

Savings Incentives¹

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Abstract

Savings promotion is a key aspect of social protection, as it increases the ability of lower income families to guard themselves against adverse economic shock; consequently, policies to improve financial inclusion providing formal savings devices have grown worldwide. Despite the above mentioned, evidence shows that the sole access to saving devices is not necessarily linked to an increase of savings. Individuals may have behavioral problems that limit their savings. For example, limited attention and time inconsistency have proven to be important, with SMS savings reminders and financial instruments with default savings being effective in increasing the amounts of savings. Using a randomized control trial, we evaluate both types of devices in vulnerable populations of Chile. We also test the effectiveness of providing savings rules of thumb, as a mechanism to help individuals make good decisions with limited knowledge. In this version of the study, we report the treatment effects on savings and debts using administrative data. No treatment had a positive effect in savings balance 9 months after the intervention.

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1. Introduction

Financial inclusion and savings encouragement are key aspects of social protection and promotion, raising the ability of lower income families to guard themselves against adverse economic shocks. Particularly, formal savings can ease the accumulation of resources in the long run, improve the security of savings, allow account holders to have more control and better management of liquidity of her funds, and be of support against contingencies. Also, formal savings can generate interests and are protected against inflation, helping households to have a buffer stock to face shocks, and accumulate resources for lumpy investments (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). Consequently, in recent years, policies to improve financial inclusion of the poor have evolved, from providing services through micro credit, to doing it through formal savings devices. Savings can also be a first step of entailment with the financial system and the opportunity to acquire sufficient financial capacity to access other services.

Despite the above mentioned, the evidence on the effects of the possession of a formal savings device in financial and socioeconomic variables in lower income populations is mixed. In some circumstances (Dupas and Robinson, 2013) having a savings account has an effect on savings, but in other cases, the access to a formal savings account was not found to be significantly associated with an increase in the amounts of savings (Brune et al. 2016) or effects are unclear and depend on the context (Prinas, 2015, Dupas, Karlan, Robinson and Ubfal, 2016).

Different studies have shown that lower income individuals, when saving, face the same psychological barriers that the rest of the population. For example, limited attention (Karlan, McConnell, Mullainathan, and Zinman, 2010) and time inconsistency (Fudenberg and Levine 2006; Ashraf, Karan and Yin, 2006), have proven to be important factors in the financial behavior of low income populations, as devices addressing them have been effective in increasing the amounts of savings.

Additionally, expenditures in temptation goods can be a relevant constraint for individuals savings (Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010). For instance, Dasso and Fernando (2013) find that beneficiaries of CCT programs in Peru increase their food expenditure on candies, chocolates and soft drinks after receiving the transfer.² On the other hand, micro credit literature has found that individuals on average pay their loans decreasing their discretionary expenses (Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman 2015).

Furthermore, access to savings accounts can change the use of other financial instruments. Individuals might decrease the use of transactional accounts for savings purposes. They can also decrease the use of debt to smooth consumption (Kast and Pomeranz, 2014). It can also trigger access to other financial products offered by the same or other banks.

According to the World Bank, 62% of adults worldwide had a bank account in 2014. In high income OECD economies, account ownership is almost universal, whereas in developing

² Evans and Popova (2014) provide a summary of the effects of CCT transfers on expenditure on temptation goods.

economies 54% of adults have one. Chile is below the OECD countries but above other Latin American countries (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012). In 2015, 98% of the population 15 years of age and over in Chile had access to a financial instrument. Over 87% of the population has a product in BancoEstado, 35% of them are only clients of this bank. The product with most prevalence is Cuenta RUT. Cuenta RUT covers 43% of the population, with more than 6 million accounts (SBIF, 2016).

Since evidence of savings constraints for middle-income countries is scarce, and there is little knowledge about the relative importance between time inconsistency, limited attention and changes in the consumption of temptation goods, we designed and implemented a randomized impact evaluation in low-income individuals in Chile with the support of the state-owned Bank (BancoEstado). BancoEstado is the bank that serves the financial need of individuals in low income groups.

Our evaluation includes three treatment arms and a control group. For addressing limited attention, personalized SMS reminders were sent monthly for a year to one group. Following Karlan, McConnell, Mullainathan, and Zinman (2010), the message was personalized with the saving objective declared by the individual at baseline. To address time inconsistency, an automatic savings plan was offered in a second treatment arm. The third treatment provided savings strategies to reduce the spending on temptation goods and included a video, a calendar and SMS with savings strategies for a year. Following Drexler, Fischer and Shoar (2014), the savings message was kept simple and straightforward. All these treatments were offered at the bank branches.

The recruitment and offering process was implemented between October 2015 and May 2016, and included 5,923 participants. We have administrative data from Banco Estado to measure the program's impact on savings balances, debt levels and use of other bank products. We are currently conducting a household survey to a subsample of 2,700 households, which will provide relevant information about their financial status.

In this version of the paper we analyze the treatment effects over 9 months after the offering. In future versions, we will analyze the impact over a longer time span, and include the effects on household level outcomes, such as total savings. We find that 6 months after the intervention, no treatment had a positive effect at the mean.

2. Study Design

2.1 Recruitment and baseline survey

The study was implemented in the Metropolitan Region, Chile, in partnership with BancoEstado, a state-owned, autonomous financial institution.

The intervention was implemented in 23 BancoEstado branches. Branches were located in vulnerable urban municipalities of the Metropolitan Region of Chile. The municipalities were chosen in highly vulnerable municipalities in accordance to the "Priority Social Index

2014”³ and in agreement with BancoEstado, considering the number of bank executives per branch, and selecting a maximum of two branches per municipality (for details see Annex 1). The intervention was named “Peso by Peso I learn to save”.

Participants were recruited in the branches. They had to be older than 18 years of age, be new or old clients of BancoEstado (defined by having or opening any product with the bank), and had to come to the branch to open a savings accounts. Furthermore, individuals should have a Cuenta RUT, or should want to open one. The “CuentaRUT” is a bank account that is automatically associated to the number of RUT (national identification number) and is not associated to a credit line. For a detailed description of the offering process see Annex 2.

If an individual was eligible, the bank executive explained the project and invited her to participate in the evaluation. If the client accepted, she had to sign a consent form that allows the use of the bank’s administrative data in the evaluation. Once the consent form was signed, the bank executive gave her a tablet (used only for the project) where the individuals were shown a one-minute video with the project explanation and then had to answer the baseline survey.⁴ The baseline survey included questions about education, labor market participation, family structure, motivations to save and if they received government subsidies. After the survey was finished, the participant returned the tablet to the bank executive. Based on the survey response, the randomization was done on the spot in the same tablet. The bank executive had to click in a hidden button in the tablet to see the treatment assignment.

With the objective to increase recruitment, starting in December 2015, after three months of the offering process, project monitors worked in the largest bank branches. The monitor, identified by a project member with a credential approached clients in the waiting area, motivating their participation in the project. If the individual agreed to participate, she signed the consent and then responded the baseline survey in the tablet. The monitor would then see the treatment assignment in the tablet and then give the individual a card that identified the treatment assignment with a number. Then in turn, the individual had to give the card to the bank executive.

Approximately 54.2% of the participants were recruited by an executive (3,208 participants), and 45.8% of the participants were recruited with the monitors support (2,715 participants). Table 1 reports the number of individuals offered in each month, and Figure 1 shows the intervention calendar.

The evaluation team constantly monitored the offering process. Each branch was visited at least twice a week. Additionally, the investigation team developed a monitoring system through weekly revision of the bank data and the consent form information.

³ The index considers income, education and health to define the level of social development of municipalities. The index is computed by the Ministry of Social Development.

⁴ The baseline questionnaire had 11 questions, and it took on average 14 minutes to respond.

2.2 Experimental Design

Individuals were randomly assigned to four treatment arms: automatic savings plan, SMS reminder, savings strategies and pure control. We stratified by saving goal (housing or other) and reception of subsidies. Table 2 shows the treatment assignment. About 30% of participants were assigned to the control group (N=1,788) and the automatic savings plan (N=1,745), and 20% of the sample to SMS (1,216) and savings strategies (N=1,174).

We designed two of the three savings incentives offered in the project. The automatic savings plan existed in Banco Estado, and our study only randomized the offering of this product. However, anyone asking for this product could get it at any Banco Estado branch. For the other two savings incentives, the savings reminders and savings strategies treatment arms, only individuals assigned to the corresponding treatment arm were offered.

2.3 Treatment groups.

Once the executive observed the treatment assignment she had to perform certain activities, depending on the treatment group. In all treatments arms, the bank executive gave participants a bag with pencils (without the program logo). This served the purpose of thanking individuals for their participation, and also allowed us not to discriminate among participants, which could have generated unease among the clients in the bank branch, as one treatment arm received gifts aimed to increase savings.

Treatment 0 (control group)

Individuals assigned to the control group did not receive any treatment. The bank executive did not do any offering and only performed the account opening the client had originally come to the branch for.

Treatment 1: Automatic savings plan.

In treatment 1, the bank executive explained the automatic savings plan to the client and then offered the product. The product would transfer from the participant's *Cuenta RUT* to a savings account. If the individual did not have a savings account, an account was opened. If she had more than one, she could choose the account where the transfer would go. The only restriction was that the savings account had to be in the individuals' name. Individuals could specify the monthly amount⁵ to be transferred and also decide the date of the transfer.

Treatment 2: Savings Reminders

Individuals in treatment 2 received monthly individualized SMS for a year. The SMS reminded them of their survey motivation, which was collected at the baseline survey.⁶ The

⁵ The minimum amount of transfer is 1,000 CLP (approximately 1.5 USD).

⁶ We asked for 16 types of savings motives at the baseline. The SMS message was “[Participant’s Name], remember to deposit this month in your savings account. Get closer to your savings goal for “[Participant’s Goals]” Greetings, Banco Estado”. See SMS in annex 3.

bank executive did not have to do any offering, and therefore from the bank's point of view, this treatment arm implied the same activities of the control group.

Treatment 3: Saving strategies

The savings strategies treatment arm had four components: a 2.5 minutes animated video⁷ with strategies that could eventually help people to lower their consumption of temptation goods, which was shown on a tablet to the individual by the bank executive.⁸ Individuals were also given a bag with several products aimed to increase their savings: a card holder with the logo of the program, a magnet as "reminders" of the strategies mentioned in the video and a calendar with the same strategies. Finally, SMS messages were sent every month during a year with these strategies. The SMS sent each month are in Annex 3, and correspond to the message that was given on the calendar.

2.4 Data

In this version of the paper we analyze the treatment's impact on outcomes available from BancoEstado administrative data 9 months after the treatment implementation.⁹ We have access to individual level data on monthly savings and debt balance from September 2014 to March 2017 for different financial instruments.

We construct the pre-treatment as the average for all available periods before the treatment offering. As the offering was conducted over eight months, the number of periods included in the pre-treatment average vary by the offering month. In this study we use data 6 months after the intervention as the outcome variable. All variables were top censored at the 99th percentile to contain outliers.

Considering there is a special account aimed for home savings in the partner bank, and as we stratified by the savings for a home motive, we present report results in these specific accounts, savings in other accounts and total savings. For debt, we disaggregate it, in mortgage, education and consumption. We also have a separate category for *cuenta RUT*, a transactional account. Details can be seen in the data appendix (Appendix number 4).

2.4 Summary Statistics

Table 3 provides the summary statistics for each treatment arm. Column [1] reports the number of observations. Columns [2]-[5] the average level of each variable by treatment arm, and columns [6]-[11] the p-values of the null hypothesis that the average amounts are equal across pair-comparisons of treatment arms. Panel A and B report results for bank data, and panel C for variables from the baseline survey.

⁷ The video is available <https://sites.google.com/site/clpmartineza/projects>. Its transcript is in annex 3.

⁸ If the individual was recruited by an evaluation monitor, the video was shown on the Tablet after the treatment assignment but before going to see the bank executive.

⁹ A household follow up survey to a subset of the population is currently on the field.

The average level of savings in the control group is US\$292.2¹⁰, and US\$44 are in home savings accounts. Total savings is balanced across treatment arms. However, there is unbalance on its component (savings for a home and other savings) when comparing SMS with the control group (p-value=0.011 and p-value=0.0128 respectively). Regarding the use of savings accounts, 55.8% of the control group has a positive balance in a savings account (22.4% in an account designed for housing savings). This use is balanced across treatments arms, with the same exception of the SMS group with respect to the control and SS.

The average balance in *Cuenta RUT*¹¹ is US\$69.3, and it is balanced across treatment arms with the exception when comparing ASP with the control group (p-value=0.045), with individuals assigned to ASP having a lower balance. In the control group, 82% of individuals have a positive balance in *Cuenta RUT*. This variable is balanced with the exceptions as the levels. Regarding debt levels, the average debt amount in the control group at baseline is US\$198, with 10.1% of the control group with some debt at baseline

Panel C of Table 3 reports the means and balance test for the individual characteristics gathered in the baseline survey. The first two variables (saving for a house and subsidy recipient) are the variables used to define the stratification cells. We observe that 47% of recipients report being saving for a home, and 43% are subsidy recipients. Both variables are balanced across treatment arms. Only 29% of participants are male, the average age is 35, and the most common highest level of education achieved is high-school with 52% of the control group in this educational category. Most participants worked last week (63%), and the average per capita household income is 257.7. There is balance on most of these variables and comparisons, with the exception of gender when comparing SS and the control group, and in education when comparing ASP with SMS and SS.

Overall, and considering the number of hypotheses tested, the treatment random assignment seems to have provided comparable groups, which supports the internal validity of the results. However, to be on the safe side and to control for any pre-treatment differences across treatment arms, we present our main results controlling for the baseline characteristics, including the baseline variable of the dependent variables.

3. Empirical Strategy and Results

3.1 Empirical Strategy

The identification strategy relies on the random assignment of each eligible individual to a treatment or control group, which guarantees that individuals in each group are, on average, the same. We will estimate the Intent to Treat (ITT) effects of the Automatic Savings Plan (ASP), SMS reminders and savings strategies (SS) on outcomes Y_{ij} for individual i in branch j with:

¹⁰ All amounts are in real prices of September 2014, and US\$ of the same month.

¹¹ We include in *Cuenta RUT* all transactional accounts: *Cuenta RUT*, checking accounts and *cuenta vista*. The above have a small prevalence in our sample.

The estimated equation is:

$$Y_{ij} = b_0 + b_1 * ASP_{ij} + b_2 * SMS_{ij} + b_3 * SS_{ij} + a_1 * Y_{ij,t-1} + a_2 * X_{ij} + u_{ij}$$

Where Y_{ij} is an outcome variable (e.g. amount saved), ASP, SMS and SS are indicators of the treatment status, $Y_{ij,t-1}$ is the lagged dependent variable and X_{ij} is a set of dummy variables indicating the stratification cell (defined house savings intention and subsidy reception), and dummies considering the offering process (if the enumerator did the recruitment and a dummy for the bank executive that did the offering).¹² Errors are clustered at the branch level. The coefficients b_1 , b_2 and b_3 capture the ITT of being offered ASP, and having received SMS and SS. We will test if b_1 , b_2 and b_3 are different from zero, and whether they are different from each other.

The lagged dependent variable corresponds to the average level of the dependent variable over all the available months (as the offering process was conducted over 8 months and we have administrative data starting in a fixed calendar month, the number of periods included in the average varies by offering month).

3.2 Results

We report results on savings, bank accounts and debt amounts over 9 months after the offering in Table 4. Panel A reports the ITT effects, and panel B the p-value of the null that the treatment effects are the same across treatment arms. Column [1], panel A shows the mean in the control group of each outcome 6 months after the offering, and column [5] the sample size. Columns [2]-[4] correspond to the ITT of each treatment arm.

Results show that none of the treatments had a significant effect on savings, *cuenta RUT* or debt balances. The coefficient on ASP (column [2]) is positive for savings and negative for *cuenta RUT* balances, but standard errors are large. A decrease in *cuenta RUT* balance alongside an increase in savings balance is consistent with the movement of savings from a transactional account to a savings account. The net effect in the sum of these balances is positive for ASP, but not significant and small in magnitude.

SMS remainders (column [3]) has negative coefficients for savings and *cuenta RUT* balances, the latter being significant at 1%. Savings strategies (column [4]) has a positive coefficient in savings balance, and negative in *cuenta RUT*. The total effect is positive, but small in magnitude and not significant. Regarding debt balances, effects are not significant for all treatment arms, positive for ASP, and negative for SMS remainders and SS. The p-values of the t-test of differences in coefficients (Table 4, panel B) are all not significant, ruling out the existence of significant effects.¹³

¹² We also included a dummy indicating 55 cases that appear had been offered the product on the same date and time.

¹³ If the balances are in logs, with a spline correction for zeros, we find that the ASP had a positive and significant effect on total savings 6 months after the intervention, whereas SMS and SS treatment arms did not have a significant impact. Individuals assigned to ASP treatment arm save 14.7 percentage points more

Table 5 reports the treatment impact on the probability of having a positive balance on savings, *Cuenta RUT* and debt. ASP and SMS reminders have a positive and significant impact on the probability of having not housing savings (2.7 and 2.1 percentage points respectively), and SS has a positive effect on the probability of having a positive balance on *Cuenta RUT* of 1.9 percentage points. The overall impact on savings and *Cuenta RUT* is positive and significant only for SS, with an increase of 1.2 percentage points. This effect is statistically different from the ASP and SMS effects (panel B). There is no impact on the probability of having debt for none of the treatment groups.

4. Conclusion

In this version of the paper, we report the impact of a randomized evaluation of three treatments, aimed to increase savings in the use of financial instruments in the partner bank. The treatments are SMS savings reminders, automatic deposit, and savings strategies. The treatments were designed with the objective of increasing savings in vulnerable populations in Chile, considering the behavioral limitations that individuals face in savings decisions.

We find that 9 months after the offering, on average, none of the treatment arms had a positive impact on saving, *cuenta RUT* nor debt balance. Only saving strategies had a positive and significant effect of having a positive balance in *cuenta RUT*, and in *cuenta RUT* + savings account.

In future versions of this paper, we will analyze the program impact over a longer time span (12 months). We will also use survey data to study the impact on the use of financial products in other financial institutions, and analyze other dimensions, such as household expenses, entrepreneurship, and subjective wellbeing.

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than the control group. The effect of ASP on other savings account is significantly different to SMS and SS at the 5%. We find that no treatment arm had a significant effect on the *Cuenta RUT* balance, nor id debt.

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Figure 1: Evaluation Timeline

Year	Month	Month since Offering	Event
2014	September	-13	First month of administrative data
			↓
2015	October	0	Beginning of the offering process
	November	1	Treatment implementation (SMS)
			↓
2016	May		End of offering process
	October	12	Last month of administrative data
			↓
2017	March	17	Beginning of follow up survey
	April	18	End of treatment implementation (SMS)
	June	20	End of follow up survey (expected)

Table 1: Recruitment by month

Year	Month	Number of offers
2015	October	445
	November	594
	December	595
2016	January	980
	February	934
	March	1.412
	April	960
	May	3
Total		5.923

Note: Author's calculation

Table 2: Treatment Assignment

Treatment Arm	Participants
Control Group	1,788
Automatic Savings Plan (ASP)	1,745
SMS reminders (SMS)	1,216
Savings strategies (SS)	1,174
Total	5,923

Note: Author's calculation

Table 3: Summary Statistics and Balance

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]
						Average				p-value	
Product Category	N obs	Control	Automatic Savings Plan (ASP)	SMS Remainders	Savings Strategies (SS)	ASP=Control	SMS=Control	SS=Control	ASP=SMS	ASP=SS	SMS=SS
Panel A: Amounts (Logs)											
<i>Savings</i>											
Total Savings	5,923	292,284	278,507	280,830	296,433	0.800	0.558	0.917	0.904	0.760	0.653
Saving for a home	5,923	44,055	51,291	52,200	46,175	0.112	0.0109	0.799	0.835	0.257	0.204
Other Savings	5,923	192,407	171,172	150,227	194,887	0.450	0.0128	0.948	0.320	0.514	0.114
<i>Transactional Accounts (Cuenta RUT and others)</i>											
	5,923	69,324	61,467	72,177	61,626	0.0448	0.771	0.135	0.0835	0.819	0.108
<i>Debt</i>											
Total Debt (non mortgage)	5,923	197,938	196,883	236,019	222,269	0.956	0.383	0.609	0.427	0.628	0.841
<i>Total Savings & Cuenta RUT</i>	5,923	428,192	391,472	419,683	416,344	0.347	0.696	0.801	0.618	0.642	0.998
Panel B: Probability (>0)											
<i>Savings</i>											
Total Savings	5,923	0.558	0.543	0.550	0.551	0.774	0.985	0.835	0.773	0.961	0.801
Saving for a home	5,923	0.224	0.229	0.248	0.229	0.198	0.00498	0.766	0.422	0.327	0.0684
Other Savings	5,923	0.446	0.433	0.435	0.458	0.568	0.758	0.561	0.986	0.212	0.421
<i>Transactional Accounts (Cuenta RUT)</i>											
	5,923	0.819	0.796	0.790	0.824	0.0575	0.224	0.547	0.942	0.0146	0.112
<i>Debt</i>											
Total Debt (non mortgage)	5,923	0.101	0.084	0.109	0.081	0.105	0.726	0.0243	0.191	0.362	0.0305
<i>Total Savings & Cuenta RUT</i>	5,923	0.913	0.888	0.879	0.901	0.0706	0.0363	0.330	0.329	0.227	0.0837
Panel C: Baseline Variables											
Saving for a home	5,923	0.470	0.465	0.453	0.460	0.323	0.316	0.313	0.589	0.594	0.901
Subsidy recipient (1=receives)	5,923	0.432	0.423	0.431	0.451						
Gender (1=male)	5,923	0.293	0.320	0.316	0.322	0.164	0.168	0.0209	0.890	0.621	0.501
<i>Highest educational level</i>											
Primary	5,923	0.107	0.123	0.100	0.103	0.132	0.498	0.673	0.0112	0.0692	0.850
Secondary	5,823	0.518	0.508	0.546	0.534	0.212	0.199	0.437	0.0250	0.0344	0.492
Tertiary	5,923	0.345	0.353	0.329	0.346	0.673	0.361	0.972	0.156	0.740	0.367
Worked last week	5,923	0.635	0.642	0.634	0.631	0.744	0.984	0.899	0.798	0.693	0.939
Studied last week	5,923	0.037	0.047	0.048	0.046	0.0899	0.100	0.220	0.934	0.838	0.788
Retired last week	5,835	0.021	0.020	0.021	0.024	0.973	0.951	0.489	0.967	0.430	0.596
Household per capita income	5,835	275,682	270,364	265,671	275,640	0.245	0.349	0.763	0.766	0.181	0.167
Age	5,835	34,951	34,883	34,771	34,736	0.869	0.635	0.591	0.766	0.725	0.999

Note: Column [1] shows the number of observations. Columns [2]-[5] show the mean value for the control group, automatic savings plan, SMS remainder and savings strategies respectively. Columns [6]-[11] report the p-values of the regressions of treatment assignment controlling by strata. Column [6] reports the p-value of the null hypothesis that ASP=control group, column [7] shows the p-value of the null hypothesis that SMS=Control group, column [8] reports the p-value of the null hypothesis that SS=control group, column [9]-[11] shows the p-value of the null hypothesis that ASP=SMS, ASP=SS and SMS=SS respectively. Variables in Panel A are in logs of US\$ dollars, using the exchange rate of September 2014 (1US\$=593.47) and with the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. All regressions control by strata (defined by the reception of subsidy and savings motive) and a dummy indicating "rare" cases where bank executives offer the program at the same hour. Standard error are calculated allowing for clustering at the bank branch. Panel A data is from the partner's bank administrative data, panel B are from the baseline survey. Sample size varies because of missing values.

Table 4: ITT effects on savings and debt balance (9 months after treatment assignment)

Panel A: Product Categories	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]
	Control Mean	Automatic Savings Plan (ASP)	SMS remainders	Savings Strategies (SS)	Sample Size
<i>Savings</i>					
Total Savings	749.1 (1914)	7.526 (43.795)	-41.035 (52.013)	8.225 (60.406)	5,923
Saving for a home	212 (418.7)	1.475 (12.518)	-3.727 (16.637)	-10.772 (13.910)	5,923
Other Savings	481.3 (1712)	4.082 (39.684)	-29.888 (49.631)	10.882 (47.225)	5,923
<i>Cuenta RUT (transactional account)</i>	121.9 (227.9)	-8.252 (5.168)	-15.802*** (4.202)	-6.934 (5.629)	5,923
<i>Total Savings & Cuenta RUT</i>	948.3 (2312)	18.041 (49.991)	-43.479 (68.781)	27.419 (69.413)	5,923
<i>Debt</i>					
Total Debt	74.85 (711.7)	4.774 (24.809)	-7.796 (20.141)	-22.815 (17.948)	5,923
Panel B: P-values					
	[1]	[2]	[3]		
	ASP=SMS	APA=SS	SMS=SS		
<i>Savings</i>					
Total Savings	0.269	0.988	0.333		
Saving for a home	0.791	0.387	0.698		
Other Savings	0.387	0.850	0.293		
<i>Cuenta RUT (transactional account)</i>	0.234	0.816	0.130		
<i>Total Savings & Cuenta RUT</i>	0.264	0.839	0.191		
<i>Debt</i>					
Total Debt	0.690	0.343	0.432		

Note: Column [1] of Panel A report the mean for the control group 6 months after the treatment assignment. Columns [2]-[4] of Panel A report intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates and standard errors (in parenthesis) of program assignment 9 months after the intervention. All variables dependent variables are measured in real US dollars (using exchange rate as of September, 2014). Variables are top coded at the 99%. Regressions include dummies for strata (defined by the reception of subsidy and savings motive), the mean of amounts previous to the application of the program, fixed effects by the date of the offering, bank executive fixed effects and a dummy indicating if the individual was recruited by an enumerator or a bank executive. We also include a dummy variable to control for “rare” cases where bank executives offer the program at the same hour. Differences in sample size are due to missing values. Panel B report the p-values of the comparison between the three treatment groups. Standard error are calculated allowing for clustering at the bank branch. Sample size varies due to missing values. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: ITT effects on savings and debt probability (9 months after treatment assignment)

<u>Panel A: Product Categories</u>	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]
	Control Mean	Automatic Savings Plan (ASP)	SMS remainders	Savings Strategies (SS)	Sample Size
<i>Savings</i>					
Total Savings	0.859 (0.349)	-0.001 (0.010)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.015)	5,923
Saving for a home	0.573 (0.495)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.030 (0.019)	5,923
Other Savings	0.588 (0.492)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.021* (0.011)	0.002 (0.012)	5,923
<i>Cuenta RUT (transactional account)</i>	0.927 (0.261)	0.004 (0.008)	0.012 (0.009)	0.019** (0.008)	5,923
<i>Total Savings & Cuenta RUT</i>	0.983 (0.128)	0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	0.012*** (0.003)	5,923
<i>Debt</i>					
Total Debt	0.095 (0.293)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.005 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.010)	5,923
<u>Panel B: P-values</u>	[1]	[2]	[3]		
	ASP=SMS	APA=SS	SMS=SS		
<i>Savings</i>					
Total Savings	0.890	0.197	0.361		
Saving for a home	0.380	0.442	0.177		
Other Savings	0.627	0.0877	0.220		
<i>Cuenta RUT (transactional account)</i>	0.380	0.0519	0.512		
<i>Total Savings & Cuenta RUT</i>	0.853	0.0147	0.00624		
<i>Debt</i>					
Total Debt	0.137	0.751	0.227		

Note: Column [1] of Panel A report the mean for the control group 9 months after the treatment assignment. Columns [2]-[4] of Panel A report intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates and standard errors (in parenthesis) of program assignment 9 months after the intervention. All variables dependent variables are measured in real US dollars (using exchange rate as of September, 2014). Variables are top coded at the 99%. Regressions include dummies for strata (defined by the reception of subsidy and savings motive), the mean of amounts previous to the application of the program, fixed effects by the date of the offering, bank executive fixed effects and a dummy indicating if the individual was recruited by an enumerator or a bank executive. We also include a dummy variable to control for “rare” cases where bank executives offer the program at the same hour. Differences in sample size are due to missing values. Panel B report the p-values of the comparison between the three treatment groups. Standard error are calculated allowing for clustering at the bank branch. Sample size varies due to missing values. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1