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John Rust,
Department of Economics,
University of Maryland
Overview This is a short course consisting of four 3 hour lectures
with the first two presented by Moshe Buchinsky
of UCLA and the last two presented by John Rust, University of Maryland. This page contains readings discussed in the two
lectures by Professor Rust. Students who attended the course and who have questions
for Professor Rust concerning his lectures or readings are encouraged to contact
him by email to Handbook of Computational Economics (volume 1) Edited by H. Amman, D. Kendrick and J.
Rust (1996) Elsevier North Holland (available for free online)
Numerical
Methods in Economics By Ken Judd (1998) MIT Press.
Numerical
Recipes
Press, W.H. S.A. Teukolsky, W.T. Vetterling, and B.P. Flannery
(2002) (available for free, online).
Dynamic Economics By Jerome Adda and Russell Cooper (2003) MIT Press.
An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data By
Harry Paarsch and Han Hong (2006) MIT Press.
Some Related "Mini courses"
Some Recent Related Conferences
Lecture 1: The "Information Revolution" will it promote good decision making or bad decision making?
The world is changing very quickly with the rise of the internet, e-commerce, and huge online
databases. I will start out the course by discussing some almost scary predictions
about a fast approaching "singularity" that is a consequence of exponential
growth in technologcal progress, including Moore's Law.
As a concrete example, I will discuss progress in supercomputing,
since in January, I was part of an NSF Panel
charged with advising NSF on awarding a contract to construct the next generation national
supercomputer that will perform in excess of 1 Petaflop. Thus,
the computational hardware we have access to today is truly amazing. However the quality of decision making
by key decision makers and firms in recent years is less than amazing, to say the least.
Further, trends in economics provide researchers with very different strategies, whose payoffs are
very unclear. One is following a rather arduous path of doing structural econometrics which involves
combining several difficult skills: 1) theory, 2) econometric, 3) computation, 4) skill in empirical work,
and 5) knowledge of institutions. The other is Freakonomics which requires far fewer skills and
can be much more fun. And for a lucky few, doing Feakonomics can bring you fame and fortune. We discuss the
costs, benefits and risks of different research paths and strategies, and whether tools such as dynamic programming
and game theory are relevant in a world where there is evidently so much irrational, and even crazy behavior
going on.
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Sites:
Readings:
-
Special Issue of the Journal of Econometrics on Structural Models of Optimization Behavior in Labor, Aging, and Health edited by Donna Gilleskie and Ahmed Khwaja
- Michael Keane's keynote paper from the above special issue,
- John Rust's comment on Keane's keynote paper
- John Rust (2006) Bad Decisions (slides from presentations at the European Meetings of the Econometric Society, Vienna, 2006
- John Rust (2006) Dynamic Programming
- John Rust (1996) Numerical Dynamic Programming in Economics in Handbook of Computational Economics (volume 1) edited by H. Ammman, D. Kendrick and J. Rust (Elsevier).
- John Rust (1994) Structural Estimation of Markov Decision Processes in Handbook of Econometrics (volume 4) edited by R.F. Engel and D.L. McFadden
- John Rust Dealing with the Complexity of Economic Calculations unpublishable manuscript.
- John Rust (1987) Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher Econometrica 55-5 999-1033.
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
- John Rust (1997) Using Randomization to Break the Curse of Dimensionality Econometrica 65-3 487-516.
- Rust, J, Traub, J.F. and H. Wozniakowski (2002) Is There a Curse of Dimensionality for Contraction Fixed Points
in the Worst Case? Econometrica 70-1 285-329.
- Susumu Imai, Neelam Jain and Andrew Ching (2009) Bayesian Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice Models Econometrica 77-6 1865-1899.
- Andriy Norets (2009) Inference in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models With Serially orrelated Unobserved State Variables Econometrica 77-5 1665-1682.
- Geoffrey Rothwell and John Rust (1995) Optimal Response to Shift in Regulatory Regime: The Case of the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry
Journal of Applied Econometrics 10-S 75--118.
- Geoffrey Rothwell and John Rust (1997) On the Optimal Lifetime of Nuclear Power Plants
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 15-2 195-208.
- John Rust and Christopher Phelan (1997) How Social Security and Medicare Affect Retirement Behavior In a World of Incomplete Markets Econometrica 65-4 781-832.
- John Rust (2005) Impact of Retiree Health Plans on Faculty Retirement Decisions in Robert Clark and Jennifer Ma (editors) Recruitment, Retention
and Retirement: The Three R's of Higher Education in the 21st Century Edward Elgar, Northhampton, Massachusetts, pp. 135--169.
- Hugo Benitez-Silva, Moshe Buchinsky and John Rust (2010) Induced Entry Effects of a $1 for $2 Offset in SSDI Benefits manuscript, resubmitted to
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
- Scholz, J.K. A. Seshshadri and S. Kitatrakun (2006) Are Americans Saving "Optimally" for Retirement? Journal of Political Economy 114-4 607-643.
- John Rust and George Hall (2003) Middle Men versus Market Makers: A Theory of Competitive Exchange Journal of Political Economy 111-2 353-403.
- John Rust and George Hall (2007) The (S,s) Rule is an Optimal Trading Strategy in a Class of Commodity Price Speculation Problems
Economic Theory 30 515--538.
- Harry Paarsch and John Rust (2008) Valuing Programs with Deterministic and Stochastic Cycles Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33 614-623.
- Sungjin Cho and John Rust (2008) Is Econometrics Useful for Private Policy Making? A Case Study of Replacement Policy at an Auto Rental Company
Journal of Econometrics 145 243--257.
- Sungjin Cho and John Rust (2010) The Flat Rental Puzzle Review of Economics Studies 77-2 534-559.
Lecture 2: Dynamic Games
I provide a brief survey and discussion of a set of papers on solving and estimating dynamic games, particularly
for a class of equilibria known as Markov perfect equilibria. Solving dynamic games is more complex than solving single agent
dynamic programming problems due to the problem of multiple equilibria. I discuss several examples where multiple equilibria
is a problem that challenges the empirical relevance of these models, since when there are many equilibria, the theory ordinarily
is silent on which of these equilibria is most likely to occur in an actual situation (if one believes that real agents are
"in equilibrium" in the first place). If there are so many equilibria that "almost anything can happen" then
game theory may not be a useful tool for predicting the outcome of multi-agent strategic interactions. We consider whether
"learning theories" might serve as a useful way of thinking about whether/how real agents come to a particular equilibrium
solution if they interact repeatedly. The conclusions of learning theory do not provide a lot of hope that this can resolve the
issue of convergence to equilibria and selection of particular equilibria when the game has many possible equilibria.
However apart from its possible empirical irrelevance, numerical solution of dynamic games can be quite interesting and lead
to important insights on how hypothetical rational agents would behave. The tension is how "seriously" we ought to take
theory, and particularly game theory, when we are doing empirical work. There are many unsolved challenges in this expanding frontier
of research, including the numerical difficulties of solving games and trying to estimate and test them empirically.
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Readings:
Pat Bajari, Han Hong, John Krainer, and Denis Nekipelov (2006) Estimating Static Models of Strategic Interactions
John Rust (2008) Answers to the Prisoner's Dilemma Question for my Computational Economics Class
Ariel Pakes and Paul McGuire (2001)
Stochastic Algorithms, Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium, and the 'curse' of Dimensionality Econometrica
69 1261-1281.
Brett Gordon and Ronald Goettler (2010) Does AMD Spur Intel to Innovate More? manuscript, Columbia University School of Business.
Patrick Bajari, Lanier Benkard and Jonathan Levin (2007)
Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition Econometrica 75-5 1331-1370.
Martin Pesendorfer and Philip Schmidt-Dengler (2003) Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games NBER working paper 9726.
Victor Aguirregabiria and Pedro Mira (2007) Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games Econometrica 75-1 1-53.
Martin Pesendorfer and Philip Schmidt-Dengler (2010) Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games: Comment Econometrica 78-2 833-842.
Audra Bowlus and Shannon Seitz (2002) Domestic Violence, Employment and Divorce Queen's University, Canada
Natasha Zhang Foutz and Vrinda Kadiyali (2003) Competitive Dynamics in the Release
Date Pre-announcements of Motion Pictures Cornell University, Johnson School of Management
Jensen, M, P. Liu, R. Matzkin, and D. McFadden (2003) The Browser War:
Econometric analysis of Markov-Perfect Equilibrium in Markets with Network Effects
D'Erasmo, Pablo (2008) Government Reputation and Debt Repayment in Emerging Economies
V. Aguirregabiria and C. Ho (2010) A Dynamic Game of Airline Network Competition: Hub-and-Spoke Networks and Entry Deterrence International Journal of Industrial Organization forthcoming
U. Doraszelski and J. Escobar (2010) A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification forthcoming, Theoretical Economics
U. Doraszelski and M. Satterthwaite (2010) Computable Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics Rand Journal of Economics 41-2 215-243.
L. Benkard, G. Weintraub and B. Van Roy (2008) Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics With Many Firms Econometrica 76-6 1375-1411.
Iskhakov, F. Rust, J. and B. Schjerning (2010) A Dynamic Model of Leap-Frogging Investments and Bertrand Price Competition
(slides accompanying this paper)
E. Giovannetti (2001) Perpetual Leapfrogging in Bertrand Duopoly International Economic Review 42-3 671--696.
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