Short Course on Estimating Dynamic Models of Decision-Making
Cours de Formation par la Recherche, CREST
June 7-17, 2010

John Rust, Department of Economics, University of Maryland

Overview This is a short course consisting of four 3 hour lectures with the first two presented by Moshe Buchinsky of UCLA and the last two presented by John Rust, University of Maryland. This page contains readings discussed in the two lectures by Professor Rust. Students who attended the course and who have questions for Professor Rust concerning his lectures or readings are encouraged to contact him by email to Handbook of Computational Economics (volume 1) Edited by H. Amman, D. Kendrick and J. Rust (1996) Elsevier North Holland (available for free online)
  • Numerical Methods in Economics By Ken Judd (1998) MIT Press.
  • Numerical Recipes Press, W.H. S.A. Teukolsky, W.T. Vetterling, and B.P. Flannery (2002) (available for free, online).
  • Dynamic Economics By Jerome Adda and Russell Cooper (2003) MIT Press.
  • An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data By Harry Paarsch and Han Hong (2006) MIT Press.

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    Lecture 1: The "Information Revolution" will it promote good decision making or bad decision making?

    The world is changing very quickly with the rise of the internet, e-commerce, and huge online databases. I will start out the course by discussing some almost scary predictions about a fast approaching "singularity" that is a consequence of exponential growth in technologcal progress, including Moore's Law. As a concrete example, I will discuss progress in supercomputing, since in January, I was part of an NSF Panel charged with advising NSF on awarding a contract to construct the next generation national supercomputer that will perform in excess of 1 Petaflop. Thus, the computational hardware we have access to today is truly amazing.

    However the quality of decision making by key decision makers and firms in recent years is less than amazing, to say the least. Further, trends in economics provide researchers with very different strategies, whose payoffs are very unclear. One is following a rather arduous path of doing structural econometrics which involves combining several difficult skills: 1) theory, 2) econometric, 3) computation, 4) skill in empirical work, and 5) knowledge of institutions. The other is Freakonomics which requires far fewer skills and can be much more fun. And for a lucky few, doing Feakonomics can bring you fame and fortune. We discuss the costs, benefits and risks of different research paths and strategies, and whether tools such as dynamic programming and game theory are relevant in a world where there is evidently so much irrational, and even crazy behavior going on.

    Sites:

    Readings:

    Lecture 2: Dynamic Games

    I provide a brief survey and discussion of a set of papers on solving and estimating dynamic games, particularly for a class of equilibria known as Markov perfect equilibria. Solving dynamic games is more complex than solving single agent dynamic programming problems due to the problem of multiple equilibria. I discuss several examples where multiple equilibria is a problem that challenges the empirical relevance of these models, since when there are many equilibria, the theory ordinarily is silent on which of these equilibria is most likely to occur in an actual situation (if one believes that real agents are "in equilibrium" in the first place). If there are so many equilibria that "almost anything can happen" then game theory may not be a useful tool for predicting the outcome of multi-agent strategic interactions. We consider whether "learning theories" might serve as a useful way of thinking about whether/how real agents come to a particular equilibrium solution if they interact repeatedly. The conclusions of learning theory do not provide a lot of hope that this can resolve the issue of convergence to equilibria and selection of particular equilibria when the game has many possible equilibria.

    However apart from its possible empirical irrelevance, numerical solution of dynamic games can be quite interesting and lead to important insights on how hypothetical rational agents would behave. The tension is how "seriously" we ought to take theory, and particularly game theory, when we are doing empirical work. There are many unsolved challenges in this expanding frontier of research, including the numerical difficulties of solving games and trying to estimate and test them empirically.

    Readings:

  • Pat Bajari, Han Hong, John Krainer, and Denis Nekipelov (2006) Estimating Static Models of Strategic Interactions
  • John Rust (2008) Answers to the Prisoner's Dilemma Question for my Computational Economics Class
  • Ariel Pakes and Paul McGuire (2001) Stochastic Algorithms, Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium, and the 'curse' of Dimensionality Econometrica 69 1261-1281.
  • Brett Gordon and Ronald Goettler (2010) Does AMD Spur Intel to Innovate More? manuscript, Columbia University School of Business.
  • Patrick Bajari, Lanier Benkard and Jonathan Levin (2007) Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition Econometrica 75-5 1331-1370.
  • Martin Pesendorfer and Philip Schmidt-Dengler (2003) Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games NBER working paper 9726.
  • Victor Aguirregabiria and Pedro Mira (2007) Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games Econometrica 75-1 1-53.
  • Martin Pesendorfer and Philip Schmidt-Dengler (2010) Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games: Comment Econometrica 78-2 833-842.
  • Audra Bowlus and Shannon Seitz (2002) Domestic Violence, Employment and Divorce Queen's University, Canada
  • Natasha Zhang Foutz and Vrinda Kadiyali (2003) Competitive Dynamics in the Release Date Pre-announcements of Motion Pictures Cornell University, Johnson School of Management
  • Jensen, M, P. Liu, R. Matzkin, and D. McFadden (2003) The Browser War: Econometric analysis of Markov-Perfect Equilibrium in Markets with Network Effects
  • D'Erasmo, Pablo (2008) Government Reputation and Debt Repayment in Emerging Economies
  • V. Aguirregabiria and C. Ho (2010) A Dynamic Game of Airline Network Competition: Hub-and-Spoke Networks and Entry Deterrence International Journal of Industrial Organization forthcoming
  • U. Doraszelski and J. Escobar (2010) A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification forthcoming, Theoretical Economics
  • U. Doraszelski and M. Satterthwaite (2010) Computable Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics Rand Journal of Economics 41-2 215-243.
  • L. Benkard, G. Weintraub and B. Van Roy (2008) Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics With Many Firms Econometrica 76-6 1375-1411.
  • Iskhakov, F. Rust, J. and B. Schjerning (2010) A Dynamic Model of Leap-Frogging Investments and Bertrand Price Competition (slides accompanying this paper)
  • E. Giovannetti (2001) Perpetual Leapfrogging in Bertrand Duopoly International Economic Review 42-3 671--696.