Midwest Economic Theory Conference

Purdue University

 

Program Notes and Index of Sessions

 

Summary of All Sessions

Click here for an index of all participants

#Date/TimeTitle/LocationPapers
1April 29, 2022
16:30-18:00
2-A3
2April 29, 2022
16:30-18:00
2-B3
3April 30, 2022
9:00-10:30
3-A3
4April 30, 2022
9:00-10:30
3-B3
5April 30, 2022
9:00-10:30
3-C3
6April 30, 2022
11:00-12:30
4-A3
7April 30, 2022
11:00-12:30
4-B3
8April 30, 2022
11:00-12:30
4-C3
9April 30, 2022
14:15-15:45
5-A3
10April 30, 2022
14:15-15:45
5-B3
11April 30, 2022
14:15-15:45
5-C3
12April 30, 2022
16:15-17:45
6-A3
13April 30, 2022
16:15-17:45
6-B3
14April 30, 2022
16:15-17:45
6-C3
 

14 sessions, 42 papers, and 0 presentations with no associated papers


 

Midwest Economic Theory Conference

Detailed List of Sessions

 
Session 1: 2-A
April 29, 2022 16:30 to 18:00
 
 

Procrastination under Uncertainty
   presented by: Mingzi Niu, William Marsh Rice University
 

Exploration and Exploitation in R&D Competition
   presented by: Alan Jaske, Duke University
 

Incentives, Guaranteed Employment, and Lincoln Electric
   presented by: Michael Rauh, Indiana University
 
Session 2: 2-B
April 29, 2022 16:30 to 18:00
 
 

On the Stock Market Variance-Return or Price Relations: A Tale of Fear and Euphoria
   presented by: Hui Guo, University of Cincinnati
 

Public Disclosure and Private Information Acquisition: A Global-game Approach
   presented by: Zhifeng Cai, Rutgers University
 

Non-Fundamental Volatility in Financial Markets
[slides]
   presented by: Keisuke Teeple, University of California Davis
 
Session 3: 3-A
April 30, 2022 9:00 to 10:30
 
 

Resisting Evidence Manipulation with Endogenous Skepticism
   presented by: Youzong Xu, University of Nottingham Ningbo China
 

Finite Bubbles, Infinite Bubbles, and Crypto Assets
   presented by: Antonio Doblas-Madrid, Michigan State University
 

Costly Persuasion by a Partially Informed Sender
   presented by: Shaofei Jiang, The University of Texas at Austin
 
Session 4: 3-B
April 30, 2022 9:00 to 10:30
 
 

Learning to Commit.
[slides]
   presented by: Jorge Ramos-Mercado, University of Minnesota
 

Speculation in Procurement Auctions
   presented by: Shanglyu Deng, University of Maryland-College Park
 

Computing stationary Markov equilibrium strategies in stochastic games
   presented by: Subir Chakrabarti, Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis
 
Session 5: 3-C
April 30, 2022 9:00 to 10:30
 
 

Signaling in Dynamic Contests with Heterogenous Rivals
   presented by: Jorge Lemus, University of Illinois at Urbana Champai
 

Costly Multidimensional Screening
   presented by: Frank Yang, Stanford University
 

Buying Opinions
   presented by: Mark Whitmeyer, Arizona State University
 
Session 6: 4-A
April 30, 2022 11:00 to 12:30
 
 

Learning by Consuming: Sequential Screening with Endogenous Information Provision
   presented by: Huiyi Guo, Texas A&M University
 

Dynamic Contracting with Multidimensional Screening
   presented by: Egor Malkov, University of Minnesota
 

Hierarchical Bayesian Persuasion: Importance of Vice Presidents
   presented by: Majid Mahzoon, Carnegie Mellon University
 
Session 7: 4-B
April 30, 2022 11:00 to 12:30
 
 

Comparing Information in General Monotone Decision Problems
   presented by: Yonggyun Kim, Duke
 

Persuading a Manipulative Agent
   presented by: Yihang Zhou, The University of Texas at Austin
 

Costly Verification and Commitment in Persuasion
   presented by: Junya Zhou, Purdue University
 
Session 8: 4-C
April 30, 2022 11:00 to 12:30
 
 

Endogenous Information Acquisition in Cheap-Talk Games
   presented by: Sophie Alexandra Kreutzkamp, University of Bonn
 

Implementing Commitment Outcomes by Verifiable Messages
   presented by: Kun Zhang, Arizona State University
 

Mestizaje and Plantation Economies
   presented by: Dan McGee, Princeton University
 
Session 9: 5-A
April 30, 2022 14:15 to 15:45
 
 

Optimal Recommender System Design
   presented by: Changhwa Lee, University of Pennsylvania
 

(Near) Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities
   presented by: Thanh Nguyen, Purdue University
 

A Unified Approach to Equilibrium Analysis in Competing Mechanism Games
   presented by: Siyang Xiong, University of California, Riverside
 
Session 10: 5-B
April 30, 2022 14:15 to 15:45
 
 

A Rational Foundation of Procrastination: Theory of Non-stationary Context-dependent Time Preference
   presented by: Joosung Lee, University of Edinburgh
 

Who to insure: firms or workers?
   presented by: Shannon Sledz, University of Wisconsin - Madison
 

Heterophily, Stable Matching, and Intergenerational Transmission in Cultural Evolution
   presented by: Hanzhe Zhang, Michigan State University
 
Session 11: 5-C
April 30, 2022 14:15 to 15:45
 
 

Mixture-Dependent Preference for Commitment
   presented by: Fernando Payro Chew, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
 

On the Distributional Robustness of Rational Inattention Models
   presented by: Emerson Melo, Indiana University
 

Updating uncertainty-averse preferences
   presented by: Jian Li, Iowa State University
 
Session 12: 6-A
April 30, 2022 16:15 to 17:45
 
 

Investing in Outside Options in Bargaining
   presented by: Enrico De Magistris, Boston University
 

Bargaining in Non-Stationary Networks
   presented by: Peter Pusztai, University of Minnesota
 

Bargaining as a Struggle between Competing Attempts at Commitment
   presented by: Rohan Dutta, McGill University
 
Session 13: 6-B
April 30, 2022 16:15 to 17:45
 
 

Improving Access to Information Through Market Design
   presented by: Xian Wu, UW-Madison
 

Information spillover in markets with heterogeneous traders
   presented by: Heng Liu, University of Michigan
 

Imperfect Competition with Costly Disposal
   presented by: Severin Lenhard, University of Bern
 
Session 14: 6-C
April 30, 2022 16:15 to 17:45
 
 

Towards Efficient Information Sharing in Network Markets
   presented by: Georgios Petropoulos, MIT, Bruegel and Stanford University
 

The Impact of Connectivity on the Production and Diffusion of Knowledge
   presented by: Farzad Pourbabaee, California Institute of Technology
 

Information exchange through secret vertical contracts
   presented by: Nicolás Riquelme, Universidad de los Andes
 

14 sessions, 42 papers, and 0 presentations with no associated papers
 
Index of Participants

Legend: C=chair, P=Presenter, D=Discussant
#ParticipantRoles in Conference
1Cai, ZhifengP2
2Chakrabarti, SubirP4
3De Magistris, EnricoP12
4Deng, ShanglyuP4
5Doblas-Madrid, AntonioP3
6Dutta, RohanP12
7Guo, HuiP2
8Guo, HuiyiP6
9Jaske, AlanP1
10Jiang, ShaofeiP3
11Kim, YonggyunP7
12Kreutzkamp, Sophie AlexandraP8
13Lee, ChanghwaP9
14Lee, JoosungP10
15Lemus, JorgeP5
16Lenhard, SeverinP13
17Li, JianP11
18Liu, HengP13
19Mahzoon, MajidP6
20Malkov, EgorP6
21McGee, DanP8
22Melo, EmersonP11
23Nguyen, ThanhP9
24Niu, MingziP1
25Payro Chew, FernandoP11
26Petropoulos, GeorgiosP14
27Pourbabaee, FarzadP14
28Pusztai, PeterP12
29Ramos-Mercado, JorgeP4
30Rauh, MichaelP1
31Riquelme, NicolásP14
32Sledz, ShannonP10
33Teeple, KeisukeP2
34Whitmeyer, MarkP5
35Wu, XianP13
36Xiong, SiyangP9
37Xu, YouzongP3
38Yang, FrankP5
39Zhang, HanzheP10
40Zhang, KunP8
41Zhou, YihangP7
42Zhou, JunyaP7

 

This program was last updated on 2022-04-04 10:40:20 EDT