SED 2008 5th Conference on Economic Design

Summary of All Sessions

#Date/TimeLocationTypeTitlePapersOrganizer
1June 15, 2008
14:00-15:40
Weill 1110 contributed Mechanism Design I4Jeffrey Ely
2June 15, 2008
14:00-15:40
Weill 1120 contributed Information and Incentives I2Okan Yilankaya
3June 15, 2008
14:00-15:40
Weill 1230 contributed Public Economics and Finance4Lise Vesterlund
4June 15, 2008
16:10-17:50
Weill 1230 contributed Bargaining and Dynamics in Games4Muhamet Yildiz
5June 15, 2008
16:10-17:50
Weill 1120 contributed Experiments I4Yoram Halevy
6June 15, 2008
16:10-17:50
Weill 1110 contributed Social Choice I4Semih Koray
7June 16, 2008
8:30-10:10
Weill 1120 invited Search I4Emre Ozdenoren
8June 16, 2008
8:30-10:10
Weill 1110 invited Algorithmic Mechanism Design4Utku Unver
9June 16, 2008
10:40-12:20
Weill 1110 contributed Contracts and Incentives: Empirics and Theory4Ali Hortacsu
10June 16, 2008
10:40-12:20
Weill 1120 contributed Search II4Michael Peters
11June 16, 2008
10:40-12:20
Weill 1230 contributed Social Choice II3Jordi Masso
12June 16, 2008
13:30-15:10
Weill 1120 invited Communication and Design4Emre Ozdenoren
13June 16, 2008
13:30-15:10
Weill 1110 invited Game Theory and Experiments3Emre Ozdenoren
14June 16, 2008
15:40-16:55
Weill 1230 contributed Matching I3Onur Kesten
15June 16, 2008
15:40-16:55
Weill 1110 contributed Auction Theory I2Tilman Borgers
16June 16, 2008
15:40-16:55
Weill 1120 contributed Decision Theory2Yusufcan Masatlioglu
17June 16, 2008
17:10-18:40
Weill 1120 invited SED Lecture1Utku Unver
18June 17, 2008
8:30-10:10
Weill 1120 invited Public Goods and Design: Theory and Experiments4Emre Ozdenoren
19June 17, 2008
8:30-10:10
Weill 1110 invited Bounded Rationality4Utku Unver
20June 17, 2008
10:40-12:20
Weill 1120 contributed Industrial Organization4Ali Hortacsu
21June 17, 2008
10:40-11:55
Weill 1110 contributed Matching II3Lones Smith
22June 17, 2008
10:40-12:20
Weill 1230 contributed Information and Incentives II4Lones Smith
23June 17, 2008
13:30-15:10
Weill 1120 invited Unawareness and Contract Design4Utku Unver
24June 17, 2008
13:30-15:10
Weill 1110 invited Matching Market Design3Utku Unver
25June 17, 2008
15:40-16:55
Weill 1230 contributed Cooperative Microeconomics and Game Theory3Federico Echenique
26June 17, 2008
15:40-16:55
Weill 1110 contributed Information and Incentives III3Lones Smith
27June 17, 2008
15:40-16:55
Weill 1120 contributed Auction Theory II3Tilman Borgers
28June 17, 2008
17:10-18:40
Weill 1120 invited Murat Sertel Lecture1Emre Ozdenoren
 

28 sessions, 92 papers


 

SED 2008 5th Conference on Economic Design

Complete List of All Sessions


Session 1: Mechanism Design I

Session Organizer: Jeffrey Ely, Northwestern University
Session Chair: Camelia Bejan, Rice University
Session type: contributed
Date: June 15, 2008
Time: 14:00 - 15:40
Location: Weill 1110
 

The Groves Mechanisms and Welfare Bounds in a Variable Population Setting
JEL codes: C79, D63
   Presented by: duygu yengin, university of adelaide
 

Optimal group strategyproof cost sharing
   Presented by: Ruben Juarez, Rice University
 

A Simple Supermodular Mechanism that Implements Lindahl Allocations
   Presented by: Matt Van Essen, University of Arizona
 

Non Profitable Decompositions in Quasi-Linear Allocation Problems
   Presented by: Camelia Bejan, Rice University

Session 2: Information and Incentives I

Session Organizer: Okan Yilankaya, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
Session Chair: Uday Rajan, University of Michigan
Session type: contributed
Date: June 15, 2008
Time: 14:00 - 15:40
Location: Weill 1120
 

On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard
JEL codes: D82
   Presented by: Uday Rajan, University of Michigan
 

A Theory of Market Microstructure and Reputation
   Presented by: Selcuk Ozyurt, New York University

Session 3: Public Economics and Finance

Session Organizer: Lise Vesterlund, University Pittsburgh
Session Chair: Bilge Ozturk, Ecole Polytechnique
Session type: contributed
Date: June 15, 2008
Time: 14:00 - 15:40
Location: Weill 1230
 

Self Reporting in Law Enforcement when Officers are Corruptible
JEL codes: D0,K42
   Presented by: alberto motta, University of Padua
 

Kaneko-Shapley cost sharing rule with public goods
   Presented by: Miguel Ginés-Vilar, University Jaume I
 

The Tiebout Hypothesis Under Membership Property Rights
   Presented by: Goksel Asan, Istanbul Bilgi University
 

Rethinking the informal labour form an evolutionary point of view
   Presented by: Bilge Ozturk, Ecole Polytechnique

Session 4: Bargaining and Dynamics in Games

Session Organizer: Muhamet Yildiz, MIT
Session Chair: Mehmet Barlo, public
Session type: contributed
Date: June 15, 2008
Time: 16:10 - 17:50
Location: Weill 1230
 

Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining
JEL codes: C7
   Presented by: Kareen Rozen, Yale University
 

In Bargaining We Trust
   Presented by: Rene Saran, Maastricht University
 

Schelling Redux: An Evolutionary Dynamic Model of Residential Segregation
   Presented by: Emin Dokumaci, University of Wisconsin-Madison
 

Bounded Memory with Finite Action Spaces
   Presented by: Mehmet Barlo, public

Session 5: Experiments I

Session Organizer: Yoram Halevy, University of British Columbia
Session Chair: Yoram Halevy, University of British Columbia
Session type: contributed
Date: June 15, 2008
Time: 16:10 - 17:50
Location: Weill 1120
 

Understanding the Reference Effect
   Presented by: Yusufcan Masatlioglu, University of Michigan
 

Charitable Giving, Inequality and Taxes
   Presented by: Neslihan Uler,
 

Choosing interaction partners induces maximum effort in the minimum effort game
   Presented by: Ingrid Rohde, Maastricht University, FDEWB
 

The Ultimatum Game: Interdependent Preferences in Experimental Setting
   Presented by: Yoram Halevy, University of British Columbia

Session 6: Social Choice I

Session Organizer: Semih Koray, Bilkent University
Session Chair: Walter Trockel, Bielefeld University
Session type: contributed
Date: June 15, 2008
Time: 16:10 - 17:50
Location: Weill 1110
 

Social Choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
   Presented by: M. Remzi Sanver, Istanbul Bilgi University
 

Nash Implementability of Tournament Solutions
   Presented by: Ipek Ozkal Sanver, Istanbul Bilgi University
 

On the measuring of the opportunity freedom in the Arrow-Debreu set-up
   Presented by: Joanna Mrowka, Cracow University of Economics
 

On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
   Presented by: Walter Trockel, Bielefeld University

Session 7: Search I

Session Organizer: Emre Ozdenoren, University of Michigan
Session Chair: Stephan Lauermann, University of Michigan
Session type: invited
Date: June 16, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:10
Location: Weill 1120
 

Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition
   Presented by: Philipp Kircher, University of Pennsylvania
 

When Less Information is Good for Efficiency
   Presented by: Stephan Lauermann, University of Michigan
 

The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of a Simple Bilateral Matching and Bargaining Mechanism
   Presented by: Artyom Shneyerov, Concordia University
 

Competing Auctions: The Case of Finite Markets
   Presented by: Gabor Virag, University of Rochester

Session 8: Algorithmic Mechanism Design

Session Organizer: Utku Unver, University of Pittsburgh
Session Chair: Mohammad Mahdian,
Session type: invited
Date: June 16, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:10
Location: Weill 1110
 

Truthful germs are contagious: A local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
   Presented by: Robert Kleinberg, Cornell
 

Externalities in Online Advertising
   Presented by: Mohammad Mahdian,
 

Methods for sponsored search auctions
   Presented by: Muthu Muthukrishnan, Google Research
 

Methods for empirical game-theoretic analysis
   Presented by: Michael Wellman,

Session 9: Contracts and Incentives: Empirics and Theory

Session Organizer: Ali Hortacsu, University of Chicago
Session Chair: Jaesoo Kim, Michigan State University
Session type: contributed
Date: June 16, 2008
Time: 10:40 - 12:20
Location: Weill 1110
 

Managers, Entrepreneurs and Investors:The Consequences of Corporate Cheating for Firm Structure Under Different Wealth Distributions
JEL codes: D82, L21, O11
   Presented by: Brishti Guha, Singapore Management University
 

Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions, Turnpike Property, and Existence of Forecast Horizon in a Dynamic Model of Hold up
   Presented by: Yutaka Suzuki, Hosei University
 

Venture Capital and Underpricing: Capacity Constraints and Early Sales
   Presented by: Roberto Pinheiro, University of Pennsylvania
 

Team Incentives for Managing Competition
   Presented by: Jaesoo Kim, Michigan State University

Session 10: Search II

Session Organizer: Michael Peters, University of British Columbia
Session Chair: Thomas Wiseman, UT Austin
Session type: contributed
Date: June 16, 2008
Time: 10:40 - 12:20
Location: Weill 1120
 

Wage-Training Contracts and Wage Dynamics In a Job Search Model with General Human Capital
JEL codes: J64, J24, J31
   Presented by: Chao Fu, University of Pennsylvania
 

Search, Moral Hazard, and Price Dispersion
   Presented by: Nuray Akin, University of Miami
 

Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition
   Presented by: Philipp Kircher, University of Pennsylvania
 

A Theory of Demand for Search Goods
   Presented by: Thomas Wiseman, UT Austin

Session 11: Social Choice II

Session Organizer: Jordi Masso,
Session Chair: Semih Koray, Bilkent University
Session type: contributed
Date: June 16, 2008
Time: 10:40 - 12:20
Location: Weill 1230
 

Efficient and Strategy-proof Social Choice When Preferences Are Single-dipped
JEL codes: D71
   Presented by: Vikram Manjunath, University of Rochester
 

Choosers as Extension Axioms
   Presented by: Bora Erdamar, University of Michigan
 

Explorations on Monotonicity in Social Choice Theory
   Presented by: Semih Koray, Bilkent University

Session 12: Communication and Design

Session Organizer: Emre Ozdenoren, University of Michigan
Session Chair: Peter Eso, Kellogg School, Northwestern University
Session type: invited
Date: June 16, 2008
Time: 13:30 - 15:10
Location: Weill 1120
 

A theory of red tape - optimal delegation with costly procedural rules
   Presented by: Attila Ambrus, Harvard University
 

Wait and See
   Presented by: Peter Eso, Kellogg School, Northwestern University
 

Communication and Efficiency in Auctions
   Presented by: Nenad Kos, Northwestern
 

Optimal Intermediation Mechanisms
   Presented by: Andras Niedermayer, Northwestern University

Session 13: Game Theory and Experiments

Session Organizer: Emre Ozdenoren, University of Michigan
Session Chair: Bogachan Celen, Columbia University
Session type: invited
Date: June 16, 2008
Time: 13:30 - 15:10
Location: Weill 1110
 

On the Role of Information and Strategic Delay in Coordination Games
   Presented by: Bogachan Celen, Columbia University
 

The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence
   Presented by: Guillaume Frechette, New York University
 

On-Campus Housing: Theory vs. Experiment
   Presented by: Onur Kesten, Carnegie Mellon University

Session 14: Matching I

Session Organizer: Onur Kesten, Carnegie Mellon University
Session Chair: Morimitsu Kurino, University of Pittsburgh
Session type: contributed
Date: June 16, 2008
Time: 15:40 - 16:55
Location: Weill 1230
 

Consistency and Acyclicity in Roommate Markets
JEL codes: C78
   Presented by: Burak Can, Maastricht University
 

Credibility, Efficiency and Stability: A Theory of Dynamic Matching Markets
   Presented by: Morimitsu Kurino, University of Pittsburgh
 

More on Subgame Perfect Implementation of Stable Matchings
   Presented by: Demet Ulker, Vanderbilt University

Session 15: Auction Theory I

Session Organizer: Tilman Borgers, University of Michigan
Session Chair: Angel Hernando-Veciana, Universidad Carlos III
Session type: contributed
Date: June 16, 2008
Time: 15:40 - 16:55
Location: Weill 1110
 

Second Best Efficiency in Auctions
   Presented by: Angel Hernando-Veciana, Universidad Carlos III
 

Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
   Presented by: Mallesh Pai, Kellogg School Of Management

Session 16: Decision Theory

Session Organizer: Yusufcan Masatlioglu, University of Michigan
Session Chair: Daisuke Nakajima, University of Michigan
Session type: contributed
Date: June 16, 2008
Time: 15:40 - 16:55
Location: Weill 1120
 

Unawareness and Strategic Announcements in Games with Uncertainty
JEL codes: C72, D82, D83
   Presented by: Erkut Ozbay, University of Maryland
 

Choice by Constraint Elimination
   Presented by: Daisuke Nakajima, University of Michigan

Session 17: SED Lecture

Session Organizer: Utku Unver, University of Pittsburgh
Session Chair: Utku Unver, University of Pittsburgh
Session type: invited
Date: June 16, 2008
Time: 17:10 - 18:40
Location: Weill 1120
 

Online Advertising Auctions
   Presented by: Susan Athey, Harvard University

Session 18: Public Goods and Design: Theory and Experiments

Session Organizer: Emre Ozdenoren, University of Michigan
Session Chair: Lise Vesterlund, University Pittsburgh
Session type: invited
Date: June 17, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:10
Location: Weill 1120
 

Give More Tomorrow: Two Field Experiments on Intertemporal Choice in Charitable Giving
   Presented by: Anna Breman, Stockholm School of Economics
 

Pork Versus Public Goods: An Experimental Study of Public Good Provision Within a Legislative Bargaining Framework
   Presented by: Guillaume Frechette, New York University
 

Supermodular Nash Implementation of Lindahl Allocations.
   Presented by: Paul Healy, The Ohio State University
 

Provision Point Mechanisms and Over Provision of Public Goods
   Presented by: Lise Vesterlund, University Pittsburgh

Session 19: Bounded Rationality

Session Organizer: Utku Unver, University of Pittsburgh
Session Chair: Andrea Wilson, New York University
Session type: invited
Date: June 17, 2008
Time: 8:30 - 10:10
Location: Weill 1110
 

Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing
   Presented by: Kfir Eliaz, Brown University
 

Revealed Conflicting Preferences
   Presented by: Kareen Rozen, Yale University
 

Revealed Bounded Rationality
   Presented by: Pietro Ortoleva, New York University
 

Optimally Selective Attention
   Presented by: Andrea Wilson, New York University

Session 20: Industrial Organization

Session Organizer: Ali Hortacsu, University of Chicago
Session Chair: Isa Hafalir, Carnegie Mellon University
Session type: contributed
Date: June 17, 2008
Time: 10:40 - 12:20
Location: Weill 1120
 

bundling and competition for slots
JEL codes: D4, K21, L13,
   Presented by: Doh-Shin Jeon, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
 

Entry-Deterrence and Learning under Demand Uncertainty
   Presented by: Neelam Jain, Northern Illinois University
 

When Do Markets Tip? An Experimental Study
   Presented by: Tanjim Hossain, HKUST
 

Nonlinear Pricing with Resale
   Presented by: Isa Hafalir, Carnegie Mellon University

Session 21: Matching II

Session Organizer: Lones Smith, University of Michigan
Session Chair: Gregory Lewis, Harvard University
Session type: contributed
Date: June 17, 2008
Time: 10:40 - 11:55
Location: Weill 1110
 

Matching with Evolving Human Capital
   Presented by: Axel Anderson, Georgetown University
 

Matching markets with signals
   Presented by: Alexey Kushnir, Pennsylvania State University
 

The College Admissions Problem with Uncertainty
   Presented by: Gregory Lewis, Harvard University

Session 22: Information and Incentives II

Session Organizer: Lones Smith, University of Michigan
Session Chair: Robertas Zubrickas, Stockholm School of Economics
Session type: contributed
Date: June 17, 2008
Time: 10:40 - 12:20
Location: Weill 1230
 

Implementation Errors and Information Acquisition in Public Procurement
   Presented by: Daniel Kraehmer, Free University Berlin
 

Information and Voting: the Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses
   Presented by: Joseph McMurray, University of Rochester
 

Optimal Grading
   Presented by: Robertas Zubrickas, Stockholm School of Economics
 

optimal insurance with adverse selection
   Presented by: Hector Chade, arizona state university

Session 23: Unawareness and Contract Design

Session Organizer: Utku Unver, University of Pittsburgh
Session Chair: Kim-Sau Chung, University of Minnesota
Session type: invited
Date: June 17, 2008
Time: 13:30 - 15:10
Location: Weill 1120
 

Object-Based Unawareness II: Applications
   Presented by: Kim-Sau Chung, University of Minnesota
 

Unawareness and Interpretation
   Presented by: Jing Li, University of Pennsylvania
 

Incorporating Unawareness into Contract Theory
   Presented by: Emel Filiz Ozbay, University of Maryland
 

Framing Contingencies in Contracts
   Presented by: Xiaojian Zhao, University of Mannheim

Session 24: Matching Market Design

Session Organizer: Utku Unver, University of Pittsburgh
Session Chair: Onur Kesten, Carnegie Mellon University
Session type: invited
Date: June 17, 2008
Time: 13:30 - 15:10
Location: Weill 1110
 

Expanding Choice in School Choice
   Presented by: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Duke University
 

Comparing mechanisms by their vulnerability to strategic manipulation
   Presented by: Parag Pathak, MIT
 

A Theory of School Choice Lotteries: Why Ties Should Not Be Broken Randomly
   Presented by: Utku Unver, University of Pittsburgh

Session 25: Cooperative Microeconomics and Game Theory

Session Organizer: Federico Echenique, Caltech
Session Chair: Francis Bloch, GREQAM
Session type: contributed
Session JEL code: C71
Date: June 17, 2008
Time: 15:40 - 16:55
Location: Weill 1230
 

An alternative approach to the ordinal Shapley value
   Presented by: Diego Dominguez, Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
 

Characterization of Certainty Equivalent Leximin Ordering
   Presented by: Sinan Ertemel, Rice University
 

Cores of Combined Games
   Presented by: Francis Bloch, GREQAM

Session 26: Information and Incentives III

Session Organizer: Lones Smith, University of Michigan
Session Chair: Luis Araujo, Michigan State University
Session type: contributed
Date: June 17, 2008
Time: 15:40 - 16:55
Location: Weill 1110
 

Efficient tournaments within teams
JEL codes: C7, D7, D8, L2
   Presented by: Paul Schweinzer, University of Bonn
 

"Tell me what you need": Signaling With LImited Resources
   Presented by: Josepa Miquel-Florensa, York University
 

Information, Trade and the Origin of Banks
   Presented by: Luis Araujo, Michigan State University

Session 27: Auction Theory II

Session Organizer: Tilman Borgers, University of Michigan
Session Chair: Giuseppe Lopomo, Duke University
Session type: contributed
Date: June 17, 2008
Time: 15:40 - 16:55
Location: Weill 1120
 

Early, Late and Multiple Bidding in Internet Auctions
JEL codes: D44, L86, D83
   Presented by: Radovan Vadovic, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
 

An Extension of Ausubel's Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods
   Presented by: Hakan Inal, University of Minnesota
 

The Economics of Contingent Re-Auctions
   Presented by: Giuseppe Lopomo, Duke University

Session 28: Murat Sertel Lecture

Session Organizer: Emre Ozdenoren, University of Michigan
Session Chair: Emre Ozdenoren, University of Michigan
Session type: invited
Date: June 17, 2008
Time: 17:10 - 18:40
Location: Weill 1120
 

A Theory of Measurable Ambiguity
   Presented by: Faruk Gul, Princeton University

This program was last updated on 2008-06-14 22:38:21 EDT