World Congress of the Game Theory Society

Summary of All Sessions

#Date/TimeLocationTitlePapers
1July 13, 2008
8:30-9:50
G45 Behavioral Theory I3
2July 13, 2008
8:30-9:50
G40 Bounded Rationality I3
3July 13, 2008
8:30-9:50
G27 Updating3
4July 13, 2008
8:30-9:50
G05 Roommate and Marriage models2
5July 13, 2008
8:30-9:50
G43 Learning and Groups3
6July 13, 2008
8:30-9:50
160 Consensus and Agreement3
7July 13, 2008
8:30-9:50
101 Awareness II3
8July 13, 2008
8:30-9:50
2245 Beliefs and Incomplete Information3
9July 13, 2008
8:30-9:50
276 Bargaining and Applications3
10July 13, 2008
8:30-9:50
G44 Implementation II3
11July 13, 2008
8:30-9:50
1246 Lobbying3
12July 13, 2008
8:30-9:50
G42 Fair Division3
13July 13, 2008
8:30-9:50
G36 Dynamics, Objective Functions, and Games3
14July 13, 2008
8:30-9:50
G03 Large Games I3
15July 13, 2008
10:00-10:30
Coon Forum Welcome Remarks and Game Theory and Computer Science Prize Announcement0
16July 13, 2008
11:00-12:20
G42 Networks IV3
17July 13, 2008
11:00-12:20
G43 Bounded complexity2
18July 13, 2008
11:00-12:20
G45 War3
19July 13, 2008
11:00-12:20
G05 Political Competition and Dynamics3
20July 13, 2008
11:00-12:20
G44 Experiments and Methods3
21July 13, 2008
11:00-12:20
G36 Mechanism Design VI2
22July 13, 2008
11:00-12:20
160 Strategy-Proofness3
23July 13, 2008
11:00-12:20
G27 Incentives3
24July 13, 2008
11:00-12:20
G40 Learning, communication, coordination.3
25July 13, 2008
11:00-12:20
1246 Algorithms and Games3
26July 13, 2008
11:00-12:20
101 Strategic Communication III3
27July 13, 2008
11:00-12:20
G03 Large Games II3
28July 13, 2008
11:00-12:20
276 Rationalizability3
29July 13, 2008
13:45-14:30
1246 Semi-Plenary A52
30July 13, 2008
13:45-15:15
Norris 202 Semi-Plenary A22
31July 13, 2008
13:45-15:15
Norris 101 Semi-Plenary A32
32July 13, 2008
13:45-15:15
Jacobs G40 Semi-Plenary A42
33July 13, 2008
13:45-15:15
Norris McKormick Semi-Plenary A12
34July 13, 2008
15:25-17:10
G40 Ambiguity and Risk4
35July 13, 2008
15:25-17:10
160 Legislative Bargaining3
36July 13, 2008
15:25-17:10
G42 Networks I: Learning4
37July 13, 2008
15:25-17:10
G43 Agency4
38July 13, 2008
15:25-17:10
1246 Uncertainty, Decisions, and Games4
39July 13, 2008
15:25-17:10
G44 Game Experiments I3
40July 13, 2008
15:25-17:10
G03 Auction and Market Experiments4
41July 13, 2008
15:25-17:10
G05 Mechanism Design and Markets2
42July 13, 2008
15:25-17:10
2245 Large Games III3
43July 13, 2008
15:25-17:10
101 Investment and Research4
44July 13, 2008
15:25-17:10
276 Applications and Matching theory3
45July 13, 2008
15:25-17:10
G27 Mechanism Design VIII4
46July 13, 2008
15:25-17:10
G36 Allocation Rules4
47July 13, 2008
15:25-17:10
G45 Information and adverse selection4
48July 13, 2008
17:30-18:30
Coon Forum Plenary - Presidential Address: Peyton Young; Chaired by Paul Milgrom0
49July 14, 2008
8:30-10:15
G45 IO and Markets4
50July 14, 2008
8:30-10:15
G40 Dynamics, learning and memory4
51July 14, 2008
8:30-10:15
G36 Awareness I4
52July 14, 2008
8:30-10:15
G27 Networks II: Formation4
53July 14, 2008
8:30-10:15
G03 Auctions3
54July 14, 2008
8:30-10:15
101 Repeated Games4
55July 14, 2008
8:30-10:15
G43 Discrete matching models4
56July 14, 2008
8:30-10:15
G05 Mechanism Design IV4
57July 14, 2008
8:30-10:15
2245 Game Theory4
58July 14, 2008
8:30-10:15
G44 Game Experiments II 4
59July 14, 2008
8:30-10:15
1246 Voting with Incomplete Information4
60July 14, 2008
8:30-10:15
160 Strategic Communication I4
61July 14, 2008
8:30-10:15
276 Strategy-Proofness4
62July 14, 2008
8:30-10:15
G42 Coalitional games, monotonicity, and social welfare4
63July 14, 2008
10:45-12:15
Norris 202 Semi-Plenary B22
64July 14, 2008
10:45-12:15
Norris McKormick Semi-Plenary B12
65July 14, 2008
10:45-12:15
Norris 101 Semi-Plenary B32
66July 14, 2008
10:45-12:15
Jacobs G40 Semi-Plenary B42
67July 14, 2008
13:30-14:45
Coon Forum Plenary - 2005 and 2007 Nobel Prize Panel: Robert Aumann, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson and Thomas Schelling; Introductions by Henry Bienen, Moderated by Ehud Kalai0
68July 14, 2008
15:15-17:00
276 The Dynamics of Information4
69July 14, 2008
15:15-17:00
1246 Theoretical Industrial Organization4
70July 14, 2008
15:15-17:00
G03 Auction Experiments4
71July 14, 2008
15:15-17:00
2245 Culture, Persona, and Self-Sorting in Equilibria3
72July 14, 2008
15:15-17:00
G27 Mechanism Design II4
73July 14, 2008
15:15-17:00
G43 Dynamic and Stochastic Games II4
74July 14, 2008
15:15-17:00
G45 Power and public goods3
75July 14, 2008
15:15-17:00
101 Repeated Game Experiments4
76July 14, 2008
15:15-17:00
G40 Markets and Competition3
77July 14, 2008
15:15-17:00
G42 Coalitional Games3
78July 14, 2008
15:15-17:00
160 The Belief Space4
79July 14, 2008
15:15-17:00
G36 Networks III: Formation4
80July 14, 2008
15:15-17:00
G44 Labor Markets4
81July 14, 2008
15:15-17:00
G05 Deliberation, Information, and Voting4
82July 14, 2008
17:30-18:30
Coon Forum Plenary - President-Elect Address: Sergiu Hart; Chaired by Shmuel Zamir0
83July 15, 2008
8:30-10:15
276 Strategic Communication IV4
84July 15, 2008
8:30-10:15
G45 Matching and Assignments3
85July 15, 2008
8:30-10:15
G40 Decision Theory and Preferences4
86July 15, 2008
8:30-10:15
2245 Theory4
87July 15, 2008
8:30-10:15
G36 Assignment game and extensions4
88July 15, 2008
8:30-10:15
G42 Coalition structures4
89July 15, 2008
8:30-10:15
G05 Mechanism Design III4
90July 15, 2008
8:30-10:15
160 Social Preferences and Institutions I4
91July 15, 2008
8:30-10:15
1246 Values of cooperative games3
92July 15, 2008
8:30-10:15
G03 Auctions and Mechanism Design4
93July 15, 2008
8:30-10:15
G44 Industrial Organization II4
94July 15, 2008
8:30-10:15
101 Public Goods and Taxation4
95July 15, 2008
8:30-10:15
G43 Dynamic and Stochastic Games I4
96July 15, 2008
8:30-10:15
G27 Networks IX3
97July 15, 2008
10:45-12:15
Norris 202 Semi-Plenary C22
98July 15, 2008
10:45-12:15
Norris 101 Semi-Plenary C32
99July 15, 2008
10:45-12:15
Jacobs G40 Semi-Plenary C42
100July 15, 2008
10:45-12:15
Norris McKormick Semi-Plenary C12
101July 15, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster5
102July 15, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster5
103July 15, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster4
104July 15, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster3
105July 15, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster3
106July 15, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster5
107July 15, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster4
108July 15, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster4
109July 15, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster5
110July 15, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster3
111July 15, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster 1
112July 15, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster3
113July 15, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster5
114July 15, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster5
115July 15, 2008
15:00-16:45
G43 Dynamic Games4
116July 15, 2008
15:00-16:45
160 Stable strategy sets4
117July 15, 2008
15:00-16:45
G45 Politics and conflict4
118July 15, 2008
15:00-16:45
276 Stochastic Games4
119July 15, 2008
15:00-16:45
G40 Cost-Sharing Mechanisms3
120July 15, 2008
15:00-16:45
101 Social Preferences and Institutions II3
121July 15, 2008
15:00-16:45
G27 Networks V: Communication and Beliefs4
122July 15, 2008
15:00-16:45
G44 Industrial Organization3
123July 15, 2008
15:00-16:45
1246 Strategic Communication II4
124July 15, 2008
15:00-16:45
G36 Biology and Economics4
125July 15, 2008
15:00-16:45
G05 Mechanism Design I4
126July 15, 2008
15:00-16:45
2245 Theory I4
127July 15, 2008
15:00-16:45
G42 Decision Procedures4
128July 15, 2008
15:00-16:45
G03 Auctions IV4
129July 15, 2008
17:00-18:00
Coon Forum Plenary - Morgenstern Lecture: Jean Tirole; Chaired by Drew Fudenberg0
130July 16, 2008
8:30-10:15
G03 Auctions V4
131July 16, 2008
8:30-10:15
1246 Repeated Games3
132July 16, 2008
8:30-10:15
G42 Core and nucleolus4
133July 16, 2008
8:30-10:15
G45 Electoral Competition 13
134July 16, 2008
8:30-10:15
G44 Dynamics and convexity4
135July 16, 2008
8:30-10:15
2245 TU Coalitional Games3
136July 16, 2008
8:30-10:15
G43 Cost Sharing4
137July 16, 2008
8:30-10:15
101 Endogenous Participation3
138July 16, 2008
8:30-10:15
276 Politics and information4
139July 16, 2008
8:30-10:15
G27 Networks VI: Games4
140July 16, 2008
8:30-10:15
G40 Behavioral Theory II3
141July 16, 2008
8:30-10:15
G05 Mechanism Design IX3
142July 16, 2008
8:30-10:15
160 Equilibrim Concepts4
143July 16, 2008
8:30-10:15
G36 Bargaining I4
144July 16, 2008
10:45-12:15
Norris McKormick Semi-Plenary D12
145July 16, 2008
10:45-12:15
Norris 101 Semi-Plenary D32
146July 16, 2008
10:45-12:15
Jacobs G40 Semi-Plenary D42
147July 16, 2008
10:45-12:15
Norris 202 Semi-Plenary D22
148July 16, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster5
149July 16, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster4
150July 16, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster2
151July 16, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster4
152July 16, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster4
153July 16, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster4
154July 16, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster2
155July 16, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster4
156July 16, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster4
157July 16, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster2
158July 16, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster4
159July 16, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster4
160July 16, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster5
161July 16, 2008
13:45-15:00
poster poster3
162July 16, 2008
15:00-16:45
G05 Multi-Unit Auctions3
163July 16, 2008
15:00-16:45
G36 Contracts and Tournament Theory4
164July 16, 2008
15:00-16:45
1246 Resale in Auctions4
165July 16, 2008
15:00-16:45
G42 Bargaining II4
166July 16, 2008
15:00-16:45
2245 Politics, Governments and Policies4
167July 16, 2008
15:00-16:45
160 Evolution and Learning3
168July 16, 2008
15:00-16:45
G40 Behavioral Models of Intertemporal Choice3
169July 16, 2008
15:00-16:45
G44 Cooperative Theory and Applications4
170July 16, 2008
15:00-16:45
276 Implementation I3
171July 16, 2008
15:00-16:45
G03 Mechanism Design V3
172July 16, 2008
15:00-16:45
G27 Networks VII: Bargaining and Allocations4
173July 16, 2008
15:00-16:45
G43 Communication and games4
174July 16, 2008
15:00-16:45
G45 Electoral Competition 24
175July 16, 2008
15:00-16:45
101 Equilibrium Computation4
176July 16, 2008
17:15-18:15
Coon Forum Plenary - von Neumann Lecture: Abraham Neyman; Chaired by George Mailath0
177July 17, 2008
8:30-10:15
G43 Common Value Auctions4
178July 17, 2008
8:30-10:15
2245 Implementation3
179July 17, 2008
8:30-10:15
G42 College admissions approaches3
180July 17, 2008
8:30-10:15
G44 Existence of Equilibrium3
181July 17, 2008
8:30-10:15
1246 Group Formation and Bargaining4
182July 17, 2008
8:30-10:15
160 Games and Computing3
183July 17, 2008
8:30-10:15
G05 Networks VIII4
184July 17, 2008
8:30-10:15
G03 Resource Allocation and Mechanisms4
185July 17, 2008
8:30-10:15
101 Fair Division and Claims3
186July 17, 2008
8:30-10:15
G36 Collective Choice4
187July 17, 2008
8:30-10:15
G45 Experimental and behavioral models3
188July 17, 2008
8:30-10:15
276 Gerrymandering and Immigration4
189July 17, 2008
8:30-10:15
G27 Bargaining III4
190July 17, 2008
8:30-10:15
G40 Behavioral Game Theory and Experiments4
191July 17, 2008
10:45-11:45
Coon Forum Plenary - Shapley Lecture: Tim Roughgarden; Chaired by Eva Tardos0
192July 17, 2008
12:00-13:20
G45 Incomplete Information2
193July 17, 2008
12:00-13:20
G36 Beliefs and Behavior3
194July 17, 2008
12:00-13:20
G44 Global Games3
195July 17, 2008
12:00-13:20
G27 Bargaining3
196July 17, 2008
12:00-13:20
160 Auctions and Markets3
197July 17, 2008
12:00-13:20
G43 Learning2
198July 17, 2008
12:00-13:20
G03 Imperfect monitoring3
199July 17, 2008
12:00-13:20
276 Population dynamics3
200July 17, 2008
12:00-13:20
G42 Fairness and Allocations3
201July 17, 2008
12:00-13:20
101 Segregation3
202July 17, 2008
12:00-13:20
G40 Incentives II2
203July 17, 2008
12:00-13:20
1246 Imitation and Adjustment3
 

203 sessions, 665 papers


 

World Congress of the Game Theory Society

Complete List of All Sessions


Session 1: Behavioral Theory I

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 9:50
Location: G45
 

Dynamic Psychological Games
JEL codes: C72, C73
By Pierpaolo Battigalli, Bocconi University Martin Dufwenberg, University of Arizona
   Presented by: Martin Dufwenberg, University of Arizona
 

Doubts and Equilibria
By Antonio Cabrales Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Madrid 126 , 28903 Getafe, SPAIN José Ramón Uriarte Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I-Ekonomi Analisiaren Oinarriak I Saila. Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre, 83. 48015 Bilbao, Basque Country-Spain.
   Presented by: Jose Uriarte, University of the Basque Country
 

The Ultimatum Game: Interdependent Preferences in Experimental Setting
By Yoram Halevy, University of British Columbia Michael Peters, University of British Columbia
   Presented by: Yoram Halevy, University of British Columbia

Session 2: Bounded Rationality I

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 9:50
Location: G40
 

Plans as Conditional Strategies: A New Concept Enabling Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
JEL codes: C72 C70 D83
By Alexander Dilger, University of Münster
   Presented by: ALEXANDER DILGER, UNIVERSITY OF MUENSTER
 

Strategic Complexity in Repeated Extensive Games
By Nozomu Muto, Hitotsubashi University
   Presented by: Nozomu Muto, Hitotsubashi University
 

Skill in Poker
By Ruud Hendrickx, Tilburg University Pim Hilbers, Tilburg University Peter Borm, Tilburg University Ben van der Genugten, Tilburg University
   Presented by: Ruud Hendrickx, Tilburg University

Session 3: Updating

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 9:50
Location: G27
 

Updating Toward the Signal
JEL codes: C02, D82, D83
By Christopher P. Chambers, Caltech Paul J. Healy, Ohio State
   Presented by: Paul Healy, The Ohio State University
 

Updating Ambiguity Averse Preferences
By Eran Hanany, Tel Aviv University Peter Klibanoff, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Eran Hanany, Tel Aviv University
 

Expected Utility Theory from a Frequentist Perspective
By Tai-Wei Hu, The Pennsylvania State University
   Presented by: Tai-Wei Hu, Pennsylvania State University

Session 4: Roommate and Marriage models

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 9:50
Location: G05
 

PARETO-STABILITY CONCEPT: A NATURAL SOLUTION CONCEPT FOR THE ROOMMATE AND THE MARRIAGE MODELS
JEL codes: C78, D78
By MARILDA SOTOMAYOR Universidade de São Paulo Department of Economics, , Cidade Universitária, Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto 908, 05508-900, São Paulo, SP, Brazil Brown University Department of Economics, 64 Waterman Street, Providence, RI, USA e-mail: marildas@usp.br
   Presented by: Marilda Sotomayor,
 

The Roommates Problem Revisited
By Thayer Morrill, University of Maryland
   Presented by: Thayer Morrill, University of Maryland

Session 5: Learning and Groups

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 9:50
Location: G43
 

Aggregate Uncertainty Can Lead to Herds
JEL codes: C72 / C79 / D83
By Ignacio Monzon, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison
   Presented by: Ignacio Monzon, University of Wisconsin-Madison
 

MONOTONE IMITATION
By Carlos Oyarzun, Universidad de Alicante Johannes Ruf, Columbia University
   Presented by: Carlos Oyarzun, Universidad de Alicante
 

Can Good Policies be Found? Repeated Elections, Learning and Policy Dynamics
By Steven Callander, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Steven Callander, Northwestern University

Session 6: Consensus and Agreement

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 9:50
Location: 160
 

Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case
JEL codes: D70, D80
By Dov Samet, Tel Aviv University
   Presented by: Dov Samet, Tel Aviv University
 

Qualitative multiple outcomes games with consensus
By Ramzi Ben Larbi, CRIL - Université d'Artois, France Sébastien Konieczny, CRIL - CNRS, France Pierre Marquis, CRIL - Université d'Artois, France
   Presented by: Sébastien Konieczny, CNRS
 

Knowing who speaks when: A note on communication, common knowledge and consensus
By Elias Tsakas Goteborg University Mark Voorneveld Tilburg University and Stockholm School of Economics
   Presented by: Elias Tsakas, Goteborg University

Session 7: Awareness II

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 9:50
Location: 101
 

Unawareness and Strategic Announcements in Games with Uncertainty
JEL codes: C70, D83
By Erkut Y. Ozbay, University of Maryland
   Presented by: Erkut Ozbay, University of Maryland
 

Unawareness, Beliefs, Games and Speculation
By Aviad Heifetz, The Open University of Israel Martin Meier, Instituto de Analisis Economico Burkhard C. Schipper, University of California Davis
   Presented by: Burkhard Schipper, University of California, Davis
 

Incentives for Unaware Agents
By Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Universitat Mannheim Xiaojian´Zhao, Universitat Mannheim
   Presented by: Xiaojian Zhao, University of Mannheim

Session 8: Beliefs and Incomplete Information

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 9:50
Location: 2245
 

Optimism and Pessimism: Subjective Beliefs in Incomplete Information Games
JEL codes: C72, D83
By Alex Possajennikov, University of Nottingham
   Presented by: Alex Possajennikov, University of Nottingham
 

On the Strategic Impact of an Event under Non-Common Priors
By Daisuke Oyama, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University Olivier Tercieux, Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE) and CNRS
   Presented by: Daisuke Oyama, Hitotsubashi University
 

Evaluating information in zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides
By Bernard de Meyer Universit\'e Paris 1 Ehud Lehrer School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Israel; Dinah Rosenberg LAGA Institut Galil\'ee, Universit\'e Paris 13, and Laboratoire d'Econom\'etrie de l'Ecole Polytechnique, Paris France
   Presented by: Dinah Rosenberg, Universite Paris 13

Session 9: Bargaining and Applications

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 9:50
Location: 276
 

Bargaining Outcomes of Patent Licensing in a Cournot Oligopoly Market
JEL codes: D45, D43, C71
By Shin Kishimoto, Tokyo Institute of Technology Naoki Watanabe, University of Tsukuba Shigeo Muto, Tokyo Institute of Technology
   Presented by: Shin Kishimoto, Tokyo Institute of Technology
 

WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions for non-convex bargaining problems
By Hans Peters, University Maastricht Dries Vermeulen, University Maastricht
   Presented by: Dries Vermeulen, University Maastricht
 

Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Environments with Lotteries
By Geoffroy de Clippel, Brown University
   Presented by: Geoffroy de Clippel, Brown University

Session 10: Implementation II

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 9:50
Location: G44
 

Fixed Points of Choice-Improving Correspondences on the Space of Direct Mechanisms and Implementability
JEL codes: C79, D71
By Fernando Tohmé, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Nacional del Sur and CONICET, Bahía Blanca, Argentina. Marcelo Auday, Centro de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia and Departamento de Humanidades, Universidad Nacional del Sur, Bahía Blanca, Argentina.
   Presented by: Fernando Tohme, Universidad Nacional del Sur
 

Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: A Generalized Bidding Approach
By Yuan Ju, University of York, UK David Wettstein, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel
   Presented by: David Wettstein, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
 

Implementation, dominance and non-bossyness
By Dolors Berga Universitat de Girona Bernardo Moreno Universidad de Málaga
   Presented by: Bernardo Moreno, Universidad de Malaga

Session 11: Lobbying

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 9:50
Location: 1246
 

Trading for the Future: Signalling in Permit Markets
JEL codes: H23, Q58, P48
By Bard Harstad, MEDS
   Presented by: Bard Harstad, Kellogg School of Management
 

Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access
By Christopher Cotton, Cornell Univ
   Presented by: Christopher Cotton, Cornell University
 

Polarization and the Power of Lobbyists
By John William Hat…eld
   Presented by: John Hatfield, Graduate School of Business

Session 12: Fair Division

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 9:50
Location: G42
 

Cutting a Pie is Not a Piece of Cake
JEL codes: C72, D61, D74
By Julius B. Barbanel, Union College Steven J. Brams, New York University Walter Stromquist, Swarthmore College (presenter)
   Presented by: Walter Stromquist, Swarthmore College
 

Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Procedure
By Steven J. Brams, New York University Michael A. Jones, Montclair State University Christian Klamler, Graz University
   Presented by: Steven Brams, New York University
 

Cooperative games in fair division
By Marco Dall'Aglio, University "G. d'Annunzio" of Chieti-Pescara, Italy Rodica Branzei, University "Alexandru Ioan Cuza", Iasi, Romania Stef Tijs, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
   Presented by: Marco Dall'Aglio, University of Chieti-Pescara

Session 13: Dynamics, Objective Functions, and Games

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 9:50
Location: G36
 

The Logit-Response Dynamics
JEL codes: C72, D83
By Carlos Alos-Ferrer, University of Konstanz Nick Netzer, University of Konstanz
   Presented by: Carlos Alos-Ferrer, University of Konstanz
 

Using Game Theory for Distributed Control Engineering
By Anders Rantzer Automatic Control LTH, Lund University, Sweden
   Presented by: Anders Rantzer, Lund University
 

Regret Minimization and the Price of Total Anarchy
By Avrim Blum, Carnegie Mellon University MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, AT&T Katrina Ligett, Carnegie Mellon University Aaron Roth, Carnegie Mellon University
   Presented by: Aaron Roth, Carnegie Mellon University

Session 14: Large Games I

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 9:50
Location: G03
 

On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players
JEL codes: C72
By Edward Cartwright, University of Kent, Myrna Wooders, Vanderbilt University
   Presented by: Edward Cartwright, University of Kent
 

large games and the law of large numbers
By nabil al-najjar
   Presented by: Nabil Al-Najjar, Northwestern University
 

Partial Exposure in Large Games
By Ronen Gradwohl, Weizmann Institute of Science Omer Reingold, Weizmann Institute of Science
   Presented by: Ronen Gradwohl, Weizmann Institute of Science

Session 15: Welcome Remarks and Game Theory and Computer Science Prize Announcement

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 10:00 - 10:30
Location: Coon Forum

Session 16: Networks IV

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:20
Location: G42
 

Heterogeneity and Link Imperfections in Nash Networks
JEL codes: C72, D85
By Pascal Billand, Université de Saint-Etienne, Creuset. Christophe Bravard, Université de Saint-Etienne, Creuset. Sudipta Sarang, Department of Economics, Virginia Tech and Louisiana State University.
   Presented by: BRAVARD Christophe, University of Saint-Etienne
 

Strategic Communication Networks
By Jeanne Hagenbach, University of Paris 1 Frederic Koessler, Paris School of Economics
   Presented by: Frederic Koessler, Paris School of Economics, CNRS
 

Complementarities, Group Formation and Preferences for Similarity
By Marcin Peski, University of Chicago
   Presented by: Marcin Peski, Economics

Session 17: Bounded complexity

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:20
Location: G43
 

Playing off-line games with bounded rationality
JEL codes: C72, C73
By Jerome Renault, Universite Paris Dauphine Marco Scarsini, LUISS Rome and HEC, Paris Tristan Tomala, HEC Paris
   Presented by: Marco Scarsini, LUISS
 

Should I remember more than you? - On the best response to bounded recall strategies
By Rene Levinsky Max Planck Institute for Economics, jena, Germany Miroslav Zeleny Faculty of Mathematics and Physics, Charles University, Praha, Czech Republic
   Presented by: Rene Levinsky, Max Planck Institute of Economics

Session 18: War

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:20
Location: G45
 

After the War: An experimental study of post-conflict behavior
JEL codes: C92,
By Juan A. Lacomba, University of Granada Francisco M. Lagos, University of Granada Ernesto Reuben, Northwestern University Frans van Winden, University of Amsterdam
   Presented by: Ernesto Reuben, Northwestern University
 

PEACE AGREEMENTS WITHOUT COMMITMENT
By Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
   Presented by: Carmen Beviá, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
 

A Dynamic Theory of War Initiation and Termination
By Department of Political Science, University of Rochester
   Presented by: Yoji Sekiya, University of Rochester

Session 19: Political Competition and Dynamics

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:20
Location: G05
 

Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition games: The hybrid case
JEL codes: C72, D72, D78
By Wallis Institute of Political Economy, University of Rochester
   Presented by: Alejandro Saporiti, University of Rochester
 

On the General Existence of Party-Unanimity Nash Equilibria in Multi-dimensional Political Competition Games
By Naoki Yoshihara The Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Naka 2-1, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-0004, Japan.
   Presented by: Naoki Yoshihara, Yale University
 

Fiscal Policy over the Real Business Cycle: A Positive Theory
By Marco Battaglini Princeton University Stephen Coate Cornell University
   Presented by: Marco Battaglini, Princeton University

Session 20: Experiments and Methods

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:20
Location: G44
 

Exact Hypothesis Tests for Experimental Game Theory
JEL codes: C14, C81, C90
By Karl H. Schlag, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
   Presented by: Karl Schlag, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
 

Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games
By Ronald Peeters, Department of Economics, Maastricht University, The Netherlands Marc Vorsatz, Department of Economics, Maastricht University, The Netherlands Markus Walzl, Department of Economics, Maastricht University, The Netherlands
   Presented by: Ronald Peeters, Universiteit Maastricht
 

Predicing the Outcome of a Game
By David H. Wolpert NASA Ames Research Center MS 269-1 Moffett Field, CA 94035
   Presented by: David Wolpert, NASA Ames Research Center

Session 21: Mechanism Design VI

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:20
Location: G36
 

Mechanism Design in Highly Anonymous Environments
JEL codes: C72,D71,D44,D89
By Vincent Conitzer, Duke University Liad Wagman, Duke University
   Presented by: Vincent Conitzer, Duke University
 

A mechanism for solving bargaining problems using risk aversion
By Sylvie Thoron, GREQAM, Marseille Emily Tanimura, GREQAM, CAMS see also joint pdf
   Presented by: Emily Tanimura, Ecole des Hautes Etudes de Sciences Soci

Session 22: Strategy-Proofness

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:20
Location: 160
 

Efficiency, Fairness, and Strategy-proofness in Queueing Problems: Characterizations and Impossibility
JEL codes: D63, C72
By Cagatay Kayi, Maastricht University Eve Ramaekers, Université catholique de Louvain and CORE
   Presented by: Cagatay Kayi, Maastricht University
 

Strategy-proofness and Equal-cost Sharing for Excludable Public Goods
By Jordi Masso, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Antonio Nicolo', Università degli Studi di Padova Arunava Sen, Indian Statistical Institute
   Presented by: Antonio Nicolo, University of Padua
 

Exchanging objects under trade restrictions
By Jorge L. Garcia, University of Rochester.
   Presented by: Jorge Garcia Ramirez, University of Rochester

Session 23: Incentives

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:20
Location: G27
 

Strategic Asset Allocation With Relative Performance Concerns
JEL codes: C73, C61, D81
By Suleyman Basak, London Business School and CEPR Dmitry Makarov, New Economic School
   Presented by: Dmitry Makarov, New Economic School
 

We Can't Argue Forever - But We Should Do So As Long As Possible
By Katalin Bognar, University of Michigan Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, UCLA Lones Smith, University of Michigan
   Presented by: Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, UCLA
 

Ratings as Incentives
By Dan Simundza, University of Michigan Lones Smith, University of Michigan
   Presented by: Dan Simundza, University of Michigan

Session 24: Learning, communication, coordination.

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:20
Location: G40
 

Communication with Unobservable Constraints
JEL codes: C73,D82,D83
By Ilya Khayutin, Institute of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.
   Presented by: Ilya Khayutin, Hebrew University
 

Strategic Information Transmission through the Media
By Hanjoon Michael Jung, Lahore University of Management Sciences
   Presented by: Hanjoon Jung, Lahore University of Management Sciences
 

Social Learning in Two-Armed Bandit Problems
By Braz Camargo University of Western Ontario
   Presented by: Braz Camargo, University of Western Ontario

Session 25: Algorithms and Games

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:20
Location: 1246
 

Game-theory-based approaches to full-scale Heads-Up Texas Hold'em poker: Automated abstraction and scalable equilibrium-finding algorithms
JEL codes: C63, C72, C61
By Presenting author: Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University Co-Authors: Andrew Gilpin, Carnegie Mellon University Troels Bjerre Sørensen, Carnegie Mellon University Samid Hoda, Carnegie Mellon University Javier Peña, Carnegie Mellon University
   Presented by: Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University
 

Knowledge and Structure in Social Algorithms
By Rohit Parikh City University of New York
   Presented by: Rohit Parikh, City University of New York
 

Congestion, Coordination and Matching
By Maisa Halko Helsinki School of Economics Hannu Salonen University of Turku
   Presented by: Hannu Salonen, University of Turku

Session 26: Strategic Communication III

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:20
Location: 101
 

Strategic Argumentation
JEL codes: D
By Wioletta Dziuda, MEDS, Kellogg School of Management
   Presented by: Wioletta Dziuda, Kellogg School of Management
 

Incomplete Language as an Incentive Device
By Peter Eso, Kellogg MEDS, Northwestern University Dezso Szalay, University of Warwick
   Presented by: Peter Eso, Kellogg School, Northwestern University
 

Disagreement and Evidence Production in Pure Communication Games
By Peter Eso, Kellogg School of Management, MEDS Adam Galambos, Lawrence University, Dept. of Economics
   Presented by: Adam Galambos, Lawrence University

Session 27: Large Games II

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:20
Location: G03
 

Thinking Categorically About Others: A Conjectural Equilibrium Approach
JEL codes: C72,
By Yaron Azrieli, Tel-Aviv University
   Presented by: Yaron Azrieli, Tel-Aviv University
 

On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Large Games
By Guilherme Carmona, Universidade Nova de Lisboa Konrad Podczeck, Universitat Wien
   Presented by: Guilherme Carmona, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
 

Robustness in Large Non-Anonymous Games
By Ehud Kalai, MEDS, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University Joyee Deb, MEDS, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Joyee Deb, Kellogg School of Management

Session 28: Rationalizability

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:20
Location: 276
 

Rationalizability in Games with a Continuum of Players
JEL codes: D84, C72, C62
By Pedro Jara-Moroni Departamento de Ingeniería Matemática (DIM), Universidad de Chile. Paris School of Economics (PSE).
   Presented by: Pedro Jara-Moroni, Paris School of Economics and Universidad de Chile
 

Bayesian Coalitional Rationalizability
By Xiao Luo, Academia Sinica & National University of Singapore Chih-Chun Yang, University of Rochester
   Presented by: Xiao Luo, Academia Sinica
 

Common p-belief and Knightian uncertainty
By Jayant V Ganguli, Cornell University
   Presented by: Jayant Ganguli, Cornell University

Session 29: Semi-Plenary A5

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 14:30
Location: 1246
 

Auctions with Budget Limits
JEL codes: c7
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Noam Nisan, The Hebrew University
 

Game Theory and Computer Science Prize lecture: The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium
By Constantinos Daskalakis
   Presented by: Constantinos Daskalakis,

Session 30: Semi-Plenary A2

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:15
Location: Norris 202
 

Ambiguity and Rationality: Objective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model
JEL codes: c7
By David Schmeidler, I. Gilboa F. Maccheroni M. Marinacci
   Presented by: David Schmeidler, Tel Aviv University and the Ohio State University
 

Belief Free Games on Incomplet Information
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Dirk Bergemann, Yale University

Session 31: Semi-Plenary A3

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:15
Location: Norris 101
 

Why do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?
JEL codes: c7
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: PAUL KLEMPERER, NUFFIELD COLLEGE
 

Manipulative Auction Design
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Philippe Jehiel, PSE

Session 32: Semi-Plenary A4

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:15
Location: Jacobs G40
 

Altruistic Kidney Exchange
JEL codes: c7
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Tayfun Sonmez,
 

One Chance in a Million: Altruism and the Bone Marrow Registry
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Ted Bergstrom, University of California at Santa Barbar

Session 33: Semi-Plenary A1

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:15
Location: Norris McKormick
 

Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions and Clubs
JEL codes: c7
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Daron Acemoglu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 

Models of Values Conflict
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Timothy Feddersen, Northwestern Universuty

Session 34: Ambiguity and Risk

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 15:25 - 17:10
Location: G40
 

Ambiguity, Dynamic Consistency and Behavioral Phenomena
JEL codes: D81, D83, D90
By Sandeep Baliga, Northwestern University Eran Hanany, Tel Aviv University Peter Klibanoff, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Peter Klibanoff, Northwestern University
 

Buying and selling price for a lottery and operational measure of riskiness
By Michal Lewandowski, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
   Presented by: Michal Lewandowski, European University Institute
 

Vector Expected Utility and Attitudes toward Variation
By Marciano Siniscalchi Economics Department, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Marciano Siniscalchi, Northwestern University
 

The induced capacity and Choquet integral monotone convergence
By Roee Teper, Tel Aviv university
   Presented by: Roee Teper, Tel Aviv University

Session 35: Legislative Bargaining

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 15:25 - 17:10
Location: 160
 

Efficient and stable majority rules for one-dimensional collective choices
JEL codes: D71, D72,
By Daniel Cardona, Universitat de les Illes Balears Clara Ponsati, IAE-CSIC, Barcelona
   Presented by: Clara Ponsati, Institut d'Analisi Economica - CSIC
 

Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in legislatures
By Maria Montero, University of Nottingham Juan J. Vidal-Puga, University of Vigo
   Presented by: Maria Montero, University of Nottingham
 

Proposals vs.\ Demands in Coalitional Bargaining: A Comparison
By Yves Breitmoser, EUV Frankfurt (Oder), Germany
   Presented by: Yves Breitmoser, Europa-Universität Viadrina

Session 36: Networks I: Learning

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 15:25 - 17:10
Location: G42
 

Bayesian Learning in Networks
JEL codes: D83
By Daron Acemoglu, MIT Munther Dahleh, MIT Ilan Lobel, MIT Asuman Ozdaglar, MIT
   Presented by: Ilan Lobel, MIT
 

Rule of Thumb Learning in Networks
By Daron Acemoglu, Department of Economics, MIT; Angelia Nedic, Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, UIUC; Asuman Ozdaglar, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, MIT
   Presented by: Asu Ozdaglar, MIT
 

Naive Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence, and the Wisdom of Crowds
By Benjamin Golub, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Matthew O. Jackson, Department of Economics, Stanford University
   Presented by: Benjamin Golub, Caltech
 

Social Networks With(out) Influential Agents
By Lara Dolecek, MIT Devavrat Shah, MIT
   Presented by: Lara Dolecek, MIT

Session 37: Agency

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 15:25 - 17:10
Location: G43
 

Distributed Dynamic Reinforcement of Efficient Outcomes in Multiagent Coordination
JEL codes: D83, D85
By Georgios C. Chasparis, University of California Los Angeles Jeff S. Shamma, Georgia Institute of Technology
   Presented by: Georgios Chasparis, Univ. of California Los Angeles
 

On Correlation and Competition under Moral Hazard
By Columbia Business School & Ecole Polytechnique
   Presented by: Pierre Fleckinger, Columbia U. & Ecole Polytechnique
 

News from the Informed Principal in Private-Value Environments
By Mylovanov, Timofiy, University of Bonn Troger, Thomas, University of Bonn
   Presented by: Thomas Troger, University of Bonn
 

Contracts with Endogenous Information
By Dezso Szalay University of Warwick
   Presented by: Dezso Szalay, University of Warwick

Session 38: Uncertainty, Decisions, and Games

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 15:25 - 17:10
Location: 1246
 

Knightian Games and Robustness to Ambiguity
JEL codes: C72, D82
By Ronald Stauber, Australian National University
   Presented by: Ronald Stauber, Australian National University
 

Ranking Completely Uncertain Decisions by the Uniform Expected Utility Criterion
By Nicolas Gravel, IDEP-GREQAM, University of Aix-Marseille II Thierry Marchant, Ghent University Arunava Sen, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi
   Presented by: Nicolas Gravel, IDEP-GREQAM, University Aix-Marseille II
 

When are Signals Complements or Substitutes?
By Tilman Borgers (University of Michigan) Angel Hernando-Veciana (Carlos III Madrid) Daniel Kraehmer (Freie Universitaet Berlin)
   Presented by: Tilman Borgers, University of Michigan
 

Iterated Regret Minimization: Towards More Realistic Solution Concepts
By Joseph Halpern, Cornell University Rafael Pass, Cornell University
   Presented by: Rafael Pass, Cornell University

Session 39: Game Experiments I

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 15:25 - 17:10
Location: G44
 

Coordination in the Presence of Asset Markets
By Shimon Kogan, Carnegie Mellon University Anthony M. Kwasnica, Penn State University Roberto Weber, Carnegie Mellon University
   Presented by: Anthony Kwasnica, Pennsylvania State University
 

Network Structure in a Link-formation Game: An Experimental Study
By Alexander Elbittar (CIDE) Rodrigo Harrison (PUC) Roberto Muñoz (USM)
   Presented by: Alexander Elbittar, CIDE
 

Neural correlates of strategic thinking in medial prefrontal cortex
By Rosemarie Nagel Giorgio Coricelli
   Presented by: Rosemarie Nagel, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Session 40: Auction and Market Experiments

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 15:25 - 17:10
Location: G03
 

Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply: Experimental Evidence
JEL codes: D44, C92
By Damian S. Damianov, University of Texas-Pan American Jorg Oechssler, University of Heidelberg Johannes Becker, ETH Zurich
   Presented by: Damian Damianov, University of Texas - Pan American
 

A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions
By J Philipp Reiss, Maastricht University Oliver Kirchkamp, University of Jena Karim Sadrieh, University of Magdeburg
   Presented by: J. Philipp Reiss, Maastricht University
 

The Consequences of Competition for Contract Choice and Conduct: Experimental Evidence
By Simon Gächter, University of Nottingham Bettina Rockenbach, University of Erfurt Abdolkarim Sadrieh, University of Magdeburg
   Presented by: Abdolkarim Sadrieh, University of Magdeburg
 

Selection in Markets for Risky and Ambiguous Prospects
By Martin G. Kocher, University of Munich Stefan T. Trautmann, University of Rotterdam
   Presented by: Martin Kocher, University of Munich

Session 41: Mechanism Design and Markets

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 15:25 - 17:10
Location: G05
 

Information-based trade
By Philip Bond, University of Pennsylvania Hulya Eraslan, University of Pennsylvania
   Presented by: Philip Bond, University of Pennsylvania
 

A Strategic Model for Information Markets
By Evdokia Nikolova, MIT EECS Rahul Sami, University of Michigan
   Presented by: Evdokia Nikolova, MIT

Session 42: Large Games III

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 15:25 - 17:10
Location: 2245
 

A large market game with private information on both sides.
JEL codes: D52, C72, D82
By Enrico Minelli, Università di Brescia, Italy. Martin Meier, IAE, Barcelona.
   Presented by: Enrico Minelli, Università di Brescia
 

Informational Overhead of Incentive Compatibility
By Moshe Babaioff, Microsoft Research Liad Blumrosen, Microsoft Research Moni Naor, Weizmann Institute Michael Schapira, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
   Presented by: Michael Schapira, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
 

Behavioral properties of correlated equilibrium in games with many players
By Edward Cartwright, University of Kent Myrna Wooders, Vanderbilt University
   Presented by: Myrna Wooders, Vanderbilt University and Warwick

Session 43: Investment and Research

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 15:25 - 17:10
Location: 101
 

Excess Returns of Companies with a Distinguished Player
JEL codes: D43, G32, C72
By Matthias Blonski, J.W.Goethe University, Frankfurt Ulf v.Lilienfeld-Toal, J.W.Goethe University, Frankfurt
   Presented by: Matthias Blonski, J.W.Goethe University Frankfurt
 

In or Out: University Research and Consulting
By Richard Jensen, University of Notre Dame Jerry Thursby, Georgia Institute of Technology Marie Thursby, Georgia Institute of Technology
   Presented by: Richard Jensen, Notre Dame
 

The Economics of Investment in Clinical Trials
By Matthias Dahm Universitat Rovira i Virgili Paula González Universidad Pablo de Olavide Nicolás Porteiro Universidad Pablo de Olavide
   Presented by: Matthias Dahm, Universitat Rovira i Virgili
 

Do firms interact strategically?: A structural model of the multi-stage investment timing game in offshore petroleum production
By C.-Y. Cynthia Lin, University of California at Davis
   Presented by: C.-Y. Cynthia Lin, University of California at Davis

Session 44: Applications and Matching theory

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 15:25 - 17:10
Location: 276
 

Codes of Best Practice in Competitive Markets
By Eduard Alonso-Paulí, Universidad Pablo de Olavide David Pérez-Castrillo, Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona
   Presented by: David Perez-Castrillo, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
 

Satiation and Inequality in Quasi-Competitive Markets
By Stefan Napel, University of Bayreuth, Germany Wendelin Schnedler, University of Heidelberg, Germany
   Presented by: Stefan Napel, University of Bayreuth
 

The Blocking Lemma for a Many-to-one Matching Model
By Ruth Martínez, Universidad Nacional de San Luis, Argentina Jordi Massó, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, España Alejandro Neme, Universidad Nacional de San Luis y Conicet, Argentina Jorge Oviedo, Universidad Nacional de San Luis y Conicet, Argentina
   Presented by: Jorge Oviedo, Universidad Nacional de San Luis

Session 45: Mechanism Design VIII

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 15:25 - 17:10
Location: G27
 

Optimal Combinatorial Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
JEL codes: D82
By Levent Ulku, Rutgers University
   Presented by: Levent Ulku, Rutgers University
 

R&D Project Selection - a Mechanism Design Approach
By Talia Bar, Cornell University Sidartha Gordon, University of Montreal
   Presented by: Talia Bar, Cornell University
 

An Efficient Auction for Non Concave Valuations
By Junjik Bae, Northwestern University Eyal Beigman, Kellogg School of Management Randall Berry, Northwestern University Michael L. Honig, Northwestern University Rakesh Vohra, Kellogg School of Management
   Presented by: Eyal Beigman, Northwestern University (KSM)
 

Beyond the Revelation Principle: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms
By Abraham Othman, Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University Tuomas Sandholm, Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University
   Presented by: Abraham Othman, Carnegie Mellon University

Session 46: Allocation Rules

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 15:25 - 17:10
Location: G36
 

Repeated allocation schemes for dynamic cost games: newsvendor inventory centralization with non-independent demands
JEL codes: C71, C73
By Ana Meca, Operations Research Center, Universidad Miguel Hernández, Elche (Alicante), Spain. M. Dror, Management Information Systems, Eller College of Management, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona. L. A. Guardiola, Operations Research Center, Universidad Miguel Hernández, Elche, Spain. J. Puerto, Facultad de Matemáticas, Universidad de Sevilla, Spain.
   Presented by: Ana Meca, University Miguel Hernandez of Elche
 

Bi-monotonic allocation rules for multi-choice clan games
By R. Branzei, Faculty of Computer Science, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University, Iasi, Romania N. Llorca, CIO and Department of Statistics, Mathematics and Computer Science, University Miguel Hernandez of Elche, Spain J. Sanchez-Soriano, CIO and Department of Statistics, Mathematics and Computer Science, University Miguel Hernandez of Elche, Spain S. Tijs, CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
   Presented by: Rodica Branzei, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University
 

Minimizing expected delay in a PERT network
By Leticia Lorenzo, Universidade de Vigo Javier Castro, Universidad Complutense de Madrid
   Presented by: Leticia Lorenzo, Universidade de Vigo
 

A note on finding the Nucleolus of an n-Person cooperative game by a single linear program
By Justo Puerto Universidad de Sevilla (Spain)
   Presented by: Justo Puerto, Universidad de Sevilla

Session 47: Information and adverse selection

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 15:25 - 17:10
Location: G45
 

A Method to Solve a Class of Two-Dimensional Screening Problems
JEL codes: C72, D82
By Raymond Deneckere, University of Wisconsin-Madsion Sergei Severinov, University of Essex and Yahoo! Research
   Presented by: Sergei Severinov, University of Essex
 

Finding Neutral Optima in Informed Principal Problems with Common Values
By Dieter Balkenborg, University of Exeter Miltiadis Makris, University of Leceister
   Presented by: Dieter Balkenborg, University of Exeter
 

Informed Auctioneer Problem
By Filippo Balestrieri MIT
   Presented by: Filippo Balestrieri, MIT
 

Monotonicity and Implementability
By Dov Monderer Technion, Israel Institute of Technology
   Presented by: Dov Monderer, Technion

Session 48: Plenary - Presidential Address: Peyton Young; Chaired by Paul Milgrom

Date: July 13, 2008
Time: 17:30 - 18:30
Location: Coon Forum

Session 49: IO and Markets

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G45
 

Herding and Bank Runs
JEL codes: C73, D82, E59,
By Chao Gu, University of Missouri
   Presented by: Chao Gu, University of Missouri
 

Strikes as the 'Tip of the Iceberg' in a Theory of Firm-Union Cooperation
By Robert J. Gary-Bobo, CREST-INSEE and Paris School of Economics. Touria Jaaidane, University of Lille 1, France
   Presented by: Robert Gary-Bobo, Université Paris 1
 

Efficiency and the Final Consumer in Resale Markets with Externalities
By Biran Omer, CEREMADE, Paris IX-Dauphine university, Paris, France. Holzman Ron, Department of Mathematics, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel.
   Presented by: Omer Biran, EDOCIF CEREMADE Dauphine Paris IX
 

Patience, Fish Wars, rarity value & Allee effects
By Reinoud Joosten University of Twente The Netherlands
   Presented by: Reinoud Joosten, University of Twente

Session 50: Dynamics, learning and memory

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G40
 

The Logit-Response Dynamics: Challenging Asynchrony and "Completeness"
JEL codes: C72, C62, C61
By Jason R. Marden - California Institute of Technology Jeff S. Shamma - Georgia Institute of Technology
   Presented by: Jason Marden, California Institute of Technology
 

Learning Games
By Nobuyuki Hanaki, University of Tsukuba Ryuichiro Ishikawa, University of Tsukuba Eizo Akiyama, University of Tsukuba
   Presented by: Nobuyuki Hanaki, University of Tsukuba
 

Efficient Dynamic Coordination with Individual Learning
By Amil Dasgupta, LSE Jakub Steiner, University of Edinburgh Colin Stewart, University of Toronto
   Presented by: Colin Stewart, University of Toronto
 

Limited Memory, Categorization and Competition
By Yuxin Chen -New York University Ganesh Iyer -University of California at Berkeley Amit Pazgal -Rice University
   Presented by: Amit Pazgal, Rice University

Session 51: Awareness I

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G36
 

Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior
JEL codes: D82, C72
By Aviad Heifetz, the department of Economics and Management, the Open University of Israel Martin Meier, Instituto de Análisis Económico - CSIC, Barcelona Burkhard Schipper, Department of Economics, University of California, Davis
   Presented by: Aviad Heifetz, The Open University of Israel
 

A Characterization of Trivial Unawareness
By José Luis Montiel Olea, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)
   Presented by: José Montiel Olea, ITAM
 

Unawareness and the Standard State Space Revisited
By Siyang Xiong, Department of Economics, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Siyang Xiong, Northwestern University
 

Player-Set Uncertainty
By Harborne W. Stuart, Jr., Columbia Business School
   Presented by: Harborne Stuart, Jr., Columbia University

Session 52: Networks II: Formation

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G27
 

Contractually Stable Networks
JEL codes: A14, C70
By CAULIER, J.F, FUSL and CORE, University of Louvain. MAULEON, A., FUSL and CORE, University of Louvain. VANNETELBOSCH, CORE, University of Louvain.
   Presented by: Ana Mauleon, Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis
 

A Strategic Theory of Network Status
By Brian W. Rogers, Northwestern University, MEDS
   Presented by: Brian Rogers, Northwestern University, Kellogg
 

Limited Connections: Economic Foundations for a Preferential Attachment Model
By Ana Babus, Erasmus University Rotterdam & Aljaz Ule, University of Amsterdam
   Presented by: Ana Babus, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
 

Congestion Games with Malicious Players
By Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft Research) Robert Kleinberg (Cornell University) Christos H. Papadimitriou (University of California at Berkeley)
   Presented by: Moshe Babaioff, Microsoft Research

Session 53: Auctions

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G03
 

Asymmetric First-Price Auctions With Uniform Distributions: Analytic Solutions to the General Case
JEL codes: D44,D82,H57,C72
By Todd R. Kaplan, University of Exeter, University of Haifa Shmuel Zamir, Hebrew University
   Presented by: Todd R Kaplan, University of Exeter
 

All-Pay Contests
By Ron Siegel
   Presented by: Ron Siegel, Northwestern University
 

Information Aggregation in Double Auctions
By Eiichiro Kazumori The University of Tokyo
   Presented by: Eiichiro Kazumori, University of Tokyo

Session 54: Repeated Games

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 101
 

Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play
JEL codes: c72
By Drew Fudenberg,Harvard University Satoru Takahashi, Princeton University
   Presented by: Drew Fudenberg, Harvard University
 

Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game with Local Interaction and Local Communication
By Myeonghwan Cho, The Pennsylvania State University
   Presented by: Myeonghwan Cho, Pennsylvania State University
 

Perceptron versus Automaton
By Sylvain BEAL, University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, GREDEG
   Presented by: Sylvain BEAL, University of Nice Sophia Antipolis
 

Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games: Community Enforcement Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma
By Joyee Deb. Kellogg School of Management (MEDS) Northwestern University. Julio Gonzalez-Diaz. Kellogg School of Management (CMS-EMS). Northwestern University.
   Presented by: Julio Gonzalez-Diaz, Northwestern University

Session 55: Discrete matching models

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G43
 

Substitutes and Stability for Matching with Contracts
JEL codes: C78, D44.
By John William Hatfield, Stanford University Fuhito Kojima, Harvard University
   Presented by: Fuhito Kojima, Harvard University
 

BENEFITS OF MATCHMAKING IN TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS
By Hanna Halaburda, Harvard Business School Mikolaj Piskorski, Harvard Business School
   Presented by: Hanna Halaburda, Harvard Business School
 

Dating and updating
By Jorge L. Garcia, University of Rochester Paula Jaramillo, University of Rochester
   Presented by: Paula Jaramillo, University of Rochester
 

Coalitional matchings
By Dinko Dimitrov, Faculty of Law and Economics, University of Bayreuth, Germany Emiliya Lazarova, School of Management and Economics, Queen's University Belfast, UK
   Presented by: Emiliya Lazarova, Queen's University Belfast

Session 56: Mechanism Design IV

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G05
 

Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships
By David Rahman, University of Minnesota Ichiro Obara, University of Minnesota
   Presented by: David Rahman, University of Minnesota
 

Optimal Separate Accounting vs. Optimal Formula Apportionment
By Thomas A. Gresik University of Notre Dame
   Presented by: Thomas Gresik, University of Notre Dame
 

Contracts for experts with opposing interests
By Tymofiy Mylovanov, University of Bonn Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Kyiv School of Economics
   Presented by: Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Kyiv School of Economics
 

Coordination, Implementation and Two-Sided Cheap-Talk
By Chirantan Ganguly, Queen's University Belfast Peter Postl, University of Birmingham Indrajit Ray, University of Birmingham
   Presented by: Indrajit Ray, University of Birmingham

Session 57: Game Theory

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 2245
 

Trees and Extensive Forms
JEL codes: C72, D70
By Carlos Alós-Ferrer, University of Konstanz Klaus Ritzberger, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna
   Presented by: Klaus Ritzberger, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna
 

Interdependent Preferences, Potential Games And Household Consumption
By Rahul Deb Yale University
   Presented by: Rahul Deb, Yale University
 

You won't harm me if you fool me
By Federico Echenique Caltech Eran Shmaya Caltech
   Presented by: Federico Echenique, Caltech
 

Learning and Falsifiability in Testing Experts
By Nabil Al-Najjar, Northwestern University Jonathan Weinstein, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Jonathan Weinstein, Northwestern University

Session 58: Game Experiments II

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G44
 

When Herding and Contrarianism foster Market Efficiency: A Financial Trading Experiment
JEL codes: D83, G14, C91
By Daniel Sgroi, Universty of Warwick Andreas Park, University of Toronto
   Presented by: Daniel Sgroi, University of Warwick
 

Equilibrium Play and Best Response to (Stated) Beliefs in Normal Form Games
By Pedro Rey-Biel Universidad Autonoma Barcelona
   Presented by: Pedro Rey-Biel, Universitat Autònoma Barcelona
 

Actions and Beliefs in a Social Preferences Experiment: What do Selfish and Social Welfare Maximizers Believe Others do?
By Nagore Iriberri Universitat Pompeu Fabra Pedro Rey-Biel Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
   Presented by: Nagore Iriberri, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
 

Strategic Sophistication Category: Response Time, Eye Movements and Prediction
By Ai Takeuchi Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University Yukihiko Funaki Waseda University Jana Vyrastekova Radboud University Nijmegen
   Presented by: Ai Takeuchi, Graduate School of Waseda University

Session 59: Voting with Incomplete Information

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 1246
 

Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees
JEL codes: D72, D82
By Matias Iaryczower Caltech
   Presented by: Matias Iaryczower, Caltech
 

Optimality and equilibrium for binary decision problems in a committee
By Jean-Francois Laslier Ecole Polytechnique, Paris Jorgen W. Weibull Stockholm School of Economics
   Presented by: Jorgen Weibull, Stockholm School of Economics
 

Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals
By Philip Bond, University of Pennsylvania Hulya Eraslan, University of Pennsylvania
   Presented by: Hulya Eraslan, University of Pennsylvania
 

Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections
By Sourav Bhattacharya Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh
   Presented by: Sourav Bhattacharya, University of Pittsburgh

Session 60: Strategic Communication I

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 160
 

Normal Talk
JEL codes: C72
By Andreas Blume, University of Pittsburgh Oliver Board, University of Pittsburgh
   Presented by: Andreas Blume, University of Pittsburgh
 

Stochastic Mechanisms in Settings without Monetary Transfers: The Regular Case
By Eugen Kovac, University of Bonn Tymofiy Mylovanov, University of Bonn
   Presented by: Eugen Kovac, University of Bonn
 

Opinions as Incentives
By Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University) Navin Kartik (University of California, San Diego)
   Presented by: Navin Kartik, University of California San Diego
 

Indifferent Public, Passionate Advocates, and Strategic Media
By Ming Li Concordia University Tymofiy Mylovanov University of Bonn
   Presented by: Tymofiy Mylovanov, University of Bonn

Session 61: Strategy-Proofness

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 276
 

Decisiveness, Manipulability, and the Spatial Median
JEL codes: D71, C61
By William S. Zwicker Mathematics Department, Union College (zwickerw@union.edu)
   Presented by: William Zwicker, Union College
 

Unequivocal majority and Maskin monotonicity
By Pablo Amoros, Universidad de Malaga
   Presented by: Pablo Amoros, Universidad de Malaga
 

A domain condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and coalitionally strategy-proofness
By Salvador Barberà Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Dolors Berga Universitat de Girona Bernardo Moreno Universidad de Málaga
   Presented by: Dolors berga, Universitat de Girona
 

Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences and the Pareto Rule
By Masashi UMEZAWA Daito Bunka University, Japan
   Presented by: Masashi Umezawa, Daito Bunka University

Session 62: Coalitional games, monotonicity, and social welfare

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G42
 

Population solidarity, polulation fair-ranking, and the egalitarian solution
JEL codes: C71, D63, D70
By Youngsub Chun, Department of Economics, Seoul National University, Seoul 151-742, South Korea
   Presented by: Youngsub Chun, Seoul National University
 

Monotonicity of social welfare optima
By Jens Leth Hougaard, University of Copenhagen Lars Peter Østerdal, University of Copenhagen
   Presented by: Lars Peter Østerdal, University of Copenhagen
 

Aggregate-monotonic stable solutions.
By Pedro Calleja, Universitat de Barcelona Carles Rafels, Universitat de Barcelona Stef Tijs, Tilburg University
   Presented by: Pedro Calleja, University of Barcelona
 

The cooperative endorsement of correlation
By Penélope Hernández Rojas, University of Valencia José A. Silva-Reus, University of Alicante
   Presented by: Penelope Hernandez,

Session 63: Semi-Plenary B2

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 10:45 - 12:15
Location: Norris 202
 

Trust, Social Capital and Economic Growth
JEL codes: c7
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Lawrence Blume, CORNELL UNIVERSITY
 

Matching through Decentralized Markets
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Leeat Yariv, California Institute of Technology

Session 64: Semi-Plenary B1

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 10:45 - 12:15
Location: Norris McKormick
 

Rational Decisions in Large Worlds
JEL codes: c7
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Kenneth Binmore, University College London
 

Work on a Project to Study Three-Person Cooperative Games Using the 'Agencies Method' in a Variation Employing Attorney-Agents of an Automatic (or Robotic) Type
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: John Nash,

Session 65: Semi-Plenary B3

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 10:45 - 12:15
Location: Norris 101
 

Modeling Behavior in Novel Strategic Situations via Level--k Thinking
JEL codes: c7
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Vincent Crawford, University of California, San Diego
 

Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Jean-Robert Tyran, UNIVERSITY of Copenhagen

Session 66: Semi-Plenary B4

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 10:45 - 12:15
Location: Jacobs G40
 

Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Incomplete Information Games
JEL codes: c7
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Pierpaolo Battigalli, BOCCONI UNIVERSITY
 

Strategic Information Sharing in Repeated Games
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Nicolas Vieille, HEC School of Management

Session 67: Plenary - 2005 and 2007 Nobel Prize Panel: Robert Aumann, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson and Thomas Schelling; Introductions by Henry Bienen, Moderated by Ehud Kalai

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 13:30 - 14:45
Location: Coon Forum

Session 68: The Dynamics of Information

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 15:15 - 17:00
Location: 276
 

Optimal Dynamic Contests
JEL codes: C73, D86
By Giuseppe Moscarini, Yale Lones Smith, Michigan
   Presented by: Lones Smith, University of Michigan
 

Delay in Strategic Information Aggregation
By Ettore Damiano, University of Toronto Hao Li, University of Toronto Wing Suen, The University of Hong Kong
   Presented by: Ettore Damiano, University of Toronto
 

information acquisition and reputation dynamics
By Qingmin Liu, Cowles Foundation at Yale and Upenn economics department.
   Presented by: Qingmin Liu, Yale and Upenn
 

The Durable Information Monopolist
By Axel Anderson, Georgetown University. Lones Smith, University of Michigan.
   Presented by: Axel Anderson, Georgetown University

Session 69: Theoretical Industrial Organization

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 15:15 - 17:00
Location: 1246
 

Markets for Information: of Inefficient Firewalls and Efficient Monopolies
JEL codes: D82, D83, G14
By Antonio Cabrales Universidad Carlos III, Madrid Piero Gottardi University of Venice
   Presented by: Piero Gottardi, University of Venice
 

The Sorting Effect of Price Competition
By Jan Eeckhout, University of Pennsylvania Philipp Kircher, University of Pennsylvania
   Presented by: jan eeckhout, University of Pennsylvania
 

Strategic Capacity Choice under Uncertainty: The Impact of Market Structure on Investment and Welfare
By Veronika Grimm, University of Cologne Gregor Zoettl, University of Cologne
   Presented by: Veronika Grimm, University of Cologne
 

On Compatibility in Two-sided Market
By Ekaterina Goldfayn, BGSE, University of Bonn Eugen Kovac, University of Bonn and CERGE, Charles University
   Presented by: Ekaterina Goldfayn, University of Bonn

Session 70: Auction Experiments

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 15:15 - 17:00
Location: G03
 

Seller Competition and Listing Attributes in Internet Auctions
JEL codes: D44,D83,D43
By Gabriella A. Bucci. DePaul University Rafael Tenorio. DePaul University
   Presented by: Rafael Tenorio, DePaul University
 

Reservation Values in Laboratory Auctions: Context and Bidding Behavior
By Theodore L. Turocy, Texas A&M University Elizabeth Watson, Trinity University
   Presented by: Theodore Turocy, Texas A&M University
 

Uniform-Price Auctions without Exogenous Uncertainty: An Experimental Study
By Alexander Elbittar, CIDE Andrei Gomberg, ITAM
   Presented by: Andrei Gomberg, ITAM
 

English Auctions with Resale: An Experimental Study
By Sotiris Georganas, Ohio State University
   Presented by: Sotirios Georganas, Bonn Graduate School of Economics

Session 71: Culture, Persona, and Self-Sorting in Equilibria

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 15:15 - 17:00
Location: 2245
 

Unscheduled Appointments
JEL codes: D23, D45, K23
By R. Preston McAfee, Yahoo! Research and California Institute of Technology, Alan D. Miller, California Institute of Technology
   Presented by: Alan Miller, California Institute of Technology
 

Persona Games
By Julian Jamison, USC David Wolpert, NASA Ames
   Presented by: Julian Jamison, University of Southern California
 

CULTURAL TRANSMISSION AND THE EVOLUTION OF TRUST AND RECIPROCITY.
By Gonzalo Olcina, University of Valencia Vicente Calabuig, University of Valencia
   Presented by: Gonzalo Olcina, University of Valencia

Session 72: Mechanism Design II

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 15:15 - 17:00
Location: G27
 

A theory of expressiveness in mechanisms
JEL codes: D44, C79, D82
By Michael Benisch (presenting author), School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University Norman Sadeh, School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University Tuomas Sandholm, School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University
   Presented by: Michael Benisch, Carnegie Mellon University
 

Publicly Achieving Privacy and Trust In Mediated Normal-Form Mechanisms
By Sergei Izmalkov (MIT, Economics) Matt Lepinski (BBN Technologies) Silvio Micali (MIT, CSAIL)
   Presented by: Sergei Izmalkov, MIT
 

Posted prices vs. negotations: an asymptotic analysis
By Liad Blumrosen, Microsoft Research Thomas Holenstein, Microsoft Research
   Presented by: Liad Blumrosen, Microsoft
 

Characterizing Mechanism Design Over Discrete Domains
By Ahuva Mu'alem, Caltech Michael Schapira, Hebrew University
   Presented by: Ahuva Mu'alem, Hebrew University

Session 73: Dynamic and Stochastic Games II

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 15:15 - 17:00
Location: G43
 

Solving Dynamic Games with Newton's Method
JEL codes: C61, C63, C73
By Michael Ferris, University of Wisconsin at Madison Kenneth L. Judd, Hoover Institution Karl Schmedders, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Karl Schmedders, Kellogg School of Management
 

Multiple Equilibria in Empirical Pricing Games
By Jean-Pierre Dube, Chicago GSB Che-Lin Su, Kellogg School, Northwestern University Maria Ana Vitorino, Chicago GSB
   Presented by: Che-Lin Su, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
 

Approximations for Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics
By C. Lanier Benkard, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Przemyslaw Jeziorski, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Benjamin Van Roy, Stanford University Gabriel Y. Weintraub, Columbia Business School
   Presented by: Gabriel Weintraub, Columbia University
 

Computing Equilibrium Value Sets for Dynamic Games with State Variables
By Sevin Yeltekin (Carnegie Mellon University) Kenneth Judd (Hoover Institution)
   Presented by: Sevin Yeltekin, Carnegie Mellon University

Session 74: Power and public goods

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 15:15 - 17:00
Location: G45
 

FAIR ALLOCATION AS POLICY HANDLE TO DISCOURAGE FREE RIDING
By KIM HANG PHAM DO Department of Economics and Finance, Massey University, New Zealand. HENK FOLMER Department of Spatial Sciences, Groningen University and Economics of Consumers and Households, Wageningen University, the Netherlands
   Presented by: Kim Hang Pham Do, Massey University
 

Probability of conflicts for an unstable effectivity function
By -Ramzi Bennour (Paris School of Economics, University Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne) -Dawidson Razafimahatolotra (Paris School of Economics, University Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne)
   Presented by: Ramzi Bennour, University Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne
 

Correlated Equilibrium and the Pricing of Public Goods
By Joseph M. Ostroy, UCLA Joon Song, University of Essex
   Presented by: Joon Song, University of Essex

Session 75: Repeated Game Experiments

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 15:15 - 17:00
Location: 101
 

The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence
JEL codes: C73, C91
By Pedro Dal Bó Brown University Guillaume R. Fréchette New York University
   Presented by: Guillaume Fréchette, New York University
 

Is Reputation Good or Bad? An Experiment
By Brit Grosskopf, Texas A&M University Rajiv Sarin, Texas A&M University
   Presented by: Brit Grosskopf, Texas A&M University
 

Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Extending Theory and Experimental Evidence
By Mathias Blonski, University of Frankfurt Peter Ockenfels, University of Frankfurt Giancarlo Spagnolo, University of Rome 'Tor Vergata' and SITE - Stockholm School of Economics
   Presented by: Giancarlo Spagnolo, University of Tor Vergata and SITE
 

Reward Beats Punishment: Reward Beats Punishment: Indirect reciprocity and the role of second order information
By Aljaz Ule, University of Amsterdam Timothy Cason, Purdue University Arno Riedl, Maastricht University Arthur Schram, University of Amsterdam
   Presented by: Arno Riedl, Maastricht University

Session 76: Markets and Competition

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 15:15 - 17:00
Location: G40
 

Contests in the Venture Capital Industry
By Ramy Elitzur, University of Toronto Arieh Gavious, Ben Gurion University
   Presented by: Arieh Gavious, Ben Gurion University
 

On Information Acquisition, Noise Trading, and Speculation
By Tri Vi Dang, University of Mannheim
   Presented by: Tri Vi Dang, University of Mannheim
 

Bargaining with Many Players: A Limit Result
By Hannu Vartiainen Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation Klaus Kultti University of Helsinki
   Presented by: Hannu Vartiainen, Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation

Session 77: Coalitional Games

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 15:15 - 17:00
Location: G42
 

An axiomatization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution
JEL codes: c71,c78
By Francesc Llerena, Universitat Rovira i Virgili Carles Rafels, Universitat de Barcelona Cori Vilella, Universitat Rovira i Virgili
   Presented by: Cori Vilella, Universitat Rovira i Virgili
 

The extension of Dutta--Ray's solution to convex NTU games
By Elena Yanovskaya St.Peterburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics
   Presented by: Elena Yanovskaya, St.Peterburg Institute for Economics and
 

Balanced per capita contributions and levels structure of cooperation
By Maria Gomez-Rua Juan Vidal-Puga
   Presented by: Juan Vidal-Puga, Universidade de Vigo

Session 78: The Belief Space

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 15:15 - 17:00
Location: 160
 

Every hierarchy of beliefs is type
JEL codes: C70
By Pinter, Miklos: Department of Mathematics, Corvinus University of Budapest
   Presented by: Miklos Pinter, Department of Mathematics
 

Hierarchies of Finitely Additive Beliefs and Universal Type Spaces
By Martin Meier, Instituto de Análisis Económico - CSIC, Barcelona.
   Presented by: Martin Meier, CSIC-Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
 

Uniform Topology on Types and Strategic Convergence
By Alfredo Di Tillio (Universitá L. Bocconi) Eduardo Faingold (Yale University)
   Presented by: Eduardo Faingold, Yale University
 

The Context of the Game
By Amanda Friedenberg, Olin Business School Martin Meier, Instituto de Análisis Económico
   Presented by: Amanda Friedenberg, Washington University

Session 79: Networks III: Formation

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 15:15 - 17:00
Location: G36
 

Partners heterogeneity in the two-way flow model
JEL codes: D85
By P. Billand, Creuset, Jean Monnet University (France) C. Bravard, Creuset, Jean Monnet University (France) S. Sarangi, Louisiana State University (United States)
   Presented by: billand pascal, creuset
 

Networks and Stability
By Frank Page, Indiana University, Bloomington 47405 Myrna Wooders, Vanderbilt University, Nashville 37235
   Presented by: Frank H. Page, Jr., Indiana University
 

Existence of one-way flow Nash networks
By J. Derks, Maastricht University J. Kuipers, Maastricht University M. Tennekes, Maastricht University F. Thuijsman, Maastricht University
   Presented by: Frank Thuijsman, Maastricht University
 

Local Dynamics in Network Formation
By Jean Derks, Maastricht University Jeroen Kuipers, Maastricht University Martijn Tennekes, Maastricht University Frank Thuijsman, Maastricht University
   Presented by: Martijn Tennekes, Maastricht University

Session 80: Labor Markets

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 15:15 - 17:00
Location: G44
 

Relational Contracts with On-the-Job Search
JEL codes: C73, J31, L14.
By Simon Board (UCLA)
   Presented by: Simon Board, UCLA
 

Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes
By Sergey V. Popov, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Department of Economics Dan Bernhardt, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Department of Economics
   Presented by: Sergey Popov, UIUC
 

Investment Under Adverse Selection with Multiple Decision Criteria
By Kira Pronin, University of Bergen
   Presented by: Kira Pronin, Norwegian School of Economics
 

Transparency, Career Concerns, and Incentives for Acquiring Expertise
By Heski Bar-Isaac, NYU
   Presented by: Heski Bar-Isaac, NYU

Session 81: Deliberation, Information, and Voting

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 15:15 - 17:00
Location: G05
 

Implementation and Partial Provability
JEL codes: D70
By Elchanan Ben-Porath, Hebrew University Barton L. Lipman, Boston University
   Presented by: Bart Lipman, Boston University
 

Disclosure of Information and Voting
By Salvador Barbera, University Autonoma de Barcelona Matthew O. Jackson, Stanford University
   Presented by: Matthew O. Jackson, Stanford University
 

The Condorcet Jyry Theorem: The dependent case.
By Bezalel Peleg, Hebrew University, Center for the Study of Rationality. Shmuel Zamir, Hebrew University, Center for the Study of Rationality.
   Presented by: Shmuel Zamir, Hebrew University, Jerusalem
 

Majoritarian Debate
By Catherine Hafer (NYU) Dimitri Landa (NYU)
   Presented by: Dimitri Landa, New York University

Session 82: Plenary - President-Elect Address: Sergiu Hart; Chaired by Shmuel Zamir

Date: July 14, 2008
Time: 17:30 - 18:30
Location: Coon Forum

Session 83: Strategic Communication IV

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 276
 

Language, meaning and games
JEL codes: C72, C73, D01
By Stefano Demichelis, Pavia University Jörgen W. Weibull, Stockholm School of Economics
   Presented by: Stefano Demichelis, Universita di Pavia
 

Signaling with endogenous “types”
By Younghwan In, National University of Singapore Julian Wright, National University of Singapore
   Presented by: Younghwan In, National University of Singapore
 

Wait and See
By Peter Eso, Kellogg MEDS, Northwestern University Yuk-fai Fong, Kellogg M&S, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Yuk-Fai Fong, Northwestern University
 

Iteratively Stable Cheap Talk Equilibria
By Sidartha Gordon, Université de Montréal
   Presented by: Sidartha Gordon, Universite de Montreal

Session 84: Matching and Assignments

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G45
 

Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study
JEL codes: C72,C78,D78,I20
By Caterina Calsamiglia, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Guillaume Haeringer, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Flip Klijn, Instituto de Analisis Economico
   Presented by: Guillaume Haeringer, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
 

Walrasian Equilibria of the Assignment Model
By Debasis Mishra, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi Dolf Talman, Tilburg University, Tilburg
   Presented by: Debasis Mishra, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi
 

Multi-sided Assignment Games: Additive Games
By Oriol Tejada (Universitat de Barcelona)
   Presented by: Oriol Tejada, Univ. de Barcelona, Fac. Econòmiques

Session 85: Decision Theory and Preferences

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G40
 

Simplicity and Likelihood: An Axiomatic Approach
JEL codes: D80
By Itzhak Gilboa, Tel Aviv University, HEC, and Yale University David Schmeidler, Tel Aviv University and Ohio State University
   Presented by: Itzhak Gilboa, Tel-Aviv University and Yale University
 

An Algorithm for Proper Rationalizability
By Andrés Perea, Maastricht University Geir B. Asheim, University of Oslo
   Presented by: Andrés Perea, Maastricht University
 

Multiplayer belief revision and accuracy orders
By Antoine BILLOT, PSE (Paris) Jean-Christophe VERGNAUD, CES (Paris) Bernard WALLISER, PSE (Paris)
   Presented by: Bernard Walliser, Paris School of Economics
 

Generating ambiguity in the laboratory
By Jack Stecher, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration John Dickhaut, University of Minnesota
   Presented by: Jack Stecher, Norwegian School of Economics

Session 86: Theory

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 2245
 

Preference for Similarity and Information Collection in Groups
JEL codes: D82, D85
By Mariagiovanna Baccara (New York University) Leeat Yariv (California Institute of Technology)
   Presented by: Mariagiovanna Baccara, Stern School of Business, NYU
 

Dividing and Discarding: A Procedure for Taking Decisions with Non-transferable Utility
By Vinicius Carrasco, PUC Rio William Fuchs, University of Chicago
   Presented by: William Fuchs, University of Chicago
 

Learning and Complementarities: Implications for Speculative Attacks
By Itay Goldstein, Department of Finance, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania Emre Ozdenoren, Department of Economics, University of Michigan Kathy Yuan, Department of Finance, Ross School, University of Michigan
   Presented by: Emre Ozdenoren, University of Michigan
 

Decisions with Errors
By Pavlo Blavatskyy, University of Zurich
   Presented by: Pavlo Blavatskyy, University of Zurich

Session 87: Assignment game and extensions

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G36
 

Sensitivity of core allocations in assignment markets
JEL codes: C 71
By Tamás Solymosi, Corvinus University of Budapest
   Presented by: Tamás Solymosi, Corvinus University of Budapest
 

Mixed Matching Markets
By Winfried Hochstättler, Fernuniversität Hagen Robert Nickel, Fernuniversität Hagen David Schiess, University of St. Gallen
   Presented by: Winfried Hochstaettler, FernUniversitaet in Hagen
 

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game
By Marina Nunez, University of Barcelona Carles Rafels, University of Barcelona
   Presented by: Carles Rafels, University of Barcelona
 

The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria
By Daniel Jaume. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis. Universidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET. Jordi Masso. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica and CODE. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Alejandro Neme. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis. Universidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET.
   Presented by: Alejandro Neme,

Session 88: Coalition structures

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G42
 

The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Limited Communication Structure
JEL codes: C71
By P.J.J. Herings, Department of Economics, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands G. van der Laan, Department of Econometrics, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands A.J.J. Talman, CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands Z. Yang, Faculty of Business Administration, Yokohama National University, Yokohama, Japan
   Presented by: Dolf Talman, Tilburg University
 

The Shapley value for games in partition function form
By Michel Grabisch, Université de Paris I, France Yukihiko Funaki, Waseda University, Japan
   Presented by: Michel Grabisch, Université de Paris I
 

Values for Partition Function Form Games
By David Housman, Goshen College
   Presented by: David Housman, Goshen College
 

Graph Monotonic Values
By Gerard Hamiache Equippe-Gremars Universite Lille 3, France
   Presented by: Gerard Hamiache, université Lille 3

Session 89: Mechanism Design III

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G05
 

Renegotiation-proof mechanism design
JEL codes: D02, D70, D82
By Zvika Neeman, Boston University and Tel-Aviv University Gregory Pavlov, Boston University
   Presented by: Gregory Pavlov, Boston University
 

Nonlinear Pricing with Resale
By Isa E. Hafalir, Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University
   Presented by: Isa Hafalir, Carnegie Mellon University
 

The Trade-off Between Fast Learning and Dynamic Efficiency
By Alex Gershkov, University of Bonn Benny Moldovanu, University of Bonn
   Presented by: Alex Gershkov, University of Bonn
 

Allocating scarce goods: what money can't buy
By Daniele Condorelli University College London
   Presented by: Daniele Condorelli, University College London

Session 90: Social Preferences and Institutions I

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 160
 

Cooperation among strangers under the shadow of the future
JEL codes: C90, C70, D80
By Gabriele Camera, University of Iowa Marco Casari, Purdue University
   Presented by: Gabriele Camera, University of Iowa
 

Recommendation Behavior and Product Choice
By Miriam Mezger, University of Magdeburg Abdolkarim Sadrieh, University of Magdeburg
   Presented by: Miriam Mezger, Magdeburg University
 

Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks
By Stephen Leider, Harvard University Markus Mobius, Harvard University Tanya Rosenblat, Wesleyan University Quah-Anh Do, Harvard University
   Presented by: Tanya Rosenblat, Wesleyan University
 

Group-Beneficial Behavior: An Unconventional Application of the Theory of Costly Signaling
By Sascha J. Mohr, University of Edinburgh
   Presented by: Sascha Mohr, University of Edinburgh

Session 91: Values of cooperative games

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 1246
 

Hierarchies achievable in simple games
JEL codes: C71
By Josep Freixas and Montserrat Pons Department of Applied Mathematics III and School of Engineering of Manresa, Technical University of Catalonia, Spain. Mailing address: EPSEM, Av. Bases de Manresa, 61-73, E-08242 Manresa, Spain. E--mails: [josep.freixas;montserrat.pons]@upc.edu
   Presented by: Josep Freixas, Technical University of Catalonia
 

A second associated consistency and axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games: a matrix theory approach
By Theo Driessen, Dept of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands
   Presented by: Theo Driessen, University of Twente
 

Smoothing values of non-differentiable vector measure games
By Omer Edhan Center for Rationality The Hebrew University Giv'at Ram Jerusalem 91904
   Presented by: Omer Edhan, The Hebrew University
 

Multilinear Extensions and Semivalues for Multichoice Games
By Michael A. Jones, Montclair State University Jennifer M. Wilson, Eugene Lang College The New School for Liberal Arts
   Presented by: Michael Jones, Montclair State University

Session 92: Auctions and Mechanism Design

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G03
 

Auctions with Return Policies as Optimal Selling Mechanisms
JEL codes: D44, D82, D83
By Jun Zhang,Economics Department, Queen's University
   Presented by: Jun Zhang, Queen's University
 

Communication and Efficiency in Auctions
By Nenad Kos
   Presented by: Nenad Kos, Northwestern
 

Sequential Procurement Auctions and Their Effect on Investment Decisions
By Gonzalo Cisternas Universidad de Chile, DII-CEA Nicolás Figueroa, DII-CEA
   Presented by: Nicolas Figueroa, University of Minnesota
 

Simplified Mechanisms and Applications
By Paul R Milgrom, Stanford University
   Presented by: Paul Milgrom, Stanford University

Session 93: Industrial Organization II

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G44
 

Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random
JEL codes: K32, K42, D82.
By Inés Macho-Stadler, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona David Pérez-Castrillo, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
   Presented by: Ines Macho-Stadler, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
 

Stability of Price Leadership Cartel with Endogenous Pricing
By Yoshio Kamijo, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University Noritsugu Nakanishi, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University
   Presented by: Yoshio Kamijo, Waseda University
 

Entrepreneurial Economies as Auctions
By Christian Roessler, University of Queensland Philipp Koellinger, Erasmus University Rotterdam
   Presented by: Christian Roessler, University of Melbourne
 

Occupational Choice and the Quality of Entrepreneurs
By Eren Inci, Sabanci University
   Presented by: Eren Inci, Sabanci University

Session 94: Public Goods and Taxation

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 101
 

Privately Provided Public Goods in a Dynamic Economy
JEL codes: C73, D91, H41
By LAURA MARSILIANI, University of Durham THOMAS RENSTROM, University of Durham and CEPR
   Presented by: Laura Marsiliani, University of Durham
 

Regulation and Monitoring with Incomplete Contracts
By Shinji Kobayashi, Nihon University Shigemi Ohba, Nihon University
   Presented by: Shinji Kobayashi, Nihon University
 

Bayesian Equilibrium in a Public Good Economy
By Shlomit Hon-Snir, Department of Economics, The Max Stern Academic College of Emek Yezreel, ISRAEL Benyamin Shitovitz, Department of Economics, Haifa University, ISRAEL Menahem Spiegel, Department of Finance and Economics, Rutgers, NJ, USA
   Presented by: Shlomit Hon-Snir, The Max Stern Academic College of Emek
 

Strategic Nonlinear Income Tax Competition with Perfect Labor Mobility
By Craig Brett, Mount Allison University John A. Weymark, Vanderbilt University
   Presented by: John Weymark, Vanderbilt University

Session 95: Dynamic and Stochastic Games I

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G43
 

Lumpy Capacity Investment Dynamics
JEL codes: C73,D43,L13,D92
By David Besanko, Northwestern University Ulrich Doraszelski, Harvard University Lauren Xiaoyuan Lu, University of North Carolina Mark Satterthwaite, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Mark A. Satterthwaite, Northwestern University
 

Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Applied Work.
By Chaim Fershtman, Tel Aviv university Ariel Pakes, Harvard University
   Presented by: Chaim Fershtman, The Eitan Berglas School of Economics
 

A User's Guide to Solving Dynamic Stochastic Games Using the Homotopy Method
By Ron N. Borkovsky, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University Ulrich Doraszelski, Harvard University Yaroslav Kryukov, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Yaroslav Kryukov, Northwestern University
 

A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification
By Ulrich Doraszelski, Harvard University Juan Escobar, Stanford University
   Presented by: Ulrich Doraszelski, Harvard University

Session 96: Networks IX

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G27
 

Robustness of networks in the threshold game - in favour of non-hierarchical, hetergeneous networks
JEL codes: C72, D85
By Kris DE JAEGHER, Utrecht School of Economics, Utrecht University
   Presented by: Kris De Jaegher, Utrecht School of Economics
 

Noncoopertaive Networks in Multimarket Oligopolies
By Pascal Billand, CRUESET,Jean Monnet University Christophe Bravard,CRUESET,Jean Monnet University Subhadip Chakrabarti, Queen's University Belfast Sudipta Sarangi, Louisiana State University
   Presented by: Sudipta Sarangi, Louisiana State University
 

Farsightedly Stable Networks
By HERINGS, P.J.J., Universitieit Maastricht, MAULEON, A., FUSL and CORE, University of Louvain, VANNETELBOSCH, V., CORE, University of Louvain.
   Presented by: Vincent Vannetelbosch, University of Louvain

Session 97: Semi-Plenary C2

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 10:45 - 12:15
Location: Norris 202
 

Chicken in Prison: Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
JEL codes: c7
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Michihiro Kandori, University of Tokyo
 

Information and Repeated Games
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Larry Samuelson, Yale University

Session 98: Semi-Plenary C3

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 10:45 - 12:15
Location: Norris 101
 

Identification of Demand in Empirical Models of Differentiated Products Oligopoly
JEL codes: c7
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Philip Haile, Yale University
 

Professionals and students: mixed-strategy play in the lab and in the field
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: John Wooders, University of Arizona

Session 99: Semi-Plenary C4

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 10:45 - 12:15
Location: Jacobs G40
 

Games with Externalities
JEL codes: c7
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Bhaskar Dutta, University of Warwick
 

Positive Externalities and Negative Externalities in Services
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Ramesh Johari, Stanford University

Session 100: Semi-Plenary C1

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 10:45 - 12:15
Location: Norris McKormick
 

On Searching and Diffusing Opinions
JEL codes: c7
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Gabrielle Demange, EHESS
 

Trading Networks
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: David Easley, Cornell University

Session 101: poster

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

HOW CAN FORM A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF PRICE IN G-PROCESS
JEL codes: C62, C73,
By Qian Bi,College of Economics and Management, Southwest University, Chongqing, 400716 Yi Gan, College of Mathematics and Statistics, Southwest University, Chongqing, 400716
   Presented by: YI Gan, Southwest University
 

Intertemporal Tradeoffs in Coordination Problems
By Eugen Kovac University of Bonn, Germany Jakub Steiner University of Edinburgh
   Presented by: Jakub Steiner, The University of Edinburgh
 

Market research and complementary advertising under asymmetric information
By Toshihiro Tsuchihashi, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
   Presented by: Toshihiro Tsuchihashi, Hitotsubashi university (grad student)
 

A New Concept of Solution for Fuzzy Matrix Games
By Moussa Larbani* and Fatiha Kacher** *Faculty of Economics, IIUM University, Jalan Gombak, 53100, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. e-mail:m_larbani@yahoo.fr **Dept. of Maths, Faculty of Sciences, University of Tizi-Ouzou, 15000 Tizi-Ouzou, Algeria. e-mail: fkacher@yahoo.fr.
   Presented by: Moussa Larbani, IIUM University
 

Competition with Asymmetric Switching Costs
By Sebastian Infante, University of Chile Nicolás Figueroa, University of Chile Ronald Fischer, University of Chile
   Presented by: Sebastian Infante Bilbao, Universidad de Chile

Session 102: poster

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Algorithms for Multiplayer Stochastic Games of Imperfect Information with Application to Three-Player No-Limit Texas Hold’em Tournaments
JEL codes: C63, C73
By Sam Ganzfried, Carnegie Mellon University Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University
   Presented by: Sam Ganzfried, Carnegie Mellon University
 

A Notion of Non-Cooperative Game Composition and Its Incentives
By Y. Xie, Computing Laboratory, University of Oxford. C.-H. L. Ong, Computing Laboratory, University of Oxford.
   Presented by: Yong Xie, Oxford University
 

Interactive Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes
By Piotr Gmytrasiewicz Computer Science University of Illinois at Chicago
   Presented by: Piotr Gmytrasiewicz, University of Illinois at Chicago
 

Strategic Betting for Competitive Agents
By Liad Wagman, Department of Economics, Duke University Vincent Conitzer, Departments of Computer Science and Economics, Duke University
   Presented by: Liad Wagman, Duke University
 

A Dynamic Procurement Auction with Persistent Backlog and Capacity Constraints
By Viplav Saini, Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA
   Presented by: Viplav Saini, Johns Hopkins University

Session 103: poster

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Pigouvian pricing and learning: A simple result in traffic network games
JEL codes: C72, D83, H23
By Emerson Melo Banco Central de Chile
   Presented by: Emerson Melo, Banco Central
 

Water filling games in wireless networks
By Eitan Altman, INRIA, France Konstantin Avrachenkov, INRIA, France Andrey Garnaev, St. Petersburg State University, Russia
   Presented by: Andrey Garnaev, St Petersburg State University
 

Loss-Avoidance and Frames
By Andre Lunardelli, Federal University of Goias
   Presented by: Andre Lunardelli, Federal University of Goias
 

Boundedly rational reputation building in social dilemmas
By Ernesto Reuben, Northwestern University Sigrid Suetens, Tilburg University
   Presented by: Sigrid Suetens, Tilburg University

Session 104: poster

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

A GAME THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MULTI-ACTIVE BARGAINERS
JEL codes: C7; F51; Z13
By Ursula F. Ott
   Presented by: Ursula Ott, Loughborough University
 

Co-opetition in an order book with strategic heterogeneous traders and uncertainty about information asymmetries.
By Givry Philippe, associate professor, GSCM-Montpellier Sup de Co Group, France
   Presented by: Philippe GIVRY, GSCM - Montpellier Sup de Co Group
 

Machine Learning of Evaluation (with Applications to Computer Chess)
By Amir Ban, visitor, Hebrew University, Center for the Study of Rationality
   Presented by: Amir Ban, Hebrew University

Session 105: poster

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Auctions with a Buy Price: The Case of Reference-Dependent Preferences
JEL codes: D44, D82, L86
By Nicholas Shunda, University of Connecticut
   Presented by: Nicholas Shunda, University of Connecticut
 

Efficient Auctions with Private Participation Costs
By Jingfeng Lu, National University of Singapore Yeneng Sun, National University of Singapore
   Presented by: Jingfeng Lu, National University of Singapore
 

A bargaining approach to negotiated agreements between public regulator and firms
By Manuel Cabugueira, Investigation Unit for Applied Economics - Lusófona University (Lisbon) and Portuguese Competiton Authority
   Presented by: Manuel Cabugueira, Lusófona University

Session 106: poster

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Sequential Coalition Formation Games With a Network Constraint
JEL codes: C70 D85 D01 D70
By Katharine Anderson, University of Michigan Department of Economics
   Presented by: Katharine Anderson, University of Michigan
 

The Pronouncements of Paranoid Politicians
By Guido Cataife Washington University in St. Louis
   Presented by: Guido Cataife, Washington University in St. Louis
 

Lottery Voting: May Majorities Prefer to Take a Chance?
By Marco Faravelli, University of St Andrews; Santiago Sanchez Pages, University of Edinburgh.
   Presented by: Marco Faravelli, University of St Andrews
 

Enfranchisement from a Political Perspective
By Soumyanetra Munshi, Rutgers University, NJ, USA.
   Presented by: Soumyanetra Munshi, Rutgers University
 

Public and Private Financing of Electoral Campaigns: The social welfare effect of political participation
By Mauricio Bugarin, Ibmec Sao Paulo Adriana Portugal, Tribunal de Contas do Distrito Federal
   Presented by: Mauricio Bugarin, Ibmec Sao Paulo

Session 107: poster

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

“Optimal Copyright Protection: Civil law vs. Criminal law.”
JEL codes: D42;
By Yasuhiro Arai
   Presented by: Yasuhiro Arai, Hitotubashi Univercity
 

Production under Uncertainty: A Characterization of Welfare Enhancing and Optimal Price Caps
By Veronika Grimm, University of Cologne Gregor Zoettl, University of Cologne
   Presented by: Gregor Zoettl, University of Cologne
 

An evolutionary argument for inequity aversion
By Robertas Zubrickas Stockholm School of Economics
   Presented by: Robertas Zubrickas, Stockholm School of Economics
 

Expert Advice and Amateur Interpretations
By Ernest K. Lai, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh
   Presented by: Ernest Lai, University of Pittsburgh

Session 108: poster

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Scientific Collaboration Networks: The role of Heterogeneity and Congestion
JEL codes: Z13,D85
By Antoni Rubi-Barcelo, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
   Presented by: Antoni Rubí-Barceló, UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA
 

Games in the Eurasian gas supply network:
By Humboldt University of Berlin & Catholic University of Leuven
   Presented by: Svetlana Ikonnikova, Catholic University of Leuven
 

Cardinal Bayesian Nontransfer Allocation Mechanisms. The Two-Object Case
By Antonio Miralles, Boston University
   Presented by: Antonio Miralles, Boston University
 

Natural Oligopoly in Industrial Research Collaboration
By Bastian Westbrock, Utrecht University
   Presented by: Bastian Westbrock, Utrecht University

Session 109: poster

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Strategy-proof mechanisms and uniqueness of matching in marriage markets
JEL codes: C78, D78
By Takumi Kongo, Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University. Taisuke Matsubae, Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University.
   Presented by: Takumi Kongo, Waswda University
 

The Rationality of Irrationality
By Uri Weiss The Cenetr for The Study of Rationality
   Presented by: Uri Weiss, The Hebrew University
 

Giving Advice and Perfect Equilibria in Matching Markets
By Joana Pais ISEG/Technical University of Lisbon and UECE - Research Unit in Complexity and Economics
   Presented by: Joana Pais, ISEG
 

Selling Authority
By Wooyoung Lim Department of Economics University of Pittsburgh
   Presented by: Wooyoung Lim, University of Pittsburgh
 

A glove-market partitioned matrix for the assignment game
By Marina Nunez, University of Barcelona Carles Rafels, University of Barcelona
   Presented by: Marina Núñez, Universitat de Barcelona

Session 110: poster

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

A Co-evolutionary Model of Growth
JEL codes: O43, O33, C73
By Desiree Desierto University of the Philippines School of Economics
   Presented by: Desiree Desierto, University of the Philippines
 

Stable Limit Cycles, Multiple Steady States and Complex Attractors in Logit Dynamics
By Marius-Ionut Ochea PhD student, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance (CeNDEF), University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands; e-mail: m.i.ochea@uva.nl; phone: + 31 20 525 7356
   Presented by: Marius-Ionut Ochea, University of Amsterdam
 

organization structure:equilibrium boundary, aggregation, and test statistics
By hsih-chia hsieh, hsing-kho university pei-gin hsieh,chung-cheng university
   Presented by: Hsih-Chia Hsieh, Hsing-Kuo University

Session 111: poster

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

A new kind of equilibria in dynamic games with imperfect information
By Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel Institute of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics Warsaw University
   Presented by: Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, Warsaw University

Session 112: poster

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Reference Points in Generalized Second Price Auction: A Computer Simulation Experiment
By Michiharu MASUI,Tokyo Institute of Technology Emiko FUKUDA,National Defence Academy of Japan
   Presented by: Michiharu Masui, Tokyo Institute of Technology
 

Multiunit auctions with private information: an indivisible unit continuous price model
By Francisco Alvarez, Universidad Complutense Madrid Cristina Mazon, Universidad Complutense Madrid
   Presented by: Francisco Alvarez, Universidad Complutense Madrid
 

First-Price Sequential Auction with Pre-determined Reserve Price
By Qiang Gong, China Center for Economic Research, Peking University. Xu Tan, Department of Economics, Stanford University. Yiqing Xing, China Center for Economic Research, Peking University.Peking University.
   Presented by: Yiqing Xing, Peking University

Session 113: poster

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Stochastic Reaction Strategies, the Barro-Gordon Framework and how null-inflation can become an equilibrium
JEL codes: C60; C70; E31
By CHRISTIAN-OLIVIER EWALD - University of St. Andrews - School of Economics and Finance JOHANNES GEISSLER - University of St. Andrews - School of Economics and Finance
   Presented by: Johannes Geissler, University of St Andrews
 

The Rubinstein bargaining game without an exogenous first-mover
By Fernando Branco, Universidade Católica Portuguesa
   Presented by: Fernando Branco, The Catholic University of Portugal
 

Dynamic Incentives and the Value of Information in Repeated Moral Hazard
By Eric Szu-Wen Chou, Department of Economics, National Tsing Hua University Shingo Ishiguro, Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
   Presented by: Eric Chou, National Tsing Hua University
 

The Theory of Collusion Under Financial Constraints
By Yosuke Yasuda, GRIPS
   Presented by: Yosuke Yasuda, GRIPS
 

Farsighted Stability of the Competitive Allocations in an Exchange Economy with Indivisible Goods
By Ryo Kawasaki Tokyo Institute of Technology
   Presented by: Ryo Kawasaki, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Session 114: poster

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

On loss aversion in a bargaining game of alternating offers
JEL codes: C78
By Bram Driesen, Maastricht University Andrés Perea, Maastricht University Hans Peters, Maastricht University
   Presented by: Bram Driesen, University Maastricht
 

Strategic complementarities and search market equilibrium
By Michael Rauh Indiana University
   Presented by: Michael Rauh, Indiana University
 

Implementing Fairness - The Design and Application of Four Bargaining Mechanisms
By James F. Ring Fair Outcomes, Inc. 49 Melcher Street Boston, MA 02210, USA e-mail: jimring@fairoutcomes.com
   Presented by: James Ring, Fair Outcomes, Inc.
 

Information sales and strategic trading
By Diego Garcıa, UNC at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, Francesco Sangiorgi, Collegio Carlo Alberto,
   Presented by: Francesco Sangiorgi, Collegio Carlo Alberto
 

robust and non robust equilibria in a strategic market game
By Regis Breton, CNRS and LEO Bertrand Gobillard, EconomiX (university of Paris X) and Department of Economics, university of Pennsylvania
   Presented by: bertrand gobillard, Univ. of Paris X & Univ. of Pennsylvania

Session 115: Dynamic Games

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G43
 

Ergodic Equilibria in Monotone Stochastic Sequential Games
JEL codes: C73, D41
By Jeremy Large, University of Oxford Thomas Norman, University of Oxford
   Presented by: Thomas Norman, Oxford University
 

Strategically Supported Cooperation in Dynamic Games.
By Leon Petrosjan St. Petersburg State University, Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Processes of Control Nadezhda Kozlovskaya St. Petersburg State University, Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Processes of Control
   Presented by: Nadezhda Kozlovskaya, Saint Petersburg State University
 

Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Open Loop Dynamic Games with Non-Differentiable Payoffs
By Adib Bagh
   Presented by: Adib Bagh, University of California-Davis
 

Long-run Negotiations with Dynamic Accumulation
By Francesca Flamini University of Glasgow
   Presented by: Francesca Flamini, University of Glasgow

Session 116: Stable strategy sets

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: 160
 

Strategic characterization of the index of an equilibrium
JEL codes: C72
By Arndt von Schemde, London School of Economics Bernhard von Stengel, London School of Economics
   Presented by: Bernhard von Stengel, London School of Economics
 

Static Stability in Games
By Igal Milchtaich, Bar-Ilan University
   Presented by: Igal Milchtaich, Bar-Ilan University
 

Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics
By Dieter Balkenborg, Department of Economics, School of Business and Economics, University of Exeter Josef Hofbauer, Department of Mathematics, University Vienna Christoph Kuzmics, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Christoph Kuzmics, Kellogg School of Management
 

Strongly rational sets for normal-form games
By Grandjean Gilles, CORE, University of Louvain Mauleon Ana, Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis and CORE, University of Louvain. Vannetelbosch Vincent, CORE, University of Louvain.
   Presented by: Grandjean Gilles, Université Catholique de Louvain

Session 117: Politics and conflict

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G45
 

How Important is the Credibility Problem in Politics: Evidence from State Level Abortion Legislation
JEL codes: C72, D72
By Francisco Rodriguez, Wesleyan Eduardo Zambrano, Cal Poly
   Presented by: Eduardo Zambrano, Cal Poly
 

An Economic Analysis of the Aldo Moro's Kidnapping and Assassination
By Bertrand Crettez, University Paris X, Nanterre Regis Deloche, University of Franche-comte
   Presented by: Régis Deloche, Université de Franche-Comté
 

The Killing Game: A Theory of Non-Democratic Succession
By Georgy Egorov, Harvard University Konstantin Sonin, New Economic School
   Presented by: Konstantin Sonin, New Economic School
 

The Art of Compromise
By Maria E. Gallego, Wilfrid Laurier University David Scoones, University of Victoria
   Presented by: Maria Gallego, Wilfrid Laurier University

Session 118: Stochastic Games

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: 276
 

OPTIMAL PORTFOLIOS IN AN COMPETING-INSIDERS MARKET: ANTICIPATIVE STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAME MODEL
JEL codes: Primary C730
By CHRISTIAN-OLIVER EWALD, Department of Economics, University of St.Andrews YAJUN XIAO, Department of Economics , University of Frankfurt
   Presented by: Yajun Xiao, University of Frankfurt
 

On Two person stochastic games of perfect information
By Parthasarathy, T. Indian Statistical Institute, Chennai India Ravindran, G*.Indian Statistical Institute, Chennai,India and Nagarajan, K , Chennai Mathematical Institute, Chennai, India (* corresponding author)
   Presented by: Gomatam Ravindran, Indian Statistical Institute
 

Pure Strategy Markov Equilibrium In Stochastic Games with Concave Transition Probabilities
By Subir K. Chakrabarti Department of Economics IUPUI 425 University Blvd Indianapolis, IN 46202
   Presented by: Subir Chakrabarti, Indiana Univeristy Purdue University Ind
 

A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification
By Ulrich Doraszelski, Harvard Juan Escobar, Stanford
   Presented by: Juan Escobar, Stanford

Session 119: Cost-Sharing Mechanisms

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G40
 

Optimal VCG Redistribution Mechanisms
By Mingyu Guo, Duke University Vincent Conitzer, Duke University
   Presented by: Mingyu Guo, Duke University
 

A core selection procedure for airline slot exchange
By James Schummer, Northwestern University Rakesh V. Vohra, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern University
 

Group strategyproof cost sharing: budget balance vs. budget surplus
By Ruben Juarez, Rice University
   Presented by: Ruben Juarez, Rice University

Session 120: Social Preferences and Institutions II

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: 101
 

Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy
JEL codes: C1, C9, D7, O1
By Pedro Dal Bó, Brown University Andrew Foster, Brown University Louis Putterman, Brown University
   Presented by: Pedro Dal Bo, Brown University
 

Fairness, Price Stickiness, and History Dependence in Decentralized Trade
By Christian Korth, University of Bayreuth, Department of Economics VWL IV, Germany Stefan Napel, University of Bayreuth, Department of Economics VWL IV, Germany
   Presented by: Christian Korth, University of Bayreuth
 

Procedural Concerns in Psychological Games
By ECARES (Université Libre de Bruxelles) and Maastricht University
   Presented by: Alexander Sebald, Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Session 121: Networks V: Communication and Beliefs

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G27
 

Extensive communication ans the madness of crowds
JEL codes: D72,
By Stefano Demichelis Univesity of Pavia Maria Saez-Marti University of Zurich
   Presented by: Maria Saez-Marti, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
 

Beliefs in Network Games
By Willemien Kets, Santa Fe Institute and Tilburg University
   Presented by: Willemien Kets, Santa Fe Institute and Tilburg Universit
 

Communication networks in the multi-player electronic mail game
By Kris DE JAEGHER, Utrecht School of Economics, Utrecht University Stephanie ROSENKRANZ, Utrecht School of Economics, Utrecht University
   Presented by: Stephanie Rosenkranz, Utrecht University
 

Strategic Information Extraction Through Networks
By Antonio Jimenez-Martinez Universidad de Guanajuato School of Economics
   Presented by: Antonio Jimenez-Martinez, Universidad de Guanajuato

Session 122: Industrial Organization

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G44
 

A Joint Project with Incomplete Information
By Eiichi Miyagawa (Kobe University) Yusuke Samejima (Toyo University)
   Presented by: Eiichi Miyagawa, Kobe University
 

Moral-Hazard and Coinsurance Arrangements within Groups
By Osnat Yaniv Fannie Mae, Business Analysis & Decisions
   Presented by: Osnat Yaniv, Fannie Mae
 

Rushes
By Andreas Park, University of Toronto Lones Smith, University of Michigan
   Presented by: Andreas Park, University of Toronto

Session 123: Strategic Communication II

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: 1246
 

Two-Senders Are Better Than One - A Note on One-Dimensional Cheap Talk under Simultaneous Disclosure
JEL codes: C72, D72, D82
By Wolfgang Gick, Harvard University
   Presented by: Wolfgang Gick, Harvard University
 

Clearly Biased Experts
By Archishman Chakraborty, Baruch College, CUNY Rick Harbaugh, Indiana University
   Presented by: Rick Harbaugh, Indiana University
 

Public vs. Private Communication with a Diverse Audience
By Maria Goltsman, University of Western Ontario Gregory Pavlov, Boston University
   Presented by: Maria Goltsman, University of Western Ontario
 

Relying on non-selfserving statements: a solution to multi-sender cheap-talk games
By Sven Feldmann, Melbourne Business School
   Presented by: Sven Feldmann, Northwestern University

Session 124: Biology and Economics

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G36
 

Evolution of Time Preferences and Attitudes Towards Risk
JEL codes: D01, D81, D87
By Nick Netzer, University of Konstanz, Germany
   Presented by: Nick Netzer, University of Konstanz
 

GROOMING IN AN ARTIFICIALLY INDUCED BIOLOGICAL MARKET
By Cécile Fruteau, Univ Strassbourg Bernhard Voekl, Univ Strassbourg Eric van Damme, Univ Tilburg Ronald Noë, Univ Strassbourg
   Presented by: Eric van Damme,
 

Evolution, Rationality and Adaptation in a Changing Environment
By Olivier Gossner, Paris School of Economics, France Christoph Kuzmics, MEDS/KSM, Northwestern University, USA
   Presented by: Olivier Gossner, PSE, Paris
 

Evolution of preferences under perfect observability: (almost) anything is stable
By Florian Herold, MEDS, KSM, Northwestern University Christoph Kuzmics, MEDS, KSM, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Florian Herold, Northwestern University, Kellogg

Session 125: Mechanism Design I

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G05
 

Should team workers prefer rich bosses?
JEL codes: C70, D23, D78
By Dunia López-Pintado, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Universidad de Málaga and CORE
   Presented by: Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Universidad de Málaga
 

Fund-Raising and Donation Games
By Alison Watts, Southern Illinois University
   Presented by: Alison Watts, Southern Illinois University
 

On Collective Identification Procedures with Independent Qualified Certification
By Stefano Vannucci, University of Siena
   Presented by: Stefano Vannucci, University of Siena
 

On the rule of k names
By Salvador BARBERA, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Danilo COELHO, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada
   Presented by: Salvador Barbera, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona

Session 126: Theory I

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: 2245
 

Betting Markets in Basque-ball Matches
JEL codes: D4
By E. Inarra, The University of the Basque Country, C. Ponsati, IAE, CSIC-Barcelona F. Valenciano, The University of the Basque Country
   Presented by: Elena Inarra, The University of the Basque Country
 

Evolution of social contracts in the laboratory
By Pontus Strimling, Centre for the study of Cultural Evolution Kimmo Eriksson, Centre for the study of Cultural Evolution
   Presented by: Pontus Strimling, Centre for study of cultural evolution
 

Renegotiation-proof Agreements under Asymmetric Information
By Arijit Sen Indian Institute of Management Calcutta
   Presented by: Arijit Sen, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta
 

An extension of Reny's theorem without quasi-concavity
By Philippe Bich, Paris school of Economics, centre d'économie de la sorbonne
   Presented by: philippe bich, P.S.E., Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne

Session 127: Decision Procedures

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G42
 

Foundations of Intrinsic Habit Formation
JEL codes: C60,D11,D90
By Kareen Rozen, Yale University
   Presented by: Kareen Rozen, Princeton University
 

Checklists: A procedural foundation for utility maximisation
By Michael Mandler, Royal Holloway, University of London Paola Manzini, Queen Mary, University of London and IZA Marco Mariotti, Queen Mary, University of London
   Presented by: Marco Mariotti, Queen Mary, University of London
 

Two-stage boundedly rational choice procedures: Theory and experimental evidence,
By Paola Manzini, Queen Mary University of London Marco Mariotti, Queen Mary University of London
   Presented by: Paola Manzini, Queen Mary, University of London
 

Choice by Constraint Elimination
By Yusufcan Masatlioglu, University of Michigan Daisuke Nakajima, University of Michigan
   Presented by: Daisuke Nakajima, University of Michigan

Session 128: Auctions IV

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G03
 

Auctions with External Incentives
JEL codes: D44, D82
By Francesco Giovannoni, University of Bristol Miltiadis Makris, University of Leicester
   Presented by: Francesco Giovannoni, University of Bristol
 

Aversion to Price Risk and the Afternoon Effect
By Claudio Mezzetti University of Warwick Department of Economics
   Presented by: Claudio Mezzetti, University of Warwick
 

Charity Auctions for the Happy Few
By Olivier Bos Paris School of Economics (PSE)
   Presented by: Olivier Bos, Paris School of Economics
 

First-price auctions, seller information and commitment to sell
By Frank Rosar, University of Mannheim
   Presented by: Frank Rosar, University of Mannheim

Session 129: Plenary - Morgenstern Lecture: Jean Tirole; Chaired by Drew Fudenberg

Date: July 15, 2008
Time: 17:00 - 18:00
Location: Coon Forum

Session 130: Auctions V

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G03
 

Learning in Unknown Games
JEL codes: C73
By Thomas Boehme, Jens Schreyer, Technische Universitaet Ilmenau, Department of Mathematics
   Presented by: Thomas Boehme, Technical University Ilmenau
 

An Extension of Ausubel's Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods
By Hakan Inal, University of Minnesota
   Presented by: Hakan Inal, University of Minnesota
 

Asymmetric First Price Auctions
By Rene Kirkegaard, Brock University
   Presented by: Rene Kirkegaard, Brock University
 

Computing Reserve Prices in Real-World English Auctions
By William E. Walsh, CombineNet (presenting author) David C. Parkes, Harvard University Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University Craig Boutilier, University of Toronto
   Presented by: William Walsh, CombineNet, inc.

Session 131: Repeated Games

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 1246
 

Bounded Memory with Finite Action Spaces
By Mehmet Barlo (Sabanci University) Guilherme Carmona (Universidade Nova de Lisboa) Hamid Sabourian (University of Cambridge)
   Presented by: Mehmet Barlo, public
 

Belief-Based Strategies in the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Asymmetric Private Monitoring
By Bo Chen Economics Department, Southern Methodist University
   Presented by: Bo Chen, Southern Methodist University
 

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall and (Almost) Perfect Monitoring
By George J Mailath University of Pennsylvania Wojciech Olszewski Northwestern University
   Presented by: George Mailath, University of Pennsylvania

Session 132: Core and nucleolus

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G42
 

Extension of the Core and the Nucleolus to Games in Partition Function Form, Not Necessarily Superadditive
JEL codes: C71
By Roger A. McCain, Professor, Department of Economics and International Business, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, and Taylor Distinguished Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas.
   Presented by: Roger McCain, Drexel University
 

The Core of Set Games
By Hao Sun Northwestern Polytechnical University Theo Driessen University of Twente
   Presented by: Hao Sun, Northwestern Polytechnical University
 

The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games
By Jingang Zhao
   Presented by: Jingang Zhao, U Saskatchewan
 

The monoclus of a coalitional game
By Marco Slikker, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven Henk Norde, Tilburg University
   Presented by: Marco Slikker, TU/e

Session 133: Electoral Competition 1

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G45
 

A positive theory of income taxation
JEL codes: D72, D31, H30,
By John E. Roemer, Yale University
   Presented by: John Roemer, Yale Univ
 

Stable Policies in Coalition Governments
By M. Socorro Puy (Universidad de Málaga, Spain)
   Presented by: M. Socorro Puy, Universidad de Málaga
 

Personal Influence: Social Context and Political Competition
By Andrea Galeotti, Essex Andrea Mattozzi, Caltech
   Presented by: Andrea Mattozzi, Caltech

Session 134: Dynamics and convexity

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G44
 

ON THE CONSISTENCY OF OPTIMALITY PRINCIPLES IN N-PERSON EXTENSIVE GAMES
JEL codes: C72
By Denis V. Kuzyutin Elina V. Zhukova
   Presented by: Elina Zhukova, Saint-Petersburg State University
 

Nash Equilibrium Points in a Game of ''Seasonal'' Stopping
By Isaac M. Sonin Department of Mathematics and Statistics University of North Carolina at Charlotte
   Presented by: Isaac Sonin, UNC at Charlotte
 

A characterization of convex games by means of bargaining sets
By Izquierdo Josep M, University of Barcelona Rafels Carles, University of Barcelona
   Presented by: Josep M Izquierdo, University of Barcelona
 

Encouraging Cooperation in Sharing Supermodular Costs
By Andreas S. Schulz, MIT Nelson Uhan, MIT
   Presented by: Andreas Schulz, MIT

Session 135: TU Coalitional Games

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 2245
 

The Shapley value for games with restricted cooperation
JEL codes: C71
By Emilio Calvo Department of Economic Analysis. University of Valencia. Spain
   Presented by: Emilio Calvo, Universidad de Valencia
 

Leximals, the Lexicore and the Average Lexicographic Value
By Yukihiko Funaki, Waseda University Stef Tijs, Tilburg University Rodica Branzei, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University
   Presented by: Yukihiko Funaki, public
 

The Restricted Harsanyi Set for Games with Ordered Players
By Rene van den Brink Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, Free University, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands Gerard van der Laan Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, Free University, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands Valeri Vasil'ev Sobolev Institute of Mathematics, Prosp. Koptyuga 4, 630090 Novisibirsk, Russia
   Presented by: Rene van den Brink, Free University

Session 136: Cost Sharing

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G43
 

Intertemporal Cost-Sharing with Durable Goods
JEL codes: D63, C71
By Laurence Kranich, University at Albany, SUNY
   Presented by: Laurence Kranich, University at Albany, SUNY
 

Additive cost sharing on a tree
By Debing Ni, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China Yuntong Wang, University of Windsor
   Presented by: Yuntong Wang, University of Windsor
 

Minimum cost spaning tree problems with groups
By Bergantiños G., Research Group in Economic Analysis. Universidade de Vigo (Spain). Gómez-Rúa M, Departamento de Estatística e Investigación Operativa. Universidade de Vigo (Spain).
   Presented by: María Gómez-Rúa, Universidade de Vigo
 

Approximate Stable Solutions in Infinite Tree Problems
By Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano University Miguel Hernández of Elche, Spain Vito Fragnelli Università del Piemonte Orientale, Alessandria, Italy Natividad Llorca University Miguel Hernández of Elche, Spain Stef Tijs Tilburg University, The Netherlands
   Presented by: Natividad Llorca, Miguel Hernandez University

Session 137: Endogenous Participation

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 101
 

Investigating Bid Preferences at Low-Price, Sealed-Bid Auctions with Endogenous Participation
JEL codes: C72 D44 H25 L92
By Timothy P. Hubbard, Department of Economics, University of Iowa Harry J. Paarsch, Department of Economics, University of Iowa
   Presented by: Harry Paarsch, University of Iowa
 

Sequential Auctions with Random Arrivals
By Maher Said, Yale University
   Presented by: Maher Said, Yale University
 

Contests with a Stochastic Number of Players
By Alexander Matros, University of Pittsburgh Wooyoung Lim, University of Pittsburgh
   Presented by: Alexander Matros, University of Pittsburgh

Session 138: Politics and information

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 276
 

Costly Information Acquisition. Part I: Better to Toss a Coin?
JEL codes: C72,
By Matteo Triossi Collegio Carlo Alberto
   Presented by: Matteo Maria Triossi Verondini, Collegio Carlo Alberto
 

One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
By Laurent BOUTON, ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles Micael CASTANHEIRA, ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles
   Presented by: Micael Castanheira, ECARES, ULB
 

Sanctioning and Learning
By Scott Ashworth, Princeton Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, University of Chicago Amanda Friedenberg, Washington University
   Presented by: Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, University of Chicago
 

Common knowledge is power
By Alexis Belianin, ICEF HSE and IMEMO RAS, Moscow, Russia
   Presented by: Alexis Belianin, Higher School of Economics

Session 139: Networks VI: Games

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G27
 

Strategic substitutes and networks
JEL codes: C72, L14
By Yann Bramoullé, Laval University Rachel Kranton, Duke University Martin D'Amours, Laval University
   Presented by: Yann Bramoullé, Laval
 

Local Interactions on Graphs: A Pairwise Approximation Approach
By Thomas Gall, University of Bonn Markus Kirkilionis, Warwick University
   Presented by: Thomas Gall, University of Bonn
 

Information Trading in Social Networks
By Andrei Karavaev, Pennsylvania State University
   Presented by: Andrei Karavaev, The Pennsylvania State University
 

The impact of degree of cooperation on Braess's Paradox
By Eitan Altman, Inria Sophia Antipolis France. Amar prakash Azad, Inria Sophia Antipolis. Rachid E-Azouzi, University of Avignon
   Presented by: elazouzi rachid, University of Avignon

Session 140: Behavioral Theory II

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G40
 

Fairness and Desert in Tournaments
By David Gill, Division of Economics, University of Southampton Rebecca Stone, School of Law, New York University
   Presented by: Rebecca Stone, New York University
 

A Simulation Study of Learning a Structure: Mike’s Bike Commuting
By Eizo Akiyama (University of Tsukuba), Ryuichiro Ishikawa (University of Tsukuba), Mamoru Kaneko (University of Tsukuba), Jeff. J. Kline (Bond University)
   Presented by: Ryuichiro Ishikawa, University of Tsukuba
 

The Strategic Value of Recall
By Ron Peretz, The Hebrew University
   Presented by: Ron Peretz, The Hebrew University

Session 141: Mechanism Design IX

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G05
 

Characterizing Truthful Market Design
JEL codes: D40
By Mira Gonen Tel Aviv University Rica Gonen Yahoo! Research labs Elan Pavlov MIT
   Presented by: Rica Gonen, Yahoo research
 

Revenue Monotonicity: New Results for Deterministic and Randomized Mechanisms
By Baharak Rastegari, UBC Anne Condon, UBC Kevin Leyton-Brown, UBC
   Presented by: Baharak Rastegari, UBC
 

Reputation in Online Markets
By Christina Aperjis, Stanford University Ramesh Johari, Stanford University
   Presented by: Christina Aperjis, Stanford University

Session 142: Equilibrim Concepts

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 160
 

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty
JEL codes: C7
By Ludovic Renou, University of Leicester Karl H. Schlag, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
   Presented by: Ludovic Renou, University of Leicester
 

Nested Potentials and Robust Equilibria
By Hiroshi Uno Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
   Presented by: Hiroshi Uno, Osaka University
 

Non-Atomic Potential Games and the Value of Vector Measure Game
By Takashi Ui Faculty of Economics, Yokoahama National Univesrsity
   Presented by: Takashi Ui, Yokohama National University
 

Fall back equilibria
By John Kleppe (Tilburg University) Peter Borm (Tilburg University) Ruud Hendrickx (Tilburg University)
   Presented by: John Kleppe, Tilburg University

Session 143: Bargaining I

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G36
 

Jackpot Justice: The Value of Inefficient Litigation
JEL codes: C78, D74, D86
By Jun Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center Tilburg University
   Presented by: Jun Zhou, TILEC and CentER of Tilburg University
 

The Nash Bargaining Solution in General n-Person Cooperative Games
By Akira Okada, Hitotsubashi University
   Presented by: Akira Okada, HITOTSUBASHI UNIVERSITY
 

Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach
By Stephan Lauermann University of Michigan
   Presented by: Stephan Lauermann, University of Michigan
 

Optimism and Bargaining Inefficiency
By Duozhe Li, Chinese University of Hong Kong Yat Fung Wong, Chinese University of Hong Kong
   Presented by: Duozhe Li, The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Session 144: Semi-Plenary D1

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 10:45 - 12:15
Location: Norris McKormick
 

Decision Theoretic Models of Uncertain Temptations
JEL codes: c7
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Eddie Dekel, Northwestern University
 

On the Possibility of Learning in Bayesian Games
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Ehud Kalai, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

Session 145: Semi-Plenary D3

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 10:45 - 12:15
Location: Norris 101
 

The Price of Anarchy, Stability, and Learning in some Congestion Games
JEL codes: c7
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: eva tardos,
 

Dynamic Mechanisms for Distributed Coordination: Models and Methods
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: David Parkes, Harvard University

Session 146: Semi-Plenary D4

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 10:45 - 12:15
Location: Jacobs G40
 

Evolutionary Game Dynamics and Stability of Nash Equilibria
JEL codes: c7
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Josef Hofbauer, Universit�t Wien
 

Robust Set-Valued Predictions in Games
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Jorgen Weibull, Stockholm School of Economics

Session 147: Semi-Plenary D2

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 10:45 - 12:15
Location: Norris 202
 

A Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
By semi-plenary
   Presented by: Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern University
 

Stable Sets Redux
By LLoyd Shapley, UCLA
   Presented by: Lloyd Shapley,

Session 148: poster

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Coordination Between a Sophisticated and Fictitious Player
JEL codes: C72, D83
By Bryan C. McCannon, Wake Forest University
   Presented by: Bryan McCannon, Wake Forest University
 

On the Incentive of Strategic Information Spillover under Relative Performance Evaluation
By Young-Ro Yoon, Indiana University Bloomington
   Presented by: Young-Ro Yoon, Indiana University Bloomington
 

Applications of a Generalized Ky Fan's Matching Theorem in Minimax and Variational Inequality
By H. HAMMAMI Ecole Polytechnique de Tunisie B.P. 743, 2078 La Marsa, Tunis, Tunisia and Paris School of Economics, University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, CNRS, CES, M.S.E. 106 Boulevard de l'H^opital, 75647 Paris cedex 13, France. E-mail address: hakim.hammami@univ-paris1.fr P. GOURDEL Paris School of Economics, University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, CNRS, CES, M.S.E. 106 Boulevard de l'H^opital, 75647 Paris cedex 13, France. E-mail address: pascal.gourdel@univ-paris1.fr
   Presented by: HAMMAMI HAKIM, CES
 

An experimental study of sponsored search auction: GSP vs VCG
By Emiko FUKUDA, National Defense Academy of Japan Michiharu MASUI, Tokyo Institute of Technology
   Presented by: Emiko FUKUDA, National Defense Academy of Japan
 

Cooperation in a sequential N-person prisoners' dilemma game: the role of information and reciprocity
By Yukihiko Funaki, Waseda Univesrity, Tokyo, Japan Jana Vyrastekova, Nijmegen University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
   Presented by: Jana Vyrastekova, Nijmegen school of management

Session 149: poster

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

An expected payoff symmetric solution and its application to bankruptcy problems
By Joosung Lee, Department of economics, Seoul National University, Seoul 151-742, South Korea
   Presented by: Joosung Lee, Seoul National University
 

No Profitable Decompositions in Quasi-Linear Allocation Problems
By Camelia Bejan Rice University Geoffroy de Clippel Brown University
   Presented by: Camelia Bejan, Rice University
 

Analysis of a strategic model imposed on claims problems
By Caroline Berden, University Maastricht Hans Peters, University Maastricht Dries Vermeulen, University Maastricht
   Presented by: Caroline Berden, University Maastricht
 

Consistency of the Harsanyi SOlution
By M. A. Hinojosa, E. Romero and J. M. Zarzuelo
   Presented by: Jose Zarzuelo, Basque Country University

Session 150: poster

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Sharing a polluted river network
By Baomin Dong, Department of Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, P. R. China Debing Ni, School of Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, Sichuan, P.R. China Yuntong Wang, Department of Economics, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
   Presented by: Baomin Dong, Univ of Int'l Business and Economics
 

Strong composition down. Characterizations of new and classical bankruptcy rules.
By Ricardo Martinez (Brown University)
   Presented by: Ricardo Martinez, University of Alicante

Session 151: poster

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Risk Taking in and after Tournaments: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
By Pavlo Blavatskyy, University of Zurich Ganna Pogrebna, Columbia University
   Presented by: Ganna Pogrebna, Columbia University
 

Core Equivalence in a Mixed Economy of Arrow-Debreu Type
By Valery Makarov, Academy of Sciences, Central Economical and Mathematical Institute, Moscow, Russia; Valery VASIL'EV, Academy of Sciences, Siberian Branch, Sobolev Institute of Mathematics, Novosibirsk, Russia; Hans Wiesmeth, Leipzig Graduate School of Management, Leipzig, Germany
   Presented by: Valery Vasil'ev, Russian Academy of Sciences
 

Cheap Talk on the Circle
By Dragan Filipovich Centro de Estudios Economicos El Colegio de Mexico
   Presented by: Dragan Filipovich, El Colegio de Mexico, CEE
 

A Dynamic Bayesian Game with Multiple Priors
By Seung Han Yoo, Cornell University
   Presented by: Seung Han Yoo, Cornell

Session 152: poster

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Technological cooperation between countries against a terrorist threat
JEL codes: C71, D74
By Sylvain Baumann university of Le Havre
   Presented by: Sylvain Baumann, CERENE
 

Bargaining, Coalitions, Signalling And Repeated Games For Economic Development And Poverty Alleviation
By KESHAB BHATTARAI, Business School, University of Hull,Cottingham Road, HU6 7RX, UK
   Presented by: Keshab Bhattarai, University of Hull
 

The monoclus of an airport game
By Gerwald van Gulick (Tilburg University) Henk Norde (Tilburg University) Marco Slikker (Technische Universiteit Eindhoven)
   Presented by: Gerwald van Gulick, Tilburg University
 

Coalition Formation and Distribution of Worth in TU-Games
By Roald Ramer University of Amsterdam
   Presented by: Roald Ramer, University of Amsterdam

Session 153: poster

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Monotonicity properties for the adjudication of conflicting claims
JEL codes: C79; D63; D74.
By Yoichi Kasajima, University of Rochester William Thomson, University of Rochester
   Presented by: Yoichi Kasajima, University of Rochester
 

Securely implementable mechanism in a Production Economy with Money.
By Rajnish Kumar, Rice University
   Presented by: Rajnish Kumar, Rice University
 

Optimal Mechanisms for Scheduling Jobs on a Single Machine
By Birgit Heydenreich, Maastricht University Debasis Mishra,Indian Statistical Institute Rudolf Müller, Maastricht University Marc Uetz, University of Twente
   Presented by: Birgit Heydenreich, Maastricht University
 

Sound taxation and privatization: On the use of self-declared value
By Marco Haan (University of Groningen) Pim Heijnen (University of Amsterdam) Lambert Schoonbeek (University of Groningen) Linda Toolsema (University of Groningen)
   Presented by: Pim Heijnen,

Session 154: poster

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Leadership by Confidence in Teams
By Hajime Kobayashi Osaka Prefecture University Hideo Suehiro Kobe University
   Presented by: Hajime Kobayashi, Osaka Prefecture University
 

Three-stage Model of Endogenous Quality Choice
By Gladkova Margarita, Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg University Zenkevich Nikolay, Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg University
   Presented by: Margarita Gladkova, St. Petersburg University

Session 155: poster

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

A Class of Markov Decision Processes with Pure and Stationary Optimal Strategies
JEL codes: C73
By Hugo Gimbert, LABRI, Bordeaux, France.
   Presented by: Hugo Gimbert, CNRS
 

Modeling of Dynamic Stable Joint Venture under Uncertainty
By Nikolay Zenkevich, St. Petersburg University, Graduate School of Management, zenkevich@som.pu.ru Nikolay Kolabutin, St. Petersburg University, Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, kolabutin_nik@mail.ru
   Presented by: Nikolay Zenkevich, Saint-Petersburg University
 

Event Game Theory Based on Computer Games
By Xu, Xin-he, Northeastern University, China Zheng, Xinying, Northeastern University, China Liu, Jihong, Northeastern University, China
   Presented by: Xinhe Xu, Northeastern University
 

Equilibria in Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg Games
By Valeriu UNGUREANU State University of Moldova
   Presented by: Valeriu Ungureanu, State University of Moldova

Session 156: poster

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Air and Rail Transport Competitive Equilibria: Are the High Speed Rail Infrastructure Costs Justifiable?
JEL codes: C61 C72 L98
By Nicole Adler, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Chris Nash, Institute of Transport Studies, Leeds University Eric Pels, Free University of Amsterdam
   Presented by: Nicole Adler, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
 

Values for graph-restricted games with coalition structure
By Anna Khmelnitskaya, St.Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics RAS
   Presented by: Anna Khmelnitskaya, SPb Institute for Economics & Mathematics RAS (Russian Academy of Sciences)
 

CENTRAL BANK HETEROGENEITY AND INFLATIONARY PRESSURE
By Maurício S. Bugarin - Ibmec São Paulo Fabia A. de Carvalho - Central Bank of Brazil
   Presented by: Fabia Carvalho, Banco Central do Brasil
 

Free-Rider and Gaming in the Distribution of Revenues Across
By Eduardo de Carvalho Andrade, Ibmec Sao Paulo Mauricio Bugarin, Ibmec Sao Paulo Bruno Rocha, USP and Tendencias Fabio Miessi, LSE
   Presented by: eduardo andrade, Ibmec Sao Paulo

Session 157: poster

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

A Multi-Stage Search Allocation Game
By Ryusuke Hohzaki, National Defense Academy of Japan
   Presented by: Ryusuke Hohzaki, National Defense Academy
 

The environment protecting dynamics: an evolutionary approach
By Paloma Zapata-Lillo, Sciences School, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
   Presented by: Paloma Zapata, Facultad de Ciencias, UNAM

Session 158: poster

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Mitigating Against M-Shape Society Using Game Theory and Computable General Equilibrium Models: An Case of Competition Between Food and Biofuels Markets in Taiwan
By (1)Yen-LanLiu, PhD student of Geography Department, National Taiwan University. clickvito@yahoo.com.tw (2) Kang-Tsung Chang, Professor of Geography Department, National Taiwan University (3)Shih-Hsun Hsu, Professor of Department of Agricultural economics, National Taiwan University (4) Chin-Hong Sun, Professor of Geography Department t, National Taiwan University
   Presented by: yen-lan LIU, National Taiwan University
 

Deterministic, Dominant Strategy Auction Design for Agents with Costly Private Information
By David Robert Martin Thompson, UBC Kevin Leyton-Brown, UBC
   Presented by: David Thompson, University of British Columbia
 

Empirical Analysis based Game Theory Model of Central Bank Supervising Risks in China
By Hongxun JIANG, school of information, Renmin Univ. of China Yili Yin, school of information, Renmin Univ. of China
   Presented by: Hongxun Jiang, Renmin Univ. of China
 

The Initial Allocation of CO2 Emission Allowances: A Theoretical and Experimental Study
By Eva Benz Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn Karl-Martin Ehrhart Institute of Economic Theory and Operations Research, University of Karlsruhe
   Presented by: Eva Benz, University of Bonn

Session 159: poster

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Existence conditions for generalized kernels and bargaining sets of coalition systems
JEL codes: C71
By Natalia Naumova Department of Mathematics and Mechanics of St.Petersburg State University, professor
   Presented by: Natalia Naumova, Saint Petersburg State University
 

Endogenous Market Power
By University of Wisconsin Madison, Oxford University
   Presented by: Marek Weretka, University of Wisconsin-Madison
 

Existence of Pure Strategy Nash equilibriums for the Two-Dimensional Three-Firms Location Problem with a Rotationally Symmetric Customer Distribution
By Kazuo Kishimoto(Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba)
   Presented by: Kazuo Kishimoto, University of Tsukuba
 

Cycle and Stability of Effecitivty Function
By Dawidson R. Paris School of Economics University Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne
   Presented by: RAZAFIMAHATOLOTRA Dawidson, University of Paris I

Session 160: poster

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Information asymmetry and checking in indefinitely repeated trust games.
JEL codes: C71, C91, D82
By Thomas Dirkmaat, Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics Stephanie Rosenkranz, Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics Vincent Buskens, Utrecht University, Department of Sociology
   Presented by: Thomas Dirkmaat, Utrecht University
 

Formation and Evolution of Beliefs in Public Good Games
By Jaromir Kovarik, University of Alicante
   Presented by: Jaromir Kovarik, University of Alicante
 

Endogenous Perturbation Equilibrium: a Possible Explanation to Some Anomalous Data about Normal Games
By Jianrong Tian
   Presented by: Jianrong Tian, Fudan University
 

Emergency Department Overcrowding as a Nash Equilibrium: Hypothesis and Test by Questionnaire
By Richard Hamilton, M.D Drexel University College of Medicine Frank Linnehan , PhD, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University Roger A. McCain , PhD, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University
   Presented by: Richard Hamilton, Drexel University College of Medicine
 

Timing of Technology Adoption with Private Signals and Social Learning: Laboratory Experiments with Information and Network Externalities
By Julian Jamison, UCLA David Owens, University of California, Berkeley Glenn Woroch, University of California, Berkeley
   Presented by: Glenn A. Woroch, University of California, Berkeley

Session 161: poster

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 13:45 - 15:00
Location: poster
 

Tournaments of weakly heterogeneous players
JEL codes: C73, C90, D21
By Dmitry Ryvkin, Florida State University
   Presented by: Dmitry Ryvkin, Florida State University
 

Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence
By Rodrigo Moita, Ibmec Sao Paulo Claudio Paiva, IMF
   Presented by: Rodrigo Moita, IBMEC SAO PAULO
 

Risk Aversion and International Environmental Agreement
By Vincent Boucher, Laval University Yann Bramoullé, Laval University
   Presented by: Vincent Boucher, Laval University

Session 162: Multi-Unit Auctions

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G05
 

Two bidder discriminatory auctions
JEL codes: C62, C72, D44
By Gabor Virag, University of Rochester
   Presented by: Gabor Virag, University of Rochester
 

Characterization of Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions and Applications
By Luciano de Castro, University of Illinois at Urbana - Champaign. Alvaro Riascos, Universidad de los Andes
   Presented by: Alvaro Riascos, Universidad de los Andes
 

Revenue and Efficiency in Uniform-Price Private Value Auctions
By Michal Bresky, CERGE-EI, Charles University, Prague.
   Presented by: Michal Bresky, CERGE-EI

Session 163: Contracts and Tournament Theory

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G36
 

Incorporating Unawareness into Contract Theory
JEL codes: D81, D86
By Emel Filiz Ozbay, University of Maryland
   Presented by: Emel Filiz Ozbay, University of Maryland
 

Efficient tournaments within teams
By Alex Gershkov, University of Bonn Jianpei Li, Humboldt University of Berlin Paul Schweinzer, University of Bonn
   Presented by: Paul Schweinzer, University of Bonn
 

Which Inequality?
By Ed Hopkins, University of Edinburgh Tatiana Kornienko, University of Edinburgh
   Presented by: Tatiana Kornienko, University of Edinburgh
 

Breakup of Repeat Transaction Contracts, Specific Investment, and Efficient Rent-Seeking
By Bernhard Ganglmair, University of Zurich and IZA, Bonn
   Presented by: Bernhard Ganglmair, University of Zurich

Session 164: Resale in Auctions

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: 1246
 

Auctions with Resale Market and Asymmetric Information
JEL codes: D44; L1
By Rodrigo Harrison, Instituto Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Roberto Muñoz, Departamento de Industrias, Universidad Técnica Federico Santa María. Felipe Varas, Escuela de Administración, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.
   Presented by: Rodrigo Harrison, Catholic University of Chile
 

Collusion via resale
By Rod Garratt, University of California, Santa Barbara Thomas Troger, University of Bonn Charles Zheng, Iowa State University
   Presented by: Rod Garratt, University of California
 

Should Speculators Be Welcomed in Auctions?
By Marco Pagnozzi Università di Napoli Federico II
   Presented by: Marco Pagnozzi, Università di Napoli Federico II
 

Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions with Resale
By Charles Z. Zheng, Iowa State University
   Presented by: Charles Z. Zheng, Iowa State University

Session 165: Bargaining II

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G42
 

Bargaining in groups
JEL codes: C78, D
By N. Querou Queen's University Management School, Queen's University Belfast
   Presented by: Nicolas QUEROU, Queen's University Belfast
 

Unobservable information acquisition before bargaining
By Sjaak Hurkens Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC)
   Presented by: SJAAK HURKENS, CSIC
 

When is Bargaining Successful? Negotiated Divisions of Tournament Prizes
By David Goldreich, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto Lukasz Pomorski, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto
   Presented by: Lukasz Pomorski, University of Toronto
 

Regular Bargaining Games
By John Duggan, University of Rochester Tasos Kalandrakis, University of Rochester
   Presented by: John Duggan, University of Rochester

Session 166: Politics, Governments and Policies

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: 2245
 

A Theory of Bad Governments
JEL codes: D71, D74, C71
By Daron Acemoglu (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Georgy Egorov (Harvard University) Konstantin Sonin (New Economic School)
   Presented by: Georgy Egorov, Harvard University
 

Redistriubtive politics with distortionary taxation
By Crutzen Benoit, Rotterdam University Sahuguet Nicolas HEC Montreal
   Presented by: Nicolas Sahuguet, HEC Montreal
 

Inefficient Redistribution and Inefficient Redistributive Politics
By Dan Kovenock, Purdue University Brian Roberson, Miami University
   Presented by: Brian Roberson, Miami University
 

Strategic Approaches to Third Party Intervention: Theory and Application to U.S. Policy in Iraq
By Nolan H. Miller
   Presented by: Nolan Miller, Harvard University

Session 167: Evolution and Learning

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: 160
 

Multiplicity and sensitivity of stochastically stable equilibria in coordination games
JEL codes: C70, C72, D70
By Toshimasa Maruta, Advanced Research Institute for the Sciences and Humanities and Population Research Institute, Nihon University Akira Okada, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
   Presented by: Toshimasa Maruta, Nihon University
 

Anticipating Cycles
By Michael Rapp, University of Wisconsin--Madison
   Presented by: Michael Rapp, Universtiy of Wisconsin, Madison
 

The Evolution of Bidding Behavior in Private-Values Auctions and Double Auctions
By 1. Rene Saran Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands 2. Roberto Serrano Brown University, Providence, U.S.A IMDEA, Madrid, Spain
   Presented by: Rene Saran, Maastricht University

Session 168: Behavioral Models of Intertemporal Choice

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G40
 

Procrastination, partial naivete, and and behavioral welfare analysis
JEL codes: C70, D60
By Geir B. Asheim, University of Oslo
   Presented by: Geir Asheim, University of Oslo
 

Learning Self-Control
By S. Nageeb Ali, University of California, San Diego
   Presented by: Syed Ali, UC-San Diego
 

Credit Card Competition and Naive Hyperbolic Consumers
By Elif Incekara Hafalir Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University
   Presented by: Elif Incekara Hafalir, Carnegie Mellon University

Session 169: Cooperative Theory and Applications

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G44
 

Fixed-route travelling salesman games and the shapley value
JEL codes: d63,
By Duygu Yengin, University of Adelaide
   Presented by: duygu yengin, university of adelaide
 

Measuring influence in command games
By Michel GRABISCH (CES, University of Paris I, France) Agnieszka RUSINOWSKA (GATE, CNRS - University of Lyon 2, France)
   Presented by: Agnieszka Rusinowska, CNRS - University of Lyon 2
 

A Coalitional Theory of Oligopoly
By Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and business, Ariel University Center of Samaria, Ariel.
   Presented by: Nir Dagan, Ariel University Center of Samaria
 

On the Geometry of Cooperative Behavior
By Virginie Masson, University of Adelaide, Australia Alexander Matros, University of Pittsburgh, USA
   Presented by: Virginie Masson, University of Adelaide

Session 170: Implementation I

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: 276
 

Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Towards a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine
JEL codes: C72, D78, D82
By Georgy Artemov, University of Melbourne Takashi Kunimoto, McGill University Roberto Serrano, Brown University-IMDEA
   Presented by: Roberto Serrano, Brown University
 

Continuous Implementation
By Marion Oury (HEC) Olivier Tercieux (PSE)
   Presented by: Olivier Tercieux, CNRS & PSE
 

Efficient Repeated Implementation with Complete Information
By Jihong Lee, Yonsei University and Birkbeck College, London Hamid Sabourian, King's College, Cambridge
   Presented by: Jihong Lee, Birkbeck College, University of London

Session 171: Mechanism Design V

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G03
 

Manna from Heaven or Forty Years in the Desert: Optimal Allocation without Transfer Payments
JEL codes: C70, D44, D89
By Surajeet Chakravarty,University of Exeter Todd R. Kaplan,University of Exeter
   Presented by: Surajeet Chakravarty, University of Exeter
 

Mechanism Design for Abstract Argumentation
By Iyad Rahwan, School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh and Faculty of Informatics, British University of Dubai Kate Larson, Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo
   Presented by: Kate Larson, University of Waterloo
 

Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis
By Irina Khovanskaya, Higher School of Economics Konstantin Sonin, New Economic School Maria Yudkevich, Higher School of Economics
   Presented by: Irina Khovanskaya, Higher School of Economics

Session 172: Networks VII: Bargaining and Allocations

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G27
 

Bargaining on Networks
JEL codes: C78
By Mihai Manea, Harvard University
   Presented by: Mihai Manea, Harvard University
 

A Sensitive Flexible-network Approach
By Noemí Navarro, Universidad de Málaga
   Presented by: Noemí Navarro, Universidad de Málaga
 

Measuring Trust in Peruvian Shantytowns
By Dean Karlan, Yale University Markus Mobius, Harvard University Tanya Rosenblat, Wesleyan University
   Presented by: Markus Mobius, Harvard University
 

Social Networks and Unraveling in Labor Markets
By Itay P. Fainmesser Harvard University Department of Economics and Harvard Business School
   Presented by: Itay Fainmesser, Harvard University

Session 173: Communication and games

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G43
 

Communication, Learning and Social Memory
JEL codes: C72, D80, D83
By Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University) Dino Gerardi (Yale University) Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University)
   Presented by: Dino Gerardi, Yale University
 

Finite-Time Communication Through Noisy Channels
By Penelope Hernandez. Department Analisis Economico. Univ. of Valencia. Amparo Urbano. Department Analisis Economico. Univ. of Valencia Jose E. Vila. Department Analisis Economico. Univ.of Valencia.
   Presented by: Amparo Urbano, University of Valencia
 

Credibility and Determinism in a Game of Persuasion
By Itai Sher University of Minnesota
   Presented by: Itai Sher, University of Minnesota
 

A Minority-Proof Cheap-Talk Protocol
By Yuval Heller, Tel-Aviv University (Based on a M.Sc. thesis supervised by prof. Ehud Lehrer)
   Presented by: Yuval Heller, Tel-Aviv University

Session 174: Electoral Competition 2

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: G45
 

Rational Expectations and Media Slant
JEL codes: D72, D83
By John Duggan, University of Rochester Cesar Martinelli, ITAM
   Presented by: Cesar Martinelli, ITAM-CIE
 

Campaign Promises and Political Factions
By Elena Panova, Département des sciences économiques, Université du Québec à Montréal
   Presented by: Elena Panova, public
 

Reputation, Negative Campaigning, and Political Shirking
By Deborah Fletcher, Miami University Steven Slutsky, University of Florida
   Presented by: Deborah Fletcher, Miami University
 

Corporate Control and Mutiple Large Shareholders
By Amrita Dhillon, University of Warwick Silvia Rossetto, Warwick Business School
   Presented by: Amrita Dhillon, University of Warwick

Session 175: Equilibrium Computation

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 15:00 - 16:45
Location: 101
 

Gradient-based algorithms for Nash equilibrium finding in huge sequential two-person zero-sum imperfect-information games
JEL codes: C63, C61
By Andrew Gilpin, Computer Science Department, Carnegie Mellon University Samid Hoda, Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University Javier Pena, Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University Tuomas Sandholm, Computer Science Department, Carnegie Mellon University
   Presented by: Andrew Gilpin, Carnegie Mellon University
 

Computational Properties of Quasi-Strict Equilibrium
By Felix Brandt and Felix Fischer University of Munich
   Presented by: Felix Brandt, University of Munich
 

Convergent Adaptive Discretization Methods for Computing Correlated Equilibria of Polynomial Games
By Noah D. Stein, MIT Asuman Ozdaglar, MIT Pablo A. Parrilo, MIT
   Presented by: Noah Stein, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 

Action-Graph Games
By Albert Xin Jiang, Department of Computer Science, University of British Columbia Kevin Leyton-Brown, Department of Computer Science, University of British Columbia Navin A.R. Bhat, Department of Physics, University of Toronto
   Presented by: Albert Xin Jiang, University of British Columbia

Session 176: Plenary - von Neumann Lecture: Abraham Neyman; Chaired by George Mailath

Date: July 16, 2008
Time: 17:15 - 18:15
Location: Coon Forum

Session 177: Common Value Auctions

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G43
 

Information Aggregation in Common Value Asset Markets and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis
JEL codes: C72, D44, D82
By Ricardo Serrano-Padial, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Economics
   Presented by: Ricardo Serrano-Padial, University of Wisconsin-Madison
 

Common-Value Auctions with Two Bidders: When To Brag About What You Know
By Daniel Quint, University of Wisconsin - Madison
   Presented by: Daniel Quint, University of Wisconsin - Madison
 

Asymmetric Common-Value Auctions with Applications to Auctions with Resale
By Harrison Cheng, University of Southern California Guofu Tan, University of Southern California
   Presented by: Harrison Cheng, University of Southern California
 

Information Concentration in Common Value Environments
By Vlad Mares, Olin School of Business, Washington University, St. Louis Mikhael Shor, Owen School of Management, Vanderbilt University
   Presented by: Mikhael Shor, Vanderbilt University

Session 178: Implementation

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 2245
 

Imminent Nash Implementation
JEL codes: D78, C72, D60
By Georgy Artemov, the University of Melbourne
   Presented by: Georgy Artemov, The University of Melbourne
 

Characterizing Natural Implementability when Social Choice Correspondences are Efficient
By Takeshi Suzuki, Tokyo Institute of Technology Hirofumi Yamamura, Tokyo Institute of Technology
   Presented by: Takeshi Suzuki, Tokyo Institute of Technology
 

Let them cheat!
By Rodrigo Velez, University of Rochester William Thomson, University of Rochester
   Presented by: Rodrigo Velez, University of Rochester

Session 179: College admissions approaches

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G42
 

College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision?
By Ayse Mumcu, Bogazici University Ismail Saglam, TOBB University of Economics and Technology
   Presented by: Ayse Mumcu, Bogazici University
 

Matching Markets under (In)complete Information
By Lars Ehlers, Université de Montréal Jordi Massó, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
   Presented by: Jordi Massó, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
 

Two-sided matching with interdependent values
By Archishman Chakraborty, Baruch College, CUNY Alessandro Citanna, HEC Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University
   Presented by: Archishman Chakraborty, Baruch College, CUNY

Session 180: Existence of Equilibrium

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G44
 

Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection
JEL codes: D82
By José Fajardo, IBMEC Business School - RJ Guilherme Carmona, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
   Presented by: josé Fajardo, IBMEC
 

Existence of Equilibrium in Qualitative and Discontinuous Games
By Paulo Barelli, University of Rochester Idione Soza, University of Rochester
   Presented by: Paulo Barelli, University of Rochester
 

Partial Cooperation in Symmetric Games
By Subhadip Chakrabarti, Queen's University, Belfast, UK Robert P. Gilles, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA Emiliya A. Lazarova, Queen's University, Belfast, UK
   Presented by: Subhadip Chakrabarti, Queens University

Session 181: Group Formation and Bargaining

Session JEL code: C78
Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 1246
 

One-dimensional Bargaining with Markov Recognition Probabilities
JEL codes: C78
By P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Maastricht University A. Predtetchinski, Maastricht University
   Presented by: P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Maastricht University
 

A strategic model of club formation; existence and characterization
By Marta Faias Departamento de Matemática - Universidade Nova de Lisboa Portugal mcm@fct.unl.pt Myrna Wooders Vanderbilt University and University of Warwick
   Presented by: Marta Faias,
 

Favoritism
By Miguel A. Duran, University of Malaga (Spain) Antonio Morales, University of Malaga (Spain)
   Presented by: Miguel Duran, University of Malaga (Spain)
 

Competition of matching intermediaries with non-dichotomous preferences
By Filomena Garcia, ISEG-Technical University of Lisbon Joana Pais, ISEG-Technical University of Lisbon
   Presented by: Filomena Garcia, ISEG

Session 182: Games and Computing

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 160
 

Guaranteed Revenue In Combinatorial Auctions
JEL codes: D44 C70
By Silvio Micali Paul Valiant
   Presented by: Silvio Micali, MIT
 

A sufficient condition for rules to be frequently manipulable for any number of alternatives
By Lirong Xia, Duke University Vincent Conitzer, Duke University
   Presented by: Lirong Xia, Duke University
 

Using Empirical Methods to Compare Multiagent Learning Algorithms
By Erik Zawadzki, University of British Columbia Asher Lipson, University of British Columbia Kevin Leyton-Brown, University of British Columbia
   Presented by: Erik Zawadzki, University of British Columbia

Session 183: Networks VIII

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G05
 

Two-Stage Myopic Dynamics in Network Formation Games
JEL codes: C62; C72
By Esteban Arcaute, Institute for Computational and Mathematical Engineering, Stanford University. Ramesh Johari, Department of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University. Shie Mannor, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, McGill University.
   Presented by: Esteban Arcaute, Stanford University
 

How to connect under incomplete information
By Dinko Dimitrov University of Bayreuth, Germany Claus-Jochen Haake Bielefeld University, Germany
   Presented by: Dinko Dimitrov, University of Bayreuth
 

Efficiency Bounds for Sequential Wireless Resource Allocation Auctions
By Junjik Bae, Northwestern Univ. Eyal Beigman, Northwestern Univ. Randall Berry, Northwestern Univ. Michael Honig, Northwestern Univ. Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern Univ.
   Presented by: Randall Berry, Northwestern University
 

Repeated Games Played in a Network
By Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain
   Presented by: Markus Kinateder, Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona

Session 184: Resource Allocation and Mechanisms

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G03
 

Voting with Money
JEL codes: C7, D71
By James Schummer MEDS, Kellogg, Northwestern University Rakesh V. Vohra MEDS, Kellogg, Northwestern University
   Presented by: James Schummer, Northwestern University
 

Mechanism Design and Money Burning
By Jason Hartline, Northwestern U Tim Roughgarden, Stanford U.
   Presented by: Jason Hartline, Northwestern U.
 

Using graphs to verify revenue equivalence
By Birgit Heydenreich, Maastricht University Rudolf Müller, Maastricht University Marc Uetz, University of Twente Rakesh V. Vohra, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Rudolf Mueller, Maastricht University
 

Axiomatic analysis of simple claims problems
By William Thomson University of Rochester
   Presented by: William Thomson, University of Rochester

Session 185: Fair Division and Claims

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 101
 

The two-stage rules for multi-issue allocation situations
By Gustavo Bergantiños, Universidade de Vigo Leticia Lorenzo, Universidade de Vigo Silvia Lorenzo-Freire, Universidade da Coruña
   Presented by: Silvia Freire, University of Coruña
 

The division problem with participant's constraints
By G. Bergantiños, Universidade de Vigo J. Massó, Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona A. Neme, Universidad de San Luis
   Presented by: Gustavo Bergantinos, Universidade de Vigo
 

Potential and consistency on augmenting structures
By E. Algaba*, J. M. Bilbao*, and M. Slikker** *Department of Applied Mathematics II, University of Seville, Spain **Department of Technology Management, Eindhoven University, The Netherlands
   Presented by: Encarnación Algaba, University of Seville

Session 186: Collective Choice

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G36
 

How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games
JEL codes: D74
By Steven J. Brams, New York University D. Marc Kilgour, Wilfrid Laurier University
   Presented by: Marc Kilgour, Wilfrid Laurier University
 

Electing and ranking by majority judgement: 1. Experimental evidence
By Michel Balinski*, \'Ecole Polytechnique and C.N.R.S., Paris, France Rida Laraki, \'Ecole Polytechnique and C.N.R.S., Paris, France
   Presented by: Michel Balinski, CNRS and Ecole Polytechnique
 

Electing and ranking by majority judgement: 2. Theoretical evidence
By Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki* École Polytechnique and C.N.R.S., Paris, France
   Presented by: Rida Laraki, CNRS & Ecole Polytechnique
 

A Theoretical Framework of Farsightedness in Sequential Committee Games
By Roland Pongou, Brown University Bertrand Tchantcho, University of Yaounde 1 and University of Caen
   Presented by: Roland Pongou, Brown University

Session 187: Experimental and behavioral models

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G45
 

Field and Lab Convergence in Poisson LUPI Games
JEL codes: C72; C92; C93;
By Robert Ostling, Stockholm School of Economics Joseph Tao-yi Wang, National Taiwan University Eileen Chou, Northwestern University Colin F. Camerer, California Institute of Technology
   Presented by: Joseph Wang, National Taiwan University
 

Looking for strategic voting in the one-dimension setting : An experimental study.
By André BLAIS (Université de Montréal), Jean-François LASLIER (CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique) Nicolas SAUGER (FNSP, CEVIPOF), Karine VAN DER STRAETEN (CNRS, PSE)
   Presented by: Jean-Francois Laslier, Ecole Polytechnique
 

Quantum Game Theory and Cooperation
By Matthias Hanauske Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University Institute of Informations Systems Mertonstr. 17, 60054 Frankfurt am Main
   Presented by: Matthias Hanauske, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University

Session 188: Gerrymandering and Immigration

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: 276
 

Can democracy always lead to efficient economic transitions?
JEL codes: D72, D78, O12
By Tapas Kundu, University of Oslo
   Presented by: Tapas Kundu, University of Oslo
 

Optimal Gerrymandering and Policy Choice: a Welfare Analysis
By Emanuele Bracco, University of Warwick
   Presented by: Emanuele Bracco, University of Warwick
 

Strategyproofness, Cross-border Externalities and the Cost of Centralization
By Antoine Loeper, Kellogg School of Management, MEDS
   Presented by: Antoine Loeper, Northwestern University
 

Political Equilibrium Social Security with Migration
By LAURA MARSILIANI, University of Durham THOMAS RENSTROM, University of Durham and CEPR
   Presented by: Thomas Renstrom, University of Durham

Session 189: Bargaining III

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G27
 

Stationary Equilibria in Bargaining with Externalities
JEL codes: C72, C78, D62
By Andreas Westermark, Department of Economics, Uppsala University Jonas Bjornerstedt, Swedish Competition Authority
   Presented by: Andreas Westermark, Uppsala University
 

The impact of bargaining on markets with price takers
By David Gill, Division of Economics, University of Southampton John Thanassoulis, Dept. of Economics, University of Oxford
   Presented by: David Gill, University of Southampton
 

Information Revelation and Acquisition in Bargaining
By Stephanie Lau Washington University in St. Louis
   Presented by: Stephanie Lau, Washington University
 

A theory of disagreement in repeated games with renegotiation
By David A. Miller (UCSD) Joel Watson (UCSD)
   Presented by: David Miller, University of California, San Diego

Session 190: Behavioral Game Theory and Experiments

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:15
Location: G40
 

Competition on Common Value Markets With Naive Traders
JEL codes: D42,D43,D61,D82
By Nadine Chlass Max Planck Institute of Economics Werner Güth Max Planck Institute of Economics
   Presented by: Nadine Chlass, Max Planck Institute of Economics
 

The Neural Correlates of Deception, Suspicion, and Strategic Thought During Bargaining
By Meghana Bhatt, Baylor College of Medicine Terry Lohrenz, Baylor College of Medicine Colin Camerer, Caltech Read Montague, Baylor College of Medicine
   Presented by: meghana bhatt,
 

Contrasting Reference-Dependent Choice Models
By Yusufcan Masatlioglu University of Michigan Neslihan Uler University of Michigan
   Presented by: Yusufcan Masatlioglu, University of Michigan
 

Decision Making with Many Options
By Tibor Besedes, Georgia Institute of Technology Cary Deck, University of Arkansas Sudipta Sarangi, Louisiana State University Mikhail Shor, Vanderbilt University
   Presented by: Tibor Besedes, Georgia Institute of Economics

Session 191: Plenary - Shapley Lecture: Tim Roughgarden; Chaired by Eva Tardos

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 10:45 - 11:45
Location: Coon Forum

Session 192: Incomplete Information

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 12:00 - 13:20
Location: G45
 

The value of Repeated Games with an informed controller
By Jérôme Renault, Université Paris-Dauphine Ceremade
   Presented by: Jérôme Renault, Université Paris Dauphine
 

THE DYNAMICS OF THE BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUM
By Prof. Ilie Parpucea PhD, Babes-Bolyai University,The Faculty of Economics PhD Student Larissa-Margareta Batrancea, Babes-Bolyai University, The Faculty of Business
   Presented by: Larissa Batrancea, Babes-Bolyai University

Session 193: Beliefs and Behavior

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 12:00 - 13:20
Location: G36
 

Learning and Risk Aversion
JEL codes: C7, D8
By Carlos Oyarzun, University of Alicante Rajiv Sarin, Texas A&M University
   Presented by: Rajiv Sarin, Texas A&M University
 

State Space Dimensions and Belief Updating
By Ricard Torres, ITAM and Universitat de Girona
   Presented by: Ricard Torres, Universitat de Girona
 

Increasing strategic uncertainty in a two-period Stackelberg-type game
By Abdolkarim Sadrieh, University of Magdeburg Irenaeus Wolff, University of Erfurt
   Presented by: Irenaeus Wolff, University of Erfurt

Session 194: Global Games

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 12:00 - 13:20
Location: G44
 

Endogenous information and credibility of beliefs in a global coordination game of regime switch
JEL codes: C72, D82, D84
By Andrea Finicelli, Bank of Italy
   Presented by: Andrea Finicelli, Bank of Italy
 

Contagion in Games with Strategic Complementarities
By Marion Oury, Paris School of Economics Olivier Tercieux, Paris School of Economics
   Presented by: Marion Oury, Paris School of Economics
 

Central Bank Transparency, Inflation Targeting and Credibility
By Aloisio Araujo ( EPGE / IMPA ) Rafael Santos ( CBB )
   Presented by: Rafael Santos, Central Bank of Brazil

Session 195: Bargaining

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 12:00 - 13:20
Location: G27
 

Multilateral Bargaining over Coalitional Externalities
JEL codes: C71; C72; D62.
By Peter Borm, Tilburg University, the Netherlands; Yuan Ju, University of York, UK; David Wettstein, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel.
   Presented by: Yuan Ju, University of York
 

Bargaining with Non-Convexity and Variable Threats
By Cheng-Zhong Qin, University of California, Santa Barbara, Guofu Tan, University of Southern California
   Presented by: Cheng-Zhong Qin, University of California
 

Some Have a Talent for Bargaining and Some Don't.
By Ella Segev, Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Israel. Tomer David, Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Israel. Niv Lazar, Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Israel.
   Presented by: Ella Segev, Technion - Israel Institute of Technolog

Session 196: Auctions and Markets

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 12:00 - 13:20
Location: 160
 

Characterization of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Uniform Price IPO Auctions
JEL codes: D44, G12, D82
By Ping Zhang, University of Nottingham
   Presented by: Ping Zhang, University of Nottingham
 

A method for dealing with dependence in auctions
By Luciano I. de Castro, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
   Presented by: Luciano de Castro, University of Illinois
 

Effectively Setting Non-Anonymity in Financial Markets with Price Leadership
By Luca Gelsomini Department of Economics, University of Warwick
   Presented by: Luca Gelsomini, University of Warwick

Session 197: Learning

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 12:00 - 13:20
Location: G43
 

Bayesian Learning with Bounded Rationality: Convergence to Nash Equilibrium
JEL codes: C72, C73, D83
By Yuichi Noguchi Economics Department, Kanto Gakuin University
   Presented by: Yuichi Noguchi, Kanto Gakuin University
 

Learning in a local interaction hawk-dove game: Do not learn as your neighbors do
By J.J.A. Kamphorst Utrecht School of Economics, Utrecht University G. van der Laan, Tinbergen Institute, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
   Presented by: Jurjen Kamphorst, Utrecht School of Economics, Utrecht Uni

Session 198: Imperfect monitoring

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 12:00 - 13:20
Location: G03
 

Eventual perfect monitoring
JEL codes: C72, C73
By Eran Shmaya Information Science and Technology California Institute of Technology
   Presented by: Eran Shmaya, Information Science and Technology
 

Correlation and authentication in repeated games with network monitoring
By Tristan Tomala HEC Paris, Economics and Finance Department
   Presented by: Tristan Tomala, HEC Paris
 

Communication Games with Asymmetric Information
By Alon Shapira, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
   Presented by: Alon Shapira, Hebrew University

Session 199: Population dynamics

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 12:00 - 13:20
Location: 276
 

Logit Evolution in Potential Games: Reversibility, Rates of Convergence, Large Deviations, and Equilibrium Selection
JEL codes: C72, C73
By Michel Benaïm, Université de Neuchâtel William H. Sandholm, University of Wisconsin
   Presented by: William Sandholm, University of Wisconsin
 

Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities Revisited
By Ulrich Berger, Vienna University of Economics
   Presented by: Ulrich Berger, Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration
 

Stochastic Replicator Dynamics and Traveling Waves in Coordination Games
By Stuart McDonald, California Institute of Technology
   Presented by: Stuart McDonald, University of Queensland

Session 200: Fairness and Allocations

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 12:00 - 13:20
Location: G42
 

Reference Points, Perceived Procedures, and Fairness
JEL codes: C91, D63
By Loyola Marymount University
   Presented by: Dorothea Herreiner, Loyola Marymount University
 

Equity Basis Selection in Allocation Environments
By Van Kolpin, University of Oregon David Aadland, University of Wyoming
   Presented by: Van Kolpin, University of Oregon
 

Money metric utilitarianism without utilities or prices
By Christopher P. Chambers, Caltech Takashi Hayashi, University of Texas, Austin
   Presented by: Christopher Chambers, California Institute of Technology

Session 201: Segregation

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 12:00 - 13:20
Location: 101
 

Schelling Redux: An Evolutionary Dynamic Model of Residential Segregation
JEL codes: C72, C73, D62
By Emin Dokumaci, University of Wisconsin-Madison William H. Sandholm, University of Wisconsin-Madison
   Presented by: Emin Dokumaci, University of Wisconsin-Madison
 

A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation
By I. Sebastian Buhai, Aarhus School of Business Marco J. van der Leij, University of Alicante
   Presented by: Marco van der Leij, Universidad de Alicante
 

Tipping and Residential Segregation: A Unified Schelling Model
By Junfu Zhang Department of Economics Clark University
   Presented by: Junfu Zhang, Clark University

Session 202: Incentives II

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 12:00 - 13:20
Location: G40
 

Lesser-Included Offenses
JEL codes: K14, K41, K42
By Ram Orzach, Oakland University Stephen J. Spurr, Wayne State University
   Presented by: Ram Orzach, Oakland University
 

Efficient Committed Budget for Implementing Target Audit Probability for Many Inspectees
By Andrew Yim, Tilburg University
   Presented by: Andrew Yim, Tilburg University/CentER

Session 203: Imitation and Adjustment

Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 12:00 - 13:20
Location: 1246
 

Imitating Cooperation and the Formation of long-term Relationships
JEL codes: C70, C72, C78
By Heiner Schumacher, University of Mannheim
   Presented by: Heiner Schumacher, University of Mannheim
 

Imitation, Local Interaction, and Coordination: Part I
By Hsiao-Chi Chen Yunshyong Chow Li-Chau Wu
   Presented by: Hsiao-Chi Chen, National Taipei University
 

Testing the TASP: an Experimental Investigation of Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria
By Timothy N. Cason, Purdue University Daniel Friedman, UCSC Ed Hopkins, University of Edinburgh
   Presented by: Ed Hopkins, University of Edinburgh

This program was last updated on 2008-07-11 20:46:54 EDT