The Killing Game:  
A Theory of Non-Democratic Succession*

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Abstract

The winner of a battle for a throne can either execute or spare the loser; if the loser is spared, he contends the throne in the next period. Executing the losing contender gives the winner an additional quiet period, but then his life is at risk if he loses to some future contender who might be, in equilibrium, too frightened to spare him. The trade-off is analyzed within a dynamic complete information game, with, potentially, an infinite number of long-term players. In an equilibrium, decisions to execute predecessors are history-dependent. With a dynastic rule in place, incentives to kill the predecessor are much higher than in non-hereditary dictatorships. The historical part of our analytic narrative contains a detailed analysis of two types of non-democratic succession: hereditary rule of the Osmanli dynasty in the Ottoman Empire in 1281–1922, and non-hereditary military dictatorships in Venezuela in 1830–1964.

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“In war you can only be killed once, but in politics many times.”
Winston Churchill

“Mr. Churchill, as a long-time Tory, just cannot get it right.”
Joseph Stalin, “Pravda”, March 8, 1946

1 Introduction

Scholars of democratic regimes recognized long ago the impact of political competition on both policies pursued by elected individuals and characteristic traits of individuals that are elected. In non-democratic regimes, which have recently become an area of intense interest of economists and political scientists alike, political competition plays an important role as well (Tullock, 1987, Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003). We focus on major decisions that any autocrat, unlike a democratically elected leader, has to make: First, what to do with the predecessor. Second, how to make the job tenure life-long. Third, how to avoid being killed or imprisoned if overthrown. (We consider the succession problem – which is ubiquitous for dictators, e.g., Herz, 1952, Tullock, 1987, Dominguez, 2000 – as a mixture of these three basic problems, and address it along the way.)

We do not study political positioning of contenders to the highest post and processes of coalition formation in dictatorships, though these certainly play a huge role. One reason for this is that basic cleavages, motivations, and tactics involved have certain resemblance – or at least important theoretical parallels – with those employed in well-studied democracies. In contrast, we focus on the nature and consequences of constraints personalistic autocrats face. That dictators, unlike democratic rulers, can use imprisonment, torture, and executions of political opponents as means of staying in power has been recognized long ago (e.g., Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1965, Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Still, even most powerful dictators that, in principle, have power to use any means to achieve their personal goals, have to weight expected costs and benefits of their decisions. Then they fail to spare predecessors and unsuccessful contenders as they fear their comebacks, they hire loyal but dumb subordinates as they fear their betrayal, and they get overthrown as they cannot commit to retire on their own. They interact with other strategic individuals such as their predecessors – even those who are long dead – and their future successors – even those yet unborn, as well as with institutions, both long-term such as dynastic traditions and short-term such as a moratorium on capital punishment.


2Though not a necessary consequence of a coup d’etat, a violent death of the fallen leader in a short period after
What is the downside of executing the enemy who lost the power struggle when it is possible to do so and then enjoy a period of quietness? The downside is that in this case, the current decision-maker might be executed himself once removed from power. Sparing the life of a person who lost a fight against the incumbent makes his rule more troubling in the short-run (he will for certain have a powerful competitor alive), but then he will enjoy a higher probability of being spared himself once he loses a fight in the future. Formally, any decision by a rational agent incorporates future enemies’ opinion of him as a result of his actions. If dictator $A$ executed his predecessor $B$, then dictator $C$, who eventually takes over $A$, is likely to kill $A$, being concerned about bloody reputation of $A$. This reputation would indeed matter for $C$, the decision-maker at the moment, since if $A$ is spared then, upon taking power back from $C$, $A$ would likely execute $C$. (Or, more precisely, this is what $C$ would most naturally expect from $A$ basing on $A$’s reputation.) One immediate result is that once somebody takes over a bloody dictator, he might be ‘bound’ to become a bloody dictator himself.

This basic logic provides an immediate history-dependence: the current winner values his options differently depending on the type of his fallen enemy. It is an illustrative example of understanding institutions as equilibria, which elicit and pattern behavior of rational agents (Bates et al, 1998, see also North, 1981, and Schotter, 1981). Concepts of path-dependence of economic processes and multiple equilibria are inter-related since the pioneering work of Douglass North (North, 1981, 1990).\(^3\) Recently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) and Acemoglu (2003) (see also Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, Lagunoff, 2004a, and Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005) have developed a workable framework for dynamic analysis of political development.\(^4\) However, the reliance on Markov-type dynamic models limit the ability of these theories to focus on mechanisms of path-dependence.\(^5\) Indeed, any formal theory of this kind models path-dependence as multiple stable equilibria. Our focus on reputational concerns allows us to go beyond the existing models by the coup is definitely not an isolated phenomenon. Examples of countries that have witnessed at least two killings of the fallen leaders during the last 50 years include Afghanistan (Mohammad Daoud, 1978, Mohammad Taraki, 1979, Hafizullah Amin, 1979), Bangladesh (Mujibur Rahman, 1975, Khalid Musharaf, 1975, Ziaur Rahman, 1981), Iraq (Faisal II, 1958, Nuri as-Said, 1958, Abdul Karim Kassem, 1963), Nigeria (Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, 1966, Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, 1966, Murtala Ramat Muhammad, 1974), Comoros (Ali Soilih, 1978, Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane, 1989), and Liberia (William Tolbert, 1980, Samuel Doe, 1990). For numerous historical examples see Section 6.

\(^3\) As a theoretical concept, multiple equilibria appeared earlier. In the field of development, first models of multiple equilibria include Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989, 1993).

\(^4\) In Egorov and Sonin (2004), the dictator’s strategy motivated by the desire to survive is analyzed within such a framework.

\(^5\) An approach different from that of this paper which also allows to go beyond Markov-type dynamic models in institutional economics is suggested in Section 5.7 of Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) and Acemoglu (2005). (Cf. critique of such models in Bates et al., 2000.)
explicitly demonstrating the workings of such a mechanism.

Our institutional focus on a single decision – to kill or to spare – is obviously very limited, especially when contrasted to big institutional economics issues such as political economy of property rights or organization of trade (e.g., Greif, 2004). However, it is not without some clear advantages. First, historians working with large (or potentially large) and heterogenous data bases, are often overwhelmed with the identification problem. For example, any analysis of interaction between the leadership turnover and economic progress involves numerous idiosyncratic decisions on the researcher part even at the stage of data collection. With respect to killings, historical sources are less ambiguous: in most cases, there is no doubt whether an individual was or was not killed. (Motives of players are of course much more ambiguous, and are subject to various interpretations.) Second, a narrowly defined issue allows to broaden the base of sources for historic narratives to provide comparisons across regimes, space, and time, both historical and physical.

Economists are often concerned with problems that could be conceptualized best in classic economic terms. E.g., games of reputation are analyzed as games of a long-term monopoly against players who play only once but observe the entire previous history (Kreps and Wilson, 1982, Milgrom and Roberts, 1982, Fudenberg and Kreps, 1982, Fudenberg and Levine, 1989, Sorin, 1999, and Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine, 2004; see also a discussion relating reputation literature to historical studies in Appendix C in Greif, 2004). The game setup we consider has a political science origin and has no straightforward IO parallel; still, the machinery developed within economic theory is most suitable for our analysis. And while economic theorists’ assumptions are often stylized to the point where they hardly approximate real decision-making problems, in reality people do face the binary problem we investigate. As General Gelu Voican Voiculescu, appointed by the Romanian revolutionary government to supervise the trial and burial of the Ceauşescus, testified in 1995: “The decision to try the couple was dictated by desire to survive – either them, or us.”

In our theory, the cost of executing a certain action is associated with the equilibrium response of a future player. There is a long tradition in economic science to study reputation in games with incomplete information, starting from seminal contributions of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). Here, we depart from this tradition and argue that many behavioral aspects of reputation could be successfully studied in a complete information environment. In our

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6See a note on General Blanco’s life in the Historical Narrative section, which, depending on different plausible interpretations, gives rise to markedly different succession lines in Venezuela.
7Fudenberg and Kreps (1987) compare a standard reputation-building model (in which prior reputations are fixed) to a model in which the opponents do not observe how the long-term player played against other opponents.
8Bates et al. (2000), in an effort to justify their Analytical Narrative approach (Bates et al., 1998, 2000) argue that any use of model of incomplete information in a historical or political study should be avoided unless this “would imply ignoring a central feature of the puzzle under investigation.”
model, we have an infinite number of (potentially) long-term players, though at each moment only two of them interact.\(^9\)

What social traits should be captured by a general theory of reputation? First, reputation is something that changes over time. Second, a proper conceptualization of reputation requires some sort of monotonicity: the more incidents of a certain action are committed by the reputation-builder, the stronger is his reputation.\(^{10}\) However, reputation makes little sense unless we allow at least one of the two actions (either the one that enhances reputation, or the one that ruins it) to be verifiable someway. In the situation we focus on, it is easy to pretend to be bloody, e.g. by revealing a dead body, and hard to pretend to be enlightened unless one is truly enlightened. Once we have introduced this asymmetry, it becomes reasonable to focus exclusively on equilibria in which contenders do not ‘believe’ in actions that can be faked. In our model, this rules out equilibria where the dictator can reduce the probability of being executed by committing more killings. This brings up the intuitively appealing monotonicity with respect to decisions players make.

Though there is indeed a certain similarity between classic ‘reputation’ literature and this model, one might argue that here reputation concern is more important for the players. In contrast with the model of a long-term player facing a sequence of short-term ones, in our model every agent cares about his reputation. Moreover, he needs to take into account the effect of his actions as an input into future players’ decision processes. Indeed, the decision to kill or to spare the current loser requires understanding of not only the loser’s strategy (if he is spared), but also of future contenders’ strategies. In the long-term monopoly models, the short-term players need to think about future short-term players’ strategies, since this might affect the current monopoly’s incentives to maintain reputation, but they do not, obviously, care about their own reputation.

Of course, in the real world, the same reputation might be good in countering some types of threats and detrimental in other situations. For example, a reputation of ‘toughness’ or ‘cruelty’ has at least two effects for a ruler: First, potential contenders might be less willing to become actual ones. Second, if potential contenders might be either strong or weak, the reputation for toughness makes the selection of actual contenders more strong. The balancing effect of a tough reputation on the incumbent’s tenure is, therefore, unclear.\(^{11}\) In our model, this complication does not arise,

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\(^9\)In economic theory, strategic dynamic interaction is most often modeled as a repeated game with a fixed number of participating agents. In our setup, in every decision node the deciding agent could always leave forever the interaction with this particular opponent. Lagunoff and Matsui (1995, 2004) introduce a concept of an ‘asynchronously repeated game’. Our model is an example of such game.

\(^{10}\)Of course the consequences of reputation might be non-monotonic as, e.g., in Diamond (1991) or, most recently, in Ely and Valimaki (2004).

\(^{11}\)This effect arise, albeit under very different circumstances, as ‘bad reputation’ in Ely and Valimaki (2003) and
since the ‘supply side’ of contenders is exogenous.

For our analysis, we restrict the set of equilibria by letting each agent’s strategy to depend on the number of killings committed by participants who are active at the moment rather than on the entire history of the game. (See, e.g., Maskin and Tirole, 1998, who argue that it is plausible to restrict the set of perfect equilibria in such a game by allowing agents’ strategies to depend on ‘pay-off relevant’ histories only.) Our focus is on perfect equilibria: in any decision node, each agent’s strategy is optimal given strategies of other agents.\footnote{Bates et al. (1998) justify the use of perfect equilibria in such games as most appropriate for modeling institutions.} Furthermore, we require that all equilibria are ‘fake-murder proof’: effectively, this requirement imposes monotonicity with respect to killings of losers. In any such equilibrium, each additional murder implies a higher probability of being punished (so there is no forgiveness or indulgence), until the probability of punishment reaches one. Once it does, fear of additional chance of being punished is no longer in effect, and the agent opts to execute every time.

It appears that these relatively mild restrictions on equilibria allow to get meaningful comparative statics even though the number of equilibria is still large. We define ‘maximum patience’ of equilibria as the maximum number of killings a dictator can commit while still facing a non-zero probability of being spared if overthrown. This value is well defined (it is always a finite number) and has intuitive properties. The maximum patience is increasing in the probability that a new contender appears in the next period despite execution of the previous one, and is decreasing in the incumbent’s survival rate. It also increases in the cost of losing life and decreases in the utility of being in power.

Historically, understanding of idea of reputation for executions manifested itself in various laws and constitutional clauses. The idea of restraint in killing defeated political opponents might be the most basic of all constitutional constraints. The problem is addressed in the Hittite Telipinu Proclamation (van den Hout, 1997), which may be the world’s oldest existing document of the West. After discussing the excessive number of revolts and civil wars, King Telipinu stipulates that high nobles should not be killed in secret, but should only be killed after a trial before the Council of the realm. Also, when someone is convicted of a treason, his innocent family members should not be killed, and his property should not be confiscated. The reason for the first rule is apparently to avoid provoking preemptive revolts, and the second rule could prevent forcing rebel’s family members to support his rebellion (which would spur a sequence of reputation-based killings). Abolishment of confiscations might also be aimed at eliminating an incentive for palace bureaucrats to falsely accuse a noble of a treason.

\cite{Ely2004}.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 demonstrates that political comebacks to the top position in a non-democracy might be the rule, rather than an exception. In Section 3, we introduce the formal game. Section 4 contains analysis of the game. In Section 6, the empirical part of our analytic narrative centers around a detailed analysis of non-democratic succession: hereditary rule of the Osmanli dynasty in the Ottoman Empire 1281–1922, and other European cases. Section 7 concludes.

2 The Politics of Comebacks: Venezuela, 1832-1964

The history of Venezuela since early 19th century – we start with the year of 1830, the first year of full state independence – serves us as a vivid example that dozens of dictators that come and go need not be necessarily harsh on their predecessors.13 One reason for relative exsanguinity at the very top was, as we argue, the equilibrium behavior of winners. Correctly anticipating a high probability to be removed from power, they opted for a mild treatment of their predecessors. Another reason was the absence of a royal family and/or aristocratic tradition, which made it impossible to significantly reduce the set of contenders ($\mu$ is high, in terms of the model). It could be argued that Venezuela in 1830–1964 provides a typical example of a Latin American country and polity; we identified comeback military rulers in almost every Latin American country.

For example, of 54 presidents and provisional rulers of Mexico in the 19th century, 17 have held this positions more than one time, and 7 came back to power at least two times (Cahoon, 2004). General de Santa Anna, “the Napoleon of Mexico”, came back at least 5 times (and 11 by

13Our brief overview of Venezuelan leadership in historical perspective is based primarily on Munro (1950), Levine (1978), and Rudolph and Rudolph (1996). For modern military coups in Latin America, see Linz and Stephen, 1978; empirical patterns are analyzed in Luttwak (1979), Ferguson (1978), O’Kane (1978), and Farcau (1994).
some accounts). In Chile, General Ramon Freire came back 5 times. In Cuba, the last comeback
dictator was Fulgencio Batista, who came to power twice (in 1933 and 1952) by means of a military
coup (Domínguez, 1998). In Venezuela, among 56 changes in leadership (this figure includes all
constitutional leaders – elected, military, and provisional), there were 14 comebacks by 10 leaders
who had previously been constitutional leaders of the country. Needless to say, a comeback is the
most visible sign that the person had not been executed after removal from power the previous
time. On the other hand, some of the rulers indeed died in office or shortly after removal from
power.

Among the generals that ruled Venezuela during 20 years after 1830, there are Jose Paez (1830–
1835 and 1839–1843, president, 1861–1863, supreme dictator), Carlos Soublette (1837–1839, pro-
visional president, 1843–1847, president, 1858, provisional president), Jose Tadeo Monagas (1847–
1851, 1851–1855, 1868) and Pedro Gual (1859, provisional president, 1861, president). In 1837,
1848, 1858, 1859, 1861 (twice), 1863, and 1868, transition of power was hostile. Still, even in the
exceptionally bloody 1858 turmoil that started the Federal War, the outgoing dictator Monagas,
who had forced Paez in exile, was allowed to find a refuge first in the French embassy, and then
to retire to France (only to come back in ten years). Julian Castro, the president that removed
Monagas in 1858 and was removed by Gual in 1859, was convicted for treason, but absolved. Páez
staged unsuccessful coups in 1848 and 1849 against Monagas and was exiled (1850–58). In 1861,
Páez returned to become the supreme dictator.

The end of the Federal War brought General Antonio Guzman Blanco in to the center of
Venezuelan political arena. He first became president in 1870 (before that he was acting president
temporarily replacing General Falcon, his military principal during the Federal War, and the pres-
ident in 1864–1868), ousting José Ruperto Monagas, a son of José Tadeo Monagas (the Monagas
who was President in 1847–1851 and 1855–1858), who brought to power by the coup of 1868. In
1877, Guzman left the office and went to France. In 1880, after the death of President Linares (in
1878) and ouster of his short-lived successor Jose Gregorio Varela, Guzman returned to Venezuela
and took power by a coup again. Another comeback, Joaquin Crespo, was president first in
1884–86 (replacing Guzman Blanco who left for Paris only to be back in 1886) and from 1892 to

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14 This would not be surprising if General de Santa Anna were a democratic politician, coming back and forth via
elections. However, most of power changes were military coups.
15 It would be only fair to note that his younger brother, Jose Gregorio Monagas, who was president in 1851–1855,
was put to jail after the coup of 1858 and died the same year.
16 While some sources, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), consider the period of 1870–1892 as that of an
interrupted rule of Guzman Blanco, with those formally holding the presidency being his puppets, others read this
as a story of hostile come-backs (e.g., Rudolph and Rudolph, 1996). It is doubtful that even a full-scale historical
investigation of the matter would result in an unambiguous interpretation.
1898, when he was killed during a revolt against his desired successor. Joaquin Crespo appears to be the only ruler of Venezuela in two centuries to be killed during or shortly after a coup; there has been no evidence that he was executed rather than killed in a fight.

The first half of the 20th century was the era of Juan Vincente Gomez, who took power in 1908 and was formally a president or a provisional president in 1908–1914, 1915–1929 and 1931–1935. However, this might not be an illustrative example of a comeback president, since historians agree that, whatever has been his official position, he was the undisputed ruler of Venezuela since 1908 until his death in 1935.

The second half of the 20th century has changed the patterns of dictatorship, though the phenomenon of 'comeback rulers' persisted even with democracy gaining a more solid ground since the presidency of Rómulo Betancourt, who himself was a comeback military leader. After taking power in 1945, he was ousted by a military coup in 1948, was returned by another coup in 1958 and voluntarily left presidency in 1964. Since 1964, two Venezuelan politicians were presidents twice (they were barred from running for a second consecutive term by constitution), but each time they were elected in a democratic election.17

3 Formal Setup

3.1 Players, Payoffs, and Timing

We assume time to be discrete, \( t = 1, 2, \ldots \infty \). Each player comes and fights with the incumbent; the fight is modeled as a lottery. If a player is the winner, he decides what to do with the loser, kill or spare. The spared loser becomes the contender in the next period. If the loser is executed, there might be no contender in the next period. However, in two periods, a new contender arrives with certainty. We formalize this as follows: there is an infinite sequence of identical players \( i = 1, 2, \ldots \infty \), each of which joins the active part of the game sequentially. In each period \( t \), there is one player (the identity of this player is \( D_t \in \mathbb{N} \)) who is the incumbent dictator in this period. In each period, there may be a player \( C_t \in \mathbb{N} \), the contender (we write \( C_t = 0 \) if there is no contender in period \( t \)).

In period \( t \), \( D_t = 1 \) and \( C_t = 2 \). For each period \( t \), let \( N_t \) denote the identity of player with the least number who has not joined the active part of the game yet (for example, \( N_1 = 3 \)). Let \( W_t \) and \( L_t \) denote the winner and the loser of the fight period \( t \), respectively.

Denote the instantaneous utility player \( i \) receives in period \( t \) by \( U_t(i) \). We assume that if

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17Still, Carlos Andres Pérez, who was president in 1974–1978, and was elected again in 1989, survived two military coups during his second term, and was finally suspended from the office under charges of corruption.
\[ i \neq D_t \text{ and } i \neq C_t, \text{ then } U_t(i) = 0. \] In other words, only actively participating players can get a non-trivial utility in the current period. In each period \( t \), agent \( i \) (actually, only agent \( W_t \)) chooses an action that maximizes his expected future life-time utility \( U(i) = \mathbb{E} \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \beta^\tau U_\tau(i) \), where \( \beta < 1 \) is the discount factor, and expectation is taken conditional on the entire game history \( H_t \) (see the definition below). In each period \( t \), the sequence of actions and events is as follows.

1. If \( C_t \neq 0 \), then the contender attempts to become the dictator. If \( C_t = 0 \), then \( W_t = D_t \), \( L_t = C_t = 0 \), \( C_{t+1} = A_t \), and \( A_{t+1} = A_t + 1 \), and in this case steps 2 - 4 are skipped.

2. The fight breaks out, and the contender wins with probability \( 0 < p < 1 \). In other words, \( \mathbb{P}(L_t = D_t) = \mathbb{P}(W_t = C_t) = p \), and \( \mathbb{P}(W_t = D_t) = \mathbb{P}(L_t = C_t) = 1 - p \).

3. \( W_t \) decides on his action \( A_t \), whether to execute \( (A_t = E) \) or spare \( (A_t = S) \) the loser \( L_t \).

4. If \( A_t = E \), then \( U_t(L_t) = -D \), and with probability \( \mu < 1 \) there is still a successor in the next period \( (C_{t+1} = A_t \text{ and } A_{t+1} = A_t + 1) \), and with probability \( 1 - \mu \) there is no successor \( (C_{t+1} = 0) \). If \( A_t = S \), then \( U_t(L_t) = 0 \), and \( C_{t+1} = L_t \).

5. The winner gets \( U_t(W_t) = Y \), and becomes the next dictator, i.e. \( D_{t+1} = W_t \).

### 3.2 Strategies

First, we introduce the history \( h_t \) of period \( t \), which is the 6-tuple \( h_t = (D_t, C_t, W_t, L_t, N_t, A_t) \). Also, we denote the projection of \( h_t \) on its first 5 components by \( \hat{h}_t \), so \( \hat{h}_t = (D_t, C_t, W_t, L_t, N_t) \).

By the time player \( W_t \) has to make his decision on \( A_t \), he knows \( H_t = \prod_{k=1}^{t-1} h_k \times \hat{h}_t \). We call history \( H_t \) feasible if it can be a result of some path of the game. The set of feasible histories is denoted by \( \Xi \). For history \( \xi \in \Xi \), let \( |\xi| \) denote the number of periods in the history (so \( |H_t| = t \)), and let \( D^\xi_t, C^\xi_t \) etc. denote the dictator, contender etc. of period \( t \) in history \( \xi \). A strategy of player \( i \) is an element of \( \times_{\xi \in \Xi \mid W^\xi_t = i} A^\xi_t \), where \( A^\xi_t \in \Delta(\{E, S\}) \).

Denote the number of actions \( A = E \) chosen by agent \( i \) in history \( \xi \) by \( E^\xi(i) \). Formally, \( E^\xi(i) = \sum_{|\xi|-1} I(W^\xi_i = i, A^\xi_i = E) \), where \( I(\cdot) \) is the indicator function. We focus on perfect equilibria: in any decision node, each agent’s strategy is optimal given strategies of other agents. We further restrict the set of equilibria by letting agents’ strategies depend on the number of killings committed by participants who are active at the moment. (Similarly, Maskin and Tirole, 1998, restrict the set

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Note that for any history \( \xi \in \Xi \), at least one of the numbers \( W^\xi_t \) and \( L^\xi_t \) is equal to 0, which means that at no period can two players that killed before be actively participating. This may be proved by induction on \(|\xi|\): if in period \(|\xi| - 1 \) there was an execution, then in period \(|\xi| \) there is an innocent newcomer, and if there was no execution, then in period \(|\xi| \) the players are the same, and their reputation (number of murders committed) is the same, too.
of perfect equilibria in a dynamic duopoly game by allowing agents’ strategies to depend on ‘pay-off relevant’ histories only.) Specifically, we call a strategy profile \( A \in \mathbb{R}^\infty \times \prod_{i=1}^\infty A_{Ei} \) stationary, if for any two histories \( \xi, \eta \in \Xi \) such that \( E_{Ei} \left( W_{\xi|\xi} \right) = E_{Ei} \left( W_{\eta|\eta} \right) \) and \( E_{Ei} \left( L_{\xi|\xi} \right) = E_{Ei} \left( L_{\eta|\eta} \right) \) the equality \( A_{Ei} = A_{Ei} \) holds.

Denote the expected future utility of winner \( W_{\xi|\xi} \) that he derives from the last period of history \( \xi \) by \( U_{Ei}^{S}(W_{\xi|\xi}) \) if he spares, and by \( U_{Ei}^{E}(W_{\xi|\xi}) \) if he executes. Likewise, denote the expected future utility of the loser by \( U_{Ei}^{E}(L_{\xi|\xi}) \) (note that he does not determine his own fate). In the case of stationary equilibria, we can simplify this notation. For \( n, m \in \mathbb{N} \), \( n \geq m \), let \( A_{Ei}^{mn} \equiv n + 1 \). For \( m, n \in \mathbb{N} \), \( mn \equiv 0 \), let \( U_{mn}^{E} = U_{Ei}^{E}(W_{\xi|\xi}) \), if \( \xi \) satisfies \( W_{\xi|\xi} = m \) and \( L_{\xi|\xi} = n \). This is well-defined in the sense that \( U_{mn}^{E} \) does not depend on the history, and there exists at least one history that satisfies these properties. Similarly, denote \( U_{mn}^{S} = U_{Ei}^{S}(W_{\xi|\xi}) \), and \( V_{mn} = U_{Ei}^{S}(L_{\xi|\xi}) \). Denote \( U_{mn} = \max(U_{mn}^{E}, U_{mn}^{S}) \). Let \( W_{mn} = (1 - p) U_{mn} + p V_{mn} \), which is simply the expected utility of an incumbent dictator before engaging in a fight. Finally, let \( \alpha_{mn} \) be such that \( A_{Ei} = \alpha_{mn}E + (1 - \alpha_{mn})S \) if \( \xi \) satisfies the properties stated above (evidently, \( \alpha_{mn} \) is the probability of execution). Since numbers \( \alpha_{mn} \) define a stationary strategies profile uniquely, we will further refer to it by \( \alpha \).

Assuming stationary strategies, everything depends on the number of executions performed by the current dictator and the current contender; accordingly, we will say that the game is in the state \((m, n)\) at the time the decision on execution or sparing is made if the winner (the decision-maker) killed \( m \) times before and the loser (his opponent) killed \( n \) times. In that case, the switching of the game between different states is summarized on Figure ???. The choice of a solid line (execute or spare) is in the hands of the current dictator, while it is the nature that decides whether dashed or dotted line will be followed. When making his decision, the winner of the fight should take into account that next time he will win with probability \( 1 - p \) and lose with probability \( p \), and this will have an impact on the next state of the game as well as his role in it.

**Definition 1** We say that a stationary equilibrium satisfies the single-crossing condition (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994) if for any histories \( \xi, \eta \in \Xi \) such that \( E_{Ei} \left( W_{\xi|\xi} \right) = E_{Ei} \left( W_{\eta|\eta} \right), E_{Ei} \left( L_{\xi|\xi} \right) < E_{Ei} \left( L_{\eta|\eta} \right), \) and \( U_{Ei}^{S}(W_{\xi|\xi}) < U_{Ei}^{S}(W_{\eta|\eta}) \), the inequality \( U_{Ei}^{S}(W_{\eta|\eta}) < U_{Ei}^{E}(W_{\eta|\eta}) \) is satisfied. Equivalently, for any \( m \geq 0 \), \( U_{mn}^{E} > U_{mn}^{S} \) implies \( U_{mn+1}^{E} > U_{mn+1}^{S} \).

**Definition 2** A stationary equilibrium is called monotonic, if for any \( m \geq 0 \), \( \alpha_{mn} \leq \alpha_{mn+1} \).

**Definition 3** A stationary equilibrium is said to have non-decreasing murder rate, if for any \( m \geq 0 \), \( \alpha_{m+0} \leq \alpha_{m+1} \).
Definition 4 A stationary equilibrium is said to have non-increasing (with additional murder) utility, if for any $m \geq 0$, $U_{m0} \geq U_{m+0}$.

Suppose now that at any time a player makes a decision whether to spare or execute, he can commit a incidental murder $M$, instead of playing $E$ or $S$. This action yields the same payoffs (for both players) in that period as action $S$: the loser is not executed, and the winner gets no period of safe rule). However, action $M$ counts against the number of murders he committed; to capture this, we redefine $E_i^\xi (i)$, the number of murders player $i$ committed, as $\sum_{t=1}^{[k]} I \left(W^S_t = i, A^S_t \in \{E, M\}\right)$. Any strategy profile of the game (and any equilibrium profile in particular) is also a strategy profile of the extended game (with action $M$), and utilities $U_{mn}$, $U^E_{mn}$, $U^S_{mn}$, $V_{mn}$ and $W_{mn}$ are the same, provided that this profile of strategies is played. Let $U^M_{mn}$ be the expected utility of a player who opts to play $M$ when the game is in state $(m, n)$, if after that, the game evolves according to the profile considered; this value is well-defined (and is equal to $U^S_{m+0}$). We use it to formulate the following definition.

Definition 5 A stationary equilibrium is said to be fake murder-proof, if for any $m \geq 0$, $U^S_{m0} \geq U^M_{m0}$, i.e. if a murder yields no direct utility, it is unprofitable to commit it.

In our analysis, we focus on symmetric equilibria in single-crossing stationary strategies. We justify this by proving that single-crossing, monotonic, non-decreasing murder rate, non-increasing utility, and fake murder-proof conditions define the same set of symmetric stationary equilibria.
4 Analysis

4.1 Necessary Equilibrium Conditions

Suppose that the winner of the fight finds himself in state \((m, n)\). He has to choose between executing and sparing, which will affect the state of the game according to Figure ??.

The analogs of the Bellman equation for our problem look as follows:\(^{19}\):

\[
U_{mn} = \max \left( U_{mn}^E, U_{mn}^S \right); \\
W_{mn} = (1 - p) U_{mn} + p V_{mn}; \\
U_{mn}^E = Y + \beta ((1 - \mu) (Y + \beta W_{m+0}) + \mu W_{m+0}); \\
U_{mn}^S = Y + \beta W_{mn}; \\
V_{mn} = (1 - \alpha_{mn}) \beta ((1 - p) V_{mn} + p U_{mn}) - \alpha_{mn} D.
\]

We start with deriving necessary conditions to characterize equilibria that consist of stationary strategies. The purpose of the analysis is twofold. First, it is a prerequisite to full description of equilibria. Second, this will allow us prove the equivalence of equilibria with single-crossing, monotonic, non-increasing utility, and fake murder-proof strategies.

**Lemma 1** Suppose \(X\) is one of variables \(U_{mn}, U_{mn}^S, U_{mn}^E, V_{mn}, W_{mn}\). Then \(-D \leq X < \frac{Y}{1 - \beta}\).

**Proof.** \(X\) is the expectation of a discounted sum of numbers, each of which is equal to either \(-D, 0, \) or \(Y\); the negative term \(-D\) may occur only once in this sum. The sum of any series that satisfies this property lies between \(-D\) and \(\frac{Y}{1 - \beta}\). Finally, \(X\) may not equal \(\frac{Y}{1 - \beta}\), because there is a non-trivial probability of losing a fight in the future, and thus the series cannot consist of \(Y\)’s only.

Now consider the function

\[
S(\alpha) \equiv \frac{Y (1 - (1 - \alpha) \beta (1 - p)) - \beta \alpha p D}{(1 - \beta (1 - p)) - (1 - \alpha) \beta (1 - \beta (1 - p) - (1 - \beta p)}.
\]

As we will prove, this function is the lower bound for the incumbent’s life-time expected utility.

**Lemma 2** \(S(\alpha)\) is a strictly decreasing function.

\(^{19}\)For a strategy profile to form a subgame perfect equilibrium, it is sufficient that at any decision node, a one-period deviation does not increase player’s expected utility. By induction, no deviation that alters behavior in a finite number of periods increases expected utility. If there is a deviation that changes behavior in an infinite number of periods and strictly increases utility, then there is a deviation that changes behavior in a sufficiently large but finite number of periods while still increasing utility.
Proof. Compute the derivative:

\[
\frac{dS(\alpha)}{d\alpha} = -\frac{\beta p (\beta p Y + D (1 - \beta) (1 - \beta + 2p))}{((1 - \beta (1 - p)) - (1 - \alpha) \beta (1 - \beta (1 - p) - (1 - \beta) p))^2} < 0. \tag{7}
\]

We will need the following information on the values of the function \(S(\alpha)\) later on:

\[
S(0) \equiv \frac{Y (1 - \beta (1 - p))}{(1 - \beta) (1 - \beta + 2p)}, \quad S(1) \equiv \frac{Y - \beta p D}{1 - \beta (1 - p)}.
\]

The next lemma states its relation to the expected utility of an agent who opts to spare.

**Lemma 3** \(U_{mn} \geq S(\alpha_{nm})\). Moreover, if \(U_{mn}^S \geq U_{mn}^E\), then

\[
U_{mn} = S(\alpha_{nm}). \tag{8}
\]

**Proof.** Equation (5) yields that

\[
V_{mn} = \frac{(1 - \alpha_{nm}) \beta p U_{mn} - \alpha_{nm} D}{1 - (1 - \alpha_{nm}) \beta (1 - p)}.
\]

Also, we use (2) to find that

\[
W_{mn} = \frac{1 - p - \beta (1 - \alpha_{nm}) (1 - 2p) U_{mn} - \alpha_{nm} p D}{1 - (1 - \alpha_{nm}) \beta (1 - p)}. \tag{9}
\]

Therefore, (4) implies that

\[
U_{mn}^S = Y + \beta \frac{1 - p - \beta (1 - \alpha_{nm}) (1 - 2p) U_{mn} - \beta \alpha_{nm} p D}{1 - (1 - \alpha_{nm}) \beta (1 - p)}.
\]

Taking into account inequalities \(U_{mn} \geq U_{mn}^S\) and

\[
\beta \frac{1 - p - \beta (1 - \alpha_{nm}) (1 - 2p) - \beta \alpha_{nm} p D}{1 - (1 - \alpha_{nm}) \beta (1 - p)} < 1,
\]

we obtain

\[
U_{mn} \geq \frac{Y - \beta \frac{1 - p - \beta (1 - \alpha_{nm}) (1 - 2p) - \beta \alpha_{nm} p D}{1 - (1 - \alpha_{nm}) \beta (1 - p)}}{1 - \beta \frac{1 - p - \beta (1 - \alpha_{nm}) (1 - 2p) - \beta \alpha_{nm} p D}{1 - (1 - \alpha_{nm}) \beta (1 - p)}} = S(\alpha_{nm}). \tag{10}
\]

(The last equality is proved by multiplication of both the numerator and the denominator by \(1 - (1 - \alpha_{nm}) \beta (1 - p)\)). This proves the first part of the statement. To prove the second part, note that if \(U_{mn}^S \geq U_{mn}^E\), then \(U_{mn} = U_{mn}^S\). In that case, the inequality (10) turns into equality, and yields \(U_{mn} = S(\alpha_{nm})\). ■

The next two lemmas establish that the ‘talion law’ holds in any equilibrium: for any number of previous killings \(n\), a person who executed contenders \(n\) times before is executed by one who has no killings in his record with probability one if and only if he would execute a newcomer.
Lemma 4  For any $n \geq 0$, $\alpha_{0n} = 1$ implies $U_{n0}^E > U_{n0}^S$, and $\alpha_{0n} = 1$ implies $U_{0n}^E > U_{0n}^S$.

Proof. Assume the contrary. Consider the case where $\alpha_{0n} = 1$, but $U_{n0}^E \leq U_{n0}^S$ (the remaining case may be treated in a similar way). Therefore, $U_{n0}^E = S(1)$. If, however, he chooses to kill once, then he gets $U_{n0}^E = Y + \beta((1 - \mu)(Y + \beta W_{n0} + \mu W_{n0}) + \mu W_{n0}) = (1 + \beta(1 - \mu)) Y + \beta(1 - \mu + \mu) W_{n0}$. Observe that

$$W_{n0} = (1 - p) U_{n0}^S + p V_{n0} + (1 - p) S(1) - p D.$$  

Here, we used inequalities $U_{n0}^S \geq (1 - p) S(1) - p D$. Therefore,

$$U_{n0}^E - U_{n0}^S \geq \frac{\beta p (1 - \mu)(Y + D(1 - \beta))}{1 - \beta(1 - p)} > 0.$$  

However, in an equilibrium, $U_{n0}^E \geq U_{n0}^S$ must hold, a contradiction. 

Lemma 5  In a stationary equilibrium, for any $n \geq 0$, four conditions $U_{n0}^E > U_{n0}^S$, $U_{0n}^E > U_{0n}^S$, $\alpha_{0n} = 1$, and $\alpha_{0n} = 1$ are equivalent.

Proof. $U_{n0}^E > U_{n0}^S$ implies $\alpha_{0n} = 1$, and $U_{0n}^E > U_{0n}^S$ implies $\alpha_{0n} = 1$. The remaining implications are proved in Lemma 4. 

4.2 Monotonicity

Theorem 1  For any symmetric stationary equilibrium, the following five conditions are equivalent:

(i) the equilibrium satisfies the single-crossing condition: if the winner strictly preferred to kill the loser rather than to spare when the number of killings he committed before was $m$, he still strictly prefers to kill when the number of killings he committed is $m + 1$;

(ii) equilibrium strategies are (weakly) monotonic with respect to the number of murders committed by the loser: the larger is the number of killings committed by him, the higher is the probability that he is executed;

(iii) equilibrium strategies are (weakly) monotonic with respect to the number of murders committed by the winner: the more killings he already committed, the more likely he is to execute;

(iv) the equilibrium satisfies non-increasing utility conditions;

(v) the equilibrium is fake murder-proof: if the winner is allowed to make fake killings, which do not remove contenders, but count against his reputation, he finds this option no better than sparing.
Proof. (v) \implies (ii) Any stationary fake murder-proof equilibrium is a stationary monotonic equilibrium.

Assume the contrary, i.e. \( \alpha_{0m+} < \alpha_{0m} \). This implies \( \alpha_{0m+} < 1 \), and thus \( \alpha_{m+0} < 1 \), therefore \( U_{m+0}^S \geq U_{m+0}^E \). In that case, \( U_{m+0} = U_{m+0}^S = S(\alpha_{0m+}) \). Obviously, that’s also equal to \( U_{m+0}^M \), for \( U_{m+0}^M = Y + \beta W_{m+0} \). Fake murder-proofness implies \( U_{m+0}^S \geq S(\alpha_{0m+}) > S(\alpha_{0m}) \) (the latter holds because \( \alpha_{0m+} < \alpha_{0m} \) by assumption). Therefore, \( U_{m+0}^E > U_{m+0}^S \), for otherwise \( U_{m+0}^S = S(\alpha_{0m}) \). This, in its turn, implies \( U_{m+0} > S(\alpha_{0m}) \), which contradicts Lemma 3.

(iv) \implies (ii) Any stationary non-increasing utility equilibrium is a stationary monotonic equilibrium.

Assume the contrary, i.e. \( \alpha_{0m+} < \alpha_{0m} \). As above, we obtain \( U_{m+0} = U_{m+0}^S = S(\alpha_{0m+}) \). Non-increasing utility condition implies \( U_{m0} \geq U_{m+0} \geq S(\alpha_{0m+}) > S(\alpha_{0m}) \). As demonstrated in the proof of the previous claim, this leads to a contradiction.

(iii) \implies (ii) Any stationary non-decreasing murder rate equilibrium is a stationary monotonic equilibrium.

Assume the contrary, i.e. \( \alpha_{0m+} < \alpha_{0m} \). If \( \alpha_{0m} = 1 \), then, by Lemma 5, \( \alpha_{m0} = 1 \). Non-decreasing murder rate implies \( \alpha_{m+0} = 1 \), and thus, again by Lemma 5, \( \alpha_{0m+} = 1 \), which contradicts the assumption \( \alpha_{0m+} < \alpha_{0m} \). If \( \alpha_{0m} < 1 \), then \( U_{m+0} = U_{m+0}^S = S(\alpha_{0m+}) \) and \( U_{m0} = U_{m0}^S = S(\alpha_{0m}) \), and hence \( U_{m0} < U_{m+0} \). From this, using (3) and (4), one gets \( U_{m0} = U_{m0}^E = (1-\mu)Y + ((1-\mu)\beta + \mu)U_{m+0}^S > (1-\mu)Y + ((1-\mu)\beta + \mu)U_{m0} \), which implies \( U_{m0} > \frac{Y}{1-\beta} \). This violates Lemma (1), and therefore leads to a contradiction.

(ii) \implies (i) Any stationary monotonic equilibrium satisfies the single-crossing condition.

Suppose that \( U_{m0}^E > U_{m0}^S \). Then, by lemma 5, \( \alpha_{m0} = 1 \). Monotonicity condition implies \( \alpha_{0m+} = 1 \), and we use lemma 5 once again to get \( U_{m+0}^E > U_{m+0}^S \).

We showed that any of the three refinements (ii) – (iv) leads to equilibria satisfying single-crossing condition. Now we establish some lemmas about the properties of such equilibria, which are important per se and will allow us to demonstrate that these equilibria are fake murder-proof, non-increasing utility and monotonic. This will complete the proof of equivalence of these refinements.

Proofs of these lemmas are relegated to Appendix.

Lemma 6 If \( \alpha_0 = 1 \), then \( \alpha_{0m+} = 1 \). In particular, \( \alpha_{0m} = 1 \) for all \( m > n \).

Lemma 7 There exists \( \varepsilon > 0 \) such that if \( \alpha_{0n+} < 1 \), then \( S(\alpha_{0n}) > S(\alpha_{0n+}) + \varepsilon \) (which implies \( \alpha_{0n} < \alpha_{0n+} \)).

Lemma 8 There exists \( k \geq 0 \) such that \( \alpha_{00} = 1 \) and \( \alpha_0 = 1 \) for \( n \geq k \), and \( \alpha_{n0} < 1 \) and \( \alpha_n < 1 \) for \( n < k \).
The two previous lemmas imply that the ‘reputation’ sequence \( \{\alpha_{0n}\} \) is strictly increasing until it reaches 1, and once it does, it stabilizes. Intuitively, it means that in any equilibrium under consideration, each additional murder implies a higher probability of being punished (so there is no forgiveness or indulgence), until the probability of punishment reaches its maximum. Once it does, fear of additional chance of being punished is no longer in effect, and the agent opts to execute every time (and so \( \alpha_{0n} = 1 \) once \( \alpha_{0n} = 1 \)).

Another corollary is that in the sequence \( \{\alpha_{0n}\} \), only the first term \( \alpha_{00} \) may equal 0. Other terms are strictly positive. This means that in the equilibria under consideration, no murder can be completely forgiven, and anyone who has executed at least once is subject to a non-zero probability of punishment.

**Lemma 9** Assume that \( 0 < \alpha_{0m} < \alpha_{0m+} < 1 \). Then \( \alpha_{m0} = \alpha_{m+0} \).

Denote

\[
A \equiv \frac{(1 + \beta (1 - \mu)) Y - \beta ((1 - \mu) + \mu) pD}{1 - \beta ((1 - \mu) + \mu) (1 - p)}.
\]

**Lemma 10** If \( m \) is such that \( \alpha_{0m} = 1 \), then \( U_{mn0} = U_{mn0}^E = A \). Moreover, \( A > S (1) \).

**Lemma 11** If \( m \) is such that \( \alpha_{0m+} = 1 \), then \( U_{mn}^E = A \).

Now we are ready to finish the proof of Theorem 1.

(i) \( \implies \) (iii) Any stationary single-crossing equilibrium satisfies the non-decreasing murder rate property.

For any \( m \geq 0 \), either \( \alpha_{0m+} = 1 \) or \( \alpha_{0m+} < 1 \). In the first case, \( \alpha_{m0} \leq \alpha_{m+0} \) because \( \alpha_{m0} \leq 1 \) and \( \alpha_{m+0} = 1 \) by Lemma 5. In the latter case, if \( \alpha_{00} > 0 \) or \( m > 0 \), then \( 0 < \alpha_{0m} < \alpha_{0m+} < 1 \) by Lemma 7, which by Lemma 9 implies \( \alpha_{m0} = \alpha_{m+0} \). Finally, if \( \alpha_{00} = 0 \) and \( m = 0 \), then \( \alpha_{m0} = 0 \leq \alpha_{m+0} \), i.e. the inequality holds in this case, too.

(i) \( \implies \) (iv) Any stationary single-crossing equilibrium satisfies the non-increasing utility property.

For any \( m \geq 0 \), either \( \alpha_{0m+} = 1 \) or \( \alpha_{0m+} < 1 \). In the first case, \( U_{m0}^E = A \), and also \( \alpha_{0(m+2)} = 1 \), which implies \( U_{m+0}^E = A \) as well. Since \( \alpha_{0m+} = 1 \), \( U_{m+0} = U_{m+0}^E = A = U_{m0}^E \leq U_{m0} \). In this case, non-increasing utility property is satisfied. In the latter case, \( U_{m+0}^E = S (\alpha_{0m+}) \), while \( U_{m0} = S (\alpha_{0m}) \), since \( \alpha_{0m} < \alpha_{0m+} < 1 \). Therefore, in this case, \( U_{m+0} = S (\alpha_{0m+}) < S (\alpha_{0m}) = U_{m0} \).

(i) \( \implies \) (v) Any stationary single-crossing equilibrium is fake murder-proof.

For any \( m \geq 0 \), either \( \alpha_{0m+} = 1 \) or \( \alpha_{0m+} < 1 \). In the first case, \( \alpha_{0m+} = \alpha_{0m+} = 1 \), and therefore \( U_{m0}^M = Y + \beta ((1 - p) U_{m+0} + p V_{0m+}) = Y + \beta ((1 - p) A - pD) \leq Y + \beta ((1 - p) U_{m0} + p V_{0m}) = U_{m0}^S \).
(because $V_{0m} \geq -D$). In the latter case, $U_{m0}^M = Y + \beta ((1 - p) U_{m+0} + pV_{0m+}) = S(\alpha_{0m+}) < S(\alpha_{0m}) = Y + \beta ((1 - p) U_{m0} + pV_{0m}) = U_{m0}^S$. In both cases, fake-murder proof condition holds.

As for monotonicity condition in stationary single crossing equilibria, it trivially follows from lemmas 6 and 7.

4.3 Best Responses

To analyze best responses, we introduce mapping $T : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ given by

$$T(x) = (1-\mu)Y + (\beta(1-\mu) + \mu)x.$$  

This mapping is contracting to the point $\frac{Y}{1-\beta}$. For $x < \frac{Y}{1-\beta}$ we have $T(x) > x$. Denote $T^n = T \circ \ldots \circ T$. As usual, $T^0$ is trivial mapping, and $T^{-n}$ is the inverse of $T^n$. Evidently, mapping $T$ satisfies

$$\left( \frac{Y}{1-\beta} - T^n(x) \right) = (\beta(1-\mu) + \mu)^n \left( \frac{Y}{1-\beta} - x \right)$$  

for any $x$.

Before proceeding, we prove a theorem which distinguishes between two main cases: where there is only one equilibrium, where players choose to execute at every decision node, and where there are multiple equilibria, which is the most interesting case.

**Theorem 2** Profile of strategies where $\alpha_{mn} = 1$ for all $m$ and $n$ always constitutes an equilibrium. Moreover, if $S(0) < A$, it is the only equilibrium. If $S(0) \geq A$, there are at least two different equilibria.

**Proof.** By Lemma 4, it is always rational to execute in the state $(m, n)$, because $\alpha_{nm} = 1$. This proves the first part of the proposition.

If $S(0) < A$, then there exists another equilibrium, where $\alpha_{00} = 0$, and $\alpha_{mn} = 1$ for $m + n > 0$. The rationale for execution is literally the same. However, if $S(0) \geq A$, then the player who chooses to spare gets $S(0)$ by definition, while he who opts to execute gets $U_{m0}^{S} = A \leq S(0)$. Therefore, at $(0, 0)$ it is best response to spare, and thus this constitutes an equilibrium.

Note that if $S(0) < A$, there is also a third equilibrium, given by $\alpha_{00} = S^{-1}(A)$, and $\alpha_{mn} = 1$ for $m + n > 0$. In this case, a person in state $(0, 0)$ is indifferent between executing and sparing.

Now, in order to characterize equilibria, it is useful to summarize best responses on strategies played by other people. Of course, we may restrict ourselves to strategies that satisfies the necessary conditions obtained in the previous subsection. Furthermore, as usual in dynamic games, it is sufficient here to consider one-shot deviations only, i.e. every player considers his future actions as given by the profile of strategies under consideration.
Lemma 12 Let $\alpha$ be a profile of strategies satisfying lemmas of the previous subsection. If $\alpha_{nm} < 1$, then in the state $(m, n)$, best response to strategies played by other people is

$$BR_{mn}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} 
\{E\}, & \text{if } S(\alpha_{nm}) < X; \\
\{S\}, & \text{if } S(\alpha_{nm}) > X; \\
\Delta(\{E, S\}), & \text{if } S(\alpha_{nm}) = X,
\end{cases}$$

where $X = T(S(\alpha_{0m}^+))$ if $\alpha_{0m}^+ < 1$, and $X = A$ if $\alpha_{0m}^+ = 1$. If $\alpha_{nm} = 1$, then $BR_{mn}(\alpha) = \{E\}$ (i.e. the above formula holds).

Proof. If $\alpha_{nm} < 1$, then $U^S_{mn} = S(\alpha_{nm})$. If $\alpha_{0m}^+ = 1$, then by Lemma 11 $U^E_{mn} = A$. If $\alpha_{0m}^+ < 1$, then from (4) we get $S(\alpha_{0m}^+) = U^S_{m^+0} = Y + \beta W_{m^+0}$; eliminating $W_{m^+0}$ from this and from (3), we get $U^E_{mn} = T(S(\alpha_{0m}^+))$. Therefore (12) simply means that a player chooses the action that yields higher utility. If $\alpha_{nm} = 1$, then by Lemma 4 $U^E_{mn} > U^S_{mn}$, i.e. best response is to execute. Note that it satisfies (12), for $X$ is either equal to $A$ or to $T(S(\alpha_{0m}^+))$, and both $A > S(1)$ and $T(S(\alpha_{0m}^+)) > S(\alpha_{0m}^+) \geq S(1)$, since $S(\alpha_{0m}^+) < \frac{Y}{1-\mu}$. $\blacksquare$

The last statement lays out some necessary equilibrium conditions.

Definition 6 Suppose that profile $\alpha$ constitutes an equilibrium. Denote $\pi(\alpha) = \max \{n \mid \alpha_n < 1\}$. (If there is no such $n$, i.e. $\alpha_0 = 1$, we write $\pi(\alpha) = -\infty$). We call this number the patience of equilibrium.

In this interpretation, patience is the maximum number of murders one can commit to still have a non-zero chance of being spared in the future.

Lemma 13 In any equilibrium given by $\alpha$, $\pi(\alpha)$ satisfies

$$T^{\pi(\alpha)}(A) \leq S(0).$$

Proof. For any $m \leq \pi(\alpha)$, $\alpha_m < 1$, and thus $\alpha_0 < 1$. Therefore, $S \in BR_{m0}(\alpha)$, and by Lemma 12, $S(\alpha_0) \geq T(S(\alpha_0^+))$ for $m < \pi(\alpha)$, and $S(\alpha_0) \geq A$ for $m = \pi(\alpha)$. Combining these inequalities, we obtain $S(0) \geq T^{\pi(\alpha)}(A)$. $\blacksquare$

Evidently, this implies that the equilibrium patience function, $\pi(\alpha)$, is bounded from above. The following theorem gives the exact boundary.

Theorem 3 Denote

$$\bar{\pi} = \log_{\frac{1}{1-\mu} + \beta} \left( \frac{Y}{1-\beta} - A \right).$$

Let $M = [\bar{\pi}]$, where brackets mean rounding down to the nearest integer. Then for any equilibrium $\alpha$ we have $\pi(\alpha) \leq M$.
Theorem 4

(i) Profile $\alpha$ such that $\alpha_{mn} = 1$ for every $m, n$ always constitutes an equilibrium such that $\pi(\alpha) = -\infty$.

(ii) If $M \geq 0$, then there exist one or two equilibria with patience $\pi(\alpha) = 0$. In these equilibria, $\alpha_{mn} = 1$ for all $(m, n)$ except for $(0, 0)$; $\alpha_{00}$ is either 0 or $S^{-1}(A)$. If $S^{-1}(A) > 0$, these equilibria are different, otherwise they coincide.

Proof. (i) This was actually proved as part of Theorem 2; it is anyway easy to check that if one’s opponents play such strategy, best response is to execute (Lemma 12).

(ii) The fact that all $\alpha_{mn}$’s should equal to 1, while $\alpha_{00}$ should not, follows from definition of patience. If $\alpha_{00} > 0$, then $BR_{00}(\alpha)$ includes both $E$ and $S$, and then by Lemma 12, $S(0) = A$. Consequently, $\alpha_{00}$ is either 0 or $S^{-1}(A)$ (the latter is not equal to 1, for that would imply $S(1) = A$, which violates Lemma 10). It is easy to check, using Lemma 12, that for any of the two $\alpha_{00}$’s, we obtain an equilibrium. If both numbers are equal (which is the case if and only if $\bar{\pi} = M = 1^{20}$), equilibrium coincide. ■

Now consider the case $m \geq 1$. In this case, in particular, $0 < \alpha_{01} < 1$, and $\alpha_{10} < 1$. On the other hand, $\alpha_{n0} = \alpha_{0n} = 1$ for $n > m$. We consider cases $\alpha_{10} \neq 0$ and $\alpha_{10} = 0$ separately.

Theorem 5

Assume $M \geq 1$ and $1 \leq m \leq M$.

(i) If $S^{-1}(T^m(A)) > 0$, then there are two and only two equilibria that satisfy $\pi(\alpha) = m$ and $\alpha_{10} \neq 0$. In both of them, for $1 \leq n \leq m$, $\alpha_{0n} = S^{-1}(T^{m-n}(A))$, and $\alpha_{n0} = S^{-1}(T^m(A))$. In one equilibrium $\alpha_{00} = S^{-1}(T^m(A))$, while in the other one $\alpha_{00} = 0$. If, however, $S^{-1}(T^m(A)) = 0$ (which is the case if and only if $m = \bar{\pi} = M^{21}$), there are no such equilibria.

20This is discussed in the proof of Theorem 5 in a more general case.

21This is a degenerate case, since this requires, in particular, $\bar{\pi}$ (found from (14) to be integer.
(ii) There always exists at least one equilibrium such that $\pi(\alpha) = m$ and $\alpha_{10} = 0$. In any equilibrium satisfying these conditions, for $0 \leq n \leq m$, $\alpha_{n0} = 0$ (in particular, $\alpha_{00} = 0$), and $\alpha_{n1} = S^{-1} \circ T^{-1} \circ S(0)$. As for $\alpha_{0n}$ for $1 < n \leq m$ if $m \geq 2$, these can be any numbers satisfying $\alpha_{0n} \leq S^{-1}(A)$ and $\alpha_{0n} \leq S^{-1} \circ T \circ S(\alpha_{0n})$ if $n < m$. Any $\alpha$ satisfying these conditions constitutes an equilibrium. If $m = \bar{m} = M$ or $m = 1$, then this series yields a unique equilibrium. Otherwise, there are continuum equilibria in this series.

**Proof.** (i) All probabilities $\alpha_{0n}$, $1 \leq n \leq m$, are equal (Lemma 9). If $\alpha_{10} \neq 0$, they are non-zero (but not equal to one either, by Lemma 5 and the assumption that $\pi(\alpha) = m$), and therefore for $1 \leq n \leq m$, $BR_{n0}(\alpha)$ includes both $E$ and $S$. Hence, it is easy to prove by induction, using Lemma 12, that for $1 \leq n \leq m$, $\alpha_{n0} = S^{-1}(T^{m-n}(A))$. Since $\pi(\alpha) \geq 1$, $\alpha_{01} < 1$, and hence, by the same Lemma, $\alpha_{n0} = S^{-1}(T^{m}(A))$ for $1 \leq n \leq m$. If $\alpha_{00} \neq 0$, then by Lemma 9 it equals $S^{-1}(T^{m}(A))$. It is straightforward to check that for both $\alpha_{00} = 0$ and $\alpha_{00} = S^{-1}(T^{m}(A))$, equations (12) are satisfied. Evidently, these equilibria differ in $\alpha_{00}$. If $S^{-1}(T^{m}(A)) = 0$, then $\alpha_{00}$ should equal 0, which violates $\alpha_{10} \neq 0$. Finally, $S^{-1}(T^{m}(A)) = 0$ is equivalent to $T^{m}(A) = S(0)$, which is only possible if $m = \bar{m}$ (and thus equals $M = [\bar{m}]$); similarly, $m = \bar{m}$ implies $\bar{m}$ is integer and $T^{m}(A) = S(0)$.

(ii) By Lemma 9, $\alpha_{n0} = 0$ for $1 \leq n \leq m$. Similarly, $\alpha_{00} = 0$ (because if it is not the case, the same lemma yields that $\alpha_{00} = \alpha_{10} = 0$). Since $0 < \alpha_{01} < 1$, $BR_{01}(\alpha)$ includes both $E$ and $S$, which implies $S(0) = T(S(\alpha_{01}))$, and therefore, $\alpha_{01} = S^{-1} \circ T^{-1} \circ S(0)$. Furthermore, since $S \in BR_{n0}(\alpha)$ for $1 \leq n \leq m$, we conclude (recalling that $S(\alpha)$ is a decreasing function) that $\alpha_{n0} \leq S^{-1}(A)$ for $n = m$, and $\alpha_{n0} \leq S^{-1} \circ T \circ S(\alpha_{0n})$ for $n < m$. It is straightforward to check that any such profile constitutes an equilibrium. Indeed, there is at least one set of numbers $\alpha_{0n}$, $1 \leq n \leq m$ satisfying these conditions: $\alpha_{n0} = S^{-1} \circ T^{-n} \circ S(0)$ (it is easy to check, as above, that $\alpha_{0m} \leq S^{-1}(A)$). These numbers are determined uniquely either if $m = 1$ (so there is no ambiguity), or if $m = \bar{m} = M$ (so all inequalities for $\alpha_{0n}$, $2 \leq n \leq m$, become equalities). If neither is the case, then there is a continuum of equilibria with $\pi(\alpha) = m \geq 1$ and $\alpha_{10} = 0$. □

### 4.5 Comparative Statics

Substituting $A$ and $S(0)$ into (14), we can rewrite $\bar{m}$ as

$$\bar{m} = \frac{\ln \left(\frac{1-(1-\mu)(1-\beta)(1-\beta(1-2\mu))(1+(1-\beta)R)}{1-\beta(1-\mu)(1-\mu)(1-\beta)}\right)}{\ln \left(\frac{1}{\beta(1-\mu)+\mu}\right)},$$

where $R = \frac{D}{E}$. Evidently, $M$ is affected by changes in $\bar{m}$ only if $\bar{m}$ is a non-negative number. The denominator is always positive, so when we analyze comparative statics, we may consider the numerator to be non-negative as well.
Now we can analyze comparative statics of $\bar{\pi}$ and $M$. Empirical support for these results is provided in Section 6.

**Theorem 6** The maximum equilibrium patience $M$ is increasing in $\frac{D}{r}$ and $\mu$ (the probability that a new contender appears in the next period despite execution of the previous one), and decreases in $p$ (incumbent’s survivorship rate). In particular, $M$ increases with $D$ (the cost of losing life) and decreases with $Y$ (incremental utility of being in power).

**Proof.** Since natural logarithm is an increasing function, the proposition is evident as far as $R$ (and, therefore, $D$ and $Y$) is concerned. Variable $p$ does not appear in the denominator. Differentiating the fraction of which the logarithm in the numerator is taken, we obtain

$$\frac{\beta (1 - \beta) (1 + (1 + \beta) (1 - \mu)) (1 - (1 - \mu) (1 - \beta)) (1 + R (1 - \beta))}{(1 - \beta (1 - p) (1 - (1 - \mu) (1 - \beta)))^2} > 0.$$

As for $\mu$, it is necessary to consider both the numerator and the denominator. Differentiation of the same expression in the numerator yields

$$\frac{(1 - \beta) (1 - \beta (1 - 2p)) (1 + (1 - \beta) R)}{(1 - \beta (1 - p) (1 - (1 - \mu) (1 - \beta)))^2} > 0.$$

At the same time, $\ln \frac{1}{\beta (1 - \mu) + \mu}$ is obviously decreasing with respect to $\mu$. Since both the numerator and the denominator are positive, we obtain the necessary comparative statics with respect to $\mu$.

In other words, patience increases with the size of punishment, which is very intuitive, since a harder punishment makes a person more fearful of it, and increases incentives to spare. A higher $p$ implies less stability of the dictator’s position and less expected time until losing the fight, which also decreases incentives to execute. Finally, a higher $\mu$ means that one is less likely to experience a period of safe rule in the case of execution. This also makes execution less profitable.

4.6 Comparing Equilibrium Paths

In this subsection, we characterize equilibrium paths of various equilibria in the game. In most interesting cases agents play mixed strategies, so the actual game path is random. Still, it is possible to derive a number of general comparative statics results.

**Theorem 7** (i) Consider two equilibria $E$ and $E'$ given by $\{\alpha_{mn}\}$ and $\{\alpha'_{mn}\}$. If for any $m, n$ we have $\alpha_{mn} \geq \alpha'_{mn}$, then for any $m, n$ the following inequality holds: $U_{mn} \leq U'_{mn}$. In other words, a less violent equilibrium yields higher utility for all the dictators along the equilibrium path.

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22This is the case, for example, if $\alpha_{oo} \geq \alpha'_{oo} > 0$. This follows from full description of equilibria (Theorems 4 and 5).
yields to $S$ (Lemma 11) and two major groups. Evidently, all equilibria where (3) is depicted on Figure 2.

(ii) At any equilibrium, if $\alpha_{0m} < 1$, then $U_{mn} \geq U_{m:n+0}$ (and if $\alpha_{0m} < 1$, then $U_{m0} > U_{m+0}$). In other words, an additional murder will decrease utility as measured from the period where a new enemy will emerge (but increases instantaneous next period’s expected utility. If $\alpha_{0m} = 1$, then these utilities are equal.

Proof. (i) If $\alpha_{nm} < 1$, then $\alpha'_{nm} < 1$, and hence $U_{mn} = S(\alpha_{nm})$, $U'_{mn} = S(\alpha'_{nm})$. The necessary inequality follows from monotonicity of function $S(\alpha)$. If $\alpha_{nm} = 1$, then there are two possible cases. If $n = 0$, then by Lemma 10 $U_{mn} = A$. At the same time, $U'_{mn}$ is either equal to $A$ or to $S(\alpha'_{nm})$ (if the latter is the case, then $\alpha'_{nm} \leq S^{-1}(A)$), so in both cases $U'_{mn} \geq A = U_{mn}$. Finally, if $m = 0$, $n > 0$, it is sufficient to demonstrate that $W_{10}' \geq W_{10}$, for that would imply (from (3)) $U'_{mn} \geq U_{mn}^E \geq U_{mn}^E = U_{mn}$. Both $W_{10}$ and $W_{10}'$ may be found from (9). Its right-hand side increasing with respect to $U_{mn}$ (that’s trivial), and decreasing with respect to $\alpha_{nm}$ (differentiation yields

$$-p(D(1-\beta)+p\beta(U_{mn}+D))/(1-(1-\alpha_{nm})\beta(1-p))^2 < 0,$$

since $U_{mn} \geq -D$). However, $\alpha'_{01} \leq \alpha_{nm}$, and we have already proved that $U'_{10} \geq U_{10}$. Therefore, $W_{10}' \geq W_{10}$, and hence $U'_{mn} \geq U_{mn}$ in the remaining case, too.

(ii) If $\alpha_{0m} < 1$, then $U_{m0} = S(\alpha_{0m})$. At the same time, if $\alpha_{0m} < 1$, then $\alpha_{0m} > \alpha_{0m}$ (Lemma 7), and hence $U_{m+0} = S(\alpha_{0m+}) < S(\alpha_{0m}) = U_{m0}$. If, however, $\alpha_{0m} = 1$, then $U_{m0}^E = A$ (Lemma 11) and $U_{m+0} = A$ (Lemma 10), and we get $U_{m0} \geq U_{m0}^E = U_{m+0}$. Finally, if $\alpha_{0m} = 1$, then $\alpha_{0m+} = 1$ (monotonicity), and hence both $U_{m0}$ and $U_{m+0}$ are equal to $A$. ■

Despite the multiplicity of equilibria, equilibrium paths of the game may be naturally split into two major groups. Evidently, all equilibria where $\alpha_{00} = 0$ lead to a trivial equilibrium path, which is depicted on Figure 2. The winner always spares, and even if he loses, the game returns back to the state $(0,0)$.

In other words, the state $(0,0)$ remains forever.23 The average duration of each rule is given by Theorem 8.

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23One can also consider the situation where $\alpha_{00} = 0$, but the game (for any reason, say, a deviation of any player) comes to the state other than $(0,0)$. In that case, if $\alpha_{10} \neq 0$, then the game evolves as if the corresponding equilibrium with $\alpha_{00} = S^{-1}(T^m(A))$ was played ($m$ is the patience of the equilibrium), and the latter will be considered later.

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23
Theorem 8 If \( \alpha_{00} = 0 \), then on the equilibrium path players 1 and 2 always spare each other, and replace each other on the dictator’s position. The mean duration of each subsequent rule equals \( \frac{1}{p} \).

Proof. The first part of the statement is evident, since the game is stuck in the state \((0,0)\). The mean duration is calculated as

\[
1 + \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} n (1-p)^{n-1} p = p \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} (1-p)^{n-1} = -p \frac{d}{dp} \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} (1-p)^n = -p \frac{d}{dp} \left( \frac{1}{p} \right) = \frac{1}{p}.
\]

Conversely, if \( \alpha_{00} \neq 0 \), there may be a variety of paths, parametrized by patience of equilibrium \( m \leq M \). The switching of states for the case \( m = 3 \) is depicted on Figure 3. In the picture, the probabilities of execution at each node is shown; the probability of sparing is of course one minus this value. The decision-maker loses with probability \( p \) in the next battle, so the game come to different states, and this is shown with dashed and dotted lines.

In an equilibrium with non-trivial equilibrium path, the probability of a bloody dictator to be punished increases with the number of murders committed, until it reaches 1. The next Theorem states that this growth is accelerating.

Theorem 9 Suppose that \( 0 \leq k < n \leq m \), where \( m \) is patience of an equilibrium with a non-trivial path. Then in that equilibrium \( \alpha_{0k^+} - \alpha_{0k} < \alpha_{0n^+} - \alpha_{0n} \).

Proof. First, let’s prove that \( \alpha_{m^+0} = 1 > S^{-1} (T^{-1} (A)) \). Since \( S \) is decreasing, and \( T \) is increasing, it is sufficient to prove that \( A > T (S (1)) \). It may be checked straightforwardly that

\[
A - T (S (1)) = \frac{p \beta^2 (1-p) (1-\mu) (\beta (1-\mu) + \mu) (Y + D(1-\beta))}{(1-\beta (\beta (1-\mu) + \mu) (1-p)) (1-\beta (1-p))} > 0.
\]

Therefore, it is sufficient to verify that

\[
S^{-1} \left( T^{m-k-1} (A) \right) - S^{-1} \left( T^{m-k} (A) \right) < S^{-1} (T^{m-n-1} (A)) - S^{-1} (T^{m-n} (A)) \quad (15)
\]

for \( 0 \leq k < n \leq m \). For any integer \( z \), \( S^{-1} (T^z (A)) = S^{-1} \left( \frac{Y}{1-z - \beta (1-\mu) + \mu} \left( \frac{Y}{1-z - \beta} - A \right) \right) \). The latter expression is well-defined for real \( z \). For any real \( x \), denote \( f (x) \equiv S^{-1} (x) \) and \( g (x) \equiv \).
Figure 3: Equilibrium Path If $\alpha_{00} \neq 0$ ($m = 3$)

$$\frac{\gamma}{1-\beta} - (\beta(1-\mu) + \mu)\gamma \left( \frac{\gamma}{1-\beta} - A \right)$$. If we prove that $f(g(z))$ is a convex function of $z$, we will prove (15).

Function $S(\alpha)$ is decreasing (Lemma 2) and convex (to see this, notice that its first derivative is increasing, for the denominator in (7) is increasing in $\alpha$). Therefore, its inverse $f(x)$ is decreasing and convex as well. Function $(\beta(1-\mu) + \mu)^2$ is decreasing (because $\beta(1-\mu) + \mu < 1$) and convex, hence, $g(x)$ is increasing and concave. Trivially,

$$(f(g(z)))'' = (f'(g(z))g'(z))^2 f''(g(z)) + f'(g(z))g''(z) > 0,$$

because each factor in the first item is positive, and both factors in the second one are negative.

The intuition behind Theorem 9 is straightforward. Why, indeed, a greater increase in probability of revenge is needed to prevent the fifth murder (i.e. to make the decision-maker indifferent between killing and sparing) as compared to what is needed to prevent the second murder? The reason is that an incremental increase in probability of being murdered values more for a person who committed one murder than to one who committed four murders. Since a serial killer (the one who killed four in this example) is more likely to be executed sooner than a one-time killer, the “Damocle’s Sword” would hang upon him for a longer time.
It is also informative to depict probabilities of committing a murder and being murdered as considered by a person who committed \( n \) murders in the past, when facing an innocent opponent. We choose a certain set of parameters \((Y = 10, D = 6, p = 0.5, \beta = 0.9, \mu = 0.2)\); in that case, maximum patience \( M = 6 \). On Figure 4, we show probabilities \( \alpha_{n0} \) and \( \alpha_{0n} \) as functions of \( n \) (the number of murders committed in the past) for \( m = 2 \) and \( m = 5 \).

As one can see from Figure 4, in equilibria with non-trivial equilibrium paths, the probability that a bloody dictator will execute his adversary is a function that has two values, one of which is 1. In the beginning, bloody dictators execute and spare with constant probabilities (depending on parameters of the model and the patience of equilibrium, of course), being aware that every additional murder increases their chance to be executed (since probabilities of being murdered by innocent contenders) are monotonically increasing. When this fear is no longer in effect, both probabilities of murdering and of being murdered simultaneously reach 1 and stabilize there. Also, it is easy to see from Figure 4 that bloody dictator’s probabilities of being executed are convex functions (until they reach 1), which illustrates Theorem 9.

As a model of institutional development, the killing game might be endowed with a much more elaborate story. In a companion paper (Egorov and Sonin, 2005), we analyze a game, where the probability of the incumbent’s survival, \( p \), is determined endogenously. Specifically, the incumbent
dictator hires an agent of a certain competence, trading off benefits of having a smart vizier and costs of the possible betrayal. (A more competent agent is more able to distinguish the enemy’s type, and, therefore, is less loyal in equilibrium.) In particular, the more killings happen along the equilibrium paths, the lower is the quality of incumbent’s viziers. Also, the model allows for an exogenous probability of the incumbent’s death, which provides an opportunity to break a bloody equilibrium path.

5 Modern Politics of Executions and Comebacks

“Who disagrees with our leadership, will get a spit into his face, a blow onto his chin, and, if necessary, a bullet into his head.”

Anastas Mikoyan, a USSR leader, quoting Mehmet Shehu, Albanian Prime Minister, at the 22nd CPSU Congress

Post-World War II political patterns provide a rich material for students of leadership dynamics outside the developed world. Although there have been some very successfull attempts to use regression analysis to get meaningful results (e.g., Longredan and Poole, 1995), there are some difficulties that make case studies and comparative analysis more fruitful. In particular, available samples of killed leaders and failed contenders are heavily truncated with respect to deliberate killings. Indeed, while deaths of leaders are typically well-documented, that of failed contenders are much less so. If such a death took place immediately after an alleged coup, then, even the ultimate circumstances of death are uncertain, it can be classified as a political killing. (The death of Lin Biao, Chairman Mao’s designated successor, is such an example.) However, classification of a suspectible death of an opposition leader not connected to any noticeable political turmoil rests with the researcher’s judgement. (E.g., the death of Eduardo Frei, former President of Chile, who was voking opposition against the Pinochet dictatorship in 1982 remains controversy until today. See Londregan, 2000; also, The Santiago Times, April 5, 2005).

In this section, we do not venture to write a comprehensive history of leadership killings in modern politics. Such an attempt would have required a work of a different scope. The topic spreads wide from classics of Conquest’s “Big Terror” to books focused on very specific episodes of political killings. Rather, we try to look at the great variety of distinct episodes through a lense of

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24 On December 17, 1981, Mehmet Shehu was found dead in his bedroom with a bullet in his head, and officially declared to commit a suicide.

25 We refer to Egorov and Sonin, 2005, for a historical analysis, focusing on Venezuela since its independence (in 1834) to 1964, with dozens of comebacks and no executions of predecessors, and the Ottoman Empire, which witnessed two (both exceptional) comebacks and dozens of killings in six centuries.
our theory: a killer reputation on either the ruler or the unsuccessful contender part enhances the probability of a new killing; high stakes for the decision-makers forces them to put more emphasis on loyalty than on competence of their subordinates. What we emphasize is that political killings, which are often tended to be seen as idiosyncratic and isolated unless they are committed by the same ruler or regime, allow for singling out a number of strategic interdependencies.26

Examples of countries that have witnessed at least two killings of the fallen leaders during the last 50 years include Afghanistan (Mohammad Daoud, 1978, Mohammad Taraki, 1979, Hafizullah Amin, 1979), Bangladesh (Mujibur Rahman, 1975, Khalid Musharaf, 1975, Ziaur Rahman, 1981), Iraq (Faisal II, 1958, Nuri as-Said, 1958, Abdul Karim Kassem, 1963), Nigeria (Abubakar Tafwa Balewa, 1966, Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsé, 1966, Murtala Ramat Muhammad, 1974), Comoros (Ali Soilih, 1978, Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane, 1989), and Liberia (William Tolbert, 1980, Samuel Doe, 1990) Other rulers killed during this period include Melchior Ndadaye in Burundi (1993), Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala (1957), Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso (1987), Long Boreth in Cambodia (1975), Sylvanus Olimpio in Togo (1963), François Tombalbaye in Chad (1975), and Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania (1989). A special list can be made of democratically elected leaders that were overthrown by a coup such as Salvatore Allende of Chile (1973); our model emphasizes an important incentive to kill a legitimate and popular leader as he or she is an obvious come-back threat. Finally, there have been violent deaths of leaders not connected to a serious attempt to change the political regime — though aimed to change specific policies associated with a particular leader — e.g., of Anwar as-Sadat in Egypt (1981), Indhira Gandi in India (1983), René Moawad in Lebanon (1989), Yitzhak Rabin in Israel (1995), or Loran Kabila in Congo (2001). It should be noted that all these samples are heavily truncated since they do not take into account many unsuccessful contenders that were killed during a coup or executed thereafter.

Communist-type dictatorships

On December 23, 1989, Nicolae Ceaușescu, a Romanian communist leader for 22 years, fled his residence in the presidential palace in Bucharest and was captured by army troops that revolted after mass protests against his rule erupted the day before. On December 25, after a two-hour military trial, he and his wife, a former first deputy prime minister and the President of Romanian Academy of Science, faced a firing squad. What did those who captured and executed Ceaușescu have in mind? Why would not they wait for a regular process of justice, which might have very

26 The degree of personalization reached its nadir in Togo, where the leader of the 1963 coup, Colonel Eyadéma, who then became president in 1967 (and held the post until his death in 2005), claimed to have personally fired the shot which killed the overthrown President Olympio.
likely ended the same way?

Hundreds of monographs and thousands of articles have been written on the subject of communist dictatorships (see Gregory and Harrison, 2005, for an up-to-date account of economic literature on Stalin’s dictatorship; Montefiore, 2003, for references to historical accounts). What the theory emphasizes is that the scale of high-profile executions, an easily observable variable, might serve as a proxy for the degree of institutionalization of a regime, which is much less observable. There are ample reasons to take the end of the World War II as the starting point for the following reason: In the Soviet Russia, which was in many ways a source and an impostor of political patterns for newly emerging communist dictatorships, the war years marked – at least in a standard historic account – the ultimate accumulation of power in hands of one person, Joseph Stalin. However, it seems more instructive to focus on the “brinkmanship cases” of 1950s. Before that period, falling from power was all but a death sentence, and by early 1960s leadership execution all but stopped at least in European communist dictatorships. Taubman (2004) observes “What finally turned Khrushchev against Beria was fear that Beria would get him if he didn’t get Beria first” (page 249).

While widespread repressions are usually aimed at reducing ex ante incentives to rebel (e.g., Conquest, 1968, Friedrich and Brzhezinski, 1956), individual killings cannot be understood in the same fashion. When actors are endowed with reputation, and interaction between players is put in a dynamic perspective, even economic - that is, rational and selfish - agents are no longer involved in an anonymous game. The Hungarian example of 1956 is a case in point (see Remniz, 2003, for a detailed historical account).

In 1956, after a decade of communist rule, an apparently disorganized uprising in Hungary led to removal of the ruling hard-liners. Shortly after the communists lost control in Budapest, Soviet troops took over and installed Janos Kadar, a former interior minister, as a head of the Hungarian state. Kadar’s rule started with the trial and execution of nearly two hundred democratic activists. The generally applied principle was that only those who were responsible for the deliberate killing of government and communist party officials were to be executed. These measures have been followed with a number of reforms aimed at broadening the political base for the Kadar’s government. In particular, a significant share of recently nationalized, especially agricultural, firms was returned to their previous owners. In 1958 the Kadar government, still reliant on Soviet troops. At this time, Imre Nagy, the political leader of the 1956 revolution, who had been held by Yugoslav and then Soviet authorities for two years, was given over to the Kadar government. After a show trial, he was executed. With Nagy alive or dead, the set of possible political coalitions would have been the same, but the absence of another focal person gave Kadar the time to solidify his grip on power.

In Romania, Nicolae Ceauşescu was the supreme leader since 1965. By academic standards,
the history of his dramatic fall from power and death is a complete mystery. However, even the
very scarce information, basically confined to the public events, allows to illuminate traces of
strategic reasoning. On December 21, 1989, after days of local and seemingly limited unrest in the
province of Timisoara, Ceausescu called a grandiose meeting at the central square of Budapest,
apparently to rally the crowds in support of his leadership. In a stunning development, the meeting
degenerated into the anarchy, and the Ceausescu couple had to flee the presidential palace. The
next day saw the announcement of death of Vasile Milea, the defence minister. Though there is
very little doubt that he was killed and not committed suicide, the official version from the first
day up until now, whether he was actually killed on Ceausescu’s orders to prevent a coup, or by
the emerging military leadership of these days out of fear that he may intervene on the Ceausescu
side. The actual composition of pre-coup forces, at least at the personal level, is a subject of much
controversy up until now. Anyway, the killing was strategic and apparently raised stakes for all the
parties involved.

On December 25, Ceausescu and his wife were caught by a provincial military unit and executed
by a firing squad after a two-hours trial in somewhat mystic circumstances. (E.g., though the
proceeding and the execution were taped and later broadcasted, not all the participants of the court
have been ever identified.) Still, there is ample evidence that the strategic reasoning behind the
swift execution was exactly as predicted by our theory. In 1995, testifying before the parliamentary
commission investigating the matter, General Gelu Voican Voiculescu, who in 1989 was appointed by
the Romanian revolutionary government to supervise the trial and burial of the Ceausescus: “The
decision to try the couple was dictated by desire to survive – either them, or us.”

Third-world dictatorships

Until 1980, Liberia has had a century of relatively peaceful rule by the oligarchic True Whig
party; presidents being typically replaced by their vice-presidents. This political “idyllic”, which
accompanied a century of economic prosperity (see, e.g, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), ended
on April 12, 1980, when colonel Samuel Doe staged a military coup, killing President William
R. Tolbert, Jr. and mass-executing members of the deposed government. A year later, a Doe’s
co-conspirator against Talbot, Thomas Weh Syen, was arrested along with four other members of
the People’s Redemption Councial, the highest governing body under Doe, for allegedly plotting
to assassinate Doe; they were executed in a matter of days. So, when in 1989 another former ally
of Doe, Charles Taylor, started a guerrilla war against him, there was no chance for Doe to survive
the deposition. He was captured in the presidential palace in Monrovia on September 9, 1990 and
killed immediately.
Afghanistan had been a hereditary monarchy until 1973, when Mohammed Daoud Khan seized power from his cousin King Zahir. In April 1978, Daoud Khan was overthrown by a revolution and executed, with most of his family, immediately thereafter. This mass execution, reported publicly as a “resignation for health reasons”, established a firm pattern for the next transitions of power. In April 1978, Nur Mohammad Taraki became the President of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and secretary general of the quasi-Marxist PDPA party. In September 1979, Taraki was killed in a military coup led by his prime-minister, Haffizullah Amin, who then became the second President of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Three months later, in December 1979, Amin and many of his followers were killed in a revolt assisted by the Soviet military. Babrak Karmal, another member of the Taraki junta, became the next President. Being directly installed by the Soviets, he became the only leader of the communist Afghanistan to survive after being removed from power, when he was replaced by the Soviet authorities in 1981.

In the neighboring Pakistan, the recent political history has been very much consistent with our equilibrium story. It started with an execution of a replaced popular leader, the first President of the republic since the split with the East Pakistan in 1971, by the new military leader on charges of murdering an opposition politician – as if for a further illustration of our story. Then the ruthless leader died in an air accident, and the number of succeeding power transitions, not necessarily democratic, were peaceful, at least at the very top. The two immediate predecessors of the current dictator, Pervez Musharraf, are exiled rather than executed, and there are reasons to believe that this in part due to Musharraf’s concern about his own future: one of the predecessors is exiled after receiving several life sentences – including the one for ordering Musharraf’s assassination.

6 Historical Examples

As the analytic narrative approach (Bates et al., 1998, 2000, Levi, 2003) suggests, theoretical models, a primary tool of economics and political science, allow us to read, organize and present empirical evidence in a narrative form, which is a primary tool of historical science. There are two basic reasons for this form of organizing discussion: First, econometric inference of empirical content of multiple equilibria models, even if data is well-identified, is an arduous task. Jovanovic (1989) and Bisin, Moro, and Topa (2002) assert that proper inference could be made under very restrictive assumptions; the dynamic nature of our equilibria makes it even harder. Second, problems of identification and interpretation of historical data related to leadership survival make analytic narrative a more appropriate tool of analysis.

What does our theory say about cross-country comparison of dictatorships? To illustrate the
existence of two paths with markedly different characteristics, which correspond to the only pure-strategy equilibria in our model, we first discuss general patterns in Europe and Latin America, and then focus on two particular examples, Venezuela, 1830–1970 (which is described above) and the Ottoman Empire, 1230–1922. One difference between the two examples is of course that the Ottoman Empire was a hereditary monarchy and Latin American countries were not.28

The Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire was not a place where succession was automatic; any male descendant of Osman, with no regard to seniority, could have become a sultan (Finer, 1997, p. 1171). Often, there were brothers succeeding the deposed dictator; the fact that most of sultans had many children made competition for succession serious. The difference which can be predicted by our comparative statics is that in a monarchy, the set of potential contenders is limited and pre-defined (e.g., all brothers, sons, and nephews); accordingly, it might really make sense to try to eliminate all potential contenders.

The House of Osman ruled the Ottoman Empire from 1281 to 1922; officially, the sultan was the sole source of governmental authority in the empire. During more than six centuries covered in the list of the Ottoman sultans, there was almost no hostile comebacks. The main reason for this was that, after a coup, the loser, be it the incumbent or the contender, was usually executed.29 Still, by many standards, the Ottoman Empire resembled European monarchies. Alderson (1982) notes that average duration of an Osmanli sultan’s reign (17 years), compares favorably with Roman emperors such incidents during the last fifty years. Other rulers killed during this period include Melchior Ndadaye in Burundi (1993), Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala (1957), Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso (1987), Salvatore Allende in Chile (1973), Long Boreth in Cambodia (1975), Sylvanus Olompi in Togo (1963), François Tombalbaye in Chad (1975). Violent deaths of leaders not associated with a serious attempt to change the regime, e.g. of Anwar as-Sadat in Egypt (1981), Indira Gandhi in India (1984), René Moawad in Lebanon (1989), Yitzhak Rabin in Israel (1995), or Loran Kabila in Congo (2001) are not such examples. Both samples are truncated since they do not take into account unsuccessful contenders that were killed during a coup or executed thereafter.

28 Another difference might be that the Venezuelan period we focus on spans only 19th and 20th centuries, which might be more civilized than e.g. 13th and 14th century. In the Ottoman Empire, most of bloody executions of royal family members indeed happened earlier than 19th century.

29 The first ‘comeback’ in the Ottoman Empire was not a result of a hostile fight between the predecessor, Murad II, and his son, Mehmed II. Indeed, During his first reign, seeing the upcoming Battle of Varna, Mehmed sent for his father, Murad II, asking him to claim the throne again to fight the enemy, only to be refused. Enraged at his father, who was then retired to rest in southwestern Anatolia, Mehmed in his famous letter wrote to his father: “If you are the sultan, come and lead your armies. If I am the sultan I hereby order you to come and lead my armies.” It was upon this letter that Murad II led the Ottoman army in the Battle of Varna in 1444. (Alderson, 1982, p. 62 details more hostility in both accession and temporary deposition of Mehmed.) The second ‘comeback’ (1622) also appears to be very specific, as Mustafa I, reportedly mentally retarded (Finer, 1997, p. 1172), was merely a ‘façade’ king.
(7 years), Byzantine emperors (12), Abbasid caliphs (12) and is close to European monarchies such as Russia (18), France (21) and Britain (23). Still, Alderson (1982) counted 17 depositions from Bayezid I to Abdul-Hamid II, almost a half of all sultans. Executions of predecessors, failed contenders, or just potential contenders such as younger brothers, was indeed wide-spread. At least 11 sultans were killed during or soon after a hostile disposition from power. Of sultans that were not killed upon the accession of a new sultan, four were the last sultans of the Empire in the period of 1876–1922; one of them, Murad V, ruled for only 93 days in 1876 and was widely believed to suffer mental illness. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that killing the predecessor was a typical strategy in the Ottoman Empire.

Another course of actions, typical for the Ottoman Empire and all but unseen in Venezuela, was killing of potential heirs to the throne. Beyazid I (1389–1402), Mehmed I (1413–1421), Mehmed II (1444–1445, 1451–1481), Murad II (1421–1444, 1445–1451), Selim I (1512–1520), Suleiman I, (1520–1566), Mustafa IV (1807–1808), Mahmud II (1808–1839) put some of their brothers or sons (and often other relatives) to death. Of course Mehmed III (1595–1603) stays notorious even in this long list for having his sixteen brothers killed upon his accession. His son, Ahmed I broke with the pattern, refusing to execute his mentally retarded brother Mustafa I (1617–1618, 1622–1623). Mehmed II enacted the ‘Law of Fratricide’, which said literally that a sultan may lawfully put his brother to death. Alderson (1982) counted 80 such executions in 650-year span.

The tradition to kill potential contenders persisted even in 19th century. In 1808, a janissary revolt brought to power Mustafa, a son of Abd-ul-Hamid I. Mustafa ordered execution of his brother Selim, the disposed sultan, as well as his another brother, Mahmud. Selim was killed, but Mahmud, the only remaining male member in line for succession, escaped, revolted against Mustafa, and had him executed upon succession to the throne.

Russia

It is plausible again to juxtapose the Ottoman Empire experience with that of the Russian Empire. As in the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire has had a well-defined sequence of absolute rulers for a prolonged period, since early 14th century, and the difference in average durations is minimal (17 and 18, respectively). In Russia, we witness both (i) less deliberate killings of predecessors and (ii) more examples of people being removed from power, but spared. There might be only single execution of a heir by the current ruler (prince Alexis, who was accused of conspiring in the plot against his father Peter the Great; the ultimate circumstances of Alexis’s death are unknown, e.g.,

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30 We use the following sources on the Ottoman Empire: Alderson (1982), Finer (1997), McCarthy (1997), and Palmer (1992).
Massie, 1980) a single episode of a son successfully, though passively, participating in a plot against his father (Alexander I against his father Pavel I in 1801). There were examples that people were removed from power or succession line and not executed (Vasily Shuisky, Sophia, a half-sister of Peter the Great, Peter the Great himself, Ivan VI, Konstantin).32

To further illustrate how different degree of security affected the winner’s attitude to the mere presence of potential contenders, compare accessions of two young women, Elizabeth I of Russia in 1741 and Catherine II (the Great) in 1762. Each of them was brought to power by a military coup organized by young officers of elite guard divisions. Elizabeth I removed the one-year old tsar, Ivan VI, and his parents, who were the regents designated by the predecessor, Empress Anna, Elizabeth’s cousin. Upon Elizabeth’s accession, Ivan VI was not killed but isolated and guarded in different fortresses, and his parents were exiled. Catherine II removed from power her husband, Emperor Peter III, who was designated as a successor by Elizabeth. Though Peter III was not executed immediately after the removal from power, he was assassinated within two weeks by people Catherine sent to ‘watch him’. Archives contain a hand-written note by one of the assassins, where he proudly reports the death of Catherine’s husband. Furthermore, Ivan VI, who had been spared by Elizabeth and kept in prison for 22 years, was killed soon on a Catherine’s order by his guards, fearful of a plot to rescue him.

The crucial difference in attitude of Elizabeth and Catherine to those whom they removed from power and who could have been expected to become if not the center, but at least a focal element of opposition, might be in that Elizabeth was a daughter of Peter the Great, the Russian tsar in 1696–1725, and thus was a heir at least as legitimate as those whom she replaced. In contrast, Catherine was a daughter of an obscure count in Prussia (Germany), and was ‘imported’ to marry Peter III, who was a great-grandchild of Peter the Great and a nephew of the reigning Empress Elizabeth. Thus, Catherine, the ‘illegitimate’ ruler, had to take much more care of contenders’ fates than Elizabeth.

31Ivan the Terrible’s son Ivan was killed by his father in a quarrel; however, there is a lot of evidence that it was accidental.
32In contrast with the Ottoman Empire, killing of non-rivaling siblings was near-taboo in Russia since the very early years: in 1217, Prince Gleb Vladimirovich of Ryazan was thrown out by citizens of his state after ordering to kill his brothers, princes of neighbouring states, at a dinner table. The first Russian saints of the Orthodox Church were young and innocent princes Boris and Gleb, killed by their brother Svyatopolk. Of course, Russian princes have had less legitimate consanguineous brothers than Ottoman rulers.
33Women occupied the Russian throne for more than a half of the 18th century, and half of them were brought to power by a military coup.
34Although Elizabeth was unable to accede to power without a military coup (which happen in 1742), she was named a heir to the throne by her mother (who died in 1727, when Elizabeth was 18), who in turn inherited the throne from Peter the Great, her husband, in 1725 (Massie, 1980).
The Russian history provides another example of the sparing equilibrium, a power struggle of two boyar clans each of which has a boy contender to the throne (chronology: Massie, 1980). In 1669, Maria Miloslavskaya, the first wife of tsar Alexis died, survived by 4 children, including her ailing sons Fedor and Ivan. Two years later, in 1671, Alexis married Natalya Naryshkina, and the whole clan of Miloslavskys, including Maria Miloslavskaya’s father, but not Fedor and Ivan, went into exile. In 1672, son Peter is born. In 1676, Alexis died, Fedor was proclaimed tsar, and Miloslavskys (including grandparents of Fedor) were returned, while Naryshkins were exiled (but not killed).

In 1682, tsar Fedor died, and his half-brother Peter, aged ten, was proclaimed tsar. Fedor’s brother Ivan, 16, who was burdened with several chronic illnesses, conceded to Peter’s accession and was kept in the Kremlin palace unharmed, while the Naryshkins (including the former first minister Artamon Matveev, tsarina Nataliya’s guardian) were returned from exile. In a few days, most important Naryshkins, including Artamon Matveev, were killed in a military uprising. Sophia Miloslavskaya became regent, formally on behalf of her brother Ivan and half-brother Peter. Though Peter, a single royal male in the Naryshkins clan, was in hands of Miloslavskys, his life was not threatened. In 1689, Peter acceded to power in bloodless coup; Sophia was kept under home arrest for rest of her life (until 1704). The essence of the story is that, despite very strong incentives and excellent opportunities on each side to kill the heir representing the rival clan, they deliberately abstained from that.

England

European monarchies of the era witnessed significantly fewer executions and killings of kings, though it was not impossible. (And, of course, the fate of numerous contenders was very often miserable.) E.g., Richard III of England was immortalized by Thomas More and William Shakespeare for slaying the baby-king Edward V and his brother Richard in an attempt to secure the crown for himself.35 The young princes, sons of the previous king Edward IV of England, were declared illegitimate by the Act of Parliament known as Titulus Regius; however, the act of parliament was legally reversible, which make them a potential threat for Richard III.36 Execution of Mary Stuart of Scots by Elizabeth I of England was apparently aimed at reducing the probability of a pro-Stuart

35 Historians do not universally take More’s account as authentic. Still, there is no doubt that the ‘Princes in the Tower’ were killed, and the primary motive was elimination of potential heirs to the throne, either for the benefit of Richard III, Henry VII, or even of Duke of Buckingham, also a descendant of Edward III (See Figure 5 at the end of the paper).

36 Bartlet (2002) provides an example of situation where, against all odds, King Stephen did not kill 6-years old William Marshal (a future regent of England), given to him as a hostage by his father John.
coup. In 1685, James Crofts, Duke of Monmouth, a bastard child of Charles II of England, was executed within nine days after capture (cf. typically long trials of other British royals in 17th century). The apparent reason for that was he proclaimed himself James II, the king of England, thus endangering the power of the existing king, also James II, his uncle.\textsuperscript{37} Even executions of kings committed by revolutionaries (e.g. Charles I of England, Louis XVI of France, and Nikolai II of Russia, whose mere existence – even after abdication – made them contenders to power), were in part motivated by consideration highlighted by our theory.\textsuperscript{38}

In a fundamental study of patterns of political succession in England, Bartlet (2002) notes that “between the 11th and early 14th, defeated political opponents of high birth were ... scarcely ever maimed or killed in cold blood.” However, in the Celtic part of British Isles, “the kings and princes of Wales, Ireland, and Gaelic Scotland continued to employ blinding, maiming, and killing in their conflicts with rivals from both with-in and with-out their families” (Bartlet, 2002). Bartlet and earlier medieval studies such as Pollock and Maitland (1898) contrast the virtual absence of royal-member executions in Norman and Angevin England with the bloodiness of the later Middle Ages and Tudor period. Figure 5 at the end of the paper illustrates that by 1486, the last year of the thirty years of the War of Roses, the only surviving male from both houses of York and Lancaster was the ruling king, Henry VII. Both chronological (in 1455–1486 in contrast to the previous period) and geographical (Celtic part vs. Wales, Ireland, and Gaelic Scotland, in 1075–1225) concentration of killings support the idea of history-dependence highlighted by our theoretical model.

7 Conclusion

Most advanced analysis of political and economic history draws insights from studies of large-scale institutional change. The challenge we took upon in this paper is to reconcile historical processes with micro decisions made by significant decision-makers at critical points in history. In this paper, we study reputation and knowledge in a complete information game with an infinite number of players. The rational winner in a power struggle determines the fate of the loser. His choice of equilibrium strategy decisions is motivated by two basic considerations: first, he is willing to increase the probability of survival by reducing the set of potential contenders. Second, he fears that a bad reputation would serve him poorly should he in turn become the loser. One conclusion

\textsuperscript{37} As in the case of Princes of the Tower, being a bastard (a legal term at that time) does not automatically exclude the person from the set of legitimate contenders.

\textsuperscript{38} A famous example of the ‘elimination strategy’ is the Slaughter of Innocent. Upon hearing the prophecy that he would be dethroned by the just-born ‘King of the Jews’, King Herod ordered to kill all male children under two years of age in Bethlehem.
that we are able to illustrate employing a historical narrative is the existence of markedly different equilibria paths. Between 1830 and nowadays, Venezuela witnessed a larger number of successful hostile comebacks of leaders that were disposed earlier. In a drastic contrast, in the Ottoman Empire, a hereditary monarchy, a typical move by a new ruler was to try to kill all the potential contenders to the throne.
References


8 Appendix

Proof of Lemma 6. \( \alpha_{0n} = 1 \) implies \( \alpha_{n0} = 1 \). From the proof of lemma 5, it follows that \( U^E_{n0} > U^S_{n0} \) as \( U^S_{n0} \geq U^E_{n0} \) leads to a contradiction. By the single-crossing condition, \( U^E_{n+0} > U^S_{n+0} \). This implies \( \alpha_{n+0} = 1 \), and hence \( \alpha_{0n+} = 1 \).

Proof of Lemma 7. Since \( \alpha_{0n+} < 1 \), \( \alpha_{0n} < 1 \) as well. Therefore, \( U_{n0} = S(\alpha_{0n}) \) and \( U_{n+0} = S(\alpha_{0n+}) \). Consider, however, \( U^E_{n0} \). We have

\[
U^E_{n0} = Y + \beta ((1 - \mu) (Y + \beta W_{n+0}) + \mu W_{n+0})
\]

\[
= (1 - \mu) Y + ((1 - \mu) \beta + \mu) (Y + \beta W_{n+0})
\]

\[
= (1 - \mu) Y + ((1 - \mu) \beta + \mu) U^S_{n+0}.
\]

Assume that \( S(\alpha_{0n}) \leq S(\alpha_{0n+}) + \varepsilon \), we obtain

\[
U^E_{n0} - U_{n0} = (1 - \mu) Y + ((1 - \mu) \beta + \mu) S(\alpha_{0n+}) - S(\alpha_{0n})
\]

\[
\geq (1 - \mu) Y + ((1 - \mu) \beta + \mu) S(\alpha_{0n+}) - S(\alpha_{0n}) - \varepsilon
\]

\[
\geq (1 - \mu) (Y - S(\alpha_{0n+}) (1 - \beta)) - \varepsilon
\]

\[
\geq \frac{(1 - \mu) \beta p Y}{(1 - \beta + 2p \beta)} - \varepsilon.
\]

Therefore, if we take \( \varepsilon < \frac{(1 - \mu) \beta p Y}{(1 - \beta + 2p \beta)} \), assertion that \( S(\alpha_{0n}) \leq S(\alpha_{0n+}) + \varepsilon \) would lead to a contradiction. Then \( S(\alpha_{0n}) > S(\alpha_{0n+}) + \varepsilon \), and, since \( S \) is strictly decreasing, \( \alpha_{0n} < \alpha_{0n+} \).

Proof of Lemma 8. By previous lemmas, it is sufficient to demonstrate that \( \alpha_{0n} = 1 \) for some \( n \). If it were not true, however, then we would find that \( S(\alpha_{00}) - S(\alpha_{0n}) \) may be an arbitrarily large number. This contradicts the fact that both numbers lie between \( S(1) \) and \( S(0) \).

Proof of Lemma 9. An agent in the states \( (0, m) \) and \( (0, m^+) \) is indifferent whether to execute or spare if \( U^E_{0m} = U^S_{0m} \) and \( U^E_{0m^+} = U^S_{0m^+} \). The utility from execution in either of these states are equal to

\[
U^E_{0m} = Y + \beta ((1 - \mu) (Y + \beta W_{10}) + \mu W_{10}) = U^E_{0m^+}.
\]

Therefore, \( S(\alpha_{m0}) = U^S_{0m} = U^S_{0m^+} = S(\alpha_{m+0}) \). Since \( S(\alpha) \) is a strictly decreasing function, \( \alpha_{m0} = \alpha_{m+0} \).

Proof of Lemma 10. Since \( \alpha_{0m} = 1 \), the agent at least does not strictly prefer to spare, and thus \( U_{n0} = U^E_{n0} \). Since \( \alpha_{0n+} = 1 \),

\[
W_{m+0} = \frac{1 - p - \beta (1 - \alpha_{0m+}) (1 - 2p)}{1 - (1 - \alpha_{0m+}) \beta (1 - p)} U_{m+0} = \frac{\alpha_{0m^+} p D}{1 - (1 - \alpha_{0m^+}) \beta (1 - p)}
\]

\[
= (1 - p) U_{m+0} - p D,
\]
and hence

\[ U_{m0} = U_{m0}^E = (1 + \beta (1 - \mu)) Y + \beta (1 - \mu) + \mu) W_{m+0} \]  

(16)

\[ = (1 + \beta (1 - \mu)) Y + \beta (1 - \mu) + \mu) ((1 - p) U_{m+0} - pD). \]

Let us demonstrate that \( U_{m0} = U_{m+0} \). If we substitute \( U_{m+0} \) in (16) for \((1 + \beta (1 - \mu)) Y + \beta (1 - \mu) + \mu) ((1 - p) U_{m+0} - pD) \) etc., then after \( n \) iterations (denote \( \gamma = \beta (1 - \mu) + \mu) (1 - p) \)) we will get

\[ U_{m0} = ((1 + \beta (1 - \mu)) Y - \beta (1 - \mu) + \mu) pD) \frac{1 - \gamma^n}{1 - \gamma} + \gamma^n U_{(m+n)0}. \]

Similarly,

\[ U_{m+0} = ((1 + \beta (1 - \mu)) Y - \beta (1 - \mu) + \mu) pD) \frac{1 - \gamma^n}{1 - \gamma} + \gamma^n U_{(m+n+1)0}. \]

Therefore,

\[ |U_{m0} - U_{m+0}| = \gamma^n |U_{(m+n)0} - U_{(m+n+1)0}| \leq \gamma^n \left( \frac{Y}{1 - \beta} + D \right). \]

Since \( 0 < \gamma < 1 \), and \( n \) can be chosen arbitrarily large, we conclude that \( U_{m0} - U_{m+0} = 0 \).

Substituting in (16) \( U_{m+0} \) for \( U_{m0} \), we will find \( U_{m0} = A \).

To prove that \( A > S (1) \), simply subtract these values.

\[ A - S (1) \]

\[ = \frac{(1 + \beta (1 - \mu)) Y - \beta (1 + \mu) + \mu) pD}{1 - \beta (1 - \mu) + \mu) (1 - p)} - \frac{Y - \beta pD}{1 - \beta (1 - p)} \]

\[ = \frac{\beta p (1 - \mu) (Y + D (1 - \beta)) (1 - \mu) p\beta}{(1 - \beta (1 - \mu) + \mu) (1 - p) (1 - \beta (1 - p))} > 0. \]

**Proof of Lemma 11.** Evidently,

\[ U_{m0}^E = (1 + \beta (1 - \mu)) Y + \beta (1 - \mu) + \mu) W_{m+0} \]

\[ = (1 + \beta (1 - \mu)) Y + \beta (1 - \mu) + \mu) ((1 - p) A - pD) = A. \]

The last equality follows from definition of \( A \).
Figure 5: “Killing Equilibrium” in the War of Roses (1455-1486)