June 23, 2025 | ||
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Time | Location | Event |
16:15 to 17:45 | EBS. 2.2 |
Leonid Hurwicz Lecture: Federico Echenique, EBS. 2.2 |
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June 24, 2025 | ||
Time | Location | Event |
16:00 to 17:30 | EBS. 2.2. |
Murat Sertel Lecture: Marzena Rostek, EBS. 2.2. |
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June 25, 2025 | ||
Time | Location | Event |
11:00 to 12:30 | EBS.2.2 |
Paul Kleindorfer Lecture: Piotr Dworczak, EBS.2.2 |
| ||
14:00 to 14:30 | EBS.2.2 |
2025 Nedim Okan Young Scholar Prize: Timothy J Flannery , EBS.2.2 |
|
Leonid Hurwicz Lecture: Federico Echenique Location: EBS. 2.2 June 23, 2025 16:15 to 17:45 | |
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Stable matching as transport |
Murat Sertel Lecture: Marzena Rostek Location: EBS. 2.2. June 24, 2025 16:00 to 17:30 | |
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Decentralized-Market Design: Some New Methods |
Paul Kleindorfer Lecture: Piotr Dworczak Location: EBS.2.2 June 25, 2025 11:00 to 12:30 | |
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Optimal Redistribution via Income Taxation and Market Design |
2025 Nedim Okan Young Scholar Prize: Timothy J Flannery Location: EBS.2.2 June 25, 2025 14:00 to 14:30 |
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Summary of All Sessions |
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Click here for an index of all participants |
# | Date/Time | Type | Title/Location | Papers |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | June 23, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Game Theory 1 Location: NTC.2.03 | 3 |
2 | June 23, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Information Design 1 Location: NTC.1.06 | 3 |
3 | June 23, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Matching 1 Location: NTC.2.01 | 3 |
4 | June 23, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Mechanism Design 1 Location: NTC.2.05 | 3 |
5 | June 23, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Mechanism Design 8 Location: NTC.2.04 | 3 |
6 | June 23, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Social Choice 1 Location: NTC.3.01 | 3 |
7 | June 23, 2025 9:30-10:30 | contributed | Fair Allocations 1 Location: NTC.3.02 | 2 |
8 | June 23, 2025 9:30-10:30 | contributed | Matching 7 Location: NTC.2.02 | 2 |
9 | June 23, 2025 11:00-12:00 | contributed | Fair Allocations 2 Location: NTC.3.02 | 2 |
10 | June 23, 2025 11:00-12:30 | contributed | Game Theory 2 Location: NTC.2.03 | 3 |
11 | June 23, 2025 11:00-12:30 | contributed | Matching 2 Location: NTC.2.01 | 3 |
12 | June 23, 2025 11:00-12:30 | contributed | Matching 8 Location: NTC.2.02 | 3 |
13 | June 23, 2025 11:00-12:30 | contributed | Mechanism Design 6 Location: NTC.2.05 | 3 |
14 | June 23, 2025 11:00-12:30 | contributed | Mechanism Design 9 Location: NTC.2.04 | 3 |
15 | June 23, 2025 11:00-12:00 | contributed | Social Choice 2 Location: NTC.3.01 | 2 |
16 | June 23, 2025 14:00-15:30 | contributed | Fair Allocations 3 Location: NTC.3.02 | 3 |
17 | June 23, 2025 14:00-15:30 | contributed | Game Theory 3 Location: NTC.2.03 | 3 |
18 | June 23, 2025 14:00-15:30 | contributed | Implementation 1 Location: NTC.3.01 | 3 |
19 | June 23, 2025 14:00-15:30 | contributed | Information Design 3 Location: NTC.1.06 | 3 |
20 | June 23, 2025 14:00-15:30 | contributed | Market Design 1 Location: NTC.2.04 | 3 |
21 | June 23, 2025 14:00-15:30 | contributed | Matching 3 Location: NTC.2.01 | 3 |
22 | June 23, 2025 14:00-15:30 | contributed | Matching 9 Location: NTC.2.02 | 3 |
23 | June 23, 2025 14:00-15:30 | contributed | Mechanism Design 3 Location: NTC.2.05 | 3 |
24 | June 24, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Auctions 1 Location: NTC.1.06 | 3 |
25 | June 24, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Implementation 2 Location: NTC.2.02 | 3 |
26 | June 24, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Market Design 2 Location: NTC.2.04 | 3 |
27 | June 24, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Matching 4 Location: NTC.2.01 | 3 |
28 | June 24, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Mechanism Design 7 Location: NTC.2.05 | 3 |
29 | June 24, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Voting 1 Location: NTC.3.02 | 3 |
30 | June 24, 2025 9:30-10:30 | contributed | Game Theory 4 Location: NTC.2.03 | 2 |
31 | June 24, 2025 9:30-10:30 | contributed | Social Choice 3 Location: NTC.3.01 | 2 |
32 | June 24, 2025 11:00-12:30 | contributed | Auctions 2 Location: NTC.1.06 | 3 |
33 | June 24, 2025 11:00-12:00 | contributed | Game Theory 5 Location: NTC.2.03 | 2 |
34 | June 24, 2025 11:00-12:30 | contributed | Market Design 3 Location: NTC.2.04 | 3 |
35 | June 24, 2025 11:00-12:30 | contributed | Matching 11 Location: NTC.2.02 | 3 |
36 | June 24, 2025 11:00-12:30 | contributed | Matching 5 Location: NTC.2.01 | 3 |
37 | June 24, 2025 11:00-12:30 | contributed | Mechanism Design 4 Location: NTC.2.05 | 3 |
38 | June 24, 2025 11:00-12:30 | contributed | Political Economy 1 Location: NTC.3.01 | 3 |
39 | June 24, 2025 11:00-12:30 | contributed | Voting 2 Location: NTC.3.02 | 3 |
40 | June 24, 2025 14:00-15:30 | contributed | Behavorial Economics 1 Location: NTC.3.02 | 3 |
41 | June 24, 2025 14:00-15:30 | contributed | Market Design 4 Location: NTC.2.04 | 3 |
42 | June 24, 2025 14:00-15:30 | contributed | Matching 6 Location: NTC.2.01 | 3 |
43 | June 24, 2025 14:00-15:30 | contributed | Mechanism Design 10 Location: NTC.1.06 | 3 |
44 | June 24, 2025 14:00-15:30 | contributed | Mechanism Design 2 Location: NTC.2.05 | 3 |
45 | June 24, 2025 14:00-15:00 | contributed | Political Economy 2 Location: NTC.3.01 | 2 |
46 | June 24, 2025 14:00-15:30 | contributed | Social Choice 4 Location: NTC.2.02 | 3 |
47 | June 25, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Contests and Networks Location: NTC.1.06 | 3 |
48 | June 25, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Decision Theory Location: NTC.2.02 | 3 |
49 | June 25, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Information Design 4 Location: NTC.3.01 | 3 |
50 | June 25, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Market Design 5 Location: NTC.2.04 | 3 |
51 | June 25, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Matching 10 Location: NTC.2.01 | 3 |
52 | June 25, 2025 9:00-10:30 | contributed | Mechanism Design 5 Location: NTC.2.05 | 3 |
53 | June 25, 2025 9:30-10:30 | contributed | Behavorial Economics 2 Location: NTC.3.02 | 2 |
54 | June 25, 2025 9:30-10:30 | contributed | Experimental Economics Location: NTC.2.03 | 2 |
54 sessions, 152 papers, and 0 presentations with no associated papers |
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  |
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The 14th Conference on Economic Design |
Detailed List of Sessions |
Session 1: Game Theory 1 June 23, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.2.03 |
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Session type: contributed |
Managing cascading disruptions through optimal liability assignment |
Presented by: Jens Gudmundsson, University of Copenhagen |
Algorithmic Learning in Local and Global Public Goods Games |
Presented by: Philippos Michaelides, Maastricht University |
Abstention, multiple issues, and the Banzhaf power index |
Presented by: Hans Peters, Maastricht University |
Session 2: Information Design 1 June 23, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.1.06 |
Session type: contributed |
Beyond Indication-Based Pricing: Information as a Regulatory Tool for Pharmaceuticals |
Presented by: Amin Hussain, |
Information transmission with privacy concerns |
Presented by: Qiaoxi Zhang, University of Chile |
Dynamic Evidence Disclosure: Delay the Good to Accelerate the Bad |
Presented by: Jan Knoepfle, Queen Mary University of London |
Session 3: Matching 1 June 23, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.2.01 |
Session type: contributed |
Manipulation of Attractiveness in Two-Sided Matching Markets |
Presented by: Gustavo Saraiva, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile |
What makes the difference: deriving characterizations of DA and IA from basic properties |
Presented by: Di Feng, Dongbei University of Finance and Econom |
Progressive Choices in School Choice Problems |
Presented by: Yuxing Liang, Concordia University |
Session 4: Mechanism Design 1 June 23, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.2.05 |
Session type: contributed |
Efficient Dissolution Mechanisms |
Presented by: Harshika Dalakoti, Azim Premji University |
Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Endogenous Seller Outside Offers |
Presented by: Xiaogang Che, City University of London |
A Collusion-Proof Efficient Dynamic Mechanism |
Presented by: Alexander Rodivilov, Stevens Institute of Technology |
Session 5: Mechanism Design 8 June 23, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.2.04 |
Session type: contributed |
Implementable Quotas and Negative Externality: a Geometric Approach |
Presented by: Soumendu Sarkar, Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi |
A theory of ex-post moral hazard. |
Presented by: Dario Gori, Toulouse School of Economics |
Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Allocating Objects among Groups |
Presented by: Shohei Tamura, Kwansei Gakuin University |
Session 6: Social Choice 1 June 23, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.3.01 |
Session type: contributed |
The Multi-Threshold Generalized Sufficientarianism and Level-Oligarchy |
Presented by: Satoshi Nakada, Tokyo University of Science |
Nash Social Ordering, Its Dual and Generalizations over Normalized Well-being Profiles |
Presented by: Hocheol SHIN, Seoul National University |
Impartial social ranking |
Presented by: Dolors Berga, Universitat de Girona |
Session 7: Fair Allocations 1 June 23, 2025 9:30 to 10:30 Location: NTC.3.02 |
Session type: contributed |
The Constrained Proportional Rule in Airport Problems |
Presented by: Zeming Ma, University of Rochester |
Welfare Lower Bounds in House Allocation Problems with Existing Tenants: A Characterization |
Presented by: Yang CHEN, University of Lausanne |
Session 8: Matching 7 June 23, 2025 9:30 to 10:30 Location: NTC.2.02 |
Session type: contributed |
On fairness of multi-center queues allocation problems |
Presented by: YAO CHENG, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics |
Rationalizable Conjectures in Dynamic Matching |
Presented by: Antonio Nicolo, University of Padova, Italy |
Session 9: Fair Allocations 2 June 23, 2025 11:00 to 12:00 Location: NTC.3.02 |
Session type: contributed |
On the merit principle in strategic exchange |
Presented by: Huaxia Zeng, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics |
Hierarchical Revenue Sharing with Ownership Rights |
Presented by: Kyubang Jo, Seoul National University |
Session 10: Game Theory 2 June 23, 2025 11:00 to 12:30 Location: NTC.2.03 |
Session type: contributed |
Negotiating Efficient Bilateral Trade Agreements |
Presented by: Malachy James Gavan, University of Liverpool |
Does the blockchain technology help to reduce information asymmetries? |
Presented by: Papatya Duman, Bielefeld University |
Nested Removal of Strictly Dominated Strategies in Infinite Games |
Presented by: Michele Crescenzi, University of Helsinki |
Session 11: Matching 2 June 23, 2025 11:00 to 12:30 Location: NTC.2.01 |
Session type: contributed |
School Choice with Unobservable Matchings |
Presented by: Vincent Vannetelbosch, University of Louvain |
Strategy-proofness and competitive equilibrium with transferable utility: Gross substitutes revisited |
Presented by: Tomoya Kazumura, Kyoto University |
TTC Domains |
Presented by: Sumit Goel, New York University Abu Dhabi |
Session 12: Matching 8 June 23, 2025 11:00 to 12:30 Location: NTC.2.02 |
Session type: contributed |
An Axiomatization of the Random Priority Rule |
Presented by: Christian Basteck, WZB Berlin Social Science Center |
Overlapping Dynamic Matching with Dichotomous Preferences |
Presented by: Md. Shahidul Islam, Concordia University |
Equal Opportunity in School Choice Lotteries |
Presented by: Yuki Tamura, Ecole Polytechnique, CREST |
Session 13: Mechanism Design 6 June 23, 2025 11:00 to 12:30 Location: NTC.2.05 |
Session type: contributed |
Weak misrepresentations |
Presented by: Jorgen Kratz, University of York |
Optimality of Two-tier Quotas in Selection |
Presented by: Byeong-hyeon Jeong, University of Zurich |
Consumer Search and Cournot Mechanisms |
Presented by: Gabor Virag, University of Toronto |
Session 14: Mechanism Design 9 June 23, 2025 11:00 to 12:30 Location: NTC.2.04 |
Session type: contributed |
Implementation in Undominated Strategies: Dictatorship and Compromise |
Presented by: Nozomu Muto, Hitotsubashi University |
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms |
Presented by: Eloisa Campioni, Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata |
Robust Delegation |
Presented by: Tan Gan, LSE |
Session 15: Social Choice 2 June 23, 2025 11:00 to 12:00 Location: NTC.3.01 |
Session type: contributed |
Expert Classification Aggregation |
Presented by: Federico Fioravanti, GATE Lyon - St Etienne |
Self-Equivalent Voting Rules |
Presented by: Hector Hermida-Rivera, Budapest University of Technology and Economics |
Session 16: Fair Allocations 3 June 23, 2025 14:00 to 15:30 Location: NTC.3.02 |
Session type: contributed |
On Connected Strongly-Proportional Cake-Cutting |
Presented by: Zsuzsanna Jankó, Corvinus University of Budapest |
The immigration officer is wrong |
Presented by: William Thomson, University of Rochester |
Ordinal fair division under quotas |
Presented by: Anna Bogomolnaia, University of Glasgow and CNRS |
Session 17: Game Theory 3 June 23, 2025 14:00 to 15:30 Location: NTC.2.03 |
Session type: contributed |
Resale-Proofness in Sequential Trades of Information |
Presented by: Naoki Watanabe, Keio University |
Negotiation in Bankruptcy Problems |
Presented by: Dirck Bouwhuis, Tilburg University |
Strategic trading with uncertain market depth |
Presented by: Junghum Park, Bank of Lithuania |
Session 18: Implementation 1 June 23, 2025 14:00 to 15:30 Location: NTC.3.01 |
Session type: contributed |
Two Player Rationalizable Implementation |
Presented by: Ritesh Jain, University of Liverpool |
strategically robust implementation |
Presented by: Michele Lombardi, University of Liverpool and University of Napoli Federico II |
Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences |
Presented by: Takashi Kunimoto, Singapore Management University |
Session 19: Information Design 3 June 23, 2025 14:00 to 15:30 Location: NTC.1.06 |
Session type: contributed |
Information Greenhouse: Optimal Persuasion for Medical Test-Avoiders |
Presented by: Zhuo Chen, Shandong University |
Bilateral Design of Product Information |
Presented by: Cédric Wasser, University of Basel |
Bilateral Trade with Costly Information Acquisition |
Presented by: Daniil Larionov, University of Münster |
Session 20: Market Design 1 June 23, 2025 14:00 to 15:30 Location: NTC.2.04 |
Session type: contributed |
Placements with Conditional Guarantees |
Presented by: Cathy Zeng, University of Rochester |
Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: Theory and Application |
Presented by: Utku Unver, Boston College |
Visibly Fair Mechanisms with Distributional Objectives |
Presented by: Inácio Bó, University of Macau |
Session 21: Matching 3 June 23, 2025 14:00 to 15:30 Location: NTC.2.01 |
Session type: contributed |
Harmonious Equilibria in Roommate Problems |
Presented by: Yu ZHOU, Nagoya University |
Matching with Endogenous Constraints |
Presented by: Bojia Li, |
ENDOGENOUS MATCHING: A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR MARKET DESIGN |
Presented by: Tommy Andersson, Lund University |
Session 22: Matching 9 June 23, 2025 14:00 to 15:30 Location: NTC.2.02 |
Session type: contributed |
Stable matching under inconsistent choice functions |
Presented by: Toshiyuki Hirai, Hosei University |
Costly Multi-hospital Dynamic Kidney Exchange |
Presented by: Duygu Sili, Università degli Studi di Messina |
Local non-bossiness |
Presented by: Eduardo Duque, LSE |
Session 23: Mechanism Design 3 June 23, 2025 14:00 to 15:30 Location: NTC.2.05 |
Session type: contributed |
Auctioning Multiple Goods without Priors |
Presented by: Wanchang Zhang, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen |
Designing Reward Mechanisms for Cybersecurity Vulnerability Verification |
Presented by: Yuta Nakamura, Yokohama City University |
Deterring Bribery with Scotch Hold'em Poker |
Presented by: Christopher Stapenhurst, Budapest University of Technology and Economics |
Session 24: Auctions 1 June 24, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.1.06 |
Session type: contributed |
An Equilibrium Model of the First-Price Auction with Strategic Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics |
Presented by: Bernhard Kasberger, University of Konstanz |
Vertical Integration in Auction Markets |
Presented by: Sander Onderstal, University of Amsterdam |
Optimal Position Auction Design with Multidimensional Types |
Presented by: Ryuji Sano, Yokohama National University |
Session 25: Implementation 2 June 24, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.2.02 |
Session type: contributed |
Costly Advertising and Information Congestion: Insights from Pigou’s Successor |
Presented by: Ryoji Jinushi, Seikei University |
Anonymous Implementation |
Presented by: Mehmet Barlo, Sabanci University |
Behavioral Implementation with Individual Rights Structures: A Full Characterization |
Presented by: Julius Zachariassen, Turku School of Economics |
Session 26: Market Design 2 June 24, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.2.04 |
Session type: contributed |
Avoidable Costs and Market Design |
Presented by: Luke Lindsay, University of Exeter Business School |
Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money |
Presented by: Masahiro Kawasaki, Kyoto University |
Assignment markets for homogeneous goods when homogeneity is heterogeneous across buyers |
Presented by: Noriaki Okamoto, Meiji Gakuin University |
Session 27: Matching 4 June 24, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.2.01 |
Session type: contributed |
Existence of Myopic-Farsighted Stable Sets in Matching Markets |
Presented by: Lars Ehlers, Université de Montréal |
Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools |
Presented by: Julien Combe, CREST - Ecole polytechnique |
Teacher Redistribution in public schools |
Presented by: Sonal Yadav, University of Liverpool |
Session 28: Mechanism Design 7 June 24, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.2.05 |
Session type: contributed |
Optimal Allowance with Limited Auditing Capacity |
Presented by: Thomas Brzustowski, University of Essex |
Mechanism Design with Costly Inspection |
Presented by: Amirreza Ahmadzadeh, Toulouse School of Economics |
Can impartial peer-review mechanisms replace external reviewers? |
Presented by: Francisco Silva, Deakin University |
Session 29: Voting 1 June 24, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.3.02 |
Session type: contributed |
Information Aggregation with Sequential Voting |
Presented by: Gerard Domènech-Gironell, University of Padova |
Combining the Borda count with approval and disapproval voting |
Presented by: José Luis García-Lapresta, Universidad de Valladolid |
Controllability of the Core and vN-M Stable Sets when voting is riskily delegated and multidimensional-policy implementation is costly |
Presented by: Francesco ciardiello, University of salerno |
Session 30: Game Theory 4 June 24, 2025 9:30 to 10:30 Location: NTC.2.03 |
Session type: contributed |
Stability in the Roommate Problem: Revisiting the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution |
Presented by: Oihane Gallo, University of Barcelona |
The complexity of power indices in voting games with incompatible players |
Presented by: Marti Jane-Ballarin, University of Barcelona |
Session 31: Social Choice 3 June 24, 2025 9:30 to 10:30 Location: NTC.3.01 |
Session type: contributed |
‘More’ universal social ordering under uncertainty |
Presented by: Leo Kurata, Waseda University |
Pairwise Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions over Restricted Dichotomous Domains |
Presented by: Abinash Panda, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence |
Session 32: Auctions 2 June 24, 2025 11:00 to 12:30 Location: NTC.1.06 |
Session type: contributed |
Concurrent Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects |
Presented by: Yu Ching Lam, Bocconi University |
Identity-Compatible Auctions |
Presented by: Haoyuan Zeng, University of Zurich |
Complexity and Revenue in Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders |
Presented by: Jihong Lee, Seoul National University |
Session 33: Game Theory 5 June 24, 2025 11:00 to 12:00 Location: NTC.2.03 |
Session type: contributed |
Unmediated communication in games with (in)complete information: the 4-player case |
Presented by: Helmuts Azacis, Cardiff University |
A Recommendation Game |
Presented by: Isaac Swift, Hong Kong Baptist University |
Session 34: Market Design 3 June 24, 2025 11:00 to 12:30 Location: NTC.2.04 |
Session type: contributed |
Data Linkage between Markets: Hidden Dangers and Unexpected Benefits |
Presented by: Arina Nikandrova, City, University of London |
COMPLEMENTARITIES IN CHILDCARE ALLOCATION UNDER PRIORITIES |
Presented by: Antonio Romero-Medina, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid |
Balanced Matching with Floor Constraints |
Presented by: Kai Maeda, University of York |
Session 35: Matching 11 June 24, 2025 11:00 to 12:30 Location: NTC.2.02 |
Session type: contributed |
Preference Evolution under Partner Choice |
Presented by: Ziwei Wang, Peking University |
Rationalizable Conjectural Stable Matching |
Presented by: Pietro Salmaso, University of Naples Federico II |
School Choice, Housing, and Inequality |
Presented by: Kentaro Tomoeda, University of Technology Sydney |
Session 36: Matching 5 June 24, 2025 11:00 to 12:30 Location: NTC.2.01 |
Session type: contributed |
Ex-post Stability under Two-Sided Matching: Complexity and Characterization |
Presented by: Peter Biro, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (KRTK) |
Pairwise efficiency and monotonicity imply Pareto efficiency in (probabilistic) object allocation |
Presented by: Bettina Klaus, University of Lausanne |
Dynamic Many-to-One Matching under Constraints |
Presented by: Rui He, Kyoto university |
Session 37: Mechanism Design 4 June 24, 2025 11:00 to 12:30 Location: NTC.2.05 |
Session type: contributed |
Optimal allocations with capacity constrained verification |
Presented by: Albin Erlanson, University of Essex |
Mechanism Design by a Politician |
Presented by: Giovanni Valvassori Bolgè, University of Fribourg |
Strategy-proof rules in object allocation problems with hard budget constraints and income effects |
Presented by: Yuya Wakabayashi, Osaka University |
Session 38: Political Economy 1 June 24, 2025 11:00 to 12:30 Location: NTC.3.01 |
Session type: contributed |
Optimizing immigration quotas: Exploring Per Capita GDP, Sectoral Allocation and Voter Preferences |
Presented by: Bernardo Moreno Jiménez, Universidad de Málaga |
A Dynamic Model of Policy-advising Competition |
Presented by: Bingbing Li, Bielefeld University |
Implementation via political parties |
Presented by: Guadalupe Correa-Lopera, Universidad de Granada |
Session 39: Voting 2 June 24, 2025 11:00 to 12:30 Location: NTC.3.02 |
Session type: contributed |
Informed Consumers Undermine Product Protests |
Presented by: Tomoya Tajika, Nihon University |
Local Strategy-Proofness and Dictatorship |
Presented by: Anup Pramanik, Shiv Nadar Institution Of Eminence |
Voting under Salience Bias and Strategic Extremism |
Presented by: Günnur Ege Bilgin, TED University |
Session 40: Behavorial Economics 1 June 24, 2025 14:00 to 15:30 Location: NTC.3.02 |
Session type: contributed |
Narrow Inference and Incentive Design |
Presented by: Alexander Clyde, University College London |
Timely Negotiations |
Presented by: Manshu Khanna, Peking University |
Decisions over Sequences |
Presented by: Siddharth Chatterjee, Indian Statistical Institute (Delhi Center) |
Session 41: Market Design 4 June 24, 2025 14:00 to 15:30 Location: NTC.2.04 |
Session type: contributed |
Self-Selection in Retail Electricity Contracts: Competition, Regulation, and Welfare Implications |
Presented by: Leopold Monjoie, Aalto University |
Marginal Mechanisms For Balanced Exchange |
Presented by: Alexander Westkamp, University of Cologne |
Balanced Exchange Under Trichotomous Preferences: The Core |
Presented by: Vikram Manjunath, |
Session 42: Matching 6 June 24, 2025 14:00 to 15:30 Location: NTC.2.01 |
Session type: contributed |
University Admissions with Reputational Externalities |
Presented by: Emil Temnyalov, University of Technology Sydney |
Limited Farsightedness in Priority-Based Matching |
Presented by: Ana Mauleon, UCLouvain |
Maximum Matching with Consecutive Acceptance Intervals |
Presented by: Szilvia Papai, Concordia University |
Session 43: Mechanism Design 10 June 24, 2025 14:00 to 15:30 Location: NTC.1.06 |
Session type: contributed |
Mixed-Price Auctions for Divisible Goods |
Presented by: Kyle Woodward, Apple |
Constrained efficiency and strategy-proofness in constrained package assignment problems with money |
Presented by: Shigehiro Serizawa, Osaka University of Economics |
Fair allocation of an object with or without a priority |
Presented by: Debasis Mishra, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi |
Session 44: Mechanism Design 2 June 24, 2025 14:00 to 15:30 Location: NTC.2.05 |
Session type: contributed |
Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence |
Presented by: Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin |
Flexible Moral Hazard Problems with Adverse Selection |
Presented by: Siwen Liu, University of Bonn |
Extreme Points in Multi-Dimensional Screening |
Presented by: Patrick Lahr, ENS Paris Saclay |
Session 45: Political Economy 2 June 24, 2025 14:00 to 15:00 Location: NTC.3.01 |
Session type: contributed |
Trust Dynamics in Electoral Competition |
Presented by: Nektaria Glynia, University of Cyprus |
Polarization for Exploration |
Presented by: Jesus Sanchez-Ibrahim, Universität Hamburg |
Session 46: Social Choice 4 June 24, 2025 14:00 to 15:30 Location: NTC.2.02 |
Session type: contributed |
Intensinist Social Welfare and Ordinal Intensity-Efficient Allocations |
Presented by: Georgios Gerasimou, University of Glasgow |
Assistance-proofness |
Presented by: Ryoga Doi, Keio University |
Accountable Voting |
Presented by: Yoko Kawada, Komazawa University |
Session 47: Contests and Networks June 25, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.1.06 |
Session type: contributed |
Contests with a Jury |
Presented by: Javier Rivas, University of Bath |
Hail Mary Pass: Contests with Stochastic Progress |
Presented by: Chang Liu, UNSW Business School |
From Centralized Mechanisms to Decentralized Catalogs: Delegated Networking Principle for Incentive Compatible Networks |
Presented by: Frank Page, LSE |
Jing Fu, Fukuoka Institute of Technology |
Session 48: Decision Theory June 25, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.2.02 |
Session type: contributed |
Matroid Search Problems and Greedy Pandora’s Rule |
Presented by: Joosung Lee, SKKU |
An Axiomatization of Inequality-Averse Preferences with Egalitarian Concerns |
Presented by: Noriaki Kiguchi, Hitotsubashi University |
Optimal Search in Trees |
Presented by: Ruhi Sonal, Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology Delhi |
Session 49: Information Design 4 June 25, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.3.01 |
Session type: contributed |
Market for Attention and Cooperative Rivalry |
Presented by: Yangbo Song, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen |
Dynamic Persuasion with Non-monotonic Preferences |
Presented by: Yun Liu, Shandong University |
Information Design with Competing Receivers |
Presented by: Dilip Ravindran, |
Session 50: Market Design 5 June 25, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.2.04 |
Session type: contributed |
MARKET DESIGN WITH DISTRIBUTIONAL OBJECTIVES |
Presented by: Isa Hafalir, University of Technology Sydney |
Firms’ Edge in M&A: The Comparative Statics on Information With(Out) Regulator Commitment |
Presented by: Maik Sälzer, Bocconi University |
Confidence in Strategy-Proof Matching Mechanisms |
Presented by: Vincent Meisner, HU Berlin |
Session 51: Matching 10 June 25, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.2.01 |
Session type: contributed |
A Dynamic Bargaining Framework for International Kidney Paired Exchange Program |
Presented by: Subhajit Pramanik, University of Padova, Italy |
Matching Through Agents |
Presented by: Ken Ho, Liaoning University |
Computing Balanced Solutions for Large International Kidney Exchange Schemes When Cycle Length Is Unbounded |
Presented by: Márton Benedek, Corvinus University of Budapest |
Session 52: Mechanism Design 5 June 25, 2025 9:00 to 10:30 Location: NTC.2.05 |
Session type: contributed |
Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object allocation problems with payments: Externalities and income effects |
Presented by: Hiroki Shinozaki, Hitotsubashi University |
Deliberating in Committees with Endogenous Information |
Presented by: Xin Gao, University of Birmingham |
Mediating a bilateral conflict with interdependent valuations |
Presented by: Darina Dintcheva-Bis, University of Warwick |
Session 53: Behavorial Economics 2 June 25, 2025 9:30 to 10:30 Location: NTC.3.02 |
Session type: contributed |
Inequity Averse Consumers with Unobservable Wholesale Prices |
Presented by: Abdul Quadir, XLRI-Xavier School of Management |
Learning with State-Dependent Preferences |
Presented by: Cavit Görkem Destan, TED University |
Session 54: Experimental Economics June 25, 2025 9:30 to 10:30 Location: NTC.2.03 |
Session type: contributed |
An experimental analysis of the IPO pricing mechanism: The case of auction method |
Presented by: Jingru Wang, Waseda University |
Testing the simplicity of strategy-proof mechanisms∗ |
Presented by: Rodrigo Velez, Texas A&M University |
# | Participant | Roles in Conference |
---|---|---|
1 | Ahmadzadeh, Amirreza | P28 |
2 | Andersson, Tommy | P21 |
3 | Azacis, Helmuts | P33 |
4 | Barlo, Mehmet | P25 |
5 | Basteck, Christian | P12 |
6 | Bó, Inácio | P20 |
7 | Benedek, Márton | P51 |
8 | Berga, Dolors | P6 |
9 | Bilgin, Günnur Ege | P39 |
10 | Biro, Peter | P36 |
11 | Bogomolnaia, Anna | P16 |
12 | Bouwhuis, Dirck | P17 |
13 | Brzustowski, Thomas | P28 |
14 | Campioni, Eloisa | P14 |
15 | Chatterjee, Siddharth | P40 |
16 | Che, Xiaogang | P4 |
17 | CHEN, Yang | P7 |
18 | Chen, Zhuo | P19 |
19 | CHENG, YAO | P8 |
20 | ciardiello, Francesco | P29 |
21 | Clyde, Alexander | P40 |
22 | Combe, Julien | P27 |
23 | Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe | P38 |
24 | Crescenzi, Michele | P10 |
25 | Dalakoti, Harshika | P4 |
26 | Destan, Cavit Görkem | P53 |
27 | Dintcheva-Bis, Darina | P52 |
28 | Doi, Ryoga | P46 |
29 | Domènech-Gironell, Gerard | P29 |
30 | Duman, Papatya | P10 |
31 | Duque, Eduardo | P22 |
32 | Ehlers, Lars | P27 |
33 | Erlanson, Albin | P37 |
34 | Feng, Di | P3 |
35 | Fioravanti, Federico | P15 |
36 | Fu, Jing | P47 |
37 | Gallo, Oihane | P30 |
38 | Gan, Tan | P14 |
39 | Gao, Xin | P52 |
40 | García-Lapresta, José Luis | P29 |
41 | Gavan, Malachy James | P10 |
42 | Gerasimou, Georgios | P46 |
43 | Glynia, Nektaria | P45 |
44 | Goel, Sumit | P11 |
45 | Gori, Dario | P5 |
46 | Gudmundsson, Jens | P1 |
47 | Hafalir, Isa | P50 |
48 | He, Rui | P36 |
49 | Hermida-Rivera, Hector | P15 |
50 | Hirai, Toshiyuki | P22 |
51 | Ho, Ken | P51 |
52 | Hussain, Amin | P2 |
53 | Islam, Md. Shahidul | P12 |
54 | Jain, Ritesh | P18 |
55 | Jane-Ballarin, Marti | P30 |
56 | Jankó, Zsuzsanna | P16 |
57 | Jeong, Byeong-hyeon | P13 |
58 | Jinushi, Ryoji | P25 |
59 | Jo, Kyubang | P9 |
60 | Kasberger, Bernhard | P24 |
61 | Kawada, Yoko | P46 |
62 | Kawasaki, Masahiro | P26 |
63 | Kazumura, Tomoya | P11 |
64 | Khanna, Manshu | P40 |
65 | Kiguchi, Noriaki | P48 |
66 | Klaus, Bettina | P36 |
67 | Knoepfle, Jan | P2 |
68 | Kratz, Jorgen | P13 |
69 | Kunimoto, Takashi | P18 |
70 | Kurata, Leo | P31 |
71 | Lahr, Patrick | P44 |
72 | Lam, Yu Ching | P32 |
73 | Larionov, Daniil | P19 |
74 | Lee, Joosung | P48 |
75 | Lee, Jihong | P32 |
76 | Li, Bingbing | P38 |
77 | Li, Bojia | P21 |
78 | Liang, Yuxing | P3 |
79 | Lindsay, Luke | P26 |
80 | Liu, Yun | P49 |
81 | Liu, Chang | P47 |
82 | Liu, Siwen | P44 |
83 | Lombardi, Michele | P18 |
84 | Ma, Zeming | P7 |
85 | Maeda, Kai | P34 |
86 | Manjunath, Vikram | P41 |
87 | Mauleon, Ana | P42 |
88 | Meisner, Vincent | P50 |
89 | Michaelides, Philippos | P1 |
90 | Mishra, Debasis | P43 |
91 | Monjoie, Leopold | P41 |
92 | Moreno Jiménez, Bernardo | P38 |
93 | Muto, Nozomu | P14 |
94 | Nakada, Satoshi | P6 |
95 | Nakamura, Yuta | P23 |
96 | Nicolo, Antonio | P8 |
97 | Nikandrova, Arina | P34 |
98 | Okamoto, Noriaki | P26 |
99 | Onderstal, Sander | P24 |
100 | Page, Frank | P47 |
101 | Panda, Abinash | P31 |
102 | Papai, Szilvia | P42 |
103 | Park, Junghum | P17 |
104 | Peters, Hans | P1 |
105 | Pramanik, Anup | P39 |
106 | Pramanik, Subhajit | P51 |
107 | Quadir, Abdul | P53 |
108 | Ravindran, Dilip | P49 |
109 | Rivas, Javier | P47 |
110 | Rodivilov, Alexander | P4 |
111 | Romero-Medina, Antonio | P34 |
112 | Salmaso, Pietro | P35 |
113 | Sanchez-Ibrahim, Jesus | P45 |
114 | Sano, Ryuji | P24 |
115 | Saraiva, Gustavo | P3 |
116 | Sarkar, Soumendu | P5 |
117 | Sälzer, Maik | P50 |
118 | Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian | P44 |
119 | Serizawa, Shigehiro | P43 |
120 | SHIN, Hocheol | P6 |
121 | Shinozaki, Hiroki | P52 |
122 | Sili, Duygu | P22 |
123 | Silva, Francisco | P28 |
124 | Sonal, Ruhi | P48 |
125 | Song, Yangbo | P49 |
126 | Stapenhurst, Christopher | P23 |
127 | Swift, Isaac | P33 |
128 | Tajika, Tomoya | P39 |
129 | Tamura, Shohei | P5 |
130 | Tamura, Yuki | P12 |
131 | Temnyalov, Emil | P42 |
132 | Thomson, William | P16 |
133 | Tomoeda, Kentaro | P35 |
134 | Unver, Utku | P20 |
135 | Valvassori Bolgè, Giovanni | P37 |
136 | Vannetelbosch, Vincent | P11 |
137 | Velez, Rodrigo | P54 |
138 | Virag, Gabor | P13 |
139 | Wakabayashi, Yuya | P37 |
140 | Wang, Jingru | P54 |
141 | Wang, Ziwei | P35 |
142 | Wasser, Cédric | P19 |
143 | Watanabe, Naoki | P17 |
144 | Westkamp, Alexander | P41 |
145 | Woodward, Kyle | P43 |
146 | Yadav, Sonal | P27 |
147 | Zachariassen, Julius | P25 |
148 | Zeng, Cathy | P20 |
149 | Zeng, Huaxia | P9 |
150 | Zeng, Haoyuan | P32 |
151 | Zhang, Wanchang | P23 |
152 | Zhang, Qiaoxi | P2 |
153 | ZHOU, Yu | P21 |
This program was last updated on 2025-06-22 08:18:20 EDT