Identity and Female Enterprise: 
Experimental Evidence from Pakistan*

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Abstract

We examine the role of gender norms and identity on business preferences of women. We use incentivised experiments with 1149 men and women in Pakistan to establish the presence of a ‘home-bias’ in where a business run by the woman should be operated. Households in our sample prefer women set up a business but operate it from within the home; limiting the potential to expand the business operations outside the home. We present evidence that it is possible to influence preference for the operation of female-run business through access to finance. Women also exhibit a ‘home-bias’ in their demand for advice; more likely to prefer the advice of a male household member than that of a field expert outside the household. Taken together, results indicate internalized gender norms can constrain the size and sustainability of businesses operated by women.

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1 Introduction

Microfinance has long been credited with the power to bring about social and economic change. In general, microcredit has the potential to directly affect household income; and in particular, by targeting women it can effectively improve female autonomy and household welfare (Aghion and Morduch, 2005; Pitt et al., 2006). However, recent evidence on the effect of access to microcredit has shown limited effect on businesses by women.\(^1\) Existing literature has cited lack of technical expertise (Blattman et al., 2015), cooperation in the household (de Mel et al., 2009, 2012) and spousal trust (Fiala, 2015) as possible reasons for the failure of microcredit to improve business outcomes for women. This study adds to existing literature by exploring the role of internalized gender norms on likelihood of women setting up their own business.

We hypothesise that disutility incurred by contravening gender rules can limit the use of microcredit for female enterprise. We use a sample of households who participated in a microenterprise loan trial in urban Pakistan and elicit their preferences regarding enterprise operated by women. We find a significant home bias - on average, both men and women prefer that women set up an enterprise but one that does not require her to venture outside her home. Identification with and internalization of gender norms present a relevant framework for considering gender roles and household division of labour. In their seminal paper, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) hypothesise that men and women internalize gender specific rules of behaviour that provide them with an ‘identity’ or sense of self.

We test for the presence of internalized gender norms and identity and their impact on business preferences. We do this in two main ways. First, in a context where socially unacceptable preferences are less likely to be exhibited, we elicit male and female preferences individually, allowing females the ‘moral wriggle room’ and anonymity to provide honest opinions (Dana et al., 2007). We find that 69% of the men prefer that their female partners set up an enterprise at home compared to 18% who would prefer a potentially larger business that would involve her venturing outside the home. Female preferences are qualitatively similar, with a slightly larger proportion preferring to set up an enterprise that would require visits outside the home (20%) and a smaller proportion preferring an enterprise at home (66%). These results hold even after we control for different levels of profits that can be earned if the business is not restricted to one that is confined to the house. Further, we exploit the fact that the women in our sample were involved in a microfinance RCT in 2014. We find that women, and their male partners, who were randomly allocated to receive a loan are significantly less likely to exhibit a home-bias. It is worth noting that the effect of the year long loan is significant two years after it was first disbursed and at least a year after it had been paid off.

Second, we investigate if the reluctance to interact outside of the household extends to other behaviours that can have an impact on business outcomes. We present a series of

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\(^1\) See for instance, (Angelucci et al., 2015; Banerjee et al., 2015; Ginè and Mansuri, 2011).
test questions to women that were rewarded if answered correctly and provided them with the option of ‘advice’ from either their male partner or a field specialist. We find that even when advice from expert has instrumental value, women are more likely to ask their male partners for advice. In fact, 40% of the women forgo advice from an expert even when it is free.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to look at the role of internalized gender norms on the decision by a woman to set up an enterprise. We add to the vast literature on microfinance that has looked at the impact of loans on business outcomes for women by exploring a constraint that has not been investigated before. We also add to a strand of literature that uses gender identity to explain behavior in a variety of contexts. The inclusion of gender as an identity helps explain why affirmative action has limited effect in the case of gender quotas in Indian politics (Mueller, 2016) and why women who disagree with patriarchal notions of division of labour in rural Bangladesh report lower levels of subjective wellbeing (Seymour and Floro, 2016). Literature also documents the ways in which gender identity can manifest itself. Codazzi et al. (2017) find that female labour force participation is lower in couples in Brazil when the female is more qualified than her male partner2; Delavande and Zafar (2017) provide evidence for gender discrimination to be more pronounced amongst men with lower socio-economic status; and Dhar et al. (2015) document lower aspirations for continuing education amongst girls with parents who have patriarchal views about a woman’s role in the society.

We add to existing literature on social learning and advice-taking that has found a low willingness to pay for advice and information from peers in general. Golman and Loewenstein (2015) hypothesise that a lack of demand may reflect a need to avoid finding out about negative outcomes. We contribute to literature by differentiating between advice from within and outside the household.

So far as consultation and advice from peers is considered, an important source of information for setting up or expanding a business, a lack of demand for advice is one explanation for why female-run businesses do not grow or survive. However, when considered with the home-bias in business location, we find that women in our sample have a distinctly inward-looking preferences that can limit the impact of female-run businesses on household income and welfare. Finally, our results suggest that it is possible to change norms and preferences in a way that encourages women to venture outside the household for business when required, and that a small, conventional loan has the potential to bring about a sustained change.

In the remainder of the paper, we sketch a conceptual framework to think of gender identity in the decision to set up enterprise (Section 2). We then describe the study design and
implementation (Section 3). We discuss results in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.

2 Conceptual Framework

In this section, we apply Akerlof and Kranton (2000)’s identity economics framework to the decision of venturing out of the household for income. Specifically, we look at the decision of our aspiring female entrepreneurs to set up an enterprise and the scale or location at which it is operated from. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) assume two social categories that prescribe specific rules of behaviour that individuals internalize and provides a sense of self. Individual utility is a function of the satisfaction (dissatisfaction) derived from own and other’s conformity (contravention) of the rules for their category. Choice of preferred activity provides an individual with utility $V$ while an activity that does not match her taste earns zero utility.

In the context of our sample of aspiring or current female entrepreneurs, conformers prescribe to the following rule: Men go out of the home to earn; women are caretakers of the household. Women can set up an enterprise to augment household finances or for her own use, but only after consultation with the household members and never an enterprise that involves her regularly venturing out of the household. By extension, nor would she prefer to interact with outsiders, for instance to seek the advice for business. We define this as Activity One. Activity Two, by contrast, involves a woman contravening conventional household and social norms and setting up an enterprise that requires her to venture outside of the home. By engaging in an enterprise outside the home, this woman will not be considered a true conformer and experience a loss of identity, $I_s$.

Figure 1 represents such an interaction between individuals with preference for Activity One and Activity Two. There are two players, Person One and Person Two. Person One acts first, prefers and chooses Activity 1, earning utility equal to $V$. Access to finance allows a woman, Person Two, to decide between Activity 1 and Activity 2. The woman prefers Activity 2 to Activity 1 but to avoid the anxiety generated from violating internalized rules, she opts for Activity 1 and earns zero utility. This sub-game equilibrium corresponds to women acting as proxies that have internalized the gender norm - they prefer to not venture outside the household, neither for business nor for advice.

If Person Two opts for Activity 2, her actions impose externalities on those around her,

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4 Akerlof and Kranton (2000) assume players correspond to two genders, male and female. However, identity in a group Green is not identified by gender. Both men and women can belong in the Green group or the Red group.

5 If the woman also prefers Activity 1 to Activity 2, then there would be no conflict and she will prefer to not venture outside the household regardless of what Person One does. However, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) is based on the distinction that women are not a monolithic group, that differences in preferences will always exist.
Default rule: Men go out to earn; Women stay at home (*Activity 1*)

**Person Two**

- Women earn outside the home (*Activity 2*)
- *V, 0*

**Person One**

- Not respond
- Respond

= \[ V - I_0, V - I_s \]

- *V - c, V - I_s - L*

Figure 1: Identity archetypes of women’s agency in earning decisions

*Source*: Adapted from framework developed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000).

leading to a loss of utility equal to *I_s* and *I_o* respectively. Person One can successfully deter Activity Two if loss to Person One from Person Two engaging in business outside the home is high (*I_o > c*) and punishment imposed on Person Two is sufficiently high (*I_s + L > V*). With effective sanctions, Person Two’s agency is limited and her business is relegated to one that is sufficient for *subsistence*, run from home without a possibility of expansion. This equilibrium corresponds to a situation where the woman prefers to set or expand her business outside the household but is restricted to the household due to social sanctions. The private preferences of this woman would be different from the action she takes in real life.

Finally, Person One can choose to not respond to Person Two’s actions. As hoped by development initiatives and microfinance programs, this would be a situation where profit maximising female enterprise is not challenged by the society or the household. According to Akerlof and Kranton (2000), this is likely to happen when sufficient individuals belong to the *contravening* group for behavioural prescriptions to change or for their actions to not cause social anxiety.
Female Identity and Enterprise

At the time of data collection, our sample consisted of a small number of female entrepreneurs (76) and only 10 reported the business operated outside the home. Therefore, data restrictions does not allow us to investigate how preferences of women vary if the woman has high agency. A vast majority of women do not set up an enterprise, despite aspiring to do so; and for half of them, despite having access to finance. Others do have a business but one that is operated out of the home. Incentivized survey questions allow us to test if the average female preference for business reflects that of a proxy who has internalized gender norms; or if indeed women would prefer to venture outside the household and are restricted from doing so due to household sanctions.

3 Experiment Setting and Design

3.1 Setting and implementation

Our experiment uses incentivised survey questions administered to a sample of women participating in a microfinance RCT in peri-urban areas of Punjab, Pakistan. Pakistan is an interesting setting for exploring the relationship between gender norms and enterprise. The promise that microcredit holds for economic empowerment of women through home-based enterprise is significant given restrictions on female mobility outside the home. These restrictions have kept female participation in the labour force well below that in other countries with similar income (Field and Vyborny, 2016). Indeed, one out of every three woman who works in Pakistan, work out of home. Of the women who do not work, 40% report this is because their family members will not allow them to work outside the home. A further 15% report that they themselves would not like to work outside the home.6

The RCT was administered in August 2014 with randomly selected women given a small, 12-month loan of PKR 30,000 (≈ $30)7 to set up an enterprise. We have data on demographics, household decision making parameters and household expenses and assets from the follow-up survey conducted with 630 women in this sample in August 2016.8 We were able to conduct interviews with husbands or male decision makers9 in 585 households that participated in the RCT. Of the 585 male respondents, 74% were husbands, 12% were sons and 4% were brothers of female respondents. We were unable to accurately record private

6 From the Pakistan Time Use Survey 2007, as calculated by Field and Vyborny (2016).
7 PKR 30,000 represents the median loan size PKR 30,000. Loan size ranged between PKR 10,000 for first time borrowers to PKR 40,000 for four repeat borrowers.
8 Baseline surveys were conducted in August 2014; followed by a midline survey in 2015 and an endline survey in 2016. The loan product had been fully paid back by the time the midline survey was conducted. Incentivised survey questions were added to the endline survey.
9 We interviewed adult, male decision makers in the household if the female respondent was unmarried or in case the husband was unavailable.
preferences of 21 women, providing us with a final sample of 564 women.\textsuperscript{10} Table A1 in appendix A presents some descriptives of the female sample. The average female respondent is 37 years old and married. About half of the respondents are housewives, while 30\% of the sample either had a business, or works as a salaried or day labourer. The median female has low decision-making power in the household.

We also conduct the digit-span test with female respondents to test for processing ability and short-term memory (Dempster, 1981).\textsuperscript{11} Respondents are asked to repeat a sequence of numbers in order, starting from 3 digits and continuing to a maximum of 9 digits. The exercise concludes if the respondent makes a mistake is made. Out of a total of 7 questions asked in this test, the median female respondent in our sample are able to correctly answer the first three.

We administered incentivised questions at the end of the female questionnaire. Men were always interviewed first for this part. Men and women were not allowed to sit together and could not communicate their responses to each other. Further, we randomised the version of question administered at the household level to avoid information spillover between respondent households in the same community. All earnings were revealed at the end of the male and female questionnaire, respectively. Appendix C contains the protocol followed by the enumerators for the two experiments.

3.2 Experiment design

3.2.1 Elicitation of business preferences

We use incentivised survey questions to elicit male and female preferences for whether the female respondent should operate a business and if she should, then where should such a business be operated from.

\textit{Step 1:} We separately asked men and women to rank business opportunities in increasing levels of profit. They were presented with a list of three opportunities, with differing levels of income and expenditure. More importantly, the business opportunities differed in where the business activities had to be conducted: at home, by going to the nearby market or by going to the nearest big city to work with a distributor. In one version of the questionnaire, these opportunities were listed in increasing levels of profits; that is, profits increased from

\textsuperscript{10} To preserve anonymity of female responses, females were asked to record their preferences on a paper and put it in a sealed envelope. Due to errors in data entry, we could not match identifiers for 21 women and their data was dropped from the analysis. These women are not statistically different in any dimension from the sample that has been used in the following analysis.

\textsuperscript{11} Literature has found performance in digit span test to be positively correlated with responsiveness to advice and learning (Barham et al., 1981). In the context of micro-enterprise, de Mel et al. (2008) found that entrepreneurs with higher digit span scores also earned higher profits.
a business at home to one in the big city. In another version, these opportunities were listed in decreasing levels of profits, with the highest profits to be made at home and the lowest when going to the big city. This randomisation of the direction in which profits change as we vary business location allows us to separate location preferences from profit considerations.

Respondents earned PKR 100\(^{12}\) for ranking opportunities in increasing order of profits. This step allows us to check respondent understanding of profit levels. Subsequent decisions could then be separated from considerations of aptitude in estimating profits from costs and revenues.

**Step 2 (male):** We ask each male respondent which of the three business opportunities would he prefer for the female respondent. They could also choose for her to do none of the three.

**Step 2 (female):** The corresponding question asked to women directly has two parts: first, they were asked to imagine a hypothetical situation where access to finance or permission from household members was not a constraint and then to provide their preference for one of the three business listed or doing nothing. This part of the survey was not incentivised. To elicit honest responses these decisions were recorded privately - respondent marked their preferences on a piece of paper that they submitted to the enumerator in a sealed envelope.\(^{13}\) Next, we test for the accuracy with which women can predict male preferences. They were rewarded PKR 100 if they could correctly guess what their male partners had said in response to the same question.

### 3.2.2 Elicitation of demand for advice

We elicit measures of female demand for advice from the male partners or from a field expert. Women who conform to gender norms will prefer to not interact with outsiders. Further, we investigate if the demand for advice is driven by whether a woman conforms to in or the out-group activity. That is, if business preferences is correlated with the need to obtain male feedback and advice. We use one question testing knowledge and one testing abstract reasoning using Raven’s matrices. We inform the respondents that they will be rewarded with PKR 200 ($\approx 2$) for every question they answer correctly.

**Step 1:** We ask men one knowledge and one puzzle question and ask them to provide two possible answers. Men are informed that we may provide the two responses to their female partners if they ask for a hint and that each correctly answered question will earn PKR 200.

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\(^{12}\) PKR 100 $\approx 1$

\(^{13}\) While the rest of the survey was conducted on a tablet, we used paper to record the response to this question. Paper was used for two reasons: Direct entry on tablets was not something that was not as easily understood by the sample as ticking a preferred option on a piece of paper. In addition, confidentiality was more credibly maintained once their answer was sealed in an envelope, unseen by the enumerator who was interviewing the participant and seen only by the researcher who would enter the data later.
Step 2: We ask the female respondent one knowledge and one puzzle question. Before providing final answers, they are also provided the opportunity to ‘purchase’ advice for each question from the male partner or an expert for PKR. 0, 50 or 100. We elicited female demand from two types of advisers (expert or husband) at these three levels of cost. The actual cost and adviser available to the respondent was randomised and disclosed after she had indicated her preference for advice at that cost.

Step 3: We implement the choice women make about purchasing advice and ask them to provide the answer to each question asked. Note, while advice narrows down choice by listing the two answers male partner or expert thinks are correct, it does not eliminate all risk and women still have to make a final decision.

Note that the cost of advice is strictly less (or free) than the expected rewards. Therefore, in expectation, women should rationally take advantage of advice to maximise reward. In fact, ‘expert’ advice should be sought more in comparison to male advice if maximising reward is the dominant concern. Appendix C lists the knowledge and puzzle questions that were asked. Questions were randomised at the household level.

3.3 Estimating preference for business and advice

We use data collected from these two experiments to measure the extent of ‘home bias’ in demand for enterprise and advice. That is, we test if women tend to be proxies of gender prescriptions or if they prefer profit maximising ventures that can be extended out of the household when needed. Women are less likely to engage in business activities outside the household if costs from loss of identity and reprimand from other members of the household or society exceeds the utility from a large business. We measure if the men are likely to be in favour of their household member setting up a business, or the location of her business, by directly eliciting their preference on this decision.

We estimate the average preference for business profits and location as (1):

$$ y_{j,i} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \text{Female}_i + \alpha_1 \cdot z_{i0} + \phi_s + \varepsilon_i $$

Where $y_{j,i}$ is the preference for business location ($j = \text{home, nearby market, big city}, \text{or the preference to not set up an enterprise at all, 'Do nothing'}, \text{by individual } i$), Female is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is female. For each outcome, we control for female characteristics such as age, literacy, current occupation and decision making power. $\phi_s$ denote household level fixed effects and all standard errors are clustered at the individual level. $\beta_1$ provides the average difference between male and female preferences. Second, we exploit one source of random variation in our sample - half of the sample was randomly selected to receive an enterprise loan to set up a new business. Variable $\text{ITT}_i$ is defined as a binary variable equal to 1 if the $ith$ female was part of the treated group, 0 otherwise. We test if access to finance can affect business location preferences. That is, we estimate the
following:

\[ y_{j,i} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \text{Female}_i + \beta_2 \cdot \text{ITT}_i + \beta_3 \cdot \text{Female}_i \cdot \text{ITT}_i + \alpha_1 \cdot z_{i0} + \phi_s + \varepsilon_i \quad (2) \]

Third, we elicit female demand for advice. We first test if this advice has any instrumental value, that is advice leads to better choices. We then check if this demand is correlated with the kind of enterprise females would prefer to be involved in.

\[ y_{j,i} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot WTP_i + \alpha_1 \cdot z_{i0} + \phi_s + \varepsilon_i \quad (3) \]

Where \( y_i \) is still the preference for business location (\( j = \text{home, nearby market, big city} \)) by individual \( i \). \( WTP_i \) is a binary variable equal to 1 if the female is willing to pay a positive cost to obtain advice. Women who are considering to set up an enterprise that requires going out of the household, contradicting gender norms, may feel a greater need for advice. Conversely, women who conform to gender norms may do the opposite. Finally, we test if the willingness to pay for advice varies by the identity of the adviser. Social norms that restrict interactions with outsiders may also be reflected in a lower demand for advice from experts outside the household. However, the demand for expert advice may be positively correlated with business preferences for women who would prefer to set up an enterprise with operations outside the home.

4 Results

4.1 Preference for enterprise

Average understanding of profit levels is high - 76% of the respondents correctly rank profits. The likelihood of providing the correct ranking is not statistically different across the question versions. Women are only 3.5% less likely than men to rank correctly once we control for female characteristics, version and household effects, a difference that is economically small, even if statistically significant. 14 It is also worth noting that women are well aware of male preferences (see Figure B2 in Appendix B). That is, it is highly improbable that a woman in this sample has shown a different preference than that of her male partner because she does not know what his preference may be.

Very few respondents prefer for the women to do nothing (11% for men and 13% for women). Figure 2, panel (a) shows preferences by profit levels. Interestingly, demand for profits is non monotonic. Contrary to what a traditional model of profit maximising, rational agents would predict, respondents in our sample appear to not differentiate between high or low profit. Note, in one version of the question, business at home had the highest

14 See Figure B1 in appendix B for average responses by gender and question version.
profits; in the other, it was a business with operations in the city. Business operated in the
nearby local market was always in between. From these responses, it seems an average
respondent in this sample always prefers either home or the city to the local market.

The apparent anomaly in profit maximising behaviour can be explained when we take into
account the ‘location’ that each business opportunity involves. The high demand for an op-
portunity that afford low profits is driven by female response in version 1, when a business
within the home has the lowest profits. Similarly, the large preference for high profits by
women is again driven by their response to version 2, where the highest profits were to be
made at home. That is, location takes precedence over the profit considerations and there
is a a strong and clear preference for home based businesses among both men and women.
Figure 2, panel (b) summarizes the proportion of men and women who prefer businesses
operation to be restricted to the home, local market or the city.

On average, the difference between male and female preferences are not economically
large. In the context of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) model discussed above, women are
proxies of men, having internalized the norms that dictate division of labour between men
and women. High levels of individual anxiety, disutility or social sanctions would keep a
preference for out-group activities low.

In Table 1 we show regression results for location preference after controlling for female
characteristics and household fixed effects and find that small differences in preferences do
exist. Women are 3% less likely to want to operate a business from the home and about 2%
more willing to operate a business that would require them to go out to the nearby market.
Though there is evidence of some women preferring to operate business outside the home,
this demand is economically small. Reluctance to expand a home based enterprise outside
the home can explain why most microfinance impact evaluations find limited enterprise
growth (see for instance, (Duflo et al., 2013; Angelucci et al., 2015; Banerjee et al., 2014;
Crepon et al., 2015; Tarozzi et al., 2014).)

Table 1: Business choices by gender and location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Business location</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dummy: Female respondent</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)**</td>
<td>(0.009)**</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>1149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All regressions include controls for age, literacy, occupation, marital status, index of deci-
sion making power of the female respondent, an index of household assets and experiment ver-
sion. All regressions include household fixed effects with errors clustered at the individual level.
* * * $p < 0.01$, * * $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

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15 See figure ?? in appendix B.
Figure 2: Business preferences by gender

(a) Preference for profits

(b) Preference for locations

Note: \textit{x-axis} shows the business opportunity by (a) profits and (b) location, or doing nothing, that the (i) male selects for the female respondent in the household and (ii) the female selects for herself. The \textit{y-axis} displays the percentage of response by respondents who were able to rank business opportunities by profits correctly. Vertical bars represent the 95\% confidence interval.
Next, we investigate if preferences can be influenced by external circumstances. Specifically, we look at the impact of access to finance on male and female preferences. Random variation in access to finance provides half of our sample with an option to contravene gender prescriptions. We would expect to see a change in preferences for women who prefer to limit themselves to home-based businesses because they lack the financial resources to do more. Table 2 shows a large and significant impact on preferences. Households with access to finance are less likely to prefer home-based businesses (column 1) and more likely to prefer larger businesses that operate outside the home (column 3).16 Interestingly, there is no difference in the male and female preferences in the treated households. Women without access to finance are more likely to prefer staying at home without an enterprise (column 4).

\[ \text{Note: ITT refers to Intention to treat, that is the female belonged to the treatment sample to receive a microenterprise loan in 2014. All regressions include controls for age, literacy, occupation, marital status, index of decision making power of the female respondent, an index of household assets and experiment version. All regressions include household fixed effects with errors clustered at the individual level. \( \ast \ast \ast p < 0.01 \), \( \ast \ast p < 0.05 \), \( \ast p < 0.1 \).}\]

### 4.2 Preference for advice

As expected, the demand for advice falls with increasing cost (figure B3).17 Demand for partner’s advice is significantly higher at all costs than that for an expert implying a ‘home-
bias’ in whose advice women prefer. This result is even more striking when we consider the fact that preference for advice from expert did not mean the respondent could not express a preference for advice from male partner as well. The experiment design randomised implementation of advice but obtained preference for advice for each level of cost and for both advisers. Yet, many women (40% of the sample) do not want to find out what outsiders think are the solution to the presented problems even when advice is free and non-binding.

Figure 3: Female demand for advice

Note: Each panel shows the demand for different ‘prices’ of advice. No demand for advice is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent indicated she did not want advice at any purchase price, including 0. Advice for 0, 50, 100 refer to the purchase price that the respondent was willing to pay for advice. x-axis shows the ‘advisor’. The y-axis displays the percentage of female respondents who were willing to pay the given price to obtain advice.

Table 3 shows estimates for the instrumental value of advice. Individuals who receive advice are 11% more likely to answer correctly and earn a reward (column 1). However, women who receive advice from experts are 6% more likely to provide the correct answer (column 2). On the other hand, advice from male partners does not improve the likelihood of providing the correct answer. These results are robust to the inclusion of measures of processing ability (digit span level) and performance in the profit questions (profits ranked correctly).

Combined with the results in section 4.1, where the dominant choice is for business operations to be constrained to the household, a general lack of demand for non-binding advice
Table 3: Effect of advice on the probability of females giving a correct answer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Answers knowledge or non verbal question correctly</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received any advice</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>(0.038)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received advice from male partner</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received advice from expert</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)*</td>
<td>(0.036)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digit span level</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profits ranked correctly</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.040)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All regressions are using data on female respondents only. All regressions include controls for age, literacy, occupation, marital status, index of decision making power of the female respondent and an index of household assets. Errors clustered at the individual level. ***\(p < 0.01\), **\(p < 0.05\), *\(p < 0.1\).

that has the potential to optimise returns implies another possible explanation for limited business growth. Home-based businesses that are unwilling to learn from peers are likely to experience low growth and less likely to survive over time. We test for correlation between willingness to obtain advice and the business decisions made by women. Results are shown in table 4.

Interesting patterns emerge when we look at the individuals who were willing to pay a positive price for advice. We find that women who opt for operating a business out of the home are less likely to ask for advice (column 1). On the other hand, women who want to operate a business that will necessitate working with a large distributor are also more open to receiving advice (column 3). Table 5 disaggregates willingness to pay by identity of adviser. Correlation between demand and a preference for business are qualitatively the same. The difference in correlation by identity of adviser is not statistically significant, except when prefer to not set up an enterprise at all.\(^{18}\) In results not shown here, we also find that while the preference for business location can be impacted by access to finance, demand for advice is largely unaffected.

\(^{18}\) Women who prefer to not set up a business are more likely to pay for advice from expert, reflecting behaviour that is consistent with optimising experiment earnings.
Table 4: Business and advice choices by women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business location</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>Nearby market</td>
<td>Big city</td>
<td>Do nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTP</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)***</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.027)**</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>564.000</td>
<td>564.000</td>
<td>564.000</td>
<td>564.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All regressions include controls for age, literacy, occupation, marital status, index of decision making power of the female respondent and an index of household assets. WTP is equal to 1 if the individual is willing to pay a positive price for advice, 0 otherwise. All regressions include household fixed effects with errors clustered at the individual level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Table 5: Business and advice choices by women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business location</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>Nearby market</td>
<td>Big city</td>
<td>Do nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTP for husband advice</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)*</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTP for expert advice</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.059)**</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.046)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>564.000</td>
<td>564.000</td>
<td>564.000</td>
<td>564.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All regressions include controls for age, literacy, occupation, marital status, index of decision making power of the female respondent and an index of household assets. WTP(expert) is equal to 1 if the individual is willing to pay a positive price for advice from an expert, 0 otherwise. All regressions include household fixed effects with errors clustered at the individual level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
5 Conclusions

We conduct two experiments to elicit preference for business and advice in a sample of microfinance borrowers. Our results provide us with 4 key insights: One, we see a significant home-bias in the preferred location of business. Both men and women in our sample would prefer that the female set up or operate a business from her home. These preferences are reflective of a defined set of socio-cultural norms that frown upon women setting outside the home. In addition, male and female preferences coincide, despite female preferences being anonymous. Under the gender identity framework of Akerlof and Kranton (2000), this implies that women have internalized gender norms.

Second, we find that it is possible to influence these norms. We exploit random variation in access to finance as a result of this sample participating in a microfinance RCT. We measure the impact of standard microloan, two years after it was first disbursed and at least as year after it had been paid back. We find an effect that has sustained over this time. We also find an effect on male preferences despite women being the beneficiaries of the loan. Men and women from the treated households are significantly more likely to prefer larger businesses with operations in the city than a business that is limited to the home. However, this effect appears to be limited to a shift in preferences and not actual action.

Third, we find evidence of home bias in even the individuals women would like to approach for advice. Women prefer to obtain advice from their male partners, despite higher instrumental value from advice from a field expert.

Fourth, home bias in preference for advice and business are correlated. That is, home-based female business women may prefer to keep the scale of her business small by not fully exploiting the supplier networks, client base and employee market outside the vicinity of her home. In addition, she is unlikely to take advantage of the advice and experience of peers or experts outside the household.

Taken together, these results provide important insights into why many impact evaluations have found low growth in female run businesses. Women appear to prefer to not expand her business to avoid venturing outside the household. She may also be reluctant to obtain advice, especially from people outside her household, even if that advice can lead to immediate gains. For instance, a reluctance to obtain advice from experienced entrepreneurs could potentially limit growth of a business. Our results also imply that it is possible to change social norms and rules of conduct around female enterprise but these are not translated into action. So, development programs need to go beyond providing just finance and business knowledge training by, for instance, marketing how women can provide a meaningful contribution to the household income by expanding their market. Programs that focus on cooperative rather than confrontational household dynamics are likely to see larger effect.

Though these results are based on incentivised experiments, we rely on preferences for a hypothetical business that the can be set up if access to finance is not an issue. We do not
have data that can test out if these preferences are acted upon. The loans provided in the RCT were small in size and insufficient on its own encourage or sustain a business. Our results do show, however, that in addition to access to finance, gender identity can be an important determinant of preferences and hence actual behaviour.

This study contributes to the literature on gender identity by exploring another decision where identity may undermine what development policies aim to achieve by empowering women economically. For instance, Bertrand et al. (2015) find that women in Brazil are less likely to participate in the labour force because they are likely to earn more than their male partners. This contradicts the gender norm that prescribes men to be the primary income earners. Similarly, Mueller (2016) shows that female politicians in India are unlikely to make pro-female policies choices and may be proxies of male representatives. Similar to existing findings on advice-taking and social learning, we see a low demand for advice.\(^\text{19}\)

We add to the literature by differentiating the identity of adviser and show that the demand for advice is even lower for an individual who may have more valuable advice but does not belong to the household. Finally, we add to the existing literature exploring low growth in female enterprise. Where other studies have explored finance (Banerjee et al., 2015; Giné and Mansuri, 2011), technical skills (Blattman et al., 2015) and a need to hide income source from the household (de Mel et al., 2012; Fiala, 2015), results show that gender identity and internalised norms can also constrain the growth of businesses run by women.

\(^\text{19}\) see Barham et al. (2017) and Stone and Zafar (2014). Weizsacker (2008) provides a review of literature and concludes preference for information from peers is only slightly higher than preference for random decisions.
References


Said, Mahmud, d’Adda & Chaudhry


Appendix A   Tables
Table A1: Descriptive data from female respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.Dev.</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy: Respondent is currently married</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy: Respondent can read and write</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy: Respondent has completed primary education or less</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy: Respondent has completed at least secondary education</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level reached in the digit span test</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index: Assets owned by the household</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy: Respondent is a housewife</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy: Respondent is self-employed</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy: Respondent is a labourer</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy: Respondent is a salaried worker</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index: Respondent makes decisions in the household herself</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>-0.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of household decisions the female makes herself</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Decisions in the household include clothing and footwear, recreation, medical expenses, visiting friends, purchasing small items for self, purchasing for household members, investing surplus money, participating in a ROSCA or applying for a loan.
Appendix B  Figures

The figure below shows the percentage of total men and women who ranked profits correctly, for each version of the question asked. In version 1, business operated from home, local market, city were associated with increasing levels of profits. In version 2, they were associated with decreasing levels of profits. Respondents were more likely to rank profits in version 2 than in version 1. However, the difference in proportion who answer either version correctly is only significant for women.

Figure B1: Profits correctly ranked, by respondent gender and question version

Note: x-axis shows the version of the game played by men and women. Version 1 involved increasing levels of profits, version 2 involved decreasing level of profits. The y-axis measures percentage of respondents who were able to rank business opportunities by profits correctly.
The figure below plots male preferences and women’s guess of the preferences of her male partner. Differences between the actual male response and female guess are both economically and statistically insignificant.

**Figure B2: Female guess of male preference for business location**

Note: *x-axis* shows the business opportunity by location (or doing nothing) that the female respondent thinks the male selected for her. ‘Male’ refers to the actual male responses. The *y-axis* displays the percentage of male or female respondents with the displayed preference.

Figure B3 displays demand for advice for knowledge and non-verbal questions, at price PKR 0, 50, 100 ($\approx 0,0.5,1$). Demand decreases as price increases. Demand for advice is lower for knowledge questions than for non-verbal questions. Demand for expert advice is always lower than the demand for advice from male household member.
Figure B3: Female demand for advice

(a) Advice on knowledge questions

![Graph showing female demand for advice on knowledge questions]

(b) Advice on non-verbal questions

![Graph showing female demand for advice on non-verbal questions]

Note: Each panel shows the demand for different ‘prices’ of advice. No demand for advice is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent indicated she did not want advice at any purchase price, including 0. Advice for 0, 50, 100 refer to the purchase price that the respondent was willing to pay for advice. x-axis shows the ‘advisor’. The y-axis displays the percentage of female respondents who were willing to pay the given price to obtain advice.
Appendix C  Experiment script

Thank you for answering our survey and being a part of our research. Before we start with a small exercise, we would like to give you Rs. 300 as a compensation for your time in participating in this survey. These Rs. 300 are not a part of the activity and are yours to keep.

I would like to have brief conversation with your husband regarding our research. Can you please call him and give us 5 minutes alone in this room?

[Enumerator: If husband is available and willing to talk to us, proceed with the next questionnaire form. If husband not available, ask if it is possible to call him and agree with him on a time to visit again. If husband not available to talk on the phone, agree with the wife on a time to visit the household again when the husband will be present. If the husband is unwilling to talk to us, please record 77.

[Enumerator: If the respondent is unmarried or her husband does not live with her/is not a part of the household roster, then ask for the male household head. If household head is a female, then ask for the main male adult (18 or above) decision maker in the household. Step 1 is then to be administered to this male individual.]

If there is no husband and/or an adult male household member in the household then record 77.

**Step 1: Male respondent** Enumerator: [Communicate the following with the male respondent]

I will now ask you a few questions. Your answers in these questions can help you earn up to Rs. 100 so please answer carefully and honestly. Please ask for clarification if you do not understand any question. Your answers will remain completely confidential and not revealed with your name outside this house. None of the responses here will be recorded with your name.

[Enumerator: Please make sure that the female respondent cannot hear what you are saying to the male household member]

Step 1: with male husband/household head/main male decision maker Record Name. Record Relationship with main female respondent.

1. There are 3 business opportunities: Version I:
   1. Business A which is to be done at home and yields Rs. 5,000 in sales every month and running cost is Rs. 2,000
   2. Business B which is to be done by going to the nearby market and yields Rs. 10,000 every month and running cost is Rs. 6,000
3. Business C which is to be done by going to the big city to work with a big distributor and yields Rs. 16,000 every month and running cost is Rs. 10,000

Version II:

1. Business A which is to be done at home and yields Rs. 5,000 in sales every month and running cost is Rs. 1,000

2. Business B which is to be done by going to the nearby market and yields Rs. 10,000 every month and running cost is Rs. 7,000

3. Business C which is to be done by going to the big city to work with a big distributor and yields Rs. 16,000 every month and running cost is Rs. 14,000.

Rank these in order of increasing profit levels. If you get the ranking correct you will get Rs.100. [Enumerator: please show the respondent the paper with the 3 options and record his response].

2. Imagine a situation where your wife has managed to obtain a loan so finance is not a constraint. Consider the same business options that I just gave you plus the option of ‘doing nothing’. Of the 4 options, which would you choose for her?

Before I talk to your wife I would also like to ask you to answer a question. Please let us know of the two possible answers to the following question. Please note that the choices you make may be given as advice to your wife for the same question. If she gets the correct answer, she will earn up to Rs.200.

[Ask version 1/2/3/4 as randomised]

Version 1: Who has the highest wickets in one day cricket? A. Wasim Akram, B. Muttiah Muralithran, C. Shane Warne, D. Waqar Younis

Version 2: In medicine, which of these is usually denoted by 120/80 for an adult? A: Normal Pulse B: Normal Hearing C: Normal vision D: Normal Blood Pressure

Version 3: Starting from the junior most, arrange these ranks in the Pakistan Army in ascending order of seniority: 1. Lieutenant Colonel, 2. general, 3. Colonel, 4. Lieutenant General A. 1243 B. 3421 C. 2431 D. 1342

Version 4: Which of these cannot be the same for two different people? A. Skin Colour B. Fingerprints C. Blood Group D. Eye Colour.

Please also look at the following pattern. Here are a group of pictures that follow some order. Can you guess what the next picture in this sequence will be? You have the following options. Again, let us know which two shapes could complete the pattern. Please note that the choices you make may be given as advice to your wife for the completing the pattern. If she gets the correct answer, she will earn up to Rs.200.

[Show version 1/2/3/4 as randomised]
Non-verbal question: Version 1

Non-verbal question: Version 2

Non-verbal question: Version 3
Non-verbal question: Version 4

[If correct profit ranking] Thank you for your time. You won Rs. 100 from your answer to the first question that I will hand to you now.

I will now like to talk to (female respondent) again to complete the survey with her.

[Enumerator: Please hand over the money won (and get proof of payment.)]

[If incorrect ranking] Thank you for your time. Unfortunately, you did not rank the options correctly and therefore, I am unable to pay you Rs. 100.

I will now like to talk to (female respondent) again to complete the survey with her.

**Step 2: Female respondent** Enumerator: Communicate the following to the female respondent: I will now ask you a few more questions. Your answers in these questions can help you earn up to Rs. 200 so please answer carefully and honestly. Please ask for clarification if you do not understand any question. Your answers will remain completely confidential. None of the responses here will be recorded with your name. 1. There are 3 business opportunities: Version I:

1. Business A which is to be done at home and yields Rs. 5,000 in sales every month and running cost is Rs. 2,000
2. Business B which is to be done by going to the nearby market and yields Rs. 10,000 every month and running cost is Rs. 6,000
3. Business C which is to be done by going to the big city to work with a big distributor and yields Rs. 16,000 every month and running cost is Rs. 10,000

Version II:

1. Business A which is to be done at home and yields Rs. 5,000 in sales every month and running cost is Rs. 1,000
2. Business B which is to be done by going to the nearby market and yields Rs. 10,000 every month and running cost is Rs. 7,000

3. Business C which is to be done by going to the big city to work with a big distributor and yields Rs. 16,000 every month and running cost is Rs. 14,000.

Rank these in order of increasing profit levels. If you get the ranking correct you will get Rs.100. [ Enumerator: please show the respondent the paper with the 3 options and record her response].

2. Imagine a situation where you have managed to obtain a loan so finance is not a constraint and you do not have to consider whether you will be able to obtain permission from your husband/household head. From the business plans specified in step 1 (with the added option of ‘doing nothing’), which one would you choose for yourself? [ Enumerator: hand the paper to the respondent with 4 options and ask them to select. Once selected, put the answer in the envelope and seal it]. Please tick on the paper, fold it and then give it to me. I will put it in an envelope and seal it. This will not be revealed to anyone in your household and will only be known to the research team who will never tell anyone.

3. Consider the same business options as in step 2 (3 businesses plus the option to do nothing). Imagine again a situation where you have managed to obtain a loan so finance is not a constraint. Which of the 4 options will your husband/household head choose for you? Your husband/household head was asked to choose for you from these 4 options and you will get Rs.100 if your answer matches his. [ Enumerator: provide a new piece of paper with 4 options]. Please tick on the paper. [ Enumerator: please enter on tablet her choice]. If she chooses the doing nothing option, then ask her why she chose this option: [ Enumerator: do not prompt. Multiple responses are allowed. For example if she says she and her household members don’t think it is suitable for her to run a business, then tick 1 and 2]

1. Husband/household head doesn’t think it’s suitable for her to run a business.

2. She doesn’t think it is suitable to run a business.

3. Husband/household head thinks she is not capable.

4. She doesn’t think she is capable.

5. There are other better uses of the money.

Advice taking

Part I: knowledge question [ Randomise order between part I and part II]

We will now ask you a question for which if you give the correct answer you will get Rs.200. We will also offer you the opportunity to get advice on the answer for the question we ask you from your husband/household head or an expert with knowledge of the field we have asked you the question about. Please listen to the question first and then wait for us to offer you the opportunity to take advice before you give your answer.
In this envelope there is a voucher for Rs.0, Rs. 50 or Rs. 100 for advice from either husband or an expert. We will now offer you to get advice from husband and/or an expert for giving up this amount from your winnings. We will open this envelope later to reveal what amount is written in it and who you have the opportunity to get advice from but before that for all amounts, we will ask you what you would want to do.

Whatever you decide, we will implement it once the envelope is opened. Please note that the advice will be two correct choices in the opinion of the expert.

[Enumerator: make sure respondent understands that we will implement the choice that she makes now once the envelope is opened]

1. Would you be willing to pay Rs. 0 to get advice from your husband?
2. Would you be willing to pay Rs.50 to get advice from your husband?
3. Would you be willing to pay Rs.100 to get advice from your husband?
4. Would you be willing to pay Rs. 0 to get advice from an expert?
5. Would you be willing to pay Rs. 50 to get advice from an expert?
6. Would you be willing to pay Rs. 100 to get advice from an expert?

[Enumerator: Open envelope: Advice from husband/expert and voucher amount 0/50/100. Accordingly implement choice. If expert choice is written on the voucher and woman willing to take it for the voucher amount, show options B and D as two possible correct choices. If husband choice is written on the voucher and woman is willing to take it for the voucher amount, show the two cards the husband chose.]

**Part II: Non verbal question**

We will now ask you a question for which if you give the correct answer you will get Rs.200. We will also offer you the opportunity to get advice on the answer for the question we ask you from your husband/household head or an expert with knowledge of the field we have asked you the question about. Please listen to the question first and then wait for us to offer you the opportunity to take advice before you give your answer.

The question is: [randomised] Here are a group of pictures that follow some order. Can you guess what the next picture in this sequence will be? You have the following options. [Enumerator: Show the respondent the graphic cards and then ask them to select their best guess. Enter their guess here].

[Show and ask version 1/2/3/4 as randomised]

In this envelope there is a voucher for Rs.0, Rs. 50 or Rs. 100 for advice from either husband or an expert. We will now offer you to get advice from husband and/or an expert for giving up this amount from your winnings. We will open this envelope later to reveal...
what amount is written in it and who you have the opportunity to get advice from but before that for all amounts, we will ask you what you would want to do.

Whatever you decide, we will implement it once the envelope is opened. Please note that the advice will be two correct choices in the opinion of the expert.

[Enumerator: make sure respondent understands that we will implement the choice that she makes now once the envelope is opened]

1. Would you be willing to pay Rs. 0 to get advice from your husband?
2. Would you be willing to pay Rs. 50 to get advice from your husband?
3. Would you be willing to pay Rs. 100 to get advice from your husband?
4. Would you be willing to pay Rs. 0 to get advice from an expert?
5. Would you be willing to pay Rs. 50 to get advice from an expert?
6. Would you be willing to pay Rs. 100 to get advice from an expert?

[Enumerator: Open envelope: Advice from husband/expert and voucher amount 0/50/100. Accordingly implement choice. If expert choice is written on the voucher and woman willing to take it for the voucher amount, show options B and D as two possible correct choices. If husband choice is written on the voucher and woman is willing to take it for the voucher amount, show the two cards the husband chose.]

Payment: [Profit ranking questions: Your answer matches that of your husband/household member whom we asked earlier. Therefore, you win Rs. 100. / Your answer does not match that of your husband/household member. Therefore we cannot pay you Rs. 100.]

[Your answer to the [knowledge and/or non verbal question] was correct. You win (additional) Rs. 200 (or Rs. 400 if both correct)/ Your answer to the [knowledge/non verbal question] was incorrect. Therefore you do not get the Rs. 200 from that question. Deduct the applicable cost of advice if the respondent has positive earnings and opted for advice.]