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Implicit Intraday Interest Rate in the UK Unsecured Overnight Loan Market

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Abstract

This paper estimates the intraday value of money implicit in the UK unsecured overnight money market. Using transactions data on overnight loans advanced through the UK payments system CHAPS, we find a positive and economically significant intraday interest rate in the 2006-2009 period. Importantly, the intraday value of money increases more than tenfold during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The key interpretation is that an increase in implicit intraday interest rate reflects the increased opportunity cost of pledging collateral intraday. We obtain qualitatively similar estimates of the intraday interest rate by using quoted intraday bid and offer rates and show that our results are not driven by the intraday variation in the bid-ask spread.

Key words: interbank money market, intraday interest rate, opportunity cost of collateral intraday

JEL classification: E42, E58, G21

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Summary

There is a very active unsecured overnight money market. Participants of this market borrow and lend funds overnight – funds are obtained on the same day and repaid back on the next. The question of this study is to understand if and how banks differentiate between overnight loan advances and repayments that happen at different times of the day. The key hypothesis is that overnight loans advanced earlier or repaid later have a premium as they provide funding intraday. There are no tradable contracts that would allow interbank market participants to obtain funds for several hours during the day. Thus if there is an intraday demand for funds, it should be reflected in the pricing of the overnight lending contracts.

The key participants of the overnight money market - settlement banks - can and usually do obtain intraday liquidity from the Bank of England. They can do that by pledging collateral with the central bank intraday. Thus the intraday interest implicit in the overnight loan contracts should be an informative measure of the opportunity cost of pledging collateral with the central bank intraday.

There is yet another intraday funding option available to settlement banks. They can delay customer payments intraday in expectation that banks sending payments to them will provide intraday liquidity needed to settle outgoing payments. If for some reason all banks prefer this option (ie because obtaining intraday liquidity is very costly) it may create an undesirable situation where majority of payments are delayed and settled only at the end of the day. Apart from an explicit delay cost faced by the customers, such an outcome is undesirable due to unacceptable risk that delayed payments will not settle e.g. as a result of an operational outage. In that regard, implicit intraday interest rate may be used as a indicator of tension in the settlement system.

Using the overnight lending data implied from the UK large value payment system CHAPS we estimate the implicit intraday interest rate in the UK unsecured overnight money market for the period from 2003 to 2009. The intraday interest implicit in the overnight lending contracts is estimated to be quite small during tranquil times, but is found to increase almost tenfold during the recent financial crisis. We find that an average loan of £65 million advanced one hour earlier

in the day carries an interest premium of £2,778 in the crisis period.[1] We obtain qualitatively similar estimates of the intraday interest rate by using quoted intraday bid and offer rates and show that our results are not driven by the intraday variation in the bid-ask spread.

Interestingly we also find that implied overnight loan rates are higher at the very end of the day in the period of no reserve averaging. But this effect almost disappeared when the reserve averaging was introduced in 2006. Our interpretation is that end of the day settlement balance concern was much more important during the period of no reserve averaging as banks managed their end of the day liquidity on a daily basis. With reserve averaging, the importance of an individual end of the day balance diminished significantly, as reflected by lower overnight loan rates at the very end of the day.

We also show that the intraday interest rate increased significantly during the crisis, while at the same time settlement activity shifted towards the end of the day (as shown by Benos, Garratt and Zimmerman (2010)). One interpretation could be that while the economic activity of the agents could have shifted towards the one requiring settlement in the morning, intraday liquidity cost considerations of the settlement banks acting on behalf of the agents moved in the opposite direction.

[1] Which is about 1.6 percentage points.

1 Introduction

Almost all central banks differentiate between overnight and intraday liquidity in their monetary frameworks either explicitly, in terms of the interest rates charged, or implicitly, via different eligibility criteria for acceptable collateral. But while the overnight market is the most liquid interbank market, there is no explicit private *intraday* money market in which counterparties contract on the delivery of funds at a specific time of the day. This is puzzling since various empirical and theoretical studies show that the participants of the payment systems have incentives to delay the settlement of noncontractual payment obligations (see Bech and Garratt (2003) or Manning, Nier and Schanz (2009) for extensive coverage of the literature). For instance, by delaying customer payments settlement banks can expect to use funds received intraday to fund outgoing payments later in the day. Such an argument also applies for contractual payment flows, like overnight loan advances and repayments. But while payment timing cannot be stipulated for noncontractual settlements, agreeing a precise timing for an advance and repayment of an overnight funding agreement seems to be feasible. Thus it may be expected that early (in terms of the time of the day) overnight advances and late repayments would come at a premium compared to overnight loans that are advanced later in the day or agreed to be repaid early next day. Such intraday price dynamics of the overnight loans, if observed, would be an indication that there is an intraday time value of money.

In this paper we test the hypothesis of a positive intraday interest rate implicit in the UK overnight money market. Our hypothesis is that although there is no explicit intraday money market, pricing of overnight loans of different lengths is consistent with the existence of an implicit intraday money market. We believe that overnight loans provide dual service to the participants of the money market. First, overnight loans allow banks to smooth day-to-day imbalances and achieve targeted end of the day settlement balance positions. Second, managing the timing of overnight loan advances and repayments allows banks to smooth intraday imbalances of payment flows. As we show these two components have different effects on the pricing of the overnight loans.

A pure intraday component of an overnight loan can be explained by the following stylised example. A bank borrowing or lending early in the day may enter in an offsetting position later in the day with the same counterparty. This way a bank can effectively obtain liquidity for an arbitrary period of time intraday with no exposure that extends into the next day. For example, bank A may borrow from bank B at 9am, but lends to bank B at 4pm on the same day, thereby generating intraday liquidity between 9am and 4pm. Similarly a bank that expects to have a net outflow of funds during the day may be willing to borrow overnight early, instead of late in the day, as the funds obtained can be used to settle outgoing payments. Thus one manifestation of a positive intraday interest rate would be decreasing overnight interest rates over the course of the trading day.

But achieving the desired end of the day balance position is the primary reason for why banks enter into overnight lending contracts. If the cost of deviations from such a perceived target are asymmetric so that it is costlier to be below the target than above then obtaining overnight funding at the end of the day may come at a premium. A similar argument, just at the daily frequency, is made by Quiros and Mendizabal (2006) in terms of explaining why overnight interest rates are expected to be higher towards the end of the reserves holding period. See also Prati, Bartolini and Bertola (2001) for empirical evidence.

Intraday liquidity can also be obtained from the central bank. The Bank of England provides interest free collateralised intraday overdrafts to settlement banks (direct participants of CHAPS). The implicit cost of pledging collateral with the Bank of England therefore should provide the upper bound for the observed intraday liquidity cost. Since the opportunity cost of pledging collateral is not observed, the difference between interest rates charged for overnight loans at different points during the day may serve as a measure of the opportunity cost of collateral used to obtain intraday liquidity from the Bank of England.

Using overnight loan transactions data from the UK large-value payment system CHAPS, we investigate whether there is a positive intra-day interest rate implicit in the UK overnight money market by estimating the average premium (defined as the interest rate less Bank Rate) charged in the overnight money market as a function of the time of the day when the loan is advanced. We split the sample period into three sub-samples reflecting the changes in the Sterling Monetary Framework (ie introduction of reserves averaging and voluntary reserves targets) and the global financial crisis of 2007.

The first sample period runs from January 2003 until April 2006. The second starts in May 2006 with the introduction of reserves averaging and ends in June 2007 before the onset of the financial crisis. The last sub-sample then runs from July 2007, when the first signs of financial distress became apparent, until February 2009, just before the Bank of England introduced[2] the Asset Purchase Facility commonly known as "quantitative easing".[3]

In the empirical model, we include a variety of control variables. We allow for a bank-specific component capturing the differences in premia due to credit risk; day-of-the-week effects; loan size and loan repayment time. We also include a variable that captures the distance of actual average reserves from the target. The hypothesis is that a borrower facing an increased pressure to meet their reserves target may be willing to accept less favourable terms than a borrower facing no such concerns. Finally, we include a measure of aggregate reserves available in the settlement system to control for the effects of intraday supply of reserves.

Our empirical results lead us to conclude that the pricing of overnight loans in the UK money market is consistent with the existence of an implicit intraday money market. While the implicit hourly intraday interest rate is quite small in the pre-crisis period (0.09bps) it increases more than tenfold during the financial crisis (1.56bps). For an average loan of £65 million, advancing the loan one hour earlier in the day increases the interest payment by an estimated £2,778 in the crisis period. We also document an increase in the implied loan rate during the last hour of trading. As expected, the end of the day effect is most pronounced during the period without reserves averaging as the settlement banks had to meet the 'target' of a nonnegative overnight settlement balance each day.

As a robustness check, we repeat the estimation using brokers' quote data. The availability of both bid and offer rates allows us to test an alternative explanation for the intraday interest rate pattern – differences in market liquidity during the day, as measured by the bid-ask spread. Our results indicate that this is not the case, and even when controlling for the bid-ask spread we obtain results qualitatively similar to those obtained from the CHAPS transactions data.

The main policy implication of our work is that opportunity cost of collateral pledged to obtain

[2] In March 2009.

[3] During the last period analysed the key features of the Sterling Monetary Framework were changed several times in response to financial crisis. For the purposes of this study we do not explicitly account for each individual policy change but focus on the treatment of bank reserves.

intraday liquidity from the Bank of England may become significant during market distress. This provides wrong incentives for banks to delay payments, as the intraday value of liquidity rises substantially. Through this channel the financial system under stress may become subject to further market distress. Recent work by Benos *et al* (2010) shows that even with throughput guidelines CHAPS banks started delaying payments after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Therefore, the implicit intraday interest rate can be used as an indicator of emerging intraday liqudity risk in payment systems.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We overview relevant literature in the next section. We describe the institutional features of the UK overnight money market in Section 3. Empirical methodology is described in Section 5 while we describe the data used in Section 4. We discuss the empirical results in Section 6 while Section 7 concludes.

2 Literature

The theoretical literature on the intraday money markets is scarce. On one hand, Martin and McAndrews (2010) argue that, based on the efficiency arguments, there should not be any private intraday money markets. To achieve a socially efficient outcome the central bank should provide free intraday liquidity, which would therefore preclude any private intraday money market.

On the other hand Gu, Guzman and Haslag (2011) show that there are conditions under which it is socially optimal to have a positive intraday interest rate and thus an active intraday (resale) market. If late-in-the-day production technology is more productive, but some agents have an intrinsic reason to consume early in the day, efficient allocation may be implementable if intraday interest rate is positive. Positive capital gains on holding private debt during the day (positive intraday interest rate) are necessary to induce debtors to produce in the morning. But if the intraday interest rate is zero, it leads to debtors choosing to produce according to a more productive late in the day technology and thus debts are settled at the end of the day.

When providing free intraday liquidity to market participants the central bank faces a trade-off between enhancing the efficiency of the system and dealing with the moral hazard associated with such a policy. A socially efficient outcome is achieved when the private opportunity cost of borrowing funds intraday is equal to the social opportunity cost of providing these funds. Apart from the possible credit loss the central bank faces almost no cost to supplying intraday liquidity. Thus expansion of the central bank balance sheet intraday is costless (apart from the operational costs of running the intraday facility).

Private agents, on the other hand, experience a positive opportunity cost in providing intraday liquidity. For example, some of their claims need to be settled with finality at a specific time of the day. But finality of settlement is generally achieved by settling in central bank liabilities. Therefore when lending funds intraday private agents take into consideration the possibility of finding themselves in shortage of the ultimate settlement asset later in the day. This is why central bank provided intraday liquidity is essential to achieve efficiency, as private markets for intraday liquidity cannot achieve a socially optimal outcome. See Bhattacharya, Haslag and Martin (2009) for a theoretical model.

As shown in Martin (2004) the key concern is that free unrestricted intraday liquidity may lead to large credit losses for the central bank. More importantly, banks could fund the purchase of risky assets by accessing free intraday facility at the central bank - the usual risk shifting argument. Therefore a fee or some other measure that limits access to intraday liquidity is needed to reduce the extent of such moral hazard, while collateralisation is desired in order to mitigate the credit risk. It is not clear, however, how exactly the mechanics of asset transformation at this ultra short maturity can take place. Indeed, it has been argued by Bhattacharya, Haslag and Martin (2008) that intraday funds are not substitutable with productive assets due to the extra short funding horizon and the fact that this funding cannot be rolled over.

Martin and McAndrews (2010) show that if moral hazard is of concern, then collateralisation of the intraday liquidity facility does address the moral hazard issue and has the potential to achieve a socially efficient outcome. The key parameter turns out to be the private opportunity cost of collateral. On one hand, if the collateral pledged with the central bank has a zero opportunity cost this policy leads to the first best outcome. Such an intraday liquidity policy neither provides incentives to engage in excessive risk taking nor does it provide incentives for a strategic default. On the other hand, if collateral is costly, the amount of central bank-eligible assets that banks choose to hold may be insufficient to meet their peak intraday liquidity needs. Thus collateralisation of intraday overdrafts is distortionary, as it effectively becomes a binding credit constraint. A good overview of various issues arising in payment and settlement systems is provided in Manning *et al* (2009).

This paper provides empirical evidence that pricing of overnight money market contracts in the UK interbank market is consistent with the existence of an implicit market for intraday liquidity. While early empirical work by Angelini (2000) finds no evidence of a positive price of intraday liquidity, several more recent contributions point invariably to the existence of a positive intraday interest rate implied by overnight loans rates. Furfine (2001) estimates the hourly intraday interest rate at 0.9bps using data on overnight loans settled in the U.S. Fedwire system in the first quarter of 1998. Bartolini, Gudell, Hilton and Schwarz (2005) find a similar pattern in the difference between the overnight unsecured federal funds rate and the target rate for the period between February 2002 and September 2004. Baglioni and Monticini (2008) focus on the Italian e-MID interbank market 2003-2004 and show that the intraday interest rate is positive but economically small. Baglioni and Monticini (2010) repeat the same analysis with a more recent sample period including the financial crisis and document a ten-fold jump in the intraday interest rate during the crisis relative to the pre-crisis period. Finally, Kraenzlin and Nellen (2010) study the Swiss secured overnight loan market 1999-2008 and estimate the hourly intraday interest rate at 0.43bps.

The key methodological difference of this paper compared to the previously mentioned empirical studies is the treatment of the repayment time of the overnight loans. Previous studies use overnight lending data from trading platforms which ensure automatic repayment of the loans at a predetermined time the next morning (ie 7:50am in Swiss franc repo market). In this paper we allow for the repayment time to be endogenously determined. That is a counterparty borrowing funds overnight in an environment of a high (low) intraday interest rate may be willing to repay the overnight loan later (earlier) the next day.

3 The UK overnight money market

In this section we describe the UK money market and the details of CHAPS, the UK large value payment system. Before we proceed it is important to clarify some of the terminology that is frequently used interchangeably in the literature, in particular liquidity and reserves. Each settlement bank holds a reserves account with the central bank. The reserves account balances at the end of the day are generally referred to as 'central bank reserves'. The amount of funds available to the settlement bank to settle payments intraday is usually referred to as ‘intraday liquidity’ which effectively is a lower bound (it may be negative) on the reserves account.

An important determinant of the overnight money market activity is the requirement for banks to hold minimum balances at the central bank, the so called reserve requirement.[4] With the money market reform of the 2006 the Bank of England introduced reserves averaging where each participant is free to set a self-imposed reserves target. Average reserves holdings within a symmetric narrow range are remunerated at the policy rate. Another unique element of the UK money market arrangement over the period analysed is time varying standing facility rates[5], which set a narrower band for market interest rates at the end of the reserves holding period. In response to the financial crisis the average reserves range has been widened and the reserve averaging framework has been subsequently suspended, effectively with all reserves being remunerated. At the same time the standing facility rates, formerly +/-100bp channel around the policy rate (and +/-25bp on the last day of the reserves holding period) were narrowed to +/-25bp at all times. For the purposes of our study, we interpret these policy changes as having the effect of easing the concerns banks may have had to hit a specific target of reserves balances on each day. The current Sterling Monetary Framework is laid out in Bank of England (2010) publication also know as the Red Book.

As mentioned above, settlement banks can obtain collateralised intraday overdrafts from the Bank of England in addition to the reserves carried over from the previous day. Usually banks manage their overnight reserves balance by borrowing or lending funds overnight in the interbank money market.[6] The market for overnight reserves is largely an OTC market (due to counterparty risk) where counterparties to each transaction negotiate the terms bilaterally. Funds are delivered and repaid via CHAPS thus effectively increasing or decreasing each counterparty’s reserves balances. While it is clear that the repayment of funds should happen the next day, usually there is no legally binding condition as to when the funds should be repaid. There appears to be a market convention that funds should be returned before noon the next day, but our data show this is not necessarily the case. Therefore in our empirical analysis we allow for endogenous repayment time.

[4]See Bank of England (2008a) for a detailed discussion. See also Clews, Salmon and Weeken (2010) for the latest developments.

[5]Uniform standing facility rates of +/- 25bp have been introduced in October 2008.

[6]Banks can also access a deposit and an operational lending facility which are intended to prevent market interest rates from deviating significantly from the Bank of England policy rate.

CHAPS, a real time gross settlement system, plays an important role in determining intraday liquidity demand of the settlement banks that are direct members of this system. Before the opening of a settlement day at 6am banks preposition eligible securities with the Bank of England, against which intraday liquidity is provided. Alternatively, settlement banks can carry over larger reserves balances or borrow funds on the interbank market if such a need arises during the day. Yet another alternative to obtain intraday liquidity is to delay outgoing payments in anticipation of incoming payments.

Payment delay is an important issue in the real time gross settlement systems and has been analysed extensively in the literature (see Bech and Garratt (2003) for theoretical arguments and Ball, Denbee, Manning and Wetherilt (2011) for a detailed discussion). To address this concern CHAPS settlement banks are required to submit on average 50% of payments by value by noon and 75% of payments by 2:30pm. Historical throughput averages are very close to these threshold values again indicating that banks are tightly managing their intraday liquidity.

There are several factors that determine the demand for reserves for each settlement bank. One of them is the agreed reserves targets.[7] Although banks try to hit a self imposed target on average, settlement account deviations from the target level on each day can accrue and put some pressure on the bank over the remainder of the maintenance period. Since net payment flows over the day are not known until just before the payment system closing time, banks usually trade in anticipation of any settlement account shocks. To alleviate the last minute rush to square the accounts, settlement banks in CHAPS have a 20 minute period at the end of the day during which only payments initiated by the settlement banks can be settled (as opposed to payments sent on behalf of the clients). In our data we see that only a small proportion of the overnight loans are settled during this period. This may be an indication that end of the day settlement account balance concern is not the key concern driving overnight borrowing and lending activity.

4 Data

We employ data on payments in the UK's large-value payment system CHAPS for the period running from January 2003 until February 2009. CHAPS is a real time gross settlement system for settling interbank payments. Only a small number of banks (12 or 13 during our sample

[7] We exclude the period during which excess reserves are remunerated from our analysis.

period) are direct members of CHAPS. Other UK banks have access to the system indirectly through business relationships with direct member institutions.

We extract the overnight loan transactions using a version of the algorithm developed by Furfine (1999) from the raw payments data. The algorithm matches payments on two consecutive days that can be deemed overnight loan advances and repayments. In particular, it searches for all payments in fairly round numbers for which there are payments in the other direction on the following day such that the implied interest rate falls within some reasonable interval around the Bank rate. A detailed description of the algorithm is provided by Wetherilt, Zimmerman and Soramäki (2010), who point out that the robustness checks carried out by Millard and Polenghi (2004) indicate that the data reflect the activity in the unsecured overnight money markets fairly well.

There are two potential caveats associated with this dataset. First, we are not able to distinguish between the direct CHAPS member banks and their clients. Consequently, we cannot control for the credit risk associated with each and every borrower, but only for the average credit risk of the settlement bank and its customers. Second, loan payments between two customers of the same settlement bank, or payments between a settlement bank and its clients, are not included in our data since these payments are settled across the books of the settlement bank and not in CHAPS.

Since the last 20 minutes of the CHAPS settlement day are reserved for interbank payments only, we exclude from our dataset the loans advanced between 4:00pm and 4:20pm. This amounts to discarding 3.9%, 2.1% and 1.7% of all transactions in Periods 1,2, and 3, respectively. Table A reports some summary statistics for the overnight loans data separately for the three sub-sample periods. The average daily volume of loans advanced through CHAPS grows steadily over time, from £19.5b (2003-2006) to about £30b (07/2007-02/2009). This is due to an increase in both the average daily number of loans advanced (from 400 to 434) as well as the average loan amount (from £49.2m to £64.7m).

Figure 1 shows the distribution of loan time, repayment time and loan duration. The distributions are remarkably stable over time. We observe that the majority of loans are advanced in the afternoon with a peak just shortly before the CHAPS system closes. Repayment usually takes place before noon (about 75%) implying that the average loan duration is less than 24 hours.

Interestingly, the distribution of loan duration exhibits two modes, with one at around 19hrs and the other one at 24hrs. Figure 1 also shows in the bottom panel the implied rate charged on the overnight loans together with the Bank rate. As expected, the average loan rate tracks the Bank rate very closely, though the loan rate itself fluctuates considerably around it. The variability of the implied overnight rate is lower once reserves averaging is introduced but increases somewhat in the crisis period.

In addition to the CHAPS payments data, we use data on intraday reserves account balances held by settlement banks at the Bank of England. The data is available at a 10-minute frequency. For each 10-minute period, we calculate the aggregate amount of reserves in the system by summing up the reserves account balances of the settlement banks.[8] We then match the regularly spaced reserves data with the irregularly spaced loans data by taking the most recent value of aggregate reserves for each loan. The reason why we do not use *contemporaneous* reserves as a control variable is because contemporaneous reserves are potentially endogenous due to market operations to keep market rates closer to the policy rate.

For the two sub-sample periods characterised by reserves averaging, we also construct a bank-specific variable capturing the distance of the current average reserves from the target the bank set for the maintenance period. In the first sub-sample period with no reserves remuneration we assume that banks try to end the day with a nonnegative reserves balance. Thus we set the target for this period to be zero. Confidentiality issues prevent us from reporting summary statistics for these variables.

5 Methodology

Let $r_{t,\tau}$ denote the rate of return on an overnight loan advanced at time τ on day t and let d denote the duration of the loan in hours. Now assume that during the day, the per-hour interest rate differs from the interest rate charged overnight and denote these by i_D and $i_{O/N}$, respectively. Further denote by $d^{(1)}$ the time elapsed between the advance of the loan and the market closing time, i.e. between τ and 4:00pm; by $d_{O/N}$ the overnight period in hours (4:00pm - 6:00am) and by $d^{(2)}$ the time elapsed between 6:00am on day $t+1$ and the actual repayment time of the loan. Thus $d = d^{(1)} + d_{O/N} + d^{(2)}$. At time τ, both $d^{(1)}$ and $d_{O/N}$ are known but $d^{(2)}$ is not. The random

[8] Note that this does not reflect all reserves available to the banks as not all reserves banks are settlement banks.

nature of the repayment time makes our analysis distinct from Baglioni and Monticini (2008) and Kraenzlin and Nellen (2010) who study overnight money markets with fixed and known maturity.

Assuming continuous compounding and same intraday interest rate on the day of loan advance and repayment, the rate of return on the overnight loan can be written as

$$r_{t,\tau} = i_D d^{(1)} + i_{O/N} d_{O/N} + i_D d^{(2)}. \quad \textbf{(1)}$$

If intraday liquidity has no value, $i_D = 0$, and the rate of return on an overnight loan only depends on the interest rate charged for the overnight period, $i_{O/N}$. In other words, it does not matter when the loan is advanced and when it is repayed, the rate of return will not be affected. On the contrary, when intraday liquidity is priced, $i_D > 0$, every additional hour of the duration of the loan increases the rate of return by i_D.

To test if there is a positive intra-day interest rate, we propose the following empirical model:

$$\text{Model 1:} \qquad r_{t,\tau} - br_t = c + \sum_{k=1}^{9} \alpha_k D_k^{\tau} + \delta d^{(2)} + \sum_{l=1}^{n_s-1} \gamma_l D_l^b + \beta' \mathbf{x}_{t,\tau} + \varepsilon_{t,\tau} \quad \textbf{(2)}$$

where

$r_{t,\tau}$	rate of return on loan advanced at time τ on day t,
br_t	the Bank rate prevailing on day t,
D_k^{τ}	dummy variable for time of day τ, $k = 1,2,...,9$
D_l^b	dummy variable for borrower l, $l = 1,2,....,n_s$
$d^{(2)}$	duration in hours between 6:00am and loan repayment time
$\mathbf{x}_{t,\tau}$	vector of control variables

and n_s is the number of settlement banks. The key parameters of interest are the coefficients on the dummy variables for the time of day when the loan is advanced. We split the day into 10 hourly intervals, starting with 6:00am - 7:00am and ending with 3:00pm - 4:00pm. The dummy variable for 11:00 - 12:00 is omitted for identification reasons. If the intra-day interest rate is zero, so are all the α_k's for it is irrelevant at what time of the day a loan is advanced; only the overnight period is rewarded by a non-zero interest rate. If, on the other hand, the intra-day interest rate is positive, the α_k's show a decreasing pattern in k as the intra-day time value of money implies higher rate of return on loans advanced earlier during the day.

To capture the intraday interest rate charged for the duration on the repayment day, $d^{(2)}$, we simply add $d^{(2)}$ into the regression model. We avoid using dummies for repayment time for the following reason. The repayment time of the loan is not known at the time when the loan is advanced and there is no legally binding obligation of the debtor to repay the loan before any given point in time. The duration of the loan, $d^{(2)}$, may thus be endogenous. The debtor, in response to being charged an above average rate on the loan, may choose to delay repayment. This hypothesis can be tested by finding a suitable instrument for $d^{(2)}$ and comparing the OLS estimates of our regression model with those obtained by running instrumental variable estimation. Needless to say, instrumenting for the dummy variables associated with the repayment time would be difficult.

We instrument for the duration of the loan on the repayment day, $d^{(2)}$, using the average repayment duration of a given borrower over the past 5 business days. By construction, this variable is pre-determined and hence uncorrelated with the regression innovations, and it passes the Steiger and Stock (1997) test for weak instruments, i.e. it possess significant predictive power for the actual repayment duration $d^{(2)}$. Intuitively, a borrower may form opinions on when to expect a repayment of the overnight loan, based on the past behavior of the borrower, while such behavior cannot be affected by intraday interest rate prevailing at some future date.

In addition to the time-of-day dummies and loan repayment time, we include a number of control variables into the model in order not to confound the intra-day interest rate pattern with some bank-specific or market-wide characteristics. The motivation for our specification is as follows.

Dummy variables for borrower We use bank-specific dummy variables to proxy for average credit risk of the settlement bank and its clients. Furfine (2001) shows that banks with different credit risk profiles are indeed paying different interest rates on overnight loans in the U.S.

Day-of-week dummy variables We employ day-of-week dummies to control for various calendar effects.

Loan size Large-value loans may be presumably more costly to obtain.

Aggregate reserves By the simple supply-demand argument, we expect the level of aggregate reserves across all settlement banks to co-vary negatively with the level of short-term interest rate. Note that not all banks holding reserve accounts with the central bank are members of the payment system.

Distance from reserves target Separately for lender and borrower, we calculate the difference between the average reserves to date and the target reserves. The idea is that a bank facing pressure to meet it reserves target at the end of the maintenance period will be prepared to accept less favorable terms than a bank facing no such concerns.

The model in equation ((**2**)) is flexible in that the intraday interest rate is not assumed to be constant throughout the day. Under the simplifying assumption that the intraday hourly interest rate is indeed constant and equal to α, the model can be written as

$$\text{Model 2:} \qquad r_{t,\tau} - br_t = c + \alpha d^{(1)} + \delta d^{(2)} + \sum_{l=1}^{n_s-1} \gamma_l D_l^b + \beta' \mathbf{x}_{t,\tau} + \varepsilon_{t,\tau}, \qquad \textbf{(3)}$$

since the α_k's in Model 1 decline linearly with k, and the slope $\alpha_{k+1} - \alpha_k$ is equal to the negative of the hourly intraday interest rate α.

If we further assume that the intraday value of funds on the day of loan advance is the same as on the day of loan repayment (i.e. $\alpha = \delta$), the model simplifies to:

$$\text{Model 3:} \qquad r_{t,\tau} - br_t = c + \alpha(d^{(1)} + d^{(2)}) + \sum_{l=1}^{n_s-1} \gamma_l D_l^b + \beta' \mathbf{x}_{t,\tau} + \varepsilon_{t,\tau}, \qquad \textbf{(4)}$$

Since $d^{(2)}$ is uncertain at the time a loan is advanced, it may well be that the interest rate charged for this part of the loan duration is higher. It remains an empirical question whether or not this is the case.

6 Empirical Results

Table B and Figure 2 summarize the estimation results separately for the three sub-sample periods described above. To ease interpretation, we express the left-hand side variable (overnight loan premium) in basis points. All models are estimated by two-stage least squares as the Hausman test (not reported) rejects exogeneity of the repayment time. That is, we find that repayment time is endogenous to the interest rate charged on the loan.

Common to all three sets of results is a clear downward sloping trend in the average premium on overnight loans persisting up to about 2pm, see Figure 2. This is consistent with a positive intraday interest rate during this part of the day and an indirect manifestation of an implicit intraday money market. The difference between the premium charged in the morning and afternoon varies considerably across the three sub-sample periods. In the first period (January 2003 - April 2006) it is about 3bps between 6am and 2pm, implying a relatively small hourly intraday interest rate of 0.4bps.[9] The value of the intraday rate decreases further after April 2006 to about 0.1bps per hour. Similar to Baglioni and Monticini (2010), however, we find a sizable increase during the crisis period. The hourly intraday interest rate jumps to about 1.7bps as loans advanced between 6 and 7am command a premium 17bps higher than loans taken between 3-4pm as the last panel of Figure 2 illustrates.

In the period preceding the introduction of reserves averaging (January 2003 - April 2006) we find a significant increase in the average premium charged for overnight loans advanced towards the end of the trading day (3-4pm). Recall that during this period settlement banks were not remunerated for positive settlement balances, thus effectively having a zero settlement balance target for each end of the day.[10] The increase in the premium at the end of the day may thus be explained by an increased demand pressure caused by banks aiming to meet their end-of-day positive balance requirement. During the reserves averaging regime, such concerns are only relevant towards the end of the maintenance period and hence the increase of the premium towards the end of the day is much smaller and economically insignificant.

Contributing to the uptick in the premium after 3pm is also the European payment systems closing at that time. Many of the settlement banks manage sterling and euro liquidity from the same offices, and manage them on a global basis (i.e. not separately by currency). Once continental Europe closes, banks can no longer access the European money market in order to boost their end-of-day reserves balances, and the demand for reserves concentrates in the UK money market.

The clear U-shaped intraday loan rate pattern documented for the first sub-sample period rules out the linear specification (Model 2) where the intraday interest rate is assumed to be constant.

[9]This calculation is made by assuming a linear intraday pattern between 6am and 2pm.

[10]Bank of England (2005) pages 211-20 describe the Sterling Monetary Framework in more detail.

In periods 2 and 3, on the other hand, it may serve as a reasonable first-order approximation as Figure 2 illustrates. The estimated intraday interest rate increases from 0.09bps in period 2 to 1.56bps during the crisis.

The repayment time comes out highly significant and positive in the first and third sample periods. Based on the estimates of Model 1, each additional hour of loan duration carries a premium of 2bps and 5.2bps in period 1 and 3, respectively. These values are higher than the respective estimates of the intraday interest rates and the difference is statistically significant; the restriction that they are equal implied by Model 3 is soundly rejected at conventional significance levels. This result indicates that lenders value intraday liquidity more on the repayment day, which likely reflects the higher uncertainty regarding the timing and value of non-contractual payments on day $t+1$ as opposed to day t.

Turning to the effect of the various control variables, we find that large-value loans are more costly to obtain between January 2003 and June 2007, while the opposite holds during the crisis. We believe that in the crisis period loan size correlates with the creditworthiness of the counterparty. As this was a period of significant credit rationing and almost complete market collapse,[11] larger loans are advanced to the counterparties with a higher credit standing thus explaining the observed negative relationship to the premium charged. We include settlement bank dummies to control for bank specific effects, but it is an imperfect measure of the credit risk component, partly because we can only identify the settlement bank group. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients nonetheless indicates that the effect of loan value is economically quite small.

Aggregate reserves covary negatively with the premium in all three sample periods. For example, during the crisis, an increase in aggregate reserves of £1 billion reduces the premium by 1.2bps. The effect of settlement bank-specific distance from reserves target seems to be economically quite small, except for the crisis period, when the borrowing settlement bank is prepared to accept a increase in the premium of 2bps if its average reserves are short £1 billion of the target.

Finally, most of the counterparty dummy variables, not reported here for confidentiality reasons, are found to be highly statistically significant and the estimated counterparty effects do vary

[11] see Bank of England (2008b).

across settlement banks.

6.1 Robustness check with brokers' quote data

One of the potential limitations of our dataset is that it only includes overnight loans settled through CHAPS. Moreover, only data on actual transactions is available, with no information about the bid and ask prices prevailing in the market at the time the loan is agreed. Figure 1 shows that the market is fairly inactive in the morning relative to the afternoon, which may suggest that the increased premium in the morning is a symptom of market illiquidity rather than a genuine intraday interest rate.

To address this question, we repeat the same exercise with data on overnight loan quotes posted by brokers and observed by the Bank of England in the Sterling overnight money market. The data has been collected by the Bank of England and is only available to us for the period between May 2006 and February 2009. The first sub-sample period is therefore omitted from this analysis. We define the premium as the difference between the quoted mid-point, i.e. the simple average of the bid and ask rates, and the Bank rate. We then regress the premium on the time-of-day dummy variables (Model 1') or on the duration to the market close $d^{(1)}$ at the time at which the quote was posted (Model 2'), controlling for the level of aggregate reserves and the bid-ask spread:

$$\text{Model 1'}: \quad r^m_{t,\tau} - br_t = c + \sum_{k=1}^{8} \alpha_k D^{\tau}_k + \beta' \mathbf{x}_{t,\tau} + \varepsilon_{t,\tau}, \qquad \textbf{(5)}$$

$$\text{Model 2'}: \quad r^m_{t,\tau} - br_t = c + \alpha d^{(1)} + \beta' \mathbf{x}_{t,\tau} + \varepsilon_{t,\tau}, \qquad \textbf{(6)}$$

where $r^m_{t,\tau}$ is the quoted middle rate at time τ on day t. The bid-ask spread can be viewed as a proxy for market liquidity and allows us to test liquidity hypothesis discussed in the previous paragraph. With the exception of aggregate reserves, the other control variables employed before cannot be used here since they are loan-specific, and this has to be taken into consideration when comparing the two sets of results.

The estimation results are reported in Table D. The intraday term structure implied by the quoted loan rates is qualitatively similar to the one obtained from the CHAPS loan data, especially during the crisis period. The intraday interest rate in Period 2 at 0.43bps (Model 2') is higher than the rate estimated from the transactions data (0.09bps). The intraday pattern, however, appears to be highly nonlinear (see Model 1') and hence the validity of the linear specification is rather questionable. For the crisis period we obtain very similar estimates across the two datasets ($\approx$ 1.5bps). Including the bid-ask spread into the regression does not significantly alter the results. The effect of the bid-ask spread is positive in Period 2 and negative and economically small in the crisis period. Aggregate reserves tend to covary negatively with the premium as before.

6.2 Intraday interest rate and the cost of collateral

Having established the presence of a positive intraday interest rate in the UK overnight money market, we now investigate whether it is related to the cost of collateral required to obtain intraday liquidity from the Bank of England. The opportunity cost of pledging collateral *intraday* is not very obvious. James and Willison (2004) suggest that the opportunity cost of posting collateral is equal to the difference between the LIBOR and the REPO rates. Their argument goes as follows.

Suppose a bank has available eligible collateral on its books. It can use it to borrow money in the secured overnight money market at the REPO rate and use the proceeds to lend in the unsecured market at the LIBOR rate. The difference between the two rates represents a risk premium that the bank can potentially earn by employing the available collateral in this way. Conversely, if a bank lacks eligible collateral, it can borrow at the LIBOR rate and reverse-repo in eligible securities, which can then be pledged with the Bank of England in order to access intraday liquidity. The cost of such reverse repo operation is again equal to the difference between the LIBOR and REPO rates.

Note that banks can obtain intraday liquidity by posting collateral intraday or by borrowing funds earlier and repaying later. Thus absent any frictions between these two alternatives intraday cost component of an overnight loan should correlate with the opportunity cost of collateral intraday.

To obtain a proxy for the intraday interest rate on a daily basis, we now estimate model ((**3**)) separately for each day in the sample. This gives us a time series of intraday interest rate estimates, $\widehat{\alpha}_t, t = 1, ..., T$. We then correlate the estimated intraday rate with the difference between the LIBOR and REPO rates. We find that in the first two sub-sample periods, the correlation is negative and insignificant (-2.5% and -12.1%, respectively). However, the correlation becomes positive (19%) and statistically significant during the crisis. Furthermore, when we calculate the correlation conditional on both variables being above their respective median values, it increases to 30% as opposed to -0.01% that we obtain for the correlation conditional on both variables being below their respective medians. Thus, the dependence between the intraday interest rate and the cost of collateral is highly asymmetric and becomes more important in periods characterised by financial distress.

Evidence of increasing intraday interest rate during market stress has important policy implications. Recall that the implicit intraday interest rate is a lower bound for the opportunity cost of collateral pledged with the central bank intraday. Thus it is a signal that the intraday opportunity cost of collateral is higher. In response banks may pledge lower amount of collateral intraday and subsequently start delaying payments. In tense market conditions this may put unnecessary pressure on the market participants who may be cautious that difficulty obtaining intraday liquidity does not translate (via reputation effects) into overnight or term liquidity problems. Payments activity is probably the only informative signal that settlement banks can get in real time regarding the liquidity conditions of their counterparties.

The key empirical results of this paper may be put in parallel with the theoretical implications of Gu *et al* (2011), who argue that there are conditions under which positive intraday interest rate may be socially efficient. The paper very elegantly shows that if the intrinsic need for settlement is perfectly substitutable between morning and afternoon, the socially optimal allocation is achieved at zero intraday interest rate with all settlements taking place in the evening. In contrast, a positive intraday interest rate may be socially desirable if some agents have an intrinsic need to settle in the morning.

But empirical evidence from CHAPS does not fit very well with the implications of Gu *et al* (2011). In particular, we find that intraday interest rate increases tenfold during the crisis period, while Benos *et al* (2010) reports lower throughput during the same period. That is, larger fraction of settlements took place later in the day when the implicit intraday interest rate increased.

6.3 Interest rate and throughput

To further illustrate the implications of the level of interest rate on bank payment behavior, Figure 3 shows daily time-series of the Bank rate and noncontractual payment throughput. Noncontractual payment throughput is defined as the proportion of all non-contractual payments made made before noon. This therefore excludes the overnight loan advances and repayments which are included for the purposes of evaluating each bank's adherence to CHAPS throughput guidelines.

Figure 3 shows that there is an inverse relationship between the Bank rate and the noncontractual throughput (throughput thereafter). In the first part of the sample, when interest rates were on the rise, the throughput was gradually decreasing. Note, that settlement banks can use their overnight balances to cushion against intraday payment flow imbalance. Ennis and Weinberg (2007) show that overnight reserves and daylight credit act as an alternative means of funding transfers during the day. Thus if there is no shortage of reserves, reflected by a low overnight interest rate, intraday liquidity would come at no cost and hence there would be no incentive for banks to delay payments. This seems to be consistent with our result that an increase in the overnight interest rate makes borrowing as a means of financing outgoing payments more costly and provides incentives for banks to delay payments in order to smooth intraday liquidity. In the summer of 2007, when the Bank rate reached its peak of 5.75%, throughput fell well below 50%. Following the subsequent interest rate cuts, throughput slowly began to rise again, with the exception of a short spell in the fall of 2008 characterised by market distress brought about by the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In this period, throughput temporarily fell to all time low levels.

7 Conclusion

This paper shows that while there is no explicit interbank intraday money market in the UK, the pricing of overnight loans is consistent with an intraday value for money. We find that the implicit intraday interest rate paid by banks within our sample period varies between 0.09bps and 1.56bps. While the implicit hourly intraday interest rate is quite small in the pre-crisis period, it increases more than tenfold during the financial crisis. For an average loan of £65 million, advancing the loan one hour earlier in the day increases the estimated average payment by £2,778 (about 1.6 percentage points). We also find that interest premium is not linear throughout the day and is U shaped - higher at the beginning and the very end of the day. We believe that higher interest rates at the end of the day can be attributed to the end of the day settlement balance concerns.

Looking at aggregate (across the settlement banks) and individual bank reserves balances we find that overnight interest rates decrease with the aggregate reserves. This means that the central bank reserves distribution across the settlement banks and other financial institutions with reserves accounts does matter for overnight interest rate determination.

There are two intraday timing components of the overnight loan, namely the time of the loan advance and the repayment time the next day. While the loan advance time is by definition known at the point of agreeing the overnight loan, the repayment time is uncertain. We find that there is a significant premium on the both intraday components of the loan. That is, overnight loans advanced early or/and expected to be repaid late the next day have a positive premium. The premium is significantly larger for the expected repayment time in the crisis period. Counterparties that delay repaying their overnight loans have to pay on average a premium of 4.33bps per hour of expected delay.

The key policy implication is that implicit intraday liquidity cost may become significant during market stress. This may provide wrong incentives for payments delay and may contribute further to the financial stress. Thus implicit intraday interest rate could be used as an indicator of intraday liquidity risk in payment systems.

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Appendix A: Tables and Figures

	Jan '03 - Apr '06	May '06 - Jun '07	Jul '07 - Feb '09
Av. daily volume (£b)	19.3	26.7	30.0
Av. loan amount (£m)	49.2	58.6	64.7
Av. loan duration (hrs)	21.2	21.3	21.4
Av. interest rate (%)	4.28	5.01	4.64
Av. premium (bp)	-3.05	5.19	-5.20
no. settlement banks	12	12	12-13
no. days	839	295	422
no. observations	321,945	125,527	193,047

Table A: Summary statistics for overnight loans data.

Table B: Estimation of the regression model for premium. The models are estimated by two-stage least squares (2SLS) since the Hausman test (not reported) rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity of repayment time. Robust t statistics are given in parentheses.

$$\text{Model 1:} \quad r_{t,\tau} - br_t = c + \textstyle\sum_{k=1}^{9} \alpha_k D_k^{\tau} + \sum_{l=1}^{n_s-1} \gamma_l D_l^b + \delta d^{(2)} + \beta' \mathbf{x}_{t,\tau} + \varepsilon_{t,\tau}$$
$$\text{Model 2:} \quad r_{t,\tau} - br_t = c + \alpha d^{(1)} + \delta d^{(2)} + \textstyle\sum_{l=1}^{n_s-1} \gamma_l D_l^b + \beta' \mathbf{x}_{t,\tau} + \varepsilon_{t,\tau}$$
$$\text{Model 3:} \quad r_{t,\tau} - br_t = c + \alpha (d^{(1)} + d^{(2)}) + \textstyle\sum_{l=1}^{n_s-1} \gamma_l D_l^b + \beta' \mathbf{x}_{t,\tau} + \varepsilon_{t,\tau}$$

	Jan '03 - Apr '06			May '06 - Jun '07			Jul '07 - Feb '09		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
A. Time-of-day effects									
6-7	3.460 (9.88)			.787 (2.11)			13.98 (16.98)		
7-8	1.825 (5.54)			1.272 (3.23)			13.64 (17.55)		
8-9	.955 (3.21)			.038 (0.14)			9.31 (15.55)		
9-10	.299 (1.26)			.357 (1.80)			7.94 (17.83)		
10-11	−.032 (−0.14)			−.182 (−1.05)			2.82 (6.63)		
12-13	−.389 (−1.77)			−.097 (−0.70)			−3.40 (−9.94)		
13-14	−.835 (−4.07)			−.433 (−3.43)			−3.94 (−12.44)		
14-15	−.127 (−0.65)			−.511 (−4.27)			−4.32 (−14.47)		
15-16	3.046 (15.2)			−.159 (−1.32)			−2.67 (−9.09)		
$d^{(1)}$		.262 (9.88)	.391 (17.3)		−.092 (−4.30)	−.105 (−5.62)		−1.563 (−33.92)	−1.246 (−32.2)
$d^{(2)}$	1.963 (13.65)	1.079 (7.90)		−.004 (−0.04)	−.055 (−0.60)		5.211 (24.05)	4.325 (21.47)	

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	Jan '03 - Apr '06			May '06 - Jun '07			Jul '07 - Feb '09		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
B. Day-of-week effects									
Monday	3.233	3.131	3.133	1.391	1.398	1.412	2.889	2.892	2.776
	(20.1)	(19.5)	(19.7)	(23.1)	(23.1)	(23.8)	(13.52)	(13.78)	(13.7)
Tuesday	.914	.930	1.020	1.364	1.354	1.360	2.531	2.479	2.299
	(5.87)	(6.00)	(6.64)	(22.41)	(22.2)	(22.4)	(11.30)	(11.25)	(10.8)
Thursday	.864	.861	.943	1.327	1.332	1.340	1.794	1.817	1.886
	(5.48)	(5.48)	(6.03)	(18.24)	(18.3)	(18.46)	(8.29)	(8.54)	(9.20)
Friday	−4.990	−4.769	−4.420	3.584	3.621	3.603	−.002	.091	.233
	(−31.8)	(−30.6)	(−28.9)	(29.43)	(29.8)	(29.8)	(−0.01)	(0.42)	(1.11)
C. Controls									
Const	−20.36	−18.54	−14.96	3.17	4.630	3.951	−29.4	−5.70	4.958
	(−32.1)	(−41.9)	(−42.3)	(5.40)	(11.43)	(18.0)	(−24.5)	(−6.35)	(8.10)
Loan size	.005	.010	.019	.006	.006	.005	−.012	−.006	.009
	(4.61)	(9.75)	(30.1)	(10.03)	(11.22)	(18.5)	(−9.05)	(−5.21)	(15.4)
Aggregate reserves	−.506	−.388	−.423	−.097	−.080	−.076	−1.173	−1.157	−1.181
	(−36.1)	(−29.2)	(−32.7)	(−10.02)	(−8.77)	(−8.56)	(−122.2)	(−121.6)	(−129.8)
Reserves lender	−.180	−.239	−.199	.085	.077	.079	.682	.622	.457
	(−8.19)	(−10.9)	(−9.31)	(4.64)	(4.28)	(4.45)	(19.8)	(18.5)	(14.8)
Reserves borrower	−.804	−.835	−.791	.203	.191	.186	−2.068	−2.158	−2.072
	(−29.3)	(−30.5)	(−29.3)	(6.43)	(6.04)	(5.94)	(−33.79)	(−35.6)	(−35.1)
no. obs.		321,945			125,527			193,047	

Table D: Estimation of the regression model for premium based on brokers' data. The models are estimated by ordinary least squares. Robust t statistics are given in parentheses.

Model 1': $r^m_{t,\tau} - br_t = c + \sum_{k=1}^{8} \alpha_k D^\tau_k + \beta' \mathbf{x}_{t,\tau} + \varepsilon_{t,\tau}$

Model 2': $r^m_{t,\tau} - br_t = c + \alpha d^{(1)} + \beta' \mathbf{x}_{t,\tau} + \varepsilon_{t,\tau}$

	May '06 - Jun '07		Jul '07 - Feb '09	
	Model 1'	Model 2'	Model 1'	Model 2'
A. Time-of-day effects				
7-8	−0.652 (−1.28)		6.131 (4.63)	
8-9	−0.121 (−0.23)		2.911 (1.86)	
9-10	0.399 (0.75)		3.662 (2.27)	
10-11	0.648 (0.96)		2.884 (1.85)	
12-13	−0.615 (−0.97)		−2.380 (−1.67)	
13-14	−0.935 (−1.58)		−3.807 (−2.65)	
14-15	−2.197 (−3.66)		−5.740 (−4.09)	
15-16	−4.229 (−6.76)		−5.015 (−3.74)	
$d^{(1)}$		0.431 (9.55)		1.449 (13.7)
B. Day-of-week effects				
Monday	2.961 (10.2)	2.846 (9.70)	6.093 (6.90)	6.114 (6.92)
Tuesday	2.545 (8.57)	2.537 (8.39)	4.720 (4.24)	4.651 (4.18)
Thursday	2.589 (7.51)	2.606 (7.52)	−0.197 (−0.26)	−0.175 (−0.23)
Friday	4.035 (10.6)	3.976 (10.4)	2.689 (3.44)	2.693 (3.44)
C. Controls				
Const	−4.733 (−4.74)	−1.709 (−2.20)	−0.771 (−0.52)	15.6 (10.8)
Spread	2.609 (14.0)	2.575 (14.0)	−0.222 (−4.90)	−0.225 (−4.99)
Aggregate reserves	-1.70e-4 (−3.76)	-2.67e-4 (−5.98)	-8.03e-4 (−12.3)	-8.01e-4 (−12.6)
no. obs.	3,718		5,890	



Chart 1: The distribution of loan time, repayment time and loan duration (hrs) are shown in the top three panels. The bottom panel shows the loan rate of return together with the Bank rate (%).



Chart 2: Estimated intraday value of money (bp). The figure shows the estimated intraday effects in equation ((**2**)). The estimation is done by two-stage least squares.



Chart 3: The figure shows the proportion of daily payments excluding overnight loans made through CHAPS before noon (10-day moving average) together with the Bank rate.