June 13, 2018
Time	Location	Event
15:00 to 18:00		Registration, Carlton Suite (36F)
June 14, 2018
Time	Location	Event
08:00 to 18:00		Registration, Carlton Suite (36F)
09:00 to 10:30	see below	Parallel Session 1
10:30 to 11:00		Coffee Break, 3F
11:00 to 12:00		Presidential Address (Hans Peters), Sapphire Ballroom (3F)
12:00 to 13:30		Lunch, Sapphire Ballroom (3F)
12:00 to 13:30		Editorial Meeting, Pine Room (3F)
13:30 to 15:30	see below	Parallel Session 2
16:00 to 16:30		Coffee Break, 36F
16:00 to 18:00	see below	Parallel Session 3
19:00 to 21:00		Welcome Reception, Sapphire Ballroom (3F)
June 15, 2018
Time	Location	Event
09:00 to 16:00		Registration, Carlton Suite (36F)
09:00 to 10:30	see below	Parallel Session 4
10:30 to 11:00		Coffee Break, 3F
11:00 to 12:30		SCW Prize Lecture (Georgy Egorov and Debasis Mishra), Sapphire Ballroom (3F)
12:30 to 14:00		Lunch, Sapphire Ballroom (3F)
12:30 to 14:00		Council Meeting, Pine Room (3F)
14:00 to 16:00	see below	Parallel Session 5
June 16, 2018
Time	Location	Event
09:00 to 18:00		Registration, Carlton Suite (36F)
09:00 to 10:30	see below	Parallel Session 6
10:30 to 11:00		Coffee Break, 3F
11:00 to 12:00		Arrow Lecture (Tayfun Sönmez), Sapphire Ballroom (3F)
12:00 to 12:30		General Assembly, Sapphire Ballroom (3F)
12:30 to 14:00		Lunch, Sapphire Ballroom (3F)
14:00 to 15:30	see below	Parallel Session 7
15:30 to 16:00		Coffee Break, 36F
16:00 to 18:00	see below	Parallel Session 8
19:00 to 21:00		Gala Dinner, Sapphire Ballroom (3F)
June 17, 2018
Time	Location	Event
09:00 to 15:00		Registration, Carlton Suite (36F)
09:00 to 10:30	see below	Parallel Session 9
10:30 to 11:00		Coffee Break, 3F
11:00 to 12:00		Condorcet Lecture (Arunava Sen), Sapphire Ballroom (3F)
12:00 to 13:30		Lunch, Sapphire Ballroom (3F)
13:30 to 15:00	see below	Parallel Session 10

Summary of All Sessions
Click here for an index of all participants

#	Date/Time	Location	Type	Title	Papers
1	June 14, 2018 9:00-10:30	Peacock Suite	invited	Decision theory 1	3
2	June 14, 2018 9:00-10:30	Garnet Suite (37F)	invited	Fairness, justice and equity (conceptual 1)	3
3	June 14, 2018 9:00-10:30	Charlotte Suite	invited	Matching (fraction/trading)	3
4	June 14, 2018 9:00-10:30	Belle-vue Suite	invited	Mechanism design 1	3
5	June 14, 2018 9:00-10:30	Pine Room (3F)	invited	Public goods 1	3
6	June 14, 2018 9:00-10:30	Astor Suite	invited	Voting and elections (majority voting)	3
7	June 14, 2018 9:00-10:30	Berkeley Suite	invited	Voting and elections (strategic voting 1)	3
8	June 14, 2018 13:30-15:30	Berkeley Suite	invited	Mechanism design 2	4
9	June 14, 2018 13:30-15:30	Charlotte Suite	invited	Implementation	4
10	June 14, 2018 13:30-15:30	Astor Suite	invited	Voting and elections (probabilistic 1)	4
11	June 14, 2018 13:30-15:30	Peacock Suite	invited	Matching (probabilistic/random)	4
12	June 14, 2018 13:30-15:30	Belle-vue Suite	invited	Political economy	4
13	June 14, 2018 13:30-15:30	Garnet Suite (37F)	invited	Voting and elections (scoring/alternative)	4
14	June 14, 2018 16:00-18:00	Astor Suite	invited	Market design 1	4
15	June 14, 2018 16:00-18:00	Peacock Suite	invited	Mechanism design 3	4
16	June 14, 2018 16:00-18:00	Berkeley Suite	invited	Voting and elections (social choice 1)	4
17	June 14, 2018 16:00-18:00	Pine Room (3F)	invited	Cooperative game theory 1	4
18	June 14, 2018 16:00-18:00	Charlotte Suite	invited	Matching (assignment 1)	4
19	June 14, 2018 16:00-18:00	Belle-vue Suite	invited	Voting and elections (electorate 1)	3
20	June 14, 2018 16:00-18:00	Garnet Suite (37F)	invited	Computational social choice 1	4
21	June 15, 2018 9:00-10:30	Charlotte Suite	invited	Inequality and poverty (theory 1)	3
22	June 15, 2018 9:00-10:30	Garnet Suite (37F)	invited	Matching (assignment 2)	3
23	June 15, 2018 9:00-10:30	Astor Suite	invited	Mechanism design 4	3
24	June 15, 2018 9:00-10:30	Berkeley Suite	invited	Voting and elections (strategic voting 2)	3
25	June 15, 2018 9:00-10:30	Belle-vue Suite	invited	Fairness, justice and equity (sharing 1)	3
26	June 15, 2018 9:00-10:30	Peacock Suite	invited	Preference aggregation 1	3
27	June 15, 2018 14:00-16:00	Berkeley Suite	invited	Mechanism design 5	4
28	June 15, 2018 14:00-16:00	Garnet Suite (37F)	invited	Welfare criteria 1	4
29	June 15, 2018 14:00-16:00	Astor Suite	invited	Experimental economics 1	4
30	June 15, 2018 14:00-16:00	Peacock Suite	invited	Voting and elections (electorate 2)	4
31	June 15, 2018 14:00-16:00	Belle-vue Suite	invited	Matching (stability 1)	4
32	June 15, 2018 14:00-16:00	Charlotte Suite	invited	Strategy-proofness 1	4
33	June 15, 2018 14:00-16:00	Pine Room (3F)	invited	Voting and elections (committee/scoring)	4
34	June 16, 2018 9:00-10:30	Belle-vue Suite	invited	Taxation	3
35	June 16, 2018 9:00-10:30	Astor Suite	invited	Matching (structure)	3
36	June 16, 2018 9:00-10:30	Pine Room (3F)	invited	Decision theory 2	3
37	June 16, 2018 9:00-10:30	Peacock Suite	invited	Public goods 2	3
38	June 16, 2018 9:00-10:30	Charlotte Suite	invited	Voting and elections (social choice 2)	3
39	June 16, 2018 9:00-10:30	Berkeley Suite	invited	Fairness, Justice and Equity (conceptual 2)	3
40	June 16, 2018 9:00-10:30	Garnet Suite (37F)	invited	Mechanism design 6	3
41	June 16, 2018 14:00-15:30	Astor Suite	invited	Inequality and poverty (theory 2)	3
42	June 16, 2018 14:00-15:30	Pine Room (3F)	invited	Network	3
43	June 16, 2018 14:00-15:30	Charlotte Suite	invited	Preference aggregation 2	3
44	June 16, 2018 14:00-15:30	Berkeley Suite	invited	Voting and elections (incentivizing)	3
45	June 16, 2018 14:00-15:30	Belle-vue Suite	invited	Fairness, justice and equity (claims)	3
46	June 16, 2018 14:00-15:30	Peacock Suite	invited	Strategy-proofness 2	3
47	June 16, 2018 14:00-15:30	Garnet Suite (37F)	invited	Cooperative game theory 2	3
48	June 16, 2018 16:00-18:00	Pine Room (3F)	invited	Experimental economics 2	3
49	June 16, 2018 16:00-18:00	Astor Suite	invited	Voting and elections (electorate 3)	4
50	June 16, 2018 16:00-18:00	Belle-vue Suite	invited	Preference aggregation 3	4
51	June 16, 2018 16:00-18:00	Charlotte Suite	invited	Market design 2	4
52	June 16, 2018 16:00-18:00	Berkeley Suite	invited	Matching (stability 2)	4
53	June 16, 2018 16:00-18:00	Peacock Suite	invited	Voting and elections (probabilistic 2)	4
54	June 16, 2018 16:00-18:00	Garnet Suite (37F)	invited	Mechanism design 7	3
55	June 17, 2018 9:00-10:30	Peacock Suite	invited	Matching (trading)	3
56	June 17, 2018 9:00-10:30	Berkeley Suite	invited	Strategy-proofness 3	3
57	June 17, 2018 9:00-10:30	Belle-vue Suite	invited	Voting and elections (social choice 3)	3
58	June 17, 2018 9:00-10:30	Astor Suite	invited	Fairness, justice and equity (sharing)	3
59	June 17, 2018 9:00-10:30	Charlotte Suite	invited	Welfare criteria 2	3
60	June 17, 2018 9:00-10:30	Garnet Suite (37F)	invited	Inequality and poverty (application 1)	3
61	June 17, 2018 9:00-10:30	Pine Room (3F)	invited	Game theory 1	3
62	June 17, 2018 13:30-15:00	Astor Suite	invited	Cooperative game theory 3	3
63	June 17, 2018 13:30-15:00	Garnet Suite (37F)	invited	Coalition formation	3
64	June 17, 2018 13:30-15:00	Peacock Suite	invited	Game theory 2	3
65	June 17, 2018 13:30-15:00	Belle-vue Suite	invited	Mechanism design 8	3
66	June 17, 2018 13:30-15:00	Charlotte Suite	invited	Inequality and poverty (application 2)	2
67	June 17, 2018 13:30-15:00	Berkeley Suite	invited	Computational social choice 2	3

 

67 sessions, 224 papers, and 0 presentations with no associated papers

The 14th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
Detailed List of Sessions

Session 1: Decision theory 1 June 14, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Peacock Suite
Session Chair: Lars Lefgren, Brigham Young University
Session type: invited
Quasi-Separable Preferences
By Wei-zhi Qin; National Taiwan University Hendrik Rommeswinkel; National Taiwan University
presented by: Hendrik Rommeswinkel, National Taiwan University
Behavioral Influence
By Christopher Chambers; Georgetown University Tugce Cuhadaroglu; University of St Andrews Yusufcan Masatlioglu; University of Maryland
presented by: Tugce Cuhadaroglu, University of St Andrews
Utility Maximization with Sensory Limitations: Theory and Evidence
By Lars Lefgren; Brigham Young University Olga Stoddard; Brigham Young University John Stovall; Brigham Young University
presented by: Lars Lefgren, Brigham Young University
Session 2: Fairness, justice and equity (conceptual 1) June 14, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Garnet Suite (37F)
Session Chair: Geir Asheim, University of Oslo
Session type: invited
Rank-discounting as a resolution to a dilemma in population ethics
By Geir Asheim; University of Oslo Stephane Zuber; Paris School of Economics - CNRS
presented by: Geir Asheim, University of Oslo
Fair utilitarianism
By Marc Fleurbaey; Princeton University Stephane Zuber; Paris School of Economics - CNRS
presented by: Marc Fleurbaey, Princeton University
The Non-Identity problem and philosophical foundation of intergenerational equity
By Reiko Gotoh; Hitotsubashi University
presented by: Reiko Gotoh, Hitotsubashi University
Session 3: Matching (fraction/trading) June 14, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Charlotte Suite
Session Chair: Vikram Manjunath,
Session type: invited
Fractional Top Trading Cycle
By Jingsheng Yu; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics Jun Zhang; Nanjing Audit University
presented by: Jun Zhang, Nanjing Audit University
The Impossibility of Individually Rational, Pareto-efficient, and Strategy-proof rules for Fractional Matching Markets
By Samson Alva; University of Texas at San Antonio Vikram Manjunath
presented by: Vikram Manjunath,
Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with coalitional trade
By Fatma Aslan; Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul and Conservatoire national des arts et métiers (Cnam), Paris Jean LAINE; Cnam
presented by: Fatma Aslan, Istanbul Bilgi University and Conservatoire national des arts et métiers
Session 4: Mechanism design 1 June 14, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Belle-vue Suite
Session Chair: Ruben Juarez, University of Hawaii
Session type: invited
Profit-Sharing and Efficient Time Allocation
By Ruben Juarez; University of Hawaii
presented by: Ruben Juarez, University of Hawaii
Optimal Mechanism for Land Acquisition
By Soumendu Sarkar; TERI School of Advanced Studies
presented by: Soumendu Sarkar, TERI School of Advanced Studies
Mechanism Design with a Guess of Social Surplus
By Yuta Nakamura; Keio University
presented by: Yuta Nakamura, Keio University
Session 5: Public goods 1 June 14, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Pine Room (3F)
Session Chair: Agnieszka Rusinowska, Paris School of Economics - CNRS, Univer
Session type: invited
Cognitive hierarchy model in a threshold public good game
By Doruk Iris; Sogang University So Jin Lee; Sogang University
presented by: So Jin Lee, Sogang University
Public Good Provision Mechanisms and Reciprocity
By Maria Kozlovskaya; Aston University Antonio Nicolo; University of Padova, Italy
presented by: Maria Kozlovskaya, Aston University
Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies
By Anne van den Nouweland; University of Oregon Agnieszka Rusinowska; Paris School of Economics - CNRS, Univer
presented by: Agnieszka Rusinowska, Paris School of Economics - CNRS, Univer
Session 6: Voting and elections (majority voting) June 14, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Astor Suite
Session Chair: Jordi Massó, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE
Session type: invited
A Re-Interpretation of the Normative Foundations of Majority Rule
By Mahendra Prasad; University of California, Berkeley
presented by: Mahendra Prasad, University of California, Berkeley
Resource Allocation by Frugal Majority Rule: An Arrovian Possibility Result
By Klaus Nehring; University of California, Davis Clemens Puppe; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
presented by: Clemens Puppe, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
Not all majority-based social choice functions are obviously strategy-proof
By R. Pablo Arribillaga; Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis Jordi Massó; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE Alejandro Neme; Universidad Nacional de San Luis
presented by: Jordi Massó, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE
Session 7: Voting and elections (strategic voting 1) June 14, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Berkeley Suite
Session Chair: Christian Basteck, ULB
Session type: invited
An informational basis of voting rules
By Alexander Karpov; National Research University Higher School of Economics
presented by: Alexander Karpov, National Research University Higher School of Economics
Assessment Voting in Large Electorates
By Hans Gersbach; ETH Zurich Akaki Mamageishvili; ETH Zurich Oriol Tejada; CER-ETH
presented by: Akaki Mamageishvili, ETH Zurich
Electing Moderates
By Christian Basteck; ULB
presented by: Christian Basteck, ULB
Session 8: Mechanism design 2 June 14, 2018 13:30 to 15:30 Berkeley Suite
Session Chair: Andrew Mackenzie, Maastricht University
Session type: invited
Strategy-proofness and efficiency in assignment problem with discrete payments
By Ryosuke Sakai; Osaka University Shigehiro Serizawa; Osaka University
presented by: Ryosuke Sakai, Osaka University
Technology Licensing and Environmental Policy Instruments: Price Control versus Quantity Control
By Seung-Gyu Sim; University of Tokyo Sungwan Hong; University of Tokyo
presented by: Sungwan Hong, University of Tokyo
Incentive Compatible Resource Transmission with Punishment
[slides]
By Lining Han Ruben Juarez; University of Hawaii
presented by: Lining Han,
Club good mechanisms: from free-riders to citizen-shareholders, from impossibility to characterization
By Andrew Mackenzie; Maastricht University Christian Trudeau; University of Windsor
presented by: Andrew Mackenzie, Maastricht University
Session 9: Implementation June 14, 2018 13:30 to 15:30 Charlotte Suite
Session Chair: Michele Lombardi, University of Glasgow
Session type: invited
Behavioral Implementation under Incomplete Information
[slides]
By Mehmet Barlo; Sabanci University Nuh Aygun Dalkiran; Bilkent University
presented by: Mehmet Barlo, Sabanci University
Repeated Implementation with Overlapping Generations of Agents
By Helmuts Azacis; Cardiff University
presented by: Helmuts Azacis, Cardiff University
Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms Without Monetary Transfers: A Solution to the Two-Person Implementation Problem
By Ville Korpela; Turku School of Economics Michele Lombardi; University of Glasgow
presented by: Ville Korpela, Turku School of Economics
Implementable piecemeal policies
By Michele Lombardi; University of Glasgow
presented by: Michele Lombardi, University of Glasgow
Session 10: Voting and elections (probabilistic 1) June 14, 2018 13:30 to 15:30 Astor Suite
Session Chair: Dipjyoti Majumdar, Concordia University
Session type: invited
Strategy-Proof Random Social Choice Functions with Behavioral Agents: A Lexicographic Approach
By Sarvesh Bandhu; ISI, Delhi
presented by: Sarvesh Bandhu, ISI, Delhi
Random Social Choice Functions for Single-peaked Domains on Trees
By Hans Peters; Maastricht University Souvik Roy; Indian Statistical Institute Soumyarup Sadhukhan; Indian Statistical Institute
presented by: Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Indian Statistical Institute
Formation of Committees through Random Voting Rules
By Souvik Roy; Indian Statistical Institute Soumyarup Sadhukhan; Indian Statistical Institute Arunava Sen; Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi
presented by: Souvik Roy, Indian Statistical Institute
A Note On probabilistic Voting Rules
By Dipjyoti Majumdar; Concordia University Souvik Roy; University of Caen
presented by: Dipjyoti Majumdar, Concordia University
Session 11: Matching (probabilistic/random) June 14, 2018 13:30 to 15:30 Peacock Suite
Session Chair: Youngsub Chun, Seoul National University
Session type: invited
Sharing Objects over Time: A Probabilistic Approach
By Yuki Tamura; University of Rochester
presented by: Yuki Tamura, University of Rochester
Upper-Contour Strategy-Proofness in the Probabilistic Assignment Problem
By Youngsub Chun; Seoul National University Kiyong Yun; Seoul National University
presented by: Youngsub Chun, Seoul National University
Ex-ante fair random allocation
By Xiang Han; Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
presented by: Xiang Han, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Random Assignments on Sequentially Dichotomous Domains
By Peng Liu; Singapore Management University
presented by: Peng Liu, Singapore Management University
Session 12: Political economy June 14, 2018 13:30 to 15:30 Belle-vue Suite
Session Chair: John Weymark, Vanderbilt University
Session type: invited
The Economic Origins of Force, Power, and the State: A Theory of Social Order
By Yijiang Wang; CKGraduate School of Business
presented by: Yijiang Wang, CKGraduate School of Business
Election Rules, Legislators' Incentives, and Policy Outcomes: Evidence from the Mixed Member System in Germany
By Nicola Maaser; University of Bremen Thomas Stratmann; George Mason University
presented by: Nicola Maaser, University of Bremen
Why Delegate? Comparing Direct And Representative Democracy.
By Guadalupe Correa-Lopera; Universidad de Málaga
presented by: Guadalupe Correa-Lopera, Universidad de Málaga
Partisan Strength and Legislative Bargaining
By Thomas Choate; Stanford Graduate School of Business John Weymark; Vanderbilt University Alan Wiseman; Vanderbilt University
presented by: John Weymark, Vanderbilt University
Session 13: Voting and elections (scoring/alternative) June 14, 2018 13:30 to 15:30 Garnet Suite (37F)
Session Chair: Vincent Merlin, Normandie Univ, UNICAEN, CNRS, CREM
Session type: invited
Measuring majority tyranny: axiomatic approach
By Aleksei Kondratev; Higher School of Economics Alexander Nesterov; Higher School of Economics
presented by: Aleksei Kondratev, Higher School of Economics
Ordinally Efficient and Reliable Social Choice: The Pluri-Borda Rule
By Klaus Nehring; University of California, Davis
presented by: Klaus Nehring, University of California, Davis
Scoring Rules and Level-k Thinking in Games with Population Uncertainty
By Francois Maniquet; CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain Margherita Negri; University of St. Andrews
presented by: Margherita Negri, University of St. Andrews
Scoring Run-off Rules, Singled-Peaked Preferences and Paradoxes of Variable Electorate
By Eric Kamwa; Université des Antilles & LC2S UMR CNRS 8053 Vincent Merlin; Normandie Univ, UNICAEN, CNRS, CREM Faty-mbaye Top; CREM, Université de Caen Normandie
presented by: Vincent Merlin, Normandie Univ, UNICAEN, CNRS, CREM
Session 14: Market design 1 June 14, 2018 16:00 to 18:00 Astor Suite
Session Chair: Utku Unver, Boston College
Session type: invited
(**cancelled)Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings
By Tommy Andersson; Lund University Lars Ehlers; Universite Montreal
presented by: Tommy Andersson, Lund University
Incentives in a Job-market Clearinghouse
By Ryan Tierney; University of Southern Denmark
presented by: Ryan Tierney, University of Southern Denmark
Optimal Priority Rule for Organ Allocation
By Jaehong Kim; Xiamen University Mengling Li; Xiamen University
presented by: Mengling Li, Xiamen University
Incentivized Kidney Exchange
By Tayfun Sonmez; Boston College Utku Unver; Boston College M. Bumin Yenmez; Boston College
presented by: Utku Unver, Boston College
Session 15: Mechanism design 3 June 14, 2018 16:00 to 18:00 Peacock Suite
Session Chair: Shigehiro Serizawa, Osaka University
Session type: invited
Pure Information Design in Classical Auctions
By Constantine Sorokin; NRU-HSE Eyal Winter; The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
presented by: Constantine Sorokin, NRU-HSE
Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey mechanisms
By Yu Zhou; Osaka University Shigehiro Serizawa; Osaka University
presented by: Yu Zhou, Osaka University
Sequential Search Auctions with a Deadline
By Joosung Lee; University of Edinburgh Daniel Z. LI; Durham University Business School
presented by: Joosung Lee, University of Edinburgh
Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage
By Tomoya Kazumura; University of Tokyo Debasis Mishra; Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Shigehiro Serizawa; Osaka University
presented by: Shigehiro Serizawa, Osaka University
Session 16: Voting and elections (social choice 1) June 14, 2018 16:00 to 18:00 Berkeley Suite
Session Chair: Karl-Dieter Crisman, Gordon College
Session type: invited
Bouletic/Deontic Modality, Liberalism and Social Choice
By Sumiyo Nishiguchi; Tokyo University of Science
presented by: Sumiyo Nishiguchi, Tokyo University of Science
LINGUISTIC COLLECTIVE DECISIONS
By Edurne Falco; University of Valladolid Madhuparna Karmokar; Indian Statistical Institute Souvik Roy; Indian Statistical Institute Ton Storcken; Maastricht University
presented by: Madhuparna Karmokar, Indian Statistical Institute
Manipulations-resistant facility location mechanisms for ZV-line graphs
By Ilan Nehama; Kyushu University Taiki Todo; Kyushu University Makoto Yokoo; Kyushu University
presented by: Ilan Nehama, Kyushu University
Broad Support in Two-Person Elections
By Karl-Dieter Crisman; Gordon College
presented by: Karl-Dieter Crisman, Gordon College
Session 17: Cooperative game theory 1 June 14, 2018 16:00 to 18:00 Pine Room (3F)
Session Chair: Yukihiko Funaki, Waseda University
Session type: invited
Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value
By Matthias Feldotto; Paderborn University Claus-Jochen Haake; University of Paderborn Alexander Skopalik; Paderborn University Nadja Stroh-Maraun; Paderborn University
presented by: Nadja Stroh-Maraun, Paderborn University
From the Shapley to Equal Division : A class of values for TU games
By Rajnish Kumar; Queen's University Belfast
presented by: Rajnish Kumar, Queen's University Belfast
A note on the interpretation of non additive-measures
By Frédéric Chantreuil; Universit of Caen Sebastien Courtin; CREM, Université de Caen Normandie Kevin Fourrey; Université Caen Normandie Isabelle Lebon; CREM-CNRS
presented by: Frédéric Chantreuil, Universit of Caen
Relationally equal treatment of equals characterizes combinations of values for cooperative games
By Yukihiko Funaki; Waseda University Takumi Kongo; Fukuoka University Koji Yokote
presented by: Yukihiko Funaki, Waseda University
Session 18: Matching (assignment 1) June 14, 2018 16:00 to 18:00 Charlotte Suite
Session Chair: Dinko Dimitrov, Saarland University
Session type: invited
Stable Task Allocation
By Antonio Nicolo; University of Padova, Italy Arunava Sen; Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Sonal Yadav; University of Padova, Italy
presented by: Sonal Yadav, University of Padova, Italy
Matching with Different Student Types
By Britta Hoyer; Paderborn University Nadja Stroh-Maraun; Paderborn University
presented by: Britta Hoyer, Paderborn University
Assignment games with externalities revisited
By Jens Gudmundsson; Lund University Helga Habis; Corvinus University of Budapest
presented by: Helga Habis, Corvinus University of Budapest
Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems
By Dinko Dimitrov; Saarland University Laura Kasper; Saarland University Yongjie Yang; Saarland University
presented by: Dinko Dimitrov, Saarland University
Session 19: Voting and elections (electorate 1) June 14, 2018 16:00 to 18:00 Belle-vue Suite
Session Chair: Thibault laurent, Toulouse School of Economics
Session type: invited
A Swing-State Theorem, with Evidence
[slides]
By John McLaren; University of Virginia Xiangjun Ma; University of International Business and Economics
presented by: Xiangjun Ma, University of International Business and Economics
2017 French presidential election. Are voters happy with their first round vote?
By Sebastien Courtin; CREM - Caen University Jean-Francois Laslier; CNRS - ENS - PSE - Paris 1 Isabelle Lebon; CREM-CNRS
presented by: Isabelle Lebon, CREM-CNRS
Exploring the Effects of National and Regional Popular Vote Interstate Compact on a Toy Symmetric Version of the Electoral College: An Electoral Engineering Perspective
By Olivier de Mouzon; Toulouse School of Economics Thibault laurent; Toulouse School of Economics Michel Le Breton; Toulouse School of Economics Dominique Lepelley; Univesité de la Réunion
presented by: Thibault laurent, Toulouse School of Economics
Session 20: Computational social choice 1 June 14, 2018 16:00 to 18:00 Garnet Suite (37F)
Session Chair: Tamás Fleiner, Budapest University of Technology and Economics
Session type: invited
All Condorcet Domains of Weak Orders on Three and Four Alternatives
By Tobias Dittrich; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
presented by: Tobias Dittrich, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
A Comprehensive Test of Tournament Formats
By Balázs Sziklai; Centre for Economic and Regional Studies László Csató; Corvinus University of Budapest Peter Biro; Hungarian Academy of Sciences
presented by: Balázs Sziklai, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions Using Ehrhart Theory and Computer Simulations
By Felix Brandt; Technische Universität München Johannes Hofbauer Martin Strobel; Nanyang Technological University
presented by: Johannes Hofbauer,
Possible and necessary allocations under serial dictatorship with incomplete preference lists
By Katarína Cechlárová; UPJS, Kosice Tamás Fleiner; Budapest University of Technology and Economics Ildikó Schlotter; Budapest University of Technology and Economics
presented by: Tamás Fleiner, Budapest University of Technology and Economics
Session 21: Inequality and poverty (theory 1) June 15, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Charlotte Suite
Session Chair: Casilda Lasso de la Vega, University of the Basque Country
Session type: invited
Inequality measurement for bounded variables
By Iñaki Permanyer; Centre d'Estudis Demografics Suman Seth; Leeds University Business School Gaston Yalonetzky; University of Leeds
presented by: Gaston Yalonetzky, University of Leeds
Measuring equalising public policies' impact on inequality: A decomposition approach
By Frédéric Chantreuil; Universit of Caen Isabelle Lebon; CREM-CNRS Kevin Fourrey; Université Caen Normandie
presented by: Kevin Fourrey, Université Caen Normandie
The Measurement of Income Segregation
By Casilda Lasso de la Vega; University of the Basque Country Oscar Volij
presented by: Casilda Lasso de la Vega, University of the Basque Country
Session 22: Matching (assignment 2) June 15, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Garnet Suite (37F)
Session Chair: Mustafa Oguz Afacan, SABANCI UNIVERSITY
Session type: invited
School Choice with Siblings
By Umut Dur; North Carolina State University Thayer Morrill; North Carolina State University William Phan; North Carolina State University
presented by: William Phan, North Carolina State University
Assignment Maximization
By Mustafa Oguz Afacan; SABANCI UNIVERSITY Inacio Bo; WZB Berlin Social Science Center Bertan Turhan; ITAM-CIE
presented by: Inacio Bo, WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Strategy-Proof Size Improvement: Is it Possible?
By Mustafa Oguz Afacan; SABANCI UNIVERSITY Umut Dur; North Carolina State University
presented by: Mustafa Oguz Afacan, SABANCI UNIVERSITY
Session 23: Mechanism design 4 June 15, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Astor Suite
Session Chair: Albin Erlanson, Stockholm School of Economics
Session type: invited
Fair Competition Design
By Ricardo Arlegi; Public University of Navarre Dinko Dimitrov; Saarland University
presented by: Ricardo Arlegi, Public University of Navarre
Referral Incentive Design
By Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong; University of Bristol Joosung Lee; University of Edinburgh
presented by: Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong, University of Bristol
A note on optimal allocation with Costly verification
By Albin Erlanson; Stockholm School of Economics
presented by: Albin Erlanson, Stockholm School of Economics
Session 24: Voting and elections (strategic voting 2) June 15, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Berkeley Suite
Session Chair: Jean-Francois Laslier, CNRS
Session type: invited
The Impossibility of Equal Voting Power
By Debabrata Pal; Jawaharlal Nehru University
presented by: Debabrata Pal, Jawaharlal Nehru University
Homo MOralis goes to the voting booth
By Ingela Alger; Toulouse School of Economics Jean-Francois Laslier; CNRS Jorgen Weibull; Stockholm School of Economics
presented by: Jean-Francois Laslier, CNRS
Political Alternation with Incumbency Factor
By Fernanda Herrera; El Colegio de Mexico
presented by: Fernanda Herrera, El Colegio de Mexico
Session 25: Fairness, justice and equity (sharing 1) June 15, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Belle-vue Suite
Session Chair: Ricardo Martinez,
Session type: invited
Legal and Political Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Water Shortage
By Takayuki Oishi; Meisei University
presented by: Takayuki Oishi, Meisei University
River Sharing: Implementation of Efficient Water Consumption
By Chiu Yu Ko; National University of Singapore Jens Leth Hougaard; University of Copenhagen Jens Gudmundsson; Lund University
presented by: Chiu Yu Ko, National University of Singapore
The problem of dividing a budget among several districts
By Ricardo Martinez
presented by: Ricardo Martinez,
Session 26: Preference aggregation 1 June 15, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Peacock Suite
Session Chair: Pablo Amorós, Universidad de Málaga
Session type: invited
Specific tastes or cliques? An analysis of a controversial jurors' voting in a classical music competition
[slides]
By Honorata Sosnowska; Warsaw School of Economics Krzysztof Kontek; Warsaw School of Economics
presented by: Krzysztof Kontek, Warsaw School of Economics
Over-dog team, under-dog team and the philosophy of ranking soccer teams?
By Frédéric Chantreuil; Universit of Caen Sebastien Courtin; CREM, Université de Caen Normandie Olivier Dagnelie; Universite de Caen
presented by: Sebastien Courtin, CREM, Université de Caen Normandie
The problem of aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition
By Pablo Amorós; Universidad de Málaga
presented by: Pablo Amorós, Universidad de Málaga
Session 27: Mechanism design 5 June 15, 2018 14:00 to 16:00 Berkeley Suite
Session Chair: James Schummer, Northwestern University
Session type: invited
Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
By Foivos Savva; University of Glasgow
presented by: Foivos Savva, University of Glasgow
Eliciting and Aggregating Information by Sortition in Collective Choice
By Rene Saran; University of Cincinnati
presented by: Rene Saran, University of Cincinnati
Nash implementation with honesty and ranges of honesty
By Tsuyoshi Adachi; Waseda University
presented by: Tsuyoshi Adachi, Waseda University
Sequential preference revelation in incomplete information settings
By James Schummer; Northwestern University Rodrigo Velez; Texas A&M University
presented by: James Schummer, Northwestern University
Session 28: Welfare criteria 1 June 15, 2018 14:00 to 16:00 Garnet Suite (37F)
Session Chair: Thierry Marchant, Ghent University
Session type: invited
The measurement of welfare change
By Walter Bossert; University of Montreal Bhaskar Dutta; University of Warwick
presented by: Walter Bossert, University of Montreal
An axiomatization of the mixed Bentham-Rawls social welfare orderings
By Kohei Kamaga; Sophia University
presented by: Kohei Kamaga, Sophia University
Efficiency, equity, and social rationality under uncertainty
By Kaname Miyagishima; Aoyama Gakuin University
presented by: Kaname Miyagishima, Aoyama Gakuin University
Utilitarianism without individual utilities
By Thierry Marchant; Ghent University
presented by: Thierry Marchant, Ghent University
Session 29: Experimental economics 1 June 15, 2018 14:00 to 16:00 Astor Suite
Session Chair: Jana Rollmann, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
Session type: invited
Multilateral Bargaining with Costly Recognition: An Experiment
By Duk Gyoo Kim; University of Mannheim Sang-Hyun Kim; Yonsei University
presented by: Duk Gyoo Kim, University of Mannheim
The Effects of Strategic Environment, Communication, and Cognitive Skills on Cooperation
By Nobuyuki Hanaki; Université Cote d'Azur Ali Ozkes; Aix Marseille School of Economics
presented by: Ali Ozkes, Aix Marseille School of Economics
Delegation and Public Pressure in a threshold Public Goods Game
By Doruk Iris; Sogang University Jungmin Lee; Seoul National University & IZA Alessandro Tavoni; LSE
presented by: Doruk Iris, Sogang University
Participation, Impact and Risk: A Field Experiment on Budget Allocation Voting
By Jana Rollmann; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) Clemens Puppe; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
presented by: Jana Rollmann, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
Session 30: Voting and elections (electorate 2) June 15, 2018 14:00 to 16:00 Peacock Suite
Session Chair: Nicolas Sahuguet, HEC Montreal
Session type: invited
Polarization and inefficient information aggregation in an electoral competition
By Tomoya Tajika; Hitotsubashi university
presented by: Tomoya Tajika, Hitotsubashi university
Political Polarization and Social Influence Networks
By Samson Alva; University of Texas at San Antonio
presented by: Samson Alva, University of Texas at San Antonio
Electoral incentives: the interaction between candidate selection and electoral rules
By Benoit Crutzen; Erasmus University Rotterdam Nicolas Sahuguet; HEC Montreal
presented by: Nicolas Sahuguet, HEC Montreal
Silent Promotion of Agendas: Campaign Contributions and Ideological Polarization
By Hideo Konishi; Boston College Chen-Yu Pan; Wuhan University
presented by: Chen-Yu Pan, Wuhan University
Session 31: Matching (stability 1) June 15, 2018 14:00 to 16:00 Belle-vue Suite
Session Chair: Szilvia Papai, Concordia University
Session type: invited
A Note on Stability in One-to-One, Multi-period Matching Markets
By Maciej Kotowski; Harvard University
presented by: Maciej Kotowski, Harvard University
Stability against Robust Deviations in the Roommate Problem
By Daisuke Hirata; Hitotsubashi University Yusuke Kasuya; Kobe University Kentaro Tomoeda; University of Technology Sydney
presented by: Daisuke Hirata, Hitotsubashi University
Fairness Comparisons of Strategyproof and Efficient Matching Rules
[slides]
By Pooya Ghasvareh; Concordia University Szilvia Papai; Concordia University
presented by: Szilvia Papai, Concordia University
Axioms for stable rules in assignment markets
By Rene van den Brink; VU Amsterdam Marina Núñez; Universitat de Barcelona Francisco Robles; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
presented by: Marina Núñez, Universitat de Barcelona
Session 32: Strategy-proofness 1 June 15, 2018 14:00 to 16:00 Charlotte Suite
Session Chair: Bernardo Moreno, Universidad de Málaga
Session type: invited
Maximal domain for Stable and Strategy-proof Matching rules
By PINAKI MANDAL; INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE, KOLKATA Souvik Roy; Indian Statistical Institute
presented by: PINAKI MANDAL, INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE, KOLKATA
Strategy-proof Rules on Arbitrary Single-peaked Domains
By Gopakumar Achuthankutty; Indian Statistical Institute Souvik Roy; Indian Statistical Institute
presented by: Gopakumar Achuthankutty, Indian Statistical Institute
Top Inseparable Domains
By Abhinaba Lahiri; Indian School of Business and Finance Anup Pramanik; Indian Institute of Management
presented by: Abhinaba Lahiri, Indian School of Business and Finance
The role of domain restrictions in mechanism design: ex post incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency
By Salvador Barbera; MOVE,Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE Dolors Berga; Universitat de Girona Bernardo Moreno; Universidad de Málaga
presented by: Bernardo Moreno, Universidad de Málaga
Session 33: Voting and elections (committee/scoring) June 15, 2018 14:00 to 16:00 Pine Room (3F)
Session Chair: Eric Kamwa, Université des Antilles & LC2S UMR CNRS 8053
Session type: invited
The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency
By Mostapha Diss; GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, France Eric Kamwa; Université des Antilles & LC2S UMR CNRS 8053 Abdelmonaim Tlidi; University Cadi Ayyad of Marrakesh
presented by: Abdelmonaim Tlidi, University Cadi Ayyad of Marrakesh
Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting
By Daniela Bubboloni; Università degli Studi di Firenze, Italy Mostapha Diss; GATE Lyon St-Etienne, France Michele Gori; Università degli Studi di Firenze, Italy
presented by: Mostapha Diss, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, France
Weighted Committee Games
By Sascha Kurz; University of Bayreuth Alexander Mayer; University of Bayreuth Stefan Napel; University of Bayreuth
presented by: Alexander Mayer, University of Bayreuth
Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: the Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Run-off Systems
By Eric Kamwa; Université des Antilles & LC2S UMR CNRS 8053 Issofa Moyouwou; University of Yaounde I
presented by: Eric Kamwa, Université des Antilles & LC2S UMR CNRS 8053
Session 34: Taxation June 16, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Belle-vue Suite
Session Chair: Francois Maniquet, CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain
Session type: invited
Public good provision financed by nonlinear income tax under reduction of envy
By Takuya Obara; Hitotsubashi University SHUICHI TSUGAWA; Kyushu university
presented by: SHUICHI TSUGAWA, Kyushu university
Equal sacrifice taxation
By John Stovall; Brigham Young University
presented by: John Stovall, Brigham Young University
Preference Responsibility vs Poverty Reduction in the taxation of labor incomes
By Lancelot Henry de Frahan; University of Chicago Francois Maniquet; CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain
presented by: Francois Maniquet, CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain
Session 35: Matching (structure) June 16, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Astor Suite
Session Chair: Alexander Westkamp, University of Cologne
Session type: invited
Two-Sided Matching with Appointment Schedule
By Chia-Ling Hsu; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics Makoto Yokoo; Kyushu University
presented by: Chia-Ling Hsu, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
Random Paths To Popularity In Two-Sided Matching
By Aleksei Kondratev; Higher School of Economics Alexander Nesterov; Higher School of Economics
presented by: Alexander Nesterov, Higher School of Economics
Strategy-Proof Exchange under Trichotomous Preferences
By Vikram Manjunath; University of Ottawa Alexander Westkamp; University of Cologne
presented by: Alexander Westkamp, University of Cologne
Session 36: Decision theory 2 June 16, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Pine Room (3F)
Session Chair: Anders Herlitz, Harvard University
Session type: invited
A Model of interaction and group identification
By Irem Bozbay; University of Surrey
presented by: Irem Bozbay, University of Surrey
A Characterisation of kth Best Rationalizable Choice Functions
By Rupali Sharma; Jawaharlal Nehru University
presented by: Rupali Sharma, Jawaharlal Nehru University
Stable and unstable choices
By Anders Herlitz; Harvard University
presented by: Anders Herlitz, Harvard University
Session 37: Public goods 2 June 16, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Peacock Suite
Session Chair: Loren Fryxell, Northwestern University
Session type: invited
Leadership through Reciprocity and Temptation
By Inkee Jang; Xiamen University
presented by: Inkee Jang, Xiamen University
Efficient public good provision by lotteries under a non-linear pricing rule
By Jingfeng Lu; National University of Singapore Zhewei Wang; Shandong University
presented by: Zhewei Wang, Shandong University
An Axiomatic Approach to Public Good Provision
By Loren Fryxell; Northwestern University
presented by: Loren Fryxell, Northwestern University
Session 38: Voting and elections (social choice 2) June 16, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Charlotte Suite
Session Chair: M. Remzi Sanver, CNRS, Universite Paris Dauphine
Session type: invited
Condorcet Consistency and the strong no show paradoxes
By Laura Kasper; Saarland University Hans Peters; Maastricht University Dries Vermeulen; Maastricht University
presented by: Laura Kasper, Saarland University
Representative range voting
By Adam Rieger; University of Glasgow
presented by: Adam Rieger, University of Glasgow
Procedural versus opportunity-wise equal treatment of alternatives: neutrality revisited
By Ali Ozkes; Aix Marseille School of Economics M. Remzi Sanver; CNRS, Universite Paris Dauphine
presented by: M. Remzi Sanver, CNRS, Universite Paris Dauphine
Session 39: Fairness, Justice and Equity (conceptual 2) June 16, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Berkeley Suite
Session Chair: Susumu Cato, The University of Tokyo
Session type: invited
Equity Criteria Based on Dominance Principle and Pareto Principle
By Norihito Sakamoto; Tokyo University of Science
presented by: Norihito Sakamoto, Tokyo University of Science
Premature deaths, accidental bequests and fairness
By Marc Fleurbaey; Princeton University Marie-Louise Leroux; UQAM Pierre Pestieau; Université de Liège Gregory Ponthiere; University Paris East (ERUDITE) and PSE Stephane Zuber; Paris School of Economics - CNRS
presented by: Gregory Ponthiere, University Paris East (ERUDITE) and PSE
Collective Responsibility, Personal Responsibility, and Compensation
By Susumu Cato; The University of Tokyo
presented by: Susumu Cato, The University of Tokyo
Session 40: Mechanism design 6 June 16, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Garnet Suite (37F)
Session Chair: Claude d'Aspremont, CORE
Session type: invited
Empirical Equilibrium
By Rodrigo Velez; Texas A&M University Alexander Brown; Texas A&M University
presented by: Rodrigo Velez, Texas A&M University
Neutralized Competition
By Seungjin Han; McMaster University
presented by: Seungjin Han, McMaster University
Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design
By Claude d'Aspremont; CORE
presented by: Claude d'Aspremont, CORE
Session 41: Inequality and poverty (theory 2) June 16, 2018 14:00 to 15:30 Astor Suite
Session Chair: Buhong Zheng, University of Colorado Denver
Session type: invited
Assessing deprivation with ordinal variables: Depth sensitivity and poverty aversion
By Suman Seth; Leeds University Business School Gaston Yalonetzky; University of Leeds
presented by: Suman Seth, Leeds University Business School
(**cancelled) On economic inequality generating process
By Jun Matsui; Waseda University
presented by: Jun Matsui, Waseda University
Stochastic Dominance and Decomposable Measures of Inequality and Poverty
By Buhong Zheng; University of Colorado Denver
presented by: Buhong Zheng, University of Colorado Denver
Session 42: Network June 16, 2018 14:00 to 15:30 Pine Room (3F)
Session Chair: Yan Long,
Session type: invited
Measuring Influence in Science: Standing on the Shoulders of Which Giants?
By Antonin Mace; Aix-Marseille School of Economics, CNRS
presented by: Antonin Mace, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, CNRS
Signaling and herd behavior in the formation of social networks
By Saptarshi Mukherjee; Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi Ruhi Sonal; Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi
presented by: Ruhi Sonal, Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi
(**cancelled) Self-fulfilling Equilibrium in Social Contests: Expectation and Neighborhood Effects
By Yan Long
presented by: Yan Long,
Session 43: Preference aggregation 2 June 16, 2018 14:00 to 15:30 Charlotte Suite
Session Chair: MAURICE SALLES,
Session type: invited
Structure-induced Condorcet Paradoxes in Hierarchical Majority Decison Making Systems
By Adrian Van Deemen; Institute for Management Research
presented by: Adrian Van Deemen, Institute for Management Research
Population-adjusted egalitarianism
By Stephane Zuber; Paris School of Economics - CNRS
presented by: Stephane Zuber, Paris School of Economics - CNRS
Independence of irrelevant alternatives: Arrow, Nash and others
By MAURICE SALLES
presented by: MAURICE SALLES,
Session 44: Voting and elections (incentivizing) June 16, 2018 14:00 to 15:30 Berkeley Suite
Session Chair: Hideo Konishi, Boston College
Session type: invited
Voting over Selfishly Optimal Income Tax Schedules with Tax-Driven Migrations
By Darong Dai; Texas A&M University
presented by: Darong Dai, Texas A&M University
Incentives for Progressive Income Taxation
By M. Socorro Puy; Universidad de Málaga
presented by: M. Socorro Puy, Universidad de Málaga
Incentivizing Team Production by Indivisible Prizes Electoral Competition under Proportional Representation
By Benoit Crutzen; Erasmus University Rotterdam Sabine Flamand; Universitat Rovira i Virgili and CREIP Hideo Konishi; Boston College Nicolas Sahuguet; HEC Montreal
presented by: Hideo Konishi, Boston College
Session 45: Fairness, justice and equity (claims) June 16, 2018 14:00 to 15:30 Belle-vue Suite
Session Chair: Chun-Hsien Yeh, Academia Sinica
Session type: invited
A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds
By Min-Hung Tsay; National Chung Cheng University
presented by: Min-Hung Tsay, National Chung Cheng University
Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs
By Yan Long Jay Sethuraman; Columbia University Jingyi Xue; Singapore Management University
presented by: Jingyi Xue, Singapore Management University
Equal area rule to adjudicate conflicting claims
By William Thomson; University of Rochester
presented by: William Thomson, University of Rochester
Session 46: Strategy-proofness 2 June 16, 2018 14:00 to 15:30 Peacock Suite
Session Chair: Dolors Berga, Universitat de Girona
Session type: invited
On The Equivalence of Local and Global Strategy-proofness
By Ujjwal Kumar; Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata Souvik Roy; Indian Statistical Institute Arunava Sen; Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Sonal Yadav; University of Padova, Italy Huaxia Zeng; Lingnan College, Sun Yat Sen University
presented by: Ujjwal Kumar, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata
Belief-independence and robust strategy-proofness
By Michael Müller; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
presented by: Michael Müller, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
When are binary ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms possible?
By Salvador Barbera; Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Dolors Berga; Universitat de Girona Bernardo Moreno; Universidad de Málaga
presented by: Dolors Berga, Universitat de Girona
Session 47: Cooperative game theory 2 June 16, 2018 14:00 to 15:30 Garnet Suite (37F)
Session Chair: Semih Koray, Bilkent University
Session type: invited
On the core of spatial voting game
By Mathieu Martin; Cergy-Pontoise zephirin nganmeni; LED, Paris 8 University, Saint-Denis Craig Tovey; Georgia Tech
presented by: Mathieu Martin, Cergy-Pontoise
Weak fairness and the Shapley value
By Pedro Calleja; University of Barcelona Francesc Llerena; Universitat Rovira i Virgili
presented by: Pedro Calleja, University of Barcelona
Every member of the core is as respectful as any other
By Semih Koray; Bilkent University Yasemin Koray; Bilkent University
presented by: Semih Koray, Bilkent University
Session 48: Experimental economics 2 June 16, 2018 16:00 to 18:00 Pine Room (3F)
Session Chair: Rustamdjan Hakimov, WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Session type: invited
An Experimental Study of The Jury Voting Model with Ambiguous Information
By Simona Fabrizi; University of Auckland Steffen Lippert; University of Auckland Addison Pan; The University of Auckland
presented by: Simona Fabrizi, University of Auckland
When Should the Jurors Talk: Timing of communication and rational ignorance
By Diego Aycinena; Universidad Francisco Marroquin Alexander Elbittar; CIDE Andrei Gomberg; ITAM Lucas Rentschler; Universidad Francisco Marroquín
presented by: Andrei Gomberg, ITAM
Iterative Versus Standard Deferred Acceptance: Experimental Evidence
By Inacio Bo; WZB Berlin Social Science Center Rustamdjan Hakimov; WZB Berlin Social Science Center
presented by: Rustamdjan Hakimov, WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Session 49: Voting and elections (electorate 3) June 16, 2018 16:00 to 18:00 Astor Suite
Session Chair: Fabian Gouret, Université de Cergy-Pontoise
Session type: invited
Bounds on Malapportionment
By László Kóczy; Hungarian Academy of Sciences Balázs Sziklai; Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
presented by: László Kóczy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
voters conformism and policy efficiency
By HUIHUI DING; University of Cergy-Pontoise
presented by: HUIHUI DING, University of Cergy-Pontoise
Do Supermajority Rules Really Deter Extremism? The Role of Electoral Competition
By Daiki Kishishita; The University of Tokyo Atsushi Yamagishi; The University of Tokyo
presented by: Daiki Kishishita, The University of Tokyo
Intensity valence
By Fabian Gouret; Université de Cergy-Pontoise Stephane Rossignol; University Paris 8
presented by: Fabian Gouret, Université de Cergy-Pontoise
Session 50: Preference aggregation 3 June 16, 2018 16:00 to 18:00 Belle-vue Suite
Session Chair: Jean LAINE, Cnam
Session type: invited
Fractional Group Identification
By Wonki Jo Cho; Korea University
presented by: Wonki Jo Cho, Korea University
Preference Aggregation for Couples
[slides]
By Rouzbeh Ghouchani; Concordia University Szilvia Papai; Concordia University
presented by: Rouzbeh Ghouchani, Concordia University
On importance indices in multicriteria decision making
By Michel Grabisch; University of Paris I, Paris School of E Christophe Labreuche; THALES Research & Technology Mustapha Ridaoui; Université Paris I
presented by: Michel Grabisch, University of Paris I, Paris School of E
Metrizable Preferences over Preferences
By Gilbert Laffond; Murat Sertel center for Advanced Economic Studies Jean LAINE; Cnam Remzi Sanver; Istanbul Bilgi University
presented by: Jean LAINE, Cnam
Session 51: Market design 2 June 16, 2018 16:00 to 18:00 Charlotte Suite
Session Chair: Yi-Cheng Kao, Chung Yuan Christian University
Session type: invited
Financial Aid in College Admissions: Need-based versus Merit-based
By Eun Jeong Heo; Vanderbilt University
presented by: Eun Jeong Heo, Vanderbilt University
Sequential School Choice: Theory and Evidence from the Field and Lab
By Umut Dur; North Carolina State University Robert Hammond; North Carolina State University Onur Kesten; Carnegie Mellon University
presented by: Umut Dur, North Carolina State University
College admissions with complementarities
By Azar Abizada; ADA University Umut Dur; North Carolina State University
presented by: Azar Abizada, ADA University
Expanding Applications in College Admissions
By WeiCheng Chen; National Chung Cheng University Yi-Yi Chen; Feng Chia University Yi-Cheng Kao; Chung Yuan Christian University
presented by: Yi-Cheng Kao, Chung Yuan Christian University
Session 52: Matching (stability 2) June 16, 2018 16:00 to 18:00 Berkeley Suite
Session Chair: Antonio Nicolo, University of Padova, Italy
Session type: invited
New and simple algorithms for stable flow problems
By Agnes Cseh; Hungarian Academy of Sciences
presented by: Agnes Cseh, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Stability in Matching with Couples having Responsive Preferences
By Shashwat Khare; Maastricht University
presented by: Shashwat Khare, Maastricht University
Degrees of Stability in Matching
By Nickesha Ayoade Szilvia Papai; Concordia University
presented by: Nickesha Ayoade,
Matching with Partners and Projects
By Antonio Nicolo; University of Padova, Italy Arunava Sen; Indian Statistical Institute Sonal Yadav; University of Padova
presented by: Antonio Nicolo, University of Padova, Italy
Session 53: Voting and elections (probabilistic 2) June 16, 2018 16:00 to 18:00 Peacock Suite
Session Chair: Anna Bogomolnaia, University of Glasgow
Session type: invited
Random Mechanism Design on Multidimensional Domains
By Shurojit Chatterji; Singapore Management University
presented by: Shurojit Chatterji, Singapore Management University
Positional Social Decision Schemes: Fair and Efficient Randomized Portioning
By Stéphane Airiau; LAMSADE Université Paris-Dauphine Haris Aziz; University of New South Wales Ioannis Caragiannis Justin Kruger Jérôme Lang
presented by: Justin Kruger,
An Analytical and Experimental Comparison of Maximal Lottery Schemes
By Florian Brandl; Technische Universität München Felix Brandt; Technische Universität München Christian Stricker; Technische Universität München
presented by: Florian Brandl, Technische Universität München
Fair mixing: the case of dichotomous preferences
By Haris Aziz; University of New South Wales Anna Bogomolnaia; University of Glasgow Herve Moulin; University of Glasgow
presented by: Anna Bogomolnaia, University of Glasgow
Session 54: Mechanism design 7 June 16, 2018 16:00 to 18:00 Garnet Suite (37F)
Session Chair: Jin Yeub Kim, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Session type: invited
A Credit Design for Irrationally Pessimist Entrepreneurs
By umut keskin; istanbul bilgi university Busra Eroglu; Bahceswhir University
presented by: umut keskin, istanbul bilgi university
Moral Hazard, Uncertain Technologies, and Linear Contract
By Urmee Khan; University of California, Riverside
presented by: Urmee Khan, University of California, Riverside
Optimal Mechanisms in Almost Ex Ante Bargaining Problems
By Jin Yeub Kim; University of Nebraska-Lincoln
presented by: Jin Yeub Kim, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Session 55: Matching (trading) June 17, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Peacock Suite
Session Chair: Bettina Klaus, University of Lausanne
Session type: invited
Core and Top Trading Cycles in a Market with Indivisible Goods and Externalities
By Miho Hong; Yonsei University Jaeok Park; Yonsei University
presented by: Miho Hong, Yonsei University
Trading Networks with Frictions
By Tamás Fleiner; Budapest University of Technology and Economics Ravi Jagadeesan; Harvard University Zsuzsanna Jankó; Corvinus University of Budapest Alexander Teytelboym; University of Oxford
presented by: Zsuzsanna Jankó, Corvinus University of Budapest
Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants
By Mehmet Karakaya; İzmir Katip Çelebi University Bettina Klaus; University of Lausanne Jan Christoph Schlegel; University of Lausanne
presented by: Bettina Klaus, University of Lausanne
Session 56: Strategy-proofness 3 June 17, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Berkeley Suite
Session Chair: MATIAS NUNEZ, Université Paris Dauphine
Session type: invited
Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices
By Bettina Klaus; University of Lausanne Alexandru Nichifor; University of Melbourne
presented by: Alexandru Nichifor, University of Melbourne
Group-Strategy-Proofness In Private-Good Economies: Revisited
By Madhav Raghavan; University of Lausanne
presented by: Madhav Raghavan, University of Lausanne
Implementing the median
By MATIAS NUNEZ; Université Paris Dauphine Carlos Pimienta; The University of New South Wales Dimitrios Xefteris; University of Cyprus
presented by: MATIAS NUNEZ, Université Paris Dauphine
Session 57: Voting and elections (social choice 3) June 17, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Belle-vue Suite
Session Chair: Patrick Harless, University of Glasgow
Session type: invited
Interim Self-Stable Decision Rules
By Semin Kim; Yonsei University Daeyoung Jeong; The Bank of Korea
presented by: Semin Kim, Yonsei University
On the solution of generalized stable sets
By Weibin Han; South China Normal University
presented by: Weibin Han, South China Normal University
Solidarity in social choice: Robust impossibilities and a new compromise family
By Patrick Harless; University of Glasgow
presented by: Patrick Harless, University of Glasgow
Session 58: Fairness, justice and equity (sharing) June 17, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Astor Suite
Session Chair: Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Universidad Pablo de Olavide
Session type: invited
The Folk Rule for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems with Multiple Sources
By Gustavo Bergantinos; Universidade de Vigo Youngsub Chun; Seoul National University Eunju Lee; Seoul National University Leticia Lorenzo; Universidade de Vigo
presented by: Eunju Lee, Seoul National University
The incentive core in co-investment problems
By Josep M Izquierdo; University of Barcelona Carles Rafels; Universitat de Barcelona
presented by: Josep M Izquierdo, University of Barcelona
Sharing the revenues from broadcasting sport events
By Gustavo Bergantinos; Universidade de Vigo Juan D. Moreno-Ternero; Universidad Pablo de Olavide
presented by: Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Universidad Pablo de Olavide
Session 59: Welfare criteria 2 June 17, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Charlotte Suite
Session Chair: Dean Spears, University of Texas at Austin
Session type: invited
The measurement of labour content: a general approach
By Naoki Yoshihara; University of Massachusetts at Amherst,
presented by: Naoki Yoshihara, University of Massachusetts at Amherst,
Rank-additive population axiology
By Marcus Pivato; Université de Cergy-Pontoise
presented by: Marcus Pivato, Université de Cergy-Pontoise
Probabilistic future people: Social criteria for evaluating population prospects
By Dean Spears; University of Texas at Austin
presented by: Dean Spears, University of Texas at Austin
Session 60: Inequality and poverty (application 1) June 17, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Garnet Suite (37F)
Session Chair: Nicholas Lawson, Université du Québec à Montréal
Session type: invited
Welfare and Inequality Comparisons for Uni- and Multi-dimensional Distributions of Ordinal Data
By Frank Cowell; London School of Economics Martyna Kobus; Polish Academy of Sciences Radosław Kurek; Vistula University
presented by: Martyna Kobus, Polish Academy of Sciences
Decomposition of the changes in poverty: poverty line and distribution change effects.
By Oihana Aristondo; Universidad del País Vasco Conchita D'Ambrosio; Universite du Luxembourg Casilda Lasso de la Vega; University of the Basque Country
presented by: Oihana Aristondo, Universidad del País Vasco
Those Who Can't Sort, Steal: Caste, Occupational Mobility, and Rent-Seeking in Rural India
By Nicholas Lawson; Université du Québec à Montréal Dean Spears; University of Texas at Austin
presented by: Nicholas Lawson, Université du Québec à Montréal
Session 61: Game theory 1 June 17, 2018 9:00 to 10:30 Pine Room (3F)
Session Chair: Thomas Weber, Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne
Session type: invited
A threshold model of urban development
By Alberto Vesperoni; Alpen-Adria-University Klagenfurt Paul Schweinzer; Alpen-Adria-University Klagenfurt
presented by: Alberto Vesperoni, Alpen-Adria-University Klagenfurt
Poisoned Chalice - Optimal Bias in Two-Stage Collective Contest
[slides]
By Wing Fung Cheng; Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
presented by: Wing Fung Cheng, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Design and Efficiency in Multi-Principal Multi-Agent Contract Games
By Thomas Weber; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne
presented by: Thomas Weber, Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne
Session 62: Cooperative game theory 3 June 17, 2018 13:30 to 15:00 Astor Suite
Session Chair: Javier Martinez de Albeniz, Universitat de Barcelona
Session type: invited
Weighted and restricted Deegan-Packel power indices
By Anna Khmelnitskaya; Saint-Petersburg State University
presented by: Anna Khmelnitskaya, Saint-Petersburg State University
Solving Becker’s assortative assignments and extensions
By Javier Martinez de Albeniz; Universitat de Barcelona Carlos Rafels; Universitat de Barcelona Neus Ybern; Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya
presented by: Javier Martinez de Albeniz, Universitat de Barcelona
On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
By Ata Atay; Hungarian Academy of Sciences Tamás Solymosi; Corvinus University of Budapest
presented by: Ata Atay, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Session 63: Coalition formation June 17, 2018 13:30 to 15:00 Garnet Suite (37F)
Session Chair: Elena Inarra, The University of the Basque Country
Session type: invited
Forming Self-enforcing Coalitions When Sharing Rules Create Potential Disagreements
By Karl Robert Jandoc; University of the Philippines-Diliman Ruben Juarez; University of Hawaii
presented by: Karl Robert Jandoc, University of the Philippines-Diliman
Impact of the Number of Neutrals on Stability Concepts in Friends Oriented Hedonic Games
By Kazunori Ota; Kyushu University Nathanaël Barrot; Riken AIP, Kyushu University Yuko Sakurai; National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) Makoto Yokoo; Kyushu University
presented by: Nathanaël Barrot, Riken AIP, Kyushu University
Rationing Rules and Stable Coaliiton Structures
By Elena Inarra; The University of the Basque Country
presented by: Elena Inarra, The University of the Basque Country
Session 64: Game theory 2 June 17, 2018 13:30 to 15:00 Peacock Suite
Session Chair: Chun-Ting Chen, National Taiwan University
Session type: invited
A Non-Cooperative Solution to Bankruptcy Problem
By Amarjyoti Mahanta; Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati India
presented by: Amarjyoti Mahanta, Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati India
Dynamics in Repeated Game with Cumulative Payoff and Portfolio Strategy: Hawk--Dove and Public Goods Game
By Namun Cho; Institute of Economic Research
presented by: Namun Cho, Institute of Economic Research
Correlation with Forwarding
By Chun-Ting Chen; National Taiwan University
presented by: Chun-Ting Chen, National Taiwan University
Session 65: Mechanism design 8 June 17, 2018 13:30 to 15:00 Belle-vue Suite
Session Chair: Francisco Robles, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Session type: invited
Strategy-proofness and efficiency for submodular and supermodular preferences without quasi-linearity
By Hiroki Shinozaki; Osaka University Tomoya Kazumura; University of Tokyo Shigehiro Serizawa; Osaka University
presented by: Hiroki Shinozaki, Osaka University
Binary Mechanism for the Allocation Problem with Single-dipped Preferences
By Hirofumi Yamamura
presented by: Hirofumi Yamamura,
Unsophisticated Misrepresentations in Allocation Problems with Unitary Demands
By Francisco Robles; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
presented by: Francisco Robles, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Session 66: Inequality and poverty (application 2) June 17, 2018 13:30 to 15:00 Charlotte Suite
Session Chair: Florent Bresson, Université Clermont Auvergne
Session type: invited
Decomposing the inequality in educational achievements in some European countries: the role of family background, school characteristics and group-peer effects
By Casilda Lasso de la Vega; University of the Basque Country Agurtzane Lekuona Agirretxe; University of Basque Country Susan Orbe; University of the Basque Country
presented by: Agurtzane Lekuona Agirretxe, University of Basque Country
Halving poverty: A robustness assessment of the MDGs' achievements with respect to poverty alleviation
By Florent Bresson; Université Clermont Auvergne
presented by: Florent Bresson, Université Clermont Auvergne
Session 67: Computational social choice 2 June 17, 2018 13:30 to 15:00 Berkeley Suite
Session Chair: Alexander Ivanov, National Research University Higher School of Economics
Session type: invited
On the Manipulability of Generalized Scoring Rules for the Case of 3 Alternatives
By Daniel Karabekyan; National Research University Higher School of Economics Alexander Ivanov; National Research University Higher School of Economics
presented by: Daniel Karabekyan, National Research University Higher School of Economics
Upper Bound of Manipulability for the Case of 3 Alternatives
By Alexander Ivanov; National Research University Higher School of Economics Daniel Karabekyan; National Research University Higher School of Economics
presented by: Alexander Ivanov, National Research University Higher School of Economics
What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? An Experiment Over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain
By Edith Elkind; University of Oxford Piotr Faliszewski; Agh University of Science and Technology Jean-Francois Laslier; CNRS Piotr Skowron; TU Berlin Arkadii Slinko; The University of Auckland Nimrod Talmon; Weizmann Institute of Science
presented by: Arkadii Slinko, The University of Auckland

 

This program was last updated on 2019-10-31 03:19:08 EDT