 1: Behavioral Theory I |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 9:50 |
| Location: G45 |
| Dynamic Psychological Games |
| JEL codes: C72, C73 |
| By Pierpaolo Battigalli, Bocconi University Martin Dufwenberg, University of Arizona |
| Presented by: Martin Dufwenberg, University of Arizona |
| Doubts and Equilibria |
| By Antonio Cabrales Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Madrid 126 , 28903 Getafe, SPAIN José Ramón Uriarte Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I-Ekonomi Analisiaren Oinarriak I Saila. Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre, 83. 48015 Bilbao, Basque Country-Spain. |
| Presented by: Jose Uriarte, University of the Basque Country |
| The Ultimatum Game: Interdependent Preferences in Experimental Setting |
| By Yoram Halevy, University of British Columbia Michael Peters, University of British Columbia |
| Presented by: Yoram Halevy, University of British Columbia |
Session 2: Bounded Rationality I |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 9:50 |
| Location: G40 |
| Plans as Conditional Strategies: A New Concept Enabling Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma |
| JEL codes: C72 C70 D83 |
| By Alexander Dilger, University of Münster |
| Presented by: ALEXANDER DILGER, UNIVERSITY OF MUENSTER |
| Strategic Complexity in Repeated Extensive Games |
| By Nozomu Muto, Hitotsubashi University |
| Presented by: Nozomu Muto, Hitotsubashi University |
| Skill in Poker |
| By Ruud Hendrickx, Tilburg University Pim Hilbers, Tilburg University Peter Borm, Tilburg University Ben van der Genugten, Tilburg University |
| Presented by: Ruud Hendrickx, Tilburg University |
Session 3: Updating |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 9:50 |
| Location: G27 |
| Updating Toward the Signal |
| JEL codes: C02, D82, D83 |
| By Christopher P. Chambers, Caltech Paul J. Healy, Ohio State |
| Presented by: Paul Healy, The Ohio State University |
| Updating Ambiguity Averse Preferences |
| By Eran Hanany, Tel Aviv University Peter Klibanoff, Northwestern University |
| Presented by: Eran Hanany, Tel Aviv University |
| Expected Utility Theory from a Frequentist Perspective |
| By Tai-Wei Hu, The Pennsylvania State University |
| Presented by: Tai-Wei Hu, Pennsylvania State University |
Session 4: Roommate and Marriage models |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 9:50 |
| Location: G05 |
| PARETO-STABILITY CONCEPT: A NATURAL SOLUTION CONCEPT FOR THE ROOMMATE AND THE MARRIAGE MODELS |
| JEL codes: C78, D78 |
| By MARILDA SOTOMAYOR Universidade de São Paulo Department of Economics, , Cidade Universitária, Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto 908, 05508-900, São Paulo, SP, Brazil Brown University Department of Economics, 64 Waterman Street, Providence, RI, USA e-mail: marildas@usp.br |
| Presented by: Marilda Sotomayor, |
| The Roommates Problem Revisited |
| By Thayer Morrill, University of Maryland |
| Presented by: Thayer Morrill, University of Maryland |
Session 5: Learning and Groups |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 9:50 |
| Location: G43 |
| Aggregate Uncertainty Can Lead to Herds |
| JEL codes: C72 / C79 / D83 |
| By Ignacio Monzon, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison |
| Presented by: Ignacio Monzon, University of Wisconsin-Madison |
| MONOTONE IMITATION |
| By Carlos Oyarzun, Universidad de Alicante Johannes Ruf, Columbia University |
| Presented by: Carlos Oyarzun, Universidad de Alicante |
| Can Good Policies be Found? Repeated Elections, Learning and Policy Dynamics |
| By Steven Callander, Northwestern University |
| Presented by: Steven Callander, Northwestern University |
Session 6: Consensus and Agreement |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 9:50 |
| Location: 160 |
| Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case |
| JEL codes: D70, D80 |
| By Dov Samet, Tel Aviv University |
| Presented by: Dov Samet, Tel Aviv University |
| Qualitative multiple outcomes games with consensus |
| By Ramzi Ben Larbi, CRIL - Université d'Artois, France Sébastien Konieczny, CRIL - CNRS, France Pierre Marquis, CRIL - Université d'Artois, France |
| Presented by: Sébastien Konieczny, CNRS |
| Knowing who speaks when: A note on communication, common knowledge and consensus |
| By Elias Tsakas Goteborg University Mark Voorneveld Tilburg University and Stockholm School of Economics |
| Presented by: Elias Tsakas, Goteborg University |
Session 7: Awareness II |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 9:50 |
| Location: 101 |
| Unawareness and Strategic Announcements in Games with Uncertainty |
| JEL codes: C70, D83 |
| By Erkut Y. Ozbay, University of Maryland |
| Presented by: Erkut Ozbay, University of Maryland |
| Unawareness, Beliefs, Games and Speculation |
| By Aviad Heifetz, The Open University of Israel Martin Meier, Instituto de Analisis Economico Burkhard C. Schipper, University of California Davis |
| Presented by: Burkhard Schipper, University of California, Davis |
| Incentives for Unaware Agents |
| By Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Universitat Mannheim Xiaojian´Zhao, Universitat Mannheim |
| Presented by: Xiaojian Zhao, University of Mannheim |
Session 8: Beliefs and Incomplete Information |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 9:50 |
| Location: 2245 |
| Optimism and Pessimism: Subjective Beliefs in Incomplete Information Games |
| JEL codes: C72, D83 |
| By Alex Possajennikov, University of Nottingham |
| Presented by: Alex Possajennikov, University of Nottingham |
| On the Strategic Impact of an Event under Non-Common Priors |
| By Daisuke Oyama, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University Olivier Tercieux, Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE) and CNRS |
| Presented by: Daisuke Oyama, Hitotsubashi University |
| Evaluating information in zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides |
| By Bernard de Meyer Universit\'e Paris 1 Ehud Lehrer School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Israel; Dinah Rosenberg LAGA Institut Galil\'ee, Universit\'e Paris 13, and Laboratoire d'Econom\'etrie de l'Ecole Polytechnique, Paris France |
| Presented by: Dinah Rosenberg, Universite Paris 13 |
Session 9: Bargaining and Applications |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 9:50 |
| Location: 276 |
| Bargaining Outcomes of Patent Licensing in a Cournot Oligopoly Market |
| JEL codes: D45, D43, C71 |
| By Shin Kishimoto, Tokyo Institute of Technology Naoki Watanabe, University of Tsukuba Shigeo Muto, Tokyo Institute of Technology |
| Presented by: Shin Kishimoto, Tokyo Institute of Technology |
| WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions for non-convex bargaining problems |
| By Hans Peters, University Maastricht Dries Vermeulen, University Maastricht |
| Presented by: Dries Vermeulen, University Maastricht |
| Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Environments with Lotteries |
| By Geoffroy de Clippel, Brown University |
| Presented by: Geoffroy de Clippel, Brown University |
Session 10: Implementation II |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 9:50 |
| Location: G44 |
| Fixed Points of Choice-Improving Correspondences on the Space of Direct Mechanisms and Implementability |
| JEL codes: C79, D71 |
| By Fernando Tohmé, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Nacional del Sur and CONICET, Bahía Blanca, Argentina. Marcelo Auday, Centro de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia and Departamento de Humanidades, Universidad Nacional del Sur, Bahía Blanca, Argentina. |
| Presented by: Fernando Tohme, Universidad Nacional del Sur |
| Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: A Generalized Bidding Approach |
| By Yuan Ju, University of York, UK David Wettstein, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel |
| Presented by: David Wettstein, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev |
| Implementation, dominance and non-bossyness |
| By Dolors Berga Universitat de Girona Bernardo Moreno Universidad de Málaga |
| Presented by: Bernardo Moreno, Universidad de Malaga |
Session 11: Lobbying |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 9:50 |
| Location: 1246 |
| Trading for the Future: Signalling in Permit Markets |
| JEL codes: H23, Q58, P48 |
| By Bard Harstad, MEDS |
| Presented by: Bard Harstad, Kellogg School of Management |
| Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access |
| By Christopher Cotton, Cornell Univ |
| Presented by: Christopher Cotton, Cornell University |
| Polarization and the Power of Lobbyists |
| By John William Hat eld |
| Presented by: John Hatfield, Graduate School of Business |
Session 12: Fair Division |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 9:50 |
| Location: G42 |
| Cutting a Pie is Not a Piece of Cake |
| JEL codes: C72, D61, D74 |
| By Julius B. Barbanel, Union College Steven J. Brams, New York University Walter Stromquist, Swarthmore College (presenter) |
| Presented by: Walter Stromquist, Swarthmore College |
| Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Procedure |
| By Steven J. Brams, New York University Michael A. Jones, Montclair State University Christian Klamler, Graz University |
| Presented by: Steven Brams, New York University |
| Cooperative games in fair division |
| By Marco Dall'Aglio, University "G. d'Annunzio" of Chieti-Pescara, Italy Rodica Branzei, University "Alexandru Ioan Cuza", Iasi, Romania Stef Tijs, Tilburg University, The Netherlands |
| Presented by: Marco Dall'Aglio, University of Chieti-Pescara |
Session 13: Dynamics, Objective Functions, and Games |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 9:50 |
| Location: G36 |
| The Logit-Response Dynamics |
| JEL codes: C72, D83 |
| By Carlos Alos-Ferrer, University of Konstanz Nick Netzer, University of Konstanz |
| Presented by: Carlos Alos-Ferrer, University of Konstanz |
| Using Game Theory for Distributed Control Engineering |
| By Anders Rantzer Automatic Control LTH, Lund University, Sweden |
| Presented by: Anders Rantzer, Lund University |
| Regret Minimization and the Price of Total Anarchy |
| By Avrim Blum, Carnegie Mellon University MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, AT&T Katrina Ligett, Carnegie Mellon University Aaron Roth, Carnegie Mellon University |
| Presented by: Aaron Roth, Carnegie Mellon University |
Session 14: Large Games I |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 9:50 |
| Location: G03 |
| On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players |
| JEL codes: C72 |
| By Edward Cartwright, University of Kent, Myrna Wooders, Vanderbilt University |
| Presented by: Edward Cartwright, University of Kent |
| large games and the law of large numbers |
| By nabil al-najjar |
| Presented by: Nabil Al-Najjar, Northwestern University |
| Partial Exposure in Large Games |
| By Ronen Gradwohl, Weizmann Institute of Science Omer Reingold, Weizmann Institute of Science |
| Presented by: Ronen Gradwohl, Weizmann Institute of Science |
Session 15: Welcome Remarks and Game Theory and Computer Science Prize Announcement |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 10:00 - 10:30 |
| Location: Coon Forum |
Session 16: Networks IV |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 11:00 - 12:20 |
| Location: G42 |
| Heterogeneity and Link Imperfections in Nash Networks |
| JEL codes: C72, D85 |
| By Pascal Billand, Université de Saint-Etienne, Creuset. Christophe Bravard, Université de Saint-Etienne, Creuset. Sudipta Sarang, Department of Economics, Virginia Tech and Louisiana State University. |
| Presented by: BRAVARD Christophe, University of Saint-Etienne |
| Strategic Communication Networks |
| By Jeanne Hagenbach, University of Paris 1 Frederic Koessler, Paris School of Economics |
| Presented by: Frederic Koessler, Paris School of Economics, CNRS |
| Complementarities, Group Formation and Preferences for Similarity |
| By Marcin Peski, University of Chicago |
| Presented by: Marcin Peski, Economics |
Session 17: Bounded complexity |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 11:00 - 12:20 |
| Location: G43 |
| Playing off-line games with bounded rationality |
| JEL codes: C72, C73 |
| By Jerome Renault, Universite Paris Dauphine Marco Scarsini, LUISS Rome and HEC, Paris Tristan Tomala, HEC Paris |
| Presented by: Marco Scarsini, LUISS |
| The Strategic Value of Recall |
| By Ron Peretz, The Hebrew University |
| Presented by: Ron Peretz, The Hebrew University |
| Should I remember more than you? - On the best response to bounded recall strategies |
| By Rene Levinsky Max Planck Institute for Economics, jena, Germany Miroslav Zeleny Faculty of Mathematics and Physics, Charles University, Praha, Czech Republic |
| Presented by: Rene Levinsky, Max Planck Institute of Economics |
Session 18: War |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 11:00 - 12:20 |
| Location: G45 |
| After the War: An experimental study of post-conflict behavior |
| JEL codes: C92, |
| By Juan A. Lacomba, University of Granada Francisco M. Lagos, University of Granada Ernesto Reuben, Northwestern University Frans van Winden, University of Amsterdam |
| Presented by: Ernesto Reuben, Northwestern University |
| PEACE AGREEMENTS WITHOUT COMMITMENT |
| By Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona |
| Presented by: Carmen Beviá, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| A Dynamic Theory of War Initiation and Termination |
| By Department of Political Science, University of Rochester |
| Presented by: Yoji Sekiya, University of Rochester |
Session 19: Political Competition and Dynamics |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 11:00 - 12:20 |
| Location: G05 |
| Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition games: The hybrid case |
| JEL codes: C72, D72, D78 |
| By Wallis Institute of Political Economy, University of Rochester |
| Presented by: Alejandro Saporiti, University of Rochester |
| On the General Existence of Party-Unanimity Nash Equilibria in Multi-dimensional Political Competition Games |
| By Naoki Yoshihara The Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Naka 2-1, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-0004, Japan. |
| Presented by: Naoki Yoshihara, Yale University |
| Fiscal Policy over the Real Business Cycle: A Positive Theory |
| By Marco Battaglini Princeton University Stephen Coate Cornell University |
| Presented by: Marco Battaglini, Princeton University |
Session 20: Experiments and Methods |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 11:00 - 12:20 |
| Location: G44 |
| Exact Hypothesis Tests for Experimental Game Theory |
| JEL codes: C14, C81, C90 |
| By Karl H. Schlag, Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
| Presented by: Karl Schlag, Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
| Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games |
| By Ronald Peeters, Department of Economics, Maastricht University, The Netherlands Marc Vorsatz, Department of Economics, Maastricht University, The Netherlands Markus Walzl, Department of Economics, Maastricht University, The Netherlands |
| Presented by: Ronald Peeters, Universiteit Maastricht |
| Predicing the Outcome of a Game |
| By David H. Wolpert NASA Ames Research Center MS 269-1 Moffett Field, CA 94035 |
| Presented by: David Wolpert, NASA Ames Research Center |
Session 21: Mechanism Design VI |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 11:00 - 12:20 |
| Location: G36 |
| Mechanism Design in Highly Anonymous Environments |
| JEL codes: C72,D71,D44,D89 |
| By Vincent Conitzer, Duke University Liad Wagman, Duke University |
| Presented by: Vincent Conitzer, Duke University |
| A mechanism for solving bargaining problems using risk aversion |
| By Sylvie Thoron, GREQAM, Marseille Emily Tanimura, GREQAM, CAMS see also joint pdf |
| Presented by: Emily Tanimura, Ecole des Hautes Etudes de Sciences Soci |
Session 22: Strategy-Proofness |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 11:00 - 12:20 |
| Location: 160 |
| Efficiency, Fairness, and Strategy-proofness in Queueing Problems: Characterizations and Impossibility |
| JEL codes: D63, C72 |
| By Cagatay Kayi, Maastricht University Eve Ramaekers, Université catholique de Louvain and CORE |
| Presented by: Cagatay Kayi, Maastricht University |
| Strategy-proofness and Equal-cost Sharing for Excludable Public Goods |
| By Jordi Masso, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Antonio Nicolo', Università degli Studi di Padova Arunava Sen, Indian Statistical Institute |
| Presented by: Antonio Nicolo, University of Padua |
| Exchanging objects under trade restrictions |
| By Jorge L. Garcia, University of Rochester. |
| Presented by: Jorge Garcia Ramirez, University of Rochester |
Session 23: Incentives |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 11:00 - 12:20 |
| Location: G27 |
| Strategic Asset Allocation With Relative Performance Concerns |
| JEL codes: C73, C61, D81 |
| By Suleyman Basak, London Business School and CEPR Dmitry Makarov, New Economic School |
| Presented by: Dmitry Makarov, New Economic School |
| We Can't Argue Forever - But We Should Do So As Long As Possible |
| By Katalin Bognar, University of Michigan Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, UCLA Lones Smith, University of Michigan |
| Presented by: Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, UCLA |
| Ratings as Incentives |
| By Dan Simundza, University of Michigan Lones Smith, University of Michigan |
| Presented by: Dan Simundza, University of Michigan |
Session 24: Learning, communication, coordination. |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 11:00 - 12:20 |
| Location: G40 |
| Communication with Unobservable Constraints |
| JEL codes: C73,D82,D83 |
| By Ilya Khayutin, Institute of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. |
| Presented by: Ilya Khayutin, Hebrew University |
| Strategic Information Transmission through the Media |
| By Hanjoon Michael Jung, Lahore University of Management Sciences |
| Presented by: Hanjoon Jung, Lahore University of Management Sciences |
| Social Learning in Two-Armed Bandit Problems |
| By Braz Camargo University of Western Ontario |
| Presented by: Braz Camargo, University of Western Ontario |
Session 25: Algorithms and Games |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 11:00 - 12:20 |
| Location: 1246 |
| Game-theory-based approaches to full-scale Heads-Up Texas Hold'em poker: Automated abstraction and scalable equilibrium-finding algorithms |
| JEL codes: C63, C72, C61 |
| By Presenting author: Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University Co-Authors: Andrew Gilpin, Carnegie Mellon University Troels Bjerre Sørensen, Carnegie Mellon University Samid Hoda, Carnegie Mellon University Javier Peña, Carnegie Mellon University |
| Presented by: Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University |
| Knowledge and Structure in Social Algorithms |
| By Rohit Parikh City University of New York |
| Presented by: Rohit Parikh, City University of New York |
| Congestion, Coordination and Matching |
| By Maisa Halko Helsinki School of Economics Hannu Salonen University of Turku |
| Presented by: Hannu Salonen, University of Turku |
Session 26: Strategic Communication III |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 11:00 - 12:20 |
| Location: 101 |
| Strategic Argumentation |
| JEL codes: D |
| By Wioletta Dziuda, MEDS, Kellogg School of Management |
| Presented by: Wioletta Dziuda, Kellogg School of Management |
| Incomplete Language as an Incentive Device |
| By Peter Eso, Kellogg MEDS, Northwestern University Dezso Szalay, University of Warwick |
| Presented by: Peter Eso, Kellogg School, Northwestern University |
| Disagreement and Evidence Production in Pure Communication Games |
| By Peter Eso, Kellogg School of Management, MEDS Adam Galambos, Lawrence University, Dept. of Economics |
| Presented by: Adam Galambos, Lawrence University |
Session 27: Large Games II |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 11:00 - 12:20 |
| Location: G03 |
| Thinking Categorically About Others: A Conjectural Equilibrium Approach |
| JEL codes: C72, |
| By Yaron Azrieli, Tel-Aviv University |
| Presented by: Yaron Azrieli, Tel-Aviv University |
| On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Large Games |
| By Guilherme Carmona, Universidade Nova de Lisboa Konrad Podczeck, Universitat Wien |
| Presented by: Guilherme Carmona, Universidade Nova de Lisboa |
| Robustness in Large Non-Anonymous Games |
| By Ehud Kalai, MEDS, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University Joyee Deb, MEDS, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University |
| Presented by: Joyee Deb, Kellogg School of Management |
Session 28: Rationalizability |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 11:00 - 12:20 |
| Location: 276 |
| Rationalizability in Games with a Continuum of Players |
| JEL codes: D84, C72, C62 |
| By Pedro Jara-Moroni Departamento de Ingeniería Matemática (DIM), Universidad de Chile. Paris School of Economics (PSE). |
| Presented by: Pedro Jara-Moroni, Paris School of Economics and Universidad de Chile |
| Bayesian Coalitional Rationalizability |
| By Xiao Luo, Academia Sinica & National University of Singapore Chih-Chun Yang, University of Rochester |
| Presented by: Xiao Luo, Academia Sinica |
| Common p-belief and Knightian uncertainty |
| By Jayant V Ganguli, Cornell University |
| Presented by: Jayant Ganguli, Cornell University |
Session 29: Semi-Plenary A5 |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 13:45 - 14:30 |
| Location: 1246 |
| Auctions with Budget Limits |
| JEL codes: c7 |
| By semi-plenary |
| Presented by: Noam Nisan, The Hebrew University |
| Game Theory and Computer Science Prize lecture: The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium |
| By Paul Goldberg |
| Presented by: Paul Goldberg, |
Session 30: Semi-Plenary A2 |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 13:45 - 15:15 |
| Location: Norris 202 |
| Ambiguity and Rationality: Objective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model |
| JEL codes: c7 |
| By David Schmeidler, I. Gilboa F. Maccheroni M. Marinacci |
| Presented by: David Schmeidler, Tel Aviv University and the Ohio State University |
| Belief Free Games on Incomplet Information |
| By semi-plenary |
| Presented by: Dirk Bergemann, Yale University |
Session 31: Semi-Plenary A3 |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 13:45 - 15:15 |
| Location: Norris 101 |
| Why do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions? |
| JEL codes: c7 |
| By semi-plenary |
| Presented by: PAUL KLEMPERER, NUFFIELD COLLEGE |
| Manipulative Auction Design |
| By semi-plenary |
| Presented by: Philippe Jehiel, PSE |
Session 32: Semi-Plenary A4 |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 13:45 - 15:15 |
| Location: Jacobs G40 |
| Altruistic Kidney Exchange |
| JEL codes: c7 |
| By semi-plenary |
| Presented by: Tayfun Sonmez, |
| One Chance in a Million: Altruism and the Bone Marrow Registry |
| By semi-plenary |
| Presented by: Ted Bergstrom, University of California at Santa Barbar |
Session 33: Semi-Plenary A1 |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 13:45 - 15:15 |
| Location: Norris McKormick |
| Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions and Clubs |
| JEL codes: c7 |
| By semi-plenary |
| Presented by: Daron Acemoglu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| Models of Values Conflict |
| By semi-plenary |
| Presented by: Timothy Feddersen, Northwestern Universuty |
Session 34: Ambiguity and Risk |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 15:25 - 17:10 |
| Location: G40 |
| Ambiguity, Dynamic Consistency and Behavioral Phenomena |
| JEL codes: D81, D83, D90 |
| By Sandeep Baliga, Northwestern University Eran Hanany, Tel Aviv University Peter Klibanoff, Northwestern University |
| Presented by: Peter Klibanoff, Northwestern University |
| Buying and selling price for a lottery and operational measure of riskiness |
| By Michal Lewandowski, European University Institute, Florence, Italy |
| Presented by: Michal Lewandowski, European University Institute |
| Vector Expected Utility and Attitudes toward Variation |
| By Marciano Siniscalchi Economics Department, Northwestern University |
| Presented by: Marciano Siniscalchi, Northwestern University |
| The induced capacity and Choquet integral monotone convergence |
| By Roee Teper, Tel Aviv university |
| Presented by: Roee Teper, Tel Aviv University |
Session 35: Legislative Bargaining |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 15:25 - 17:10 |
| Location: 160 |
| Efficient and stable majority rules for one-dimensional collective choices |
| JEL codes: D71, D72, |
| By Daniel Cardona, Universitat de les Illes Balears Clara Ponsati, IAE-CSIC, Barcelona |
| Presented by: Clara Ponsati, Institut d'Analisi Economica - CSIC |
| Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in legislatures |
| By Maria Montero, University of Nottingham Juan J. Vidal-Puga, University of Vigo |
| Presented by: Maria Montero, University of Nottingham |
| Proposals vs.\ Demands in Coalitional Bargaining: A Comparison |
| By Yves Breitmoser, EUV Frankfurt (Oder), Germany |
| Presented by: Yves Breitmoser, Europa-Universität Viadrina |
Session 36: Networks I: Learning |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 15:25 - 17:10 |
| Location: G42 |
| Bayesian Learning in Networks |
| JEL codes: D83 |
| By Daron Acemoglu, MIT Munther Dahleh, MIT Ilan Lobel, MIT Asuman Ozdaglar, MIT |
| Presented by: Ilan Lobel, MIT |
| Rule of Thumb Learning in Networks |
| By Daron Acemoglu, Department of Economics, MIT; Angelia Nedic, Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, UIUC; Asuman Ozdaglar, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, MIT |
| Presented by: Asu Ozdaglar, MIT |
| Naive Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence, and the Wisdom of Crowds |
| By Benjamin Golub, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Matthew O. Jackson, Department of Economics, Stanford University |
| Presented by: Benjamin Golub, Caltech |
| Social Networks With(out) Influential Agents |
| By Lara Dolecek, MIT Devavrat Shah, MIT |
| Presented by: Lara Dolecek, MIT |
Session 37: Agency |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 15:25 - 17:10 |
| Location: G43 |
| Distributed Dynamic Reinforcement of Efficient Outcomes in Multiagent Coordination |
| JEL codes: D83, D85 |
| By Georgios C. Chasparis, University of California Los Angeles Jeff S. Shamma, Georgia Institute of Technology |
| Presented by: Georgios Chasparis, Univ. of California Los Angeles |
| On Correlation and Competition under Moral Hazard |
| By Columbia Business School & Ecole Polytechnique |
| Presented by: Pierre Fleckinger, Columbia U. & Ecole Polytechnique |
| News from the Informed Principal in Private-Value Environments |
| By Mylovanov, Timofiy, University of Bonn Troger, Thomas, University of Bonn |
| Presented by: Thomas Troger, University of Bonn |
| Contracts with Endogenous Information |
| By Dezso Szalay University of Warwick |
| Presented by: Dezso Szalay, University of Warwick |
Session 38: Uncertainty, Decisions, and Games |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 15:25 - 17:10 |
| Location: 1246 |
| Knightian Games and Robustness to Ambiguity |
| JEL codes: C72, D82 |
| By Ronald Stauber, Australian National University |
| Presented by: Ronald Stauber, Australian National University |
| Ranking Completely Uncertain Decisions by the Uniform Expected Utility Criterion |
| By Nicolas Gravel, IDEP-GREQAM, University of Aix-Marseille II Thierry Marchant, Ghent University Arunava Sen, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi |
| Presented by: Nicolas Gravel, IDEP-GREQAM, University Aix-Marseille II |
| When are Signals Complements or Substitutes? |
| By Tilman Borgers (University of Michigan) Angel Hernando-Veciana (Carlos III Madrid) Daniel Kraehmer (Freie Universitaet Berlin) |
| Presented by: Tilman Borgers, University of Michigan |
| Iterated Regret Minimization: Towards More Realistic Solution Concepts |
| By Joseph Halpern, Cornell University Rafael Pass, Cornell University |
| Presented by: Rafael Pass, Cornell University |
Session 39: Game Experiments I |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 15:25 - 17:10 |
| Location: G44 |
| Coordination in the Presence of Asset Markets |
| By Shimon Kogan, Carnegie Mellon University Anthony M. Kwasnica, Penn State University Roberto Weber, Carnegie Mellon University |
| Presented by: Anthony Kwasnica, Pennsylvania State University |
| Network Structure in a Link-formation Game: An Experimental Study |
| By Alexander Elbittar (CIDE) Rodrigo Harrison (PUC) Roberto Muñoz (USM) |
| Presented by: Alexander Elbittar, CIDE |
| Neural correlates of strategic thinking in medial prefrontal cortex |
| By Rosemarie Nagel Giorgio Coricelli |
| Presented by: Rosemarie Nagel, Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
Session 40: Auction and Market Experiments |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 15:25 - 17:10 |
| Location: G03 |
| Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply: Experimental Evidence |
| JEL codes: D44, C92 |
| By Damian S. Damianov, University of Texas-Pan American Jorg Oechssler, University of Heidelberg Johannes Becker, ETH Zurich |
| Presented by: Damian Damianov, University of Texas - Pan American |
| A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions |
| By J Philipp Reiss, Maastricht University Oliver Kirchkamp, University of Jena Karim Sadrieh, University of Magdeburg |
| Presented by: J. Philipp Reiss, Maastricht University |
| The Consequences of Competition for Contract Choice and Conduct: Experimental Evidence |
| By Simon Gächter, University of Nottingham Bettina Rockenbach, University of Erfurt Abdolkarim Sadrieh, University of Magdeburg |
| Presented by: Abdolkarim Sadrieh, University of Magdeburg |
| Selection in Markets for Risky and Ambiguous Prospects |
| By Martin G. Kocher, University of Munich Stefan T. Trautmann, University of Rotterdam |
| Presented by: Martin Kocher, University of Munich |
Session 41: Mechanism Design and Markets |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 15:25 - 17:10 |
| Location: G05 |
| Information-based trade |
| By Philip Bond, University of Pennsylvania Hulya Eraslan, University of Pennsylvania |
| Presented by: Philip Bond, University of Pennsylvania |
| A Strategic Model for Information Markets |
| By Evdokia Nikolova, MIT EECS Rahul Sami, University of Michigan |
| Presented by: Evdokia Nikolova, MIT |
Session 42: Large Games III |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 15:25 - 17:10 |
| Location: 2245 |
| A large market game with private information on both sides. |
| JEL codes: D52, C72, D82 |
| By Enrico Minelli, Università di Brescia, Italy. Martin Meier, IAE, Barcelona. |
| Presented by: Enrico Minelli, Università di Brescia |
| Informational Overhead of Incentive Compatibility |
| By Moshe Babaioff, Microsoft Research Liad Blumrosen, Microsoft Research Moni Naor, Weizmann Institute Michael Schapira, Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
| Presented by: Michael Schapira, Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
| Behavioral properties of correlated equilibrium in games with many players |
| By Edward Cartwright, University of Kent Myrna Wooders, Vanderbilt University |
| Presented by: Myrna Wooders, Vanderbilt University and Warwick |
Session 43: Investment and Research |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 15:25 - 17:10 |
| Location: 101 |
| Excess Returns of Companies with a Distinguished Player |
| JEL codes: D43, G32, C72 |
| By Matthias Blonski, J.W.Goethe University, Frankfurt Ulf v.Lilienfeld-Toal, J.W.Goethe University, Frankfurt |
| Presented by: Matthias Blonski, J.W.Goethe University Frankfurt |
| In or Out: University Research and Consulting |
| By Richard Jensen, University of Notre Dame Jerry Thursby, Georgia Institute of Technology Marie Thursby, Georgia Institute of Technology |
| Presented by: Richard Jensen, Notre Dame |
| The Economics of Investment in Clinical Trials |
| By Matthias Dahm Universitat Rovira i Virgili Paula González Universidad Pablo de Olavide Nicolás Porteiro Universidad Pablo de Olavide |
| Presented by: Matthias Dahm, Universitat Rovira i Virgili |
| Do firms interact strategically?: A structural model of the multi-stage investment timing game in offshore petroleum production |
| By C.-Y. Cynthia Lin, University of California at Davis |
| Presented by: C.-Y. Cynthia Lin, University of California at Davis |
Session 44: Applications and Matching theory |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 15:25 - 17:10 |
| Location: 276 |
| Codes of Best Practice in Competitive Markets |
| By Eduard Alonso-Paulí, Universidad Pablo de Olavide David Pérez-Castrillo, Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona |
| Presented by: David Perez-Castrillo, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona |
| Satiation and Inequality in Quasi-Competitive Markets |
| By Stefan Napel, University of Bayreuth, Germany Wendelin Schnedler, University of Heidelberg, Germany |
| Presented by: Stefan Napel, University of Bayreuth |
| The Blocking Lemma for a Many-to-one Matching Model |
| By Ruth Martínez, Universidad Nacional de San Luis, Argentina Jordi Massó, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, España Alejandro Neme, Universidad Nacional de San Luis y Conicet, Argentina Jorge Oviedo, Universidad Nacional de San Luis y Conicet, Argentina |
| Presented by: Jorge Oviedo, Universidad Nacional de San Luis |
Session 45: Mechanism Design VIII |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 15:25 - 17:10 |
| Location: G27 |
| Optimal Combinatorial Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values |
| JEL codes: D82 |
| By Levent Ulku, Rutgers University |
| Presented by: Levent Ulku, Rutgers University |
| R&D Project Selection - a Mechanism Design Approach |
| By Talia Bar, Cornell University Sidartha Gordon, University of Montreal |
| Presented by: Talia Bar, Cornell University |
| An Efficient Auction for Non Concave Valuations |
| By Junjik Bae, Northwestern University Eyal Beigman, Kellogg School of Management Randall Berry, Northwestern University Michael L. Honig, Northwestern University Rakesh Vohra, Kellogg School of Management |
| Presented by: Eyal Beigman, Northwestern University (KSM) |
| Beyond the Revelation Principle: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms |
| By Abraham Othman, Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University Tuomas Sandholm, Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University |
| Presented by: Abraham Othman, Carnegie Mellon University |
Session 46: Allocation Rules |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 15:25 - 17:10 |
| Location: G36 |
| Repeated allocation schemes for dynamic cost games: newsvendor inventory centralization with non-independent demands |
| JEL codes: C71, C73 |
| By Ana Meca, Operations Research Center, Universidad Miguel Hernández, Elche (Alicante), Spain. M. Dror, Management Information Systems, Eller College of Management, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona. L. A. Guardiola, Operations Research Center, Universidad Miguel Hernández, Elche, Spain. J. Puerto, Facultad de Matemáticas, Universidad de Sevilla, Spain. |
| Presented by: Ana Meca, University Miguel Hernandez of Elche |
| Bi-monotonic allocation rules for multi-choice clan games |
| By R. Branzei, Faculty of Computer Science, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University, Iasi, Romania N. Llorca, CIO and Department of Statistics, Mathematics and Computer Science, University Miguel Hernandez of Elche, Spain J. Sanchez-Soriano, CIO and Department of Statistics, Mathematics and Computer Science, University Miguel Hernandez of Elche, Spain S. Tijs, CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands |
| Presented by: Rodica Branzei, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University |
| Minimizing expected delay in a PERT network |
| By Leticia Lorenzo, Universidade de Vigo Javier Castro, Universidad Complutense de Madrid |
| Presented by: Leticia Lorenzo, Universidade de Vigo |
| A note on finding the Nucleolus of an n-Person cooperative game by a single linear program |
| By Justo Puerto Universidad de Sevilla (Spain) |
| Presented by: Justo Puerto, Universidad de Sevilla |
Session 47: Information and adverse selection |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 15:25 - 17:10 |
| Location: G45 |
| A Method to Solve a Class of Two-Dimensional Screening Problems |
| JEL codes: C72, D82 |
| By Raymond Deneckere, University of Wisconsin-Madsion Sergei Severinov, University of Essex and Yahoo! Research |
| Presented by: Sergei Severinov, University of Essex |
| Finding Neutral Optima in Informed Principal Problems with Common Values |
| By Dieter Balkenborg, University of Exeter Miltiadis Makris, University of Leceister |
| Presented by: Dieter Balkenborg, University of Exeter |
| Informed Auctioneer Problem |
| By Filippo Balestrieri MIT |
| Presented by: Filippo Balestrieri, MIT |
| Monotonicity and Implementability |
| By Dov Monderer Technion, Israel Institute of Technology |
| Presented by: Dov Monderer, Technion |
Session 48: Plenary - Presidential Address: Peyton Young |
|---|
| Date: July 13, 2008 |
| Time: 17:30 - 18:30 |
| Location: Coon Forum |
Session 49: IO and Markets |
|---|
| Date: July 14, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 10:15 |
| Location: G45 |
| Herding and Bank Runs |
| JEL codes: C73, D82, E59, |
| By Chao Gu, University of Missouri |
| Presented by: Chao Gu, University of Missouri |
| Strikes as the 'Tip of the Iceberg' in a Theory of Firm-Union Cooperation |
| By Robert J. Gary-Bobo, CREST-INSEE and Paris School of Economics. Touria Jaaidane, University of Lille 1, France |
| Presented by: Robert Gary-Bobo, Université Paris 1 |
| Efficiency and the Final Consumer in Resale Markets with Externalities |
| By Biran Omer, CEREMADE, Paris IX-Dauphine university, Paris, France. Holzman Ron, Department of Mathematics, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel. |
| Presented by: Omer Biran, EDOCIF CEREMADE Dauphine Paris IX |
| Patience, Fish Wars, rarity value & Allee effects |
| By Reinoud Joosten University of Twente The Netherlands |
| Presented by: Reinoud Joosten, University of Twente |
Session 50: Dynamics, learning and memory |
|---|
| Date: July 14, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 10:15 |
| Location: G40 |
| The Logit-Response Dynamics: Challenging Asynchrony and "Completeness" |
| JEL codes: C72, C62, C61 |
| By Jason R. Marden - California Institute of Technology Jeff S. Shamma - Georgia Institute of Technology |
| Presented by: Jason Marden, California Institute of Technology |
| Learning Games |
| By Nobuyuki Hanaki, University of Tsukuba Ryuichiro Ishikawa, University of Tsukuba Eizo Akiyama, University of Tsukuba |
| Presented by: Nobuyuki Hanaki, University of Tsukuba |
| Efficient Dynamic Coordination with Individual Learning |
| By Amil Dasgupta, LSE Jakub Steiner, University of Edinburgh Colin Stewart, University of Toronto |
| Presented by: Colin Stewart, University of Toronto |
| Limited Memory, Categorization and Competition |
| By Yuxin Chen -New York University Ganesh Iyer -University of California at Berkeley Amit Pazgal -Rice University |
| Presented by: Amit Pazgal, Rice University |
Session 51: Awareness I |
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| Date: July 14, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 10:15 |
| Location: G36 |
| Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior |
| JEL codes: D82, C72 |
| By Aviad Heifetz, the department of Economics and Management, the Open University of Israel Martin Meier, Instituto de Análisis Económico - CSIC, Barcelona Burkhard Schipper, Department of Economics, University of California, Davis |
| Presented by: Aviad Heifetz, The Open University of Israel |
| A Characterization of Trivial Unawareness |
| By José Luis Montiel Olea, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) |
| Presented by: José Montiel Olea, ITAM |
| Unawareness and the Standard State Space Revisited |
| By Siyang Xiong, Department of Economics, Northwestern University |
| Presented by: Siyang Xiong, Northwestern University |
| Player-Set Uncertainty |
| By Harborne W. Stuart, Jr., Columbia Business School |
| Presented by: Harborne Stuart, Jr., Columbia University |
Session 52: Networks II: Formation |
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| Date: July 14, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 10:15 |
| Location: G27 |
| Contractually Stable Networks |
| JEL codes: A14, C70 |
| By CAULIER, J.F, FUSL and CORE, University of Louvain. MAULEON, A., FUSL and CORE, University of Louvain. VANNETELBOSCH, CORE, University of Louvain. |
| Presented by: Ana Mauleon, Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis |
| A Strategic Theory of Network Status |
| By Brian W. Rogers, Northwestern University, MEDS |
| Presented by: Brian Rogers, Northwestern University, Kellogg |
| Limited Connections: Economic Foundations for a Preferential Attachment Model |
| By Ana Babus, Erasmus University Rotterdam & Aljaz Ule, University of Amsterdam |
| Presented by: Ana Babus, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam |
| Congestion Games with Malicious Players |
| By Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft Research) Robert Kleinberg (Cornell University) Christos H. Papadimitriou (University of California at Berkeley) |
| Presented by: Moshe Babaioff, Microsoft Research |
Session 53: Auctions |
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| Date: July 14, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 10:15 |
| Location: G03 |
| Asymmetric First-Price Auctions With Uniform Distributions: Analytic Solutions to the General Case |
| JEL codes: D44,D82,H57,C72 |
| By Todd R. Kaplan, University of Exeter, University of Haifa Shmuel Zamir, Hebrew University |
| Presented by: Todd R Kaplan, University of Exeter |
| All-Pay Contests |
| By Ron Siegel |
| Presented by: Ron Siegel, Northwestern University |
| Information Aggregation in Double Auctions |
| By Eiichiro Kazumori The University of Tokyo |
| Presented by: Eiichiro Kazumori, University of Tokyo |
Session 54: Repeated Games |
|---|
| Date: July 14, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 10:15 |
| Location: 101 |
| Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play |
| JEL codes: c72 |
| By Drew Fudenberg,Harvard University Satoru Takahashi, Princeton University |
| Presented by: Drew Fudenberg, Harvard University |
| Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game with Local Interaction and Local Communication |
| By Myeonghwan Cho, The Pennsylvania State University |
| Presented by: Myeonghwan Cho, Pennsylvania State University |
| Perceptron versus Automaton |
| By Sylvain BEAL, University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, GREDEG |
| Presented by: Sylvain BEAL, University of Nice Sophia Antipolis |
| Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games: Community Enforcement Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma |
| By Joyee Deb. Kellogg School of Management (MEDS) Northwestern University. Julio Gonzalez-Diaz. Kellogg School of Management (CMS-EMS). Northwestern University. |
| Presented by: Julio Gonzalez-Diaz, Northwestern University |
Session 55: Discrete matching models |
|---|
| Date: July 14, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 10:15 |
| Location: G43 |
| Substitutes and Stability for Matching with Contracts |
| JEL codes: C78, D44. |
| By John William Hatfield, Stanford University Fuhito Kojima, Harvard University |
| Presented by: Fuhito Kojima, Harvard University |
| BENEFITS OF MATCHMAKING IN TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS |
| By Hanna Halaburda, Harvard Business School Mikolaj Piskorski, Harvard Business School |
| Presented by: Hanna Halaburda, Harvard Business School |
| Dating and updating |
| By Jorge L. Garcia, University of Rochester Paula Jaramillo, University of Rochester |
| Presented by: Paula Jaramillo, University of Rochester |
| Coalitional matchings |
| By Dinko Dimitrov, Faculty of Law and Economics, University of Bayreuth, Germany Emiliya Lazarova, School of Management and Economics, Queen's University Belfast, UK |
| Presented by: Emiliya Lazarova, Queen's University Belfast |
Session 56: Mechanism Design IV |
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| Date: July 14, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 10:15 |
| Location: G05 |
| Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships |
| By David Rahman, University of Minnesota Ichiro Obara, University of Minnesota |
| Presented by: David Rahman, University of Minnesota |
| Optimal Separate Accounting vs. Optimal Formula Apportionment |
| By Thomas A. Gresik University of Notre Dame |
| Presented by: Thomas Gresik, University of Notre Dame |
| Contracts for experts with opposing interests |
| By Tymofiy Mylovanov, University of Bonn Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Kyiv School of Economics |
| Presented by: Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Kyiv School of Economics |
| Coordination, Implementation and Two-Sided Cheap-Talk |
| By Chirantan Ganguly, Queen's University Belfast Peter Postl, University of Birmingham Indrajit Ray, University of Birmingham |
| Presented by: Indrajit Ray, University of Birmingham |
Session 57: Game Theory |
|---|
| Date: July 14, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 10:15 |
| Location: 2245 |
| Trees and Extensive Forms |
| JEL codes: C72, D70 |
| By Carlos Alós-Ferrer, University of Konstanz Klaus Ritzberger, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna |
| Presented by: Klaus Ritzberger, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna |
| Interdependent Preferences, Potential Games And Household Consumption |
| By Rahul Deb Yale University |
| Presented by: Rahul Deb, Yale University |
| You won't harm me if you fool me |
| By Federico Echenique Caltech Eran Shmaya Caltech |
| Presented by: Federico Echenique, Caltech |
| Learning and Falsifiability in Testing Experts |
| By Nabil Al-Najjar, Northwestern University Jonathan Weinstein, Northwestern University |
| Presented by: Jonathan Weinstein, Northwestern University |
Session 58: Game Experiments II |
|---|
| Date: July 14, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 10:15 |
| Location: G44 |
| When Herding and Contrarianism foster Market Efficiency: A Financial Trading Experiment |
| JEL codes: D83, G14, C91 |
| By Daniel Sgroi, Universty of Warwick Andreas Park, University of Toronto |
| Presented by: Daniel Sgroi, University of Warwick |
| Equilibrium Play and Best Response to (Stated) Beliefs in Normal Form Games |
| By Pedro Rey-Biel Universidad Autonoma Barcelona |
| Presented by: Pedro Rey-Biel, Universitat Autònoma Barcelona |
| Actions and Beliefs in a Social Preferences Experiment: What do Selfish and Social Welfare Maximizers Believe Others do? |
| By Nagore Iriberri Universitat Pompeu Fabra Pedro Rey-Biel Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona |
| Presented by: Nagore Iriberri, Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
| Strategic Sophistication Category: Response Time, Eye Movements and Prediction |
| By Ai Takeuchi Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University Yukihiko Funaki Waseda University Jana Vyrastekova Radboud University Nijmegen |
| Presented by: Ai Takeuchi, Graduate School of Waseda University |
Session 59: Voting with Incomplete Information |
|---|
| Date: July 14, 2008 |
| Time: 8:30 - 10:15 |
| Location: 1246 |
| Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees |
| JEL codes: D72, D82 |
| By Matias Iaryczower Caltech |
| Presented by: Matias Iaryczower, Caltech |
| Optimality and equilibrium for binary decision problems in a committee |
| By Jean-Francois Laslier Ecole Polytechnique, Paris Jorgen W. Weibull Stockholm School of Economics |
| Presented by: Jorgen Weibull, Stockholm School of Economics |
| Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals |
| By Philip Bond, University of Pennsylvania Hulya Eraslan, University of Pennsylvania |