

Network Structures and Public Good Provision

Evidence from village kinship networks in the Gambia

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Abstract

Public goods such as water wells and roads are especially important in a developing-country context. This paper studies how social networks can be used to mitigate the free-rider problem predicted by economic theory. I consider whether the level of connectedness of a household (*network centrality*) within the village affects its decision to contribute to public goods using data from rural areas in the Gambia. As an identification strategy, I use an instrumental variable approach that exploits the arguably exogenous variation in village ethnic composition, largely determined by random historical accident. The findings suggest that better-connected households contribute more to some public goods. The network position effect is smaller when using a centrality measure that accounts for indirectly connected households. This paper also offers networks as a potential mechanism that explains the long-established relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods.

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1 Introduction

The economic theory of public goods generally predicts that, when public good provision is private, the free-rider problem arises.¹ Yet, we observe abundant informal cooperation for voluntary public good provision, especially in the developing country setting. One theory suggests that social capital may help mitigate this market failure through networks such as kinship connections.² Additionally, one strand of game theory literature has investigated how network structures and network positions influence public good contribution (See, for example, [Ballester et al. \(2006\)](#) and [Bramoullé and Kranton \(2007\)](#)). Despite the rich theory literature, there is a lack of causal empirical evidence that establishes the relationship between networks and public goods. The current study aims to fill this gap in the literature by investigating whether networks actually play a role in facilitating cooperation and whether the network position of an agent affects his contribution level.

In this paper, I provide rigorous empirical evidence that network position does indeed affect household voluntary public good contribution. More precisely, I show that better-connected agents contribute more, using data from rural villages in the Gambia. The empirical challenge of this estimation lies in the endogeneity of the network formation process. An observed relationship between network position and public good contribution could be spurious, because network position is correlated with some other unobserved attributes. To establish this causal relationship, I employ an instrumental variable (IV) method that makes use of arguably exogenous variation in village ethnic composition to predict household network position. In an ethnically diverse country, such as the Gambia, having more households of the same ethnic group in the village serves as a proxy for having more kinship connections, mainly due to the patrilineal culture.

The validity of this IV hinges on the patterns of settlements being exogenous to factors influencing public good contribution. For a given ethnic group, the fact that group size is larger in some parts of the country than in others is, by a large extent, determined by historical accidents. To address the main concern for household sorting into villages, I show that, within the same ethnic group, households with small and large ethnic representation are similar across all observed socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Moreover, data from the Gambia census reveal that village ethnic composition has been historically determined and remained stable across time. In light of the fact that there is no sorting based on a wide range of observed variables, any remaining concern for the unobserved variables

¹I consider public goods that are relatively non-excludable such as roads and water wells that are shared by everyone in a given village. Individuals have incentives to free-ride by under-reporting their valuations and still gain benefits of public goods due to non-excludability.

²For a comprehensive survey of the social capital literature, see [Durlauf and Fafchamps \(2005\)](#).

correlated with public goods is likely to be minor in this case. Additionally, I employ an extensive set of control variables to reduce possible omitted variable bias. Given the current set of evidence, the exogeneity assumption seems plausible at least in this context. In terms of the exclusion restriction, the anthropological and historical literature documents that ethnic identity in the Gambia is not as salient in everyday life decisions compared to other West African countries (no incidence of ethnic conflict, no language barrier, and so on); therefore, ethnic composition should not influence public good decisions directly.

To estimate the effect of network position on public good contribution, I use a unique dataset from rural Gambia that contains information on complete village kinship networks. These traditional rural societies have poor access to electricity and reliable water sources. They rely heavily on community involvement to provide and maintain public goods with some assistance from the governmental and non-governmental organizations. Public goods considered in this paper include roads, communal buildings, water wells, public education and public health; all of which are shared at the village level.

My main results suggest that central households voluntarily contribute more. When using degree centrality as a measure of household network position, I find that the effect is slightly larger than that of eigenvector centrality, possibly indicating that direct links are more important than indirect links in public good decisions (see the appendix for formal definitions of network terminology). The estimates are robust to controlling for various types of relationships outside the village and using different subsamples that exclude extreme majorities and minorities. At the village level, there is some evidence that denser networks sustain a higher level of contribution, but the relationship is inconclusive. I interpret the results as evidence that social capital in networks can be used to facilitate cooperation. There are several mechanisms that can explain this network centrality effect on cooperation such as monitoring, social pressure, pure altruism, and information diffusion. However, because of data limitations, I estimate the net effects of these mechanisms and do not distinguish among them.

To my knowledge, this paper is the first to provide field-based evidence outside of a laboratory setting.³ It also offers an alternative interpretation to the long established results that ethnic fragmentation lowers public goods, thereby adding to the public good literature. The results provide suggestive evidence of social networks as a mechanism causing this relationship. In this paper, the data allows me to break down the analysis to the household level; this is useful because agents, even within the same group, may face different levels of incentives to provide public goods. This breakdown helps supplement the results in the

³The findings resonate with the results of an experimental study by [Carpenter et al. \(2010\)](#) who conduct a lab experiment to compare public good contribution under different network structures.

literature that mostly use aggregate public good data.

This paper contributes to the growing empirical literature that estimates the effects of social networks on economic outcomes, especially in the developing country context. For example, many network studies have been particularly interested in peer effects⁴; however, only a few recent papers have taken network structure into account when considering public goods contribution.⁵ In this work, I attempt to estimate the causal effects of network positions on an outcome, a relationship that has not been studied empirically using a non-experimental approach.

While my empirical strategy is specific to the unique context of the Gambia, the findings yield broader policy implications for development projects that require collective action within a community. Examples of such projects are the growing Community-Driven Development (CDD) programs led by the World Bank ([Wong \(2012\)](#)).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines potential mechanisms and discusses theoretical works that establish links between network structures and public good contribution. Section 3 describes data used in the paper. Section 4 explains the identification strategy and establishes the validity of the method. Section 5 presents main findings and robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 concludes.

2 Theoretical Motivation

The motivation of this paper is largely based on theoretical works that have established a connection between social networks and public goods. In this section, I discuss possible mechanisms through which network positions may affect public good contribution. I also review the game theoretical literature that considers cooperative games in the network setting. Although most existing models do not apply directly to the current context, I discuss how some aspects might explain what can be observed in the data. In terms of theoretical predictions, there is no consensus in the literature on the relationship between individual network position and his equilibrium level of contribution. Theoretical results generally depend on assumptions made regarding the excludability of public goods and the nature of network links. An empirical analysis in this paper therefore aims to provide some guidance for future theoretical works.

⁴An agent behavior is influenced by his/her peers' behavior. See, for examples, [Conley and Udry \(2010\)](#), [De Giorgi et al. \(2009\)](#).

⁵[Jackson et al. \(2012\)](#) examine favor exchange in networks and propose that a threat of losing common links can be used to sustain a seemingly fragile one-shot game. They provide empirical evidence that such support structure is prevalent in Indian village networks. [Alatas et al. \(2012\)](#) and [Banerjee et al. \(2013\)](#) take a structural approach to model diffusion of information also in the developing country context. Both find that central agents are better informed and better able to contribute to the diffusion of information.

In rural areas of developing countries, public goods often refer to infrastructure such as roads, schools, and water wells that are sometimes non-excludable in the community.⁶ Agents, or in this case, households, have access to public goods regardless of their contribution and network connections.⁷ In terms of network interactions, there seems to be some strategic complementarities between the contributions of two connected agents, since we observe a positive correlation between them. The interpretation of such complementarity is further discussed below. In the absence of networks, the situation reverts back to the classical public good model that results in free-riding of agents.

Among others, [Belhaj et al. \(2012\)](#) develop a model that can be applicable with the current setting, in that they study a class of cooperative games in networks with linear best-reply functions.⁸ In this model, contributions between connected agents are assumed to be strategic complements. Their theoretical results show that when network effects are small, an agent’s equilibrium contribution is proportional to his/her centrality. This simple prediction is appealing for an empirical test; however, the proportionality depends on the size of a theoretical parameter and the overall shape of network structures. When the network effect is large, this relationship breaks down. The equilibrium solution may not exist without further assumption about the bound of contribution. Moreover, if the interactions between actions of connected agents are strategic substitutes, instead of complements, the equilibrium solution may involve complex multiple equilibria ([Bramoullé et al. \(2013\)](#)). Therefore, testing these models directly requires collecting more data as well as assumptions that may not be reasonable nor testable.

Instead of viewing network relationships as strategic interactions, a different model by [Wolitzky \(2013\)](#) considers network connections as monitoring channels (agents can observe only behaviors of those connected to them). Under this setup, a group can sustain the maximum level of cooperation (contribution) using a grim trigger strategy.⁹ The model also makes a similar prediction that central agents have a higher level of cooperation. The equilibrium characterization relies on the fact that an agent deviates from his maximum cooperation once he receives some information of any deviation from his connected peers. The information about deviation then diffuses along network links to other agents. Eventually,

⁶This is suggested in the focus group interviews discussed in Section 3.

⁷A branch of theory literature focus on *local public goods* in which goods are non-excludable only along a link but not to others. Working examples of such public goods are innovations and information. The interactions between the contributions of two connected agents are often assumed to be strategic substitutes. Relevant papers include [Bramoullé and Kranton \(2007\)](#), [Bloch and Zenginobuz \(2007\)](#) and [Galeotti and Goyal \(2010\)](#).

⁸An example of payoff function that might fit the current setting of global public good is a modification of Equation (1) in [Ballester et al. \(2006\)](#) with an additional term to capture non-excludability at the network level *i.e.* agents’ payoffs also depend on the total contribution.

⁹Each agent plays the maximum level of cooperation, until he observes a deviation.

the entire cooperation collapses after the deviation of at least one agent. In rural villages, however, public good projects are generally village-wide activities. It is possible that a villager can observe those without links present at an ongoing project regardless of network structures. Therefore, a kinship network used in this paper may not be the best proxy for a monitoring network for public goods.

As presented above, there is no consensus in the theory literature on how network positions or, more specifically, network centrality, affect public good contribution. Instead of directly testing any specific model, which would require making untestable assumptions given the current dataset, I estimate the empirical relationship between network centrality and household public good contribution. This exercise can help shed light on the direction of the relationship and, indeed, whether such relationship exists at all.

The theoretical basis in the above set of literature motivates me to choose eigenvector centrality among many network measures in the literature.¹⁰ Eigenvector centrality is designed to capture impacts from both directly and indirectly connected agents, whereas a simpler measure, degree centrality, focuses only on the direct peers. Another benefit is that the results can be compared with other empirical studies that also use eigenvector centrality (for example, [Banerjee et al. \(2013\)](#), [Alatas et al. \(2012\)](#)).

In addition to the theory literature, a similar question has been studied only in an experimental setting by [Carpenter et al. \(2010\)](#). In the experiment, subjects were assigned into groups of four and asked to play repeated public good games. In this context, the (exogenously imposed) network connections dictated who observed whom in terms of contribution. The researchers found that agents contributed more when being monitored more. Also, well-connected networks yielded a higher level of contribution.

In a non-experimental setting, there are other possible mechanisms that can explain why network centrality might affect public good contribution. I outline three possible mechanisms in addition to monitoring in this section.

First, central agents may face a higher threat of social punishment. They have more to lose if they shirk. The idea of social punishment or social sanction has been extensively explored in the public good literature; yet, it largely ignores social networks as an implementing channel. For example, [Miguel and Gugerty \(2005\)](#) build a simple public good model in which agents can punish free-riders of the same ethnic group but not across ethnic groups. Therefore, a highly diverse community has a lower contribution level because its members cannot impose punishment effectively. However, such a relationship cannot explain a low level of public goods in places with ethnic homogeneity ([Esteban et al. \(2012\)](#)). On the

¹⁰Eigenvector centrality corresponds to a special case of Bonacich centrality, the measure used in [Ballester et al. \(2006\)](#) and [Belhaj et al. \(2012\)](#). See the appendix for further discussion.

contrary, these cases may be better explained by network fragmentation, rather than ethnic fragmentation. Consider two unconnected agents from the same ethnic group; if one free-rides, another would not have any credible means to assert social pressure. On the flip side, it is also possible that two agents of different ethnicities may be connected and thus possess the means to punish each other. This type of punishment is also observed in experimental settings (see [Fehr and Gächter \(2000\)](#), [Masclot et al. \(2003\)](#), [Ertana et al. \(2009\)](#)). In some cases, findings indicate that experimental subjects choose to punish free-riders even at their own costs.

Second, network centrality may serve as a proxy for the true valuation of public goods if an individual valuation of public goods depends upon the number of friends/families he has. A central agent has more to gain by contributing to public goods because she cares about more people within a given network. This mechanism is closely related to altruistic links among extended family studied in the previous literature ([Altonji et al. \(1992\)](#), [Cox and Fafchamps \(2008\)](#)).

Third, the free-rider problem could stem from information asymmetry.¹¹ When the true valuation of public goods is private information, agents have incentives to underreport their preferences, resulting in inefficient allocations. In the network context, it is possible that the private information of central agents is better known within their networks. There is some evidence in models of information diffusion that more central agents are better informed ([Banerjee et al. \(2013\)](#), [Alatas et al. \(2012\)](#)). The opposite may be true that their private information might also spread faster in the network.

Despite the rich theoretical literature, empirical studies that provide causal evidence have been limited. The current study provides empirical evidence for the relationship between network centrality and voluntary public good contribution. Due to the limitations of the data, I only estimate the net effects of the mechanisms outlined above and do not distinguish between them.

3 Data

3.1 Survey and Sampling method

I examine the effect of network positions on voluntary public good contribution using cross-sectional data from the Gambia. The data is part of a baseline household survey for an impact evaluation of the Gambia Community-Driven Development Project (CDDP) con-

¹¹This is studied in the literature related to Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms.

ducted between February and May 2009.¹² To create a nationally representative dataset, wards were randomly selected from 6 Local Government Areas (LGA) out of 8 LGAs covering the entire country. Then, 3 - 8 rural villages were randomly chosen from each selected ward. Table 1 shows summary statistics at the village level. The villages are small with the number of households, ranging from 18 to 138. The economic conditions are those of traditional rural societies with little access to electricity and improved water sources.

The data contain information on 2,718 households from 60 villages in rural areas.¹³ The aim of the survey was to cover a wide range of networks as extensively as possible. This includes data on complete networks for various types of relationships within the village. Using an ethno-graphical approach, the survey team covered 94% of all households in the sampled villages.

For the main analysis, I restrict the sample to a subset of villages referred to as *stable villages* because my identifying assumption is more credible for this given subset. The subsample includes 2,110 households in 48 villages. The details regarding this restriction will be discussed in Section 4. The results for the full sample are similar to the main analysis and are included as a robustness check.

In rural Gambia, villagers are usually organized into compounds in which members of the same family, related by blood or marriage, live together in a group of huts. Usually a compound can be identified as a household. In some cases, however, some members of a compound declare themselves as an independent household (15% of the sample household heads are not compound heads). The distinction between a household and a compound is generally recognizable to the village head and other villagers.

Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for households in the sample. The large average household size of 13 is explained by polygamous culture, with 48% of the households being polygamous. A head is generally the oldest male in the household or his widow. A typical household may consist of multi-generational nuclear families (van de Walle and Gaye (2006)). The average annual self-reported per capita income was 2,282 Gambia Dalasi (Approximately 302 PPP-adjusted US Dollars per year or 0.8 US Dollars per day in 2008). This monetary income was likely an inaccurate measure of standard of living of these households because of agricultural activities and the informal sector.¹⁴ The preferred measures of wealth

¹²The data were generously shared with me by Dany Jaimovich of Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany. See Jaimovich (2011) and Arcand et al. (2010) for more detailed data description.

¹³The network module in the survey is most complete with information of networks on 2,886 households as in Jaimovich (2011). The final sample is smaller due to some missing variables. Even though I need to drop some households with missing data, they still count as a part of networks of households in the final sample

¹⁴Since the majority of households (73%) worked in the agricultural sector, economic transactions could be in-kind. Their actual consumption and standard of living may have been higher than the self-reported

are the number of huts with corrugated roofs and the number of huts with grass roofs.

3.2 Public goods in rural Gambia

The setting of a traditional rural society makes the Gambia suitable for my interest in network-level interactions. The cooperation of villagers in providing and maintaining public goods is prevalent, although there is some involvement of government and NGOs. This dataset contains unique information on individual household contribution that allows me to study household-level incentives to contribute to public goods.

The questionnaire asked whether each household had any member who participated in specific *village activities for the community* including roads, communal buildings, water wells, public education, and public health. Even though the public good question does not ask for specific tasks performed as a contribution, the public good provision in this case is defined broadly to include maintenance of the goods as well. In addition, the survey specifies the form of each contribution (e.g. voluntary, paid work, or monetary contribution). Approximately, 6% of all contributions were monetary, less than 1% was work with pay, and the rest were voluntary work. In this study, I focus on voluntary contribution including both monetary and in-kind work and exclude paid work to isolate the incentives to contribute induced by networks rather than monetary incentives.

Ideally, we would measure contribution in a more detailed manner, *i.e.* total monetary amount or time spent contributing. However, the survey elicits only binary variables for contribution to different categories of public goods. In addition to these binary variables, I construct another outcome variable by summing the total number of public goods to which a household contributes. Panel B of Table 2 shows summary statistics of the six outcome variables. Note that only 3% of the sample households reported not contributing at all. On average a household contributes to 2.7 public goods.

The pattern of contribution reveals that there is a high correlation for contributions among households in the same village. For each type of public goods, there are some villages with zero contribution. Since the timing of the public good question covered only one year prior to the survey, this pattern might indicate that contribution also depends on projects occurring during the time period. This circumstance, in turn, depends on needs that arise in the village. Since, the definition of public good contribution is defined broadly, I assume that there is always an opportunity for villagers to contribute to any type of public goods.¹⁵

In addition to the main questionnaire, the survey team conducted focus group interviews

monetary income. Unfortunately, we do not have information on consumption or sources of income.

¹⁵I also experiment with conditioning on whether a public good project exists by excluding villages with zero contribution for each type of public goods. Doing so does not significantly change the main results.

among villagers in 29 villages (as reported in [Arcand et al. \(2010\)](#)). The participants were selected at random and invited to the interviews.¹⁶ Even though we do not have specific information about existing public goods or the need for certain public goods, this focus group report provides some insight into the public good situation in the rural Gambia context. The report suggests that, in all 29 cases, both male and female villagers (who composed separate interview groups) considered access and distribution of public goods to be universal. Given this response, public goods considered are likely to be non-excludable at the village level.

I next summarize some relevant aspects of each village public good as described in the field report. First of all, water wells were noted as most inadequate in 27 out of 29 villages, followed by roads, public health, and public education. Villagers typically shared one or two wells/boreholes with a hand pump. Based on the government report on water resources ([Jarju \(2009\)](#)), these wells were hand-dug and not very deep because of the shallow sand aquifer that received underground water from the Gambia River. Given that every household needs water and that water wells are typically the main source of clean water, they are a good representative of public goods that require voluntary contribution. The second most important public good is the availability of roads. Having good roads is related to having improved access to hospitals, markets, and other facilities outside of the village. This access is crucial to monetary income because the rural Gambia economy relies heavily on groundnut exports ([Sylla \(2010\)](#)). In the Gambia, there are two main all-weather roads that stretch from East to West along the north and the south banks of the Gambia river. Smaller roads that branch out into villages are generally dirt roads that can be easily damaged during the monsoon season. The baseline report also suggests that some villages were not accessible by roads all year round. Contributions to roads may include activities such as building a new dirt road and repairing damages from flood and rain. Another type of public good is communal buildings, such as town halls. A mosque is also considered a community building; therefore, incentives to contribute might vary with religion. This motivates me to control for religion in all specifications. Note that 99% of the sample population is Muslim.

Public education and public health refer to the construction and maintenance of related facilities such as schools and village health facilities. A specific example, as told by a village chief during an interview: an NGO recently started a primary school project by supplying construction materials, the villagers then had to cooperate and organize their own manual labor for the construction. There could also be other types of contributing tasks that require certain skills such as teaching or medical training. More educated individuals may be more able to contribute to public education. For this particular example, however, since the majority of the sample is illiterate, contribution to public education may not necessarily

¹⁶In practice, this was not always the case because some villagers passing by might have joined in as well.

mean formal teaching. For instance, [Gamble \(1949\)](#) documents the use of folklore as a way to transfer knowledge. Given this type of education, one does not require literacy to be able to contribute to public education.

3.3 Network Data

The network module contains binary data on kinship ties among all households within a village. All relationships considered here are undirected and unweighted.¹⁷ The type of relationships considered here is kin networks, a term that refer to the blood relations of a household head and his wives.¹⁸ The questionnaire asked which households the household head and wives had direct blood relationships with (father/children, direct brother/sisters).

Figure 1 illustrates network graphs that represent kin relationships among households in 2 villages in the sample. Each node represents a household and each line presents a kin relationship between the two connected households. The colors of the nodes show whether the household contributes to a particular type of public good (as labeled in the figure).

Two different measures of network centrality are selected based on the theoretical motivation as discussed in Section 2. Each of which measure intends to capture the relative importance of a node in a graph under different concepts. The simplest measure of centrality, “degree centrality,” is the number of links a household has. This measure, however, does not take into account other aspects of the network beyond the locality of a given agent. It is possible that being connected to an influential agent may make one more influential relative to being connected to a non-influential agent. “Eigenvector centrality” captures this aspect by weighting in the centrality of each connected node. This measure allows households with the same degree centrality to vary depending on their extended networks. The correlation between the two measures is approximately 0.6.¹⁹ Eigenvector centrality differs more from degree centrality when there are many low-degree nodes (households with fewer links) connecting to high-degree nodes. Figure 2 shows the distribution of degree centrality and eigenvector centrality.

Additionally, at the village level, I present a descriptive analysis of how aggregate public good contribution (the percentage of households contributing to public goods) may vary with a network structure measure. I use network density, which represents how well connected

¹⁷An *undirected* link means that household i and household j are connected even if only one of them reports the relationship. An *unweighted* link refers to a binary relationship with no information on the strength of the tie.

¹⁸The data also contains information on networks of economic-interactions among households. I focus mainly on the kinship networks for which my identification strategy is strongest. The results for economic-exchange networks are also included in the Online Appendix.

¹⁹This is significantly lower than the correlation found in [Valente et al. \(2008\)](#) who consider 62 health-related networks from 7 different studies.

households are within a village relative to all possible connections. The descriptive statistics for all network characteristics are reported in Table 3.

4 Estimation Strategy

4.1 Identification

In estimating the effects of network position on public good contribution, the main concern is the endogeneity of network positions.²⁰ Households choose with whom to form links. The direction of the bias in OLS estimates is ambiguous depending on the underlying network formation process. Furthermore, there may also be other omitted variables. For example, a previous study by Anderson et al. (2004) identifies trust as a determinant reducing individual public good contribution. If more trustworthy households are also more central, omitting a trust measure may therefore bias the OLS estimates downward. Another determinant of public good contribution that may also create a downward bias is the number of females in the households. Nowell and Tinkler (1994) find that females generally contribute more to public goods. In a male-dominant society, having more females in a household might be associated with being less central in kinship networks. On the other hand, the direction could be the reverse, if we consider a potential reverse causality that contributing more would attract more connections. Since none of these factors is particularly dominant in this context and the network formation process is unobserved, the direction of bias is then left as an empirical question.

To address the endogeneity of network centrality, I exploit *household ethnic fraction* within a village as an instrument for household network centrality. This variable is defined as the fraction of households within the village that belong to the same ethnic group as the current household. The ethnicity of a household is the ethnicity of the household head which is pre-determined by that of his father. For illustration purposes, in a village of 10 households, if 3 households belong to the same ethnic group, their associated value of the *household ethnic fraction* is 0.3.

Since a kin link is more likely to form between households of the same ethnic group due to the patrilineal culture, *household ethnic fraction* should be a strong predictor of household network centrality. Note that since kin networks are defined as the blood relatives of both husband and wives, it is not necessary that two connected households must be of the same ethnic group. In fact, about 17% of all kin links are between households from different ethnic groups due to inter-ethnic marriages. I use the fact that rural Gambian villages are highly

²⁰See Manski (1993) for a discussion of endogenous network formation.

ethnically diverse, and that this variation is arguably exogenous to estimate the effects of household network position on public good contribution.

The validity of this IV method rests on the village-level patterns of settlements being exogenous to the factors that influence household public good contribution decisions. The identification is derived from comparing households of the same ethnicity who reside in places with variation in ethnic fraction. The main concern is household sorting that leads to selection of different household types into villages where they have less or more ethnic representation. I provide evidence against this concern by showing that, within ethnicity, household observable characteristics are uncorrelated with household ethnic fraction. The key identifying assumption is that, for a given ethnic group, group size (as measured by ethnic fraction) is bigger in some parts of the country than in others, and this variation is, to a large extent, determined by historical accident. Evidence supporting this exogeneity is discussed extensively in the next subsection.

The exogenous treatment of ethnic composition has been used in the previous literature. Prominent papers, including [Easterly and Levine \(1997\)](#) and [Acemoglu et al. \(2001\)](#), treat ethnic fragmentation as exogenous when studying it as a determinant of economic growth at the cross-country level. Among those who attempt to tackle the endogeneity of local ethnic composition, [Miguel and Gugerty \(2005\)](#) use residential ethnic composition to instrument for school-level composition in Kenya. In the current context, I make an argument similar to that in the Kenya case: that residential ethnic composition has been historically determined and that contemporaneous migration is limited.

Figure 3 displays a reduced-form relationship between *household ethnic fraction* and household total public good contributions.²¹ I hypothesize that this positive relationship develops through the effect of household ethnic fraction on household social networks and subsequently through social networks on public good contribution. To allow for non-linearity, I also present a kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing estimation in the same figure. Overall, the nonparametric estimate is similar to the linear estimate, although the ethnic fraction effect increases slightly between 0.4 and 0.5 but tapers off at 0.7.

In the rest of this section, I provide some background detail on ethnic groups in the Gambia. Then, I provide evidence to support the exogeneity of the instrument. Finally, for the exclusion restriction, I discuss the possibility of mechanisms other than networks through which household ethnic fraction may affect public good contribution.

²¹Full reduced-form results with all 6 outcome variables are included in the Online Appendix.

4.2 Validity of the IV

Despite the country’s small size, Gambian population comprises many diverse ethnic groups. Major ethnic groups include Mandinka, Fula, Wolof, Jola, Serahuleh, Serer, and Manjago. In this data, the average village ethnic diversity index (Herfindahl) is 0.3.²² Historically, these ethnic groups migrated to Gambia from various parts of West Africa, with Serer being the oldest inhabitants in the area. The dominant group is Mandinka, who migrated to the Gambia during the spread of the Mali Empire in the 13th century. The Wolof generally locates south and north of the Western part of the Gambia River. An extensive study series by anthropologist David [Gamble \(1949\)](#) explicitly states how the Wolof occupy roughly the same area now that it did in the 15th century. Even the newest ethnic group, Serahuli, arrived from the larger Senegambia area since the 1800’s ([Mwakikagile \(2010\)](#)). Across all villages in the sample, those that are closer to the capital, Banjul, generally have higher ethnic diversity, possibly due to external migration to the economically developed urban areas. Also, among different the ethnic groups, six different ethnicities form the village majority group at least once in this data.

The census data, collected by the Gambia Bureau of Statistics (GBoS), reveals that ethnic composition at the national level has barely changed since 1983, indicating that settlement patterns have been historically stable or that the change has been extremely gradual. Between 1983 and 2003, the largest group, Mandinka, remained at approximately 34-36 % of the total population; the second largest group, Fula, made up 17% with an increase to 22% in 2003.²³ Note that the dataset oversampled Mandinka and undersampled Wolof and Jola.

In order for household ethnic fraction to be a valid instrument, I argue that households from the same ethnic group settle in places with variation in their ethnic fraction by random historical accident. This claim is supported by the data. The main concern is that there may be a selection process that leads to different types of households sorting into villages related to public goods. In the context of rural Gambia, sorting in this way seems to be limited. To investigate whether this type of sorting is relevant in this setting, I compare households from the same ethnic group with different ethnic fractions across all observed characteristics. The balance check in [Table 4](#) shows that they are similar across the categories of total income, income from agricultural activities, household size, age of household head, whether head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household members, number of household workers, size of land owned, whether land is of high quality, role as the village chief, role as a traditional

²²According to [Fearon \(2003\)](#), Gambia’s ethnic fractionalization index is 0.76 and is ranked the 26th most diverse country in the world.

²³More detailed data are provided in the Appendix.

healer, role as a village development committee, role as a marabout, religion, marital status, relative wealth, number of corrugated huts and number of grass-roof huts. Of all variables, only one (having an imam in the household) is significantly correlated with household ethnic fraction.²⁴ Such an occurrence is likely to be random. The results reinforce the argument that ethnic fraction of households within the same ethnic group is random and likely to be determined by historical accident.

In all specifications in this paper, I also control for this extensive list of variables to correct for any potential imbalance. The remaining concern that may invalidate the instrument is household sorting based on unobserved characteristics correlated with public good contribution. Based on the current results and further information from the census data, this concern seems to be minor in this case.

One implicit assumption that I make in the analysis is that only networks of households within the same village matter for public good decisions. For kinship networks, the ethnic fraction variable serves as a proxy for extended families residing in the same village. Households with a smaller ethnic fraction could have a large kinship network living outside of the village; however, since public goods are shared at the village level, networks outside the village should not affect their within-village public good decisions.

A further investigation using the 1993 and 2003 census data shows that the ethnic fraction variable has been stable in the sample villages over the ten-year span. Recall that the full sample contains data from 60 villages. I could confirm the stability of this variable in only 48 villages and therefore restrict my main analysis sample as such. At the village level, the absolute percentage change of each ethnic group has an average close to zero for all groups. 8 out of 60 villages have one or two groups with a relatively large percent change.²⁵ Most of these unstable villages are located closer to the Banjul areas, especially in the upper and lower Niuni districts across the river from the capital. In particular, one unstable village that lies on the West coast near Banjul experiences a drastic fall in the “Others” ethnic category. Another unstable village has a 275% increase in population size. This change is not true in the stable villages. As a robustness check, I perform an analysis on the full sample as well.

It is worth emphasizing that the changes in the census data are at the population level rather than at the household level as used to construct the IV. To some extent, these changes could reflect household expansion rather than creation of new households (which would not affect the ethnic fraction variable). Unfortunately, the number of households in each village is reported at an aggregate level that combines several nearby villages into a 500-household

²⁴Excluding households with imams (approximately 20 households) does not change the main results.

²⁵Data on 4 villages were not available in the 1993 census.

“census settlement.” Villages forming each settlement also vary between the two census rounds, making it difficult to determine whether the observed population changes are due to migration or household expansion.

Additional data from the 2003 and 2009 migration reports address the concern about migration in response to public goods. Mobility in rural Gambia is generally low. The 2003 Migration Analysis reports that 96% of internal migration in the Gambia is rural to urban migration. The common destinations are the urban Kanifing and Banjul areas, which are not included in the sample. The 2009 Migration and Urbanization survey suggests that the main reasons for migrating are marriages and work (36.4% and 19.8% respectively). The majority of migrants are either women who marry men who live the Banjul area or young men who move to find employment in the city. Given that an average household size is large, this type of migration may change household structure but has minimal impact on household ethnic fraction in rural villages. As discussed earlier, the household-level census data is not available to test this hypothesis; however, in interviews with 2 village chiefs (in 2 rural villages outside the sample), the chiefs did not recall any incidence where a migration involved an entire household.

Additionally, ethnic composition may affect public good contribution via channels other than networks. There has been an established that ethnic fragmentation lowers public goods in the previous literature, although only a few studies distinguish between mechanisms explaining such a relationship. [Habyarimana et al. \(2007\)](#) attempts to do so using a lab experiment in Uganda, finding find strong evidence in favor of mechanisms that go through networks. I next discuss and provide evidence to rule out channels other than networks in the current context.

First of all, one of the most studied mechanisms suggests that conflicts or discrimination between ethnic groups can be the main cause of lower public goods. In the Gambia, it is well documented in the historical and anthropological literature that ethnic groups in the Gambia live together harmoniously relative to other West African countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, or Mauritania ([Sonko-Godwin \(2003\)](#), [Mwakikagile \(2010\)](#)). There is low to no tribal conflict. Despite different origins, the colonization of the British, the abolition of slave-trade, and intermarriages between different ethnic groups have promoted cultural integration among the ethnic groups. There is also evidence against economic tension between ethnic groups. [Arcand and Jaimovich \(2012\)](#) use the same data as does the current study to show that the difference in ethnicity does not hinder households from engaging in an economic interaction. The impact of ethnic diversity on public goods through direct conflict seems irrelevant in this case.

Another possible channel is that minority households may have less access to public goods

and hence may not contribute. Even though I cannot directly test this in the data, according to the focus group interviews, all groups in the 29 interview villages report that access to public goods is universal. Moreover, even if the distribution of public goods is dictated by a village authority figure, such as the village chief and village development committee, being a village chief is not correlated with being from a large or small ethnic group, as evident in the balance check in Table 4.

Households of the same ethnic group may possess technology that enhances cooperation among them. An example of such technology is language. People of different tribes may have a language barrier in cooperating for public goods. However, this is not the case in the Gambia. In general, a large fraction of population - including children - speaks more than one language, especially Mandinka. More importantly, individuals can speak the language of the dominant tribe in their own villages. Formal schooling is conducted in English. Another type of technology that may enhance collective actions is social sanction (see, for example, [Besley and Coate \(1995\)](#) and [Miguel and Gugerty \(2005\)](#)). This requires an assumption that households can only sanction those in the same ethnic group. It is more credible to specify a precise channel, such as network links, as a way households can punish one another.

Last but not least, another explanation suggests that households may simply have altruistic feelings strictly toward others in their own ethnic group. If true, we should see that, at the village level, higher ethnic fragmentation reduces the aggregate level of public goods. Panel A of Table 5 shows that when the village-level contribution is regressed on ethnic diversity index (Herfindahl index), the coefficients are not significant for all types of public goods. The same results hold when controlling for network density in Panel B. In addition to the village-level evidence, there are also other reasons to believe that this is a minor concern. In the context of the Gambia, ethnic identity is not salient in everyday life decisions as manifested in the lack of incidence of ethnic conflict, the lack of language barrier, and so on. The spread of Islam throughout the region reconciles differences among people and seems to create an identity that is more unifying than ethnic identity ([Mwakikagile \(2010\)](#)).

Despite indirect evidence, altruism strictly toward co-ethnic households remains a potential limitation for the exclusion restriction of the IV. Overall, since channels other than networks do not seem relevant in this context, the exclusion restriction of household ethnic fraction is plausible.

4.3 Empirical specification

For the household-level analysis, I estimate the effects of household network position on public good contribution using a 2SLS regression. The first-stage specification is as follows:

$$Centrality_{ijk} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 EthFraction_{ijk} + \alpha_2 X_{ijk} + ETH_j + v_k + u_{ijk}$$

where the IV, $EthFraction_{ijk}$, is the fraction of households in the village k that belongs to the same ethnic group j as household i , $Centrality_{ijk}$ refers to the two measures of household network centrality (degree centrality and eigenvector centrality), X_{ijk} is a vector of household characteristics, ETH_j is the ethnicity fixed effects, v_k are village fixed effects, and finally u_{ijk} is the error term for the first stage regression.

Table 6 presents the first stage regression results. The coefficient, α_1 , is highly significant. *Household ethnic fraction* works well in predicting kin network centrality.²⁶ The F-stats are 61.03 for degree centrality and 94.45 for eigenvector centrality, well above the [Stock and Yogo \(2005\)](#) critical value of 16.38.

The second stage is then:

$$Contribute_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \widehat{Centrality}_{ijk} + \beta_2 X_{ijk} + ETH_j + v_k + \epsilon_{ijk}$$

where $Contribute_{ijk}$ is the outcome variable (5 binary variables for different types of public goods and 1 non-binary variable, total contribution), $\widehat{Centrality}_{ijk}$ is the predicted network centrality from the first stage, and ϵ_{ijk} is the error term in the second stage regression.

The main coefficient of interest is β_1 , which represents the effect of network centrality on household public good contribution. The outcome variables are binary (with an exception of total contribution), so β_1 can be interpreted as probability.²⁷

In all but the first set of the OLS estimates, I control for a range of household characteristics (see the list in Table 4). Because my analysis is at the household level, household size and the number of household workers might be problematic: having more members and workers both relaxes the household resource constraint to contribute to public goods and increases the channel of connections to other households. Controlling for these variables is crucial. However, the effect of having an additional household member on network centrality may not be constant for all levels of household size. To identify networks separately from the ethnic composition of the village, I experiment with a more flexible form of the household size variable by using household size relative to the rest of the village (ranking) instead. I also control for village fixed effects, because we do not have information regarding either existing

²⁶The first stage regressions are similar to a specification in Table 8 of [Arcand and Jaimovich \(2012\)](#).

²⁷Probit model yields similar results in comparisons to the linear probability model. The probit results are available upon request.

public goods in each village or their specific needs for public goods. This control also sweeps out common factors such as availability of projects and government/NGO involvements in providing public goods. Since the sample villages are relatively small, it is reasonable to assume that all households face the same public goods within the village.

5 Effects of Network Centrality on Public Good Contribution

5.1 Descriptive Results

I begin by presenting the descriptive results.²⁸ Following the theoretical motivation laid out above, I consider two different measures of centrality: degree centrality and eigenvector centrality. Degree centrality counts only the directly connected households, whereas, eigenvector centrality captures a broader network structure beyond the given household's locality. Table 7 shows how the two centrality measures vary with observed characteristics. Both measures are correlated with several variables, indicating that network position is likely endogenous.

Next, I analyze how network density is associated with aggregate public good contribution at the village level. The outcome variables are percentages of households in the village that contribute to different types of public goods. I do not claim to make any progress in terms of causal interpretation for this analysis. Some of the frameworks in the theory literature discussed in Section 2 also extend to predict network-level contributions. Given that individual-level centrality increases public good contribution, at the network level, this fact directly translates to a prediction that a densely connected network yields a higher level of contribution. Intuitively, a dense network has higher *social capital*, which could facilitate cooperation, leading in turn to higher levels of public good contribution.

Panel B of Table 5 shows that a denser network is associated with more contributions for roads, public health, public education, and average total contribution, even when holding ethnic diversity index constant. The relationships are statistically significant for all but public education. The results are reversed for contribution to communal buildings and water wells. Surprisingly, for these two types of public goods, sparser networks are associated with more contributions. This set of results, however, cannot be interpreted causally, because results may be driven by omitted variable bias. For example, a high network density may capture the fact that households live relatively closer together (despite the same level of

²⁸In all analyses, I drop households that report unusually large degree centrality. The cutoff is at 15 which is approximately the 99 percentile. There are only 20 households above this cutoff. Using the full sample does not change the results by much. The results with full sample are available upon request.

reported areas) and therefore need fewer contributions to water wells. More data is needed to disentangle the effect of network density on aggregate contribution. Nonetheless, this descriptive result helps to bridge the main results at the household level to community-level public goods, for which data are generally more available in other contexts. The village-level evidence also allows for comparisons with the previous literature that studies public goods at the aggregate level (for example, [Alesina et al. \(1999\)](#), [Miguel and Gugerty \(2005\)](#)).

Before proceeding to the IV results, I establish correlations between network centrality and voluntary household contribution to public goods. Panel A of Table 8 reports the OLS estimates when regressing the six contribution variables on the two network centrality measures. Each outcome variable is regressed separately on each centrality measure. Overall, household network centrality is positively correlated with public good contribution. More specifically, we see significant and positive correlations for contribution to community buildings, water wells, public education, and total contribution. The magnitudes are small, however.

Panel B of Table 8 reports similar specifications while holding a range of household characteristics constant. The coefficients do not change by much, even though the centrality measures are correlated with some of the control variables. The coefficients of both centrality measures for total contribution become slightly smaller and less precise. Some of the household characteristics are significantly correlated with contribution, but there is no obvious pattern across public goods.²⁹ Farmers are more likely to contribute to roads. More education is associated with contributing to community building construction. Households with fewer members and more workers are more likely to contribute to water wells. Households with traditional healers also contribute more to water wells as well as public health. Households with marabouts, on the contrary, contribute less to public health. Those in the village development committee contribute more to public education. Finally, the village development committee and farming households contribute to more types of public goods overall.

5.2 IV Results

In Table 9, the IV results suggest that network centrality increases household contribution to public goods. The coefficients are positive for all types of public goods, but they are significant only for water wells and total contribution. In all cases, the IV estimates are at least twice as large as the OLS estimates. The downward bias indicates that such factors as a reverse causality from public good contribution to centrality may not be as dominant.

²⁹I only present the coefficients of network centrality but omit estimates for household characteristics.

The effect of degree centrality is particularly strong for water wells. The marginal effect of having an additional kin link increases the likelihood to contribute by 3%. The difference between an isolated household and a household with an average number of links, 4, is 12%; the size of the effect accounts for 25% of the mean water well contribution. The effect is as large as 75% for a household with the highest degree centrality (15 links). For total contribution, the network centrality effect is small compared with the mean outcome.

The eigenvector centrality measure diverges from degree centrality by taking into account indirectly connected households. Eigenvector centrality also allows households with the same degree centrality to vary depending on the extended network structure surrounding them. This measure can be interpreted as a weighted sum of walks³⁰ originated from a given household to other indirectly connected households. A longer walk (between the originated house and an indirectly connected household) is discounted more. Thus, a household is more eigenvector-central, if it is connected to more households with shorter distances.³¹ The distribution of the measure, as shown in the Figure 2, has a fatter tail above the mean (0.79), with a large number of households clustered close to 0. The shape of the distribution indicates that when the global network structure is taken into account, the difference between the mean and the most central households is wider than is the difference when one focuses on the local network using degree centrality.

Since the value of eigenvector centrality is relative, it is more meaningful to interpret the magnitudes of the coefficients by direct comparisons. Increasing household eigenvector centrality from 0 to the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 99th percentiles raises the likelihood of contributing to water wells to 3%, 8%, 15%, and 41%, respectively. Notice that the increment is much larger at the higher percentile because of the distribution shape. Overall, however, the magnitudes of the eigenvector centrality coefficients are slightly smaller than those of the degree centrality, possibly suggesting that direct links are more important to public good decisions.

Despite positive effects for water wells and total contribution, the lack of coefficient significance of other types of public goods does not imply that there is no relationship; it may be a result of the lack of statistical power. When the sample is expanded to the full sample, at least two other coefficients become significant (community buildings and public education). Yet, the centrality effects for roads and public health seem especially low. In this context, road construction and public health may rely more on public provision from the government than from household cooperation. The field report suggests that, from the perspective of villagers, roads as a public good generally refer to roads that connect one village to another,

³⁰A *walk* is a sequence of links connecting a sequence of nodes (households).

³¹See the terminology appendix for further explanation.

as opposed to those used within a village. In this case, contributing to roads may be less feasible for a private provision project to undertake and may require cooperation across villages. Similarly, public health may also be difficult for within-village provision, because providing public health may need constant outside support from professionals with formal healthcare training.

5.3 Robustness checks

The validity of the IV results in Table 9 depends on the exogeneity of the IV. As argued above, the assumption seems plausible, at least in the current setting. I further confirm the results by performing three robustness checks. Overall, I find that the main IV estimates are robust with small changes in magnitude.

First, I add another set of controls, including network relationships outside the village and enumerator fixed effects. In addition to the within-village networks, the dataset contains information on the existence of links with households outside of the village. The information is, however, limited to binary variables - whether the household has different types of relationships outside of the village rather than the actual number of such external links. These variables were previously excluded for parsimony. The types of external links include having a credit exchange (borrowing or lending), a labor exchange, a land exchange, a productive input exchange, and lastly marriage relationships. Furthermore, I also attempt to control for measurement errors that may arise from data collection by controlling for enumerator fixed effects. During the survey, respondents were interviewed in groups. One concern is that the respondents might be influenced by the enumerator and other respondents present during the same interview.

Panel A of Table 10 reports the IV results for this robustness check. Compared with the main results, the estimates do not change by much when more controls are added. Most coefficients increase slightly, but do not differ significantly from the previous estimates. Only in a few cases are the enumerator fixed effects significant, indicating possible but limited measurement errors.

As a second robustness check in Panel B, I use the full sample to ensure that the results are not driven by the selection of the stable village subsample. When the full sample is used, the results show a similar pattern to the main analysis with only stable villages. The magnitudes are slightly larger and, in 2 cases, become significant (communal buildings and public education).

Panel C of the same table presents the results for another subsample that excludes extreme cases of households with the largest and smallest ethnic fraction. These extreme

ends of the ethnic fraction distribution may capture preferences that are not representative of the data. Again, the IV estimates do not change much from the main results.

Taken together, the results show that better-connected households contribute more to various public goods and also contribute overall. The positive effects are robust to several robustness checks.

5.4 Alternative specifications

This subsection considers alternative specifications to the main results.

Non-linear relationships

It is possible that there is a nonlinear relationship between contribution and network centrality. [Bandiera and Rasul \(2006\)](#) found an inverse-U relationship between the number of social links and the decision to adopt a new crop because of the learning effects and strategic delays. In the current context, the influence from each link may decline with additional links. It could also be that households with a very large network can assert influence on their links and do not contribute. I explore two different specifications that allow for non-linearity. Since there is only one IV for network centrality, the identification strategy cannot be applied to the non-linear specifications.³² Investigating the possibilities for non-linear relationships using OLS estimates can still help interpret the main results.

I first formulate a nonlinear specification by adding a squared term of degree centrality to the OLS specification (in Panel B of Table 8). Table 11 shows that the coefficients for squared terms are negative, albeit small and statistically insignificant, for most public goods. The next specification (Table 12) allows for more flexibility by using a set of dummy variables for each level of degree centrality. There is some evidence suggesting nonlinear relationship. In particular, for water well contribution, having more than five links seems to have a stronger positive correlation. Overall, however, there is limited evidence to suggest non-linear relationships between centrality and public good contribution.

Peer effects framework

Within the existing literature, a number of studies have explored impacts of social networks under a peer effects framework which posits that an agent's behavior is influenced by peer behaviors. My paper focuses on the effect of network positions rather than peer effects.

³²One possibility is to use a squared term of household ethnic fraction as an additional instrument for a squared term of centrality. However, the first-stage F statistics do not pass the weak instrument test.

For comparison purposes, I also report the results using a peer effect specification (Manski (1993)):

$$Contribute_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \frac{1}{n_i} \sum_{j \neq i} g_{ij} Contribute_j + \alpha_2 X_i + e_i$$

where $g_{ij} = 1$ if household i is connected to household j ; $g_{ij} = 0$, otherwise. α_1 is the peer effect.

In Table 13, I regress household public good contribution on the number of connected households that contribute, controlling for the total number of connections (degree centrality). In most cases, household contributions are positively correlated with contributions by the household’s connected peers, indicating possible strategic complementarities assumed in the models discussed in Section 2. The coefficients are, however, significant only for roads and community buildings.

6 Conclusion

This paper employs social network analysis from the sociology literature to analyze economic decisions. I provide field-based evidence for the relationship between network position and household public good decisions, a relationship that has mostly been studied in the theory literature and the experimental setting. The results establish network centrality as a determinant increasing public good contribution. Given the limitations of the current data, I do not distinguish between the mechanisms driving this relationship. A natural next step would be to understand these distinctions better. The descriptive results at the village level suggest a possibility that sparse networks may constitute a channel that causes the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods. This observation can potentially explain some of the puzzling results in Esteban et al. (2012), in which countries such as China, Haiti, and undivided Korea experienced many cooperative problems despite low ethnic fragmentation. Future works can investigate these particular cases for evidence regarding their network structures. The findings also yield policy implications that exploiting information about existing social networks may be beneficial when implementing community-driven projects. For example, policy makers can target their effort to communities with more households with low centrality, because it is more difficult to sustain cooperation.


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
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Figures




(a) Village ID: 4, contribution to water well construction




(b) Village ID: 11, contribution to public health

Figure 1: Examples of kin network graphs (black dot = contribute)

Notes: This figure presents network graphs of kin networks for two villages in the sample. Each node represents a household in the village and a line represents a kin relationship between the two connected households. The black color means the household contributes to the public good.



(a) Degree centrality



(b) Eigenvector centrality

Figure 2: Distribution of centrality measures for kin networks




Figure 3: Reduced-form relationship between number of household contributions and household ethnic fraction

Tables

Table 1: Summary statistics at the village level

Variables	Mean	S.D.
A: Village characteristics		
# of households	54.31	28.10
Total population	599.08	210.95
Village area (km ²)	122651.40	127730.90
Log per capital income	14.74	0.58
Income Gini coefficient	0.30	0.10
Illiteracy rate	0.42	0.21
% Population without electricity	0.97	0.04
% Population without toilet	0.37	0.30
Ethnic diversity, Herfindahl index	0.31	0.21
Religion diversity, Herfindahl index	0.03	0.08
B: Outcome variables		
% contributing to road construction	0.56	0.29
% contributing to community building construction	0.60	0.33
% contributing to water well construction	0.45	0.27
% contributing to public health	0.58	0.31
% contributing to public education	0.36	0.30
Avarage total contribution	2.71	0.98
Number of observations	48	

Table 2: Summary statistics at the household level

Variable	Mean	S.D.
A: Household Characteristics		
Income (Gambian Dalasi, 28GD = 1USD in 2008)	29213.18	20506.27
Household size	12.80	8.79
Head age	51.97	16.15
Female head	0.06	0.23
Whether household head is illiterate	0.46	0.50
# Current sick members	0.24	0.49
# Household workers	4.55	3.72
Amount of lands owned (hectares)	8.29	20.50
Self-reported high quality land	0.05	0.21
Marital status1: unmarried	0.03	0.17
Marital status2: monogamous	0.46	0.50
Marital status3: polygamous	0.48	0.50
Farming	0.73	0.44
Muslim	0.99	0.09
Number of corrugated huts	1.31	1.37
Number of grass-roof huts	1.09	1.55
Self-report relative wealth 1 (first quantile)	0.45	0.50
Self-report relative wealth 2 (second quantile)	0.25	0.48
Self-report relative wealth 3 (third quantile)	0.16	0.36
Self-report relative wealth 4 (highest quantile)	0.04	0.20
Role: Alkalo (village chief)	0.02	0.14
Role: Village development committee	0.19	0.40
Role: Traditional healer	0.13	0.34
Role: Imam	0.02	0.13
Role: Marabout	0.02	0.14
Ethnicity 1: Mandinka	0.53	0.50
Ethnicity 2: Fula	0.22	0.41
Ethnicity 3: Wollof	0.10	0.30
Ethnicity 4: Jola	0.09	0.29
Ethnicity 5: Sarehuleh	0.01	0.08
Ethnicity 6: Sereer	0.04	0.20
Ethnicity 7: Manjago	0.01	0.09
Ethnicity 8: Others	0.01	0.08
B: Outcome Variables		
Contribute to public goods (Y/N)	0.97	0.16
Buliding road	0.62	0.49
Building community buildings	0.71	0.46
Public education	0.51	0.50
Public health	0.67	0.47
Public water source	0.44	0.50
Total contribution	3.10	1.34
Number of Observations:	2,112	

Table 3: Household network centrality and village network structure

Variables	Mean	S.D.
A: Village-level network characteristics		
Kin network, density	0.13	0.08
Number of Observations:	60	
B: Household-level network characteristics		
Kin network, degree centrality	4.16	3.03
Kin network, eigenvector centrality	0.79	0.71
C: External link (binary)		
External marriage link	0.85	0.36
External land-exchange link	0.16	0.37
External labor-exchange link	0.08	0.27
External input-exchange link	0.11	0.32
External credit-exchange link	0.15	0.36
Number of Observations:	2,112	

Notes: All networks are undirected and unweighted. Eigenvector centrality is normalized within a village. See Appendix A for formal definitions of network terminology.

Table 4: Comparing households of the same ethnic group with variation in ethnic fraction

	(1)	(2)
	Coeff.	Std. Errors
Log income	-0.224	(0.925)
Household size	0.038	(0.086)
Head age	-0.042	(0.035)
Female head	-0.395	(1.990)
Illiterate head	1.484	(1.344)
# Sick members	-0.693	(0.798)
# household workers	0.066	(0.148)
Land owned (hectares)	0.021	(0.018)
Self-reported high-quality land	0.693	(1.417)
Role: Alkalo	1.762	(1.497)
Role: Village dev. committee	1.700	(1.180)
Role: Traditional healer	0.364	(1.204)
Role: Imam	4.060**	(1.630)
Role: Marabout	2.383	(1.630)
Farming	1.079	(1.195)
Muslim	1.917	(3.526)
Marital status1: unmarried	2.171	(3.431)
Marital status2: monogamous	0.318	(2.937)
Marital status3: polygamous	0.339	(2.789)
Relative wealth 2: second quantile	1.009	(1.024)
Relative wealth 3: third quantile	0.372	(1.174)
Relative wealth 4: highest quantile	-1.975	(1.812)
Agricultural income	-0.022	(0.101)
Number of corrugated huts	0.640	(0.419)
Number of grass-roof huts	-0.709	(0.484)
Observations	2,110	

Notes: This table shows that, within the same ethnicity, households from majority groups and minority groups are comparable in all but one characteristic. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 5: Network structure and village-level contribution

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	Road construction	Communal buildings	Water well construction	Public health	Public education	Total contribution
Panel A: OLS estimates without controlling for network density						
Ethnic diversity index	-0.032 (0.169)	-0.037 (0.181)	0.127 (0.151)	-0.165 (0.167)	-0.113 (0.189)	-0.549 (0.529)
Panel B: OLS estimates controlling for network density						
Ethnic diversity index	0.012 (0.167)	-0.059 (0.200)	0.043 (0.152)	-0.064 (0.153)	-0.104 (0.193)	-0.313 (0.494)
Network density	0.801* (0.466)	-0.383 (0.820)	-1.496*** (0.426)	1.818*** (0.551)	0.163 (0.918)	4.253** (1.975)
Mean outcomes	0.53	0.61	0.45	0.58	0.39	2.69
Number of Obs	60 villages					

Notes: This table presents the OLS estimates from regressing aggregate public good contribution on village ethnic diversity (Herfindahl index) and network density. Each cell presents the coefficient of network density for each separate regression. All specifications include district fixed effects and the following control variables: number of households, total population, areas, log per capita income, income Gini coefficient, illiteracy rate, % of households with no electricity, religion diversity (Herfindahl index). The coefficients of village characteristics are not reported here, but are available upon request. Standard errors are in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6: First stage regressions

Endogenous Variable:	(1) Degree cent.	(2) Eigen. Cent.
IV:		
Household ethnic group size	3.955*** (0.506)	0.874*** (0.090)
Constant	-1.260 (1.537)	-0.196 (0.501)
First-stage F statistic	61.03	94.45
Observations		2,110
R-squared	0.388	0.172
# villages		48

Notes: This table shows the first stage regression using *household ethnic group size* to instrument for network centrality. The critical value for the F-statistics is 16.38 (Stock and Yogo (2005)). The coefficients of household characteristics are not reported here, but are available upon request. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses. The specification includes ethnic-group FE, village FE and the following control variables: log income, household size, age of household head, whether head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household members, number of workers, size of land owned, whether land is of high quality, role as the village chief, role as a traditional healer, role as a village development committee, role as a imam, role as a marabout, religion, marital status, relative wealth, agricultural income, number of corrugated huts and number of grass-roof huts. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 7: Correlates of centrality measures

	Degree cent.		Eigen. cent.	
	(1) Coeff.	(2) Std. Errors	(3) Coeff.	(4) Std. Errors
Log income	-0.158	(0.135)	-0.038	(0.052)
Household size	0.024*	(0.013)	0.007**	(0.003)
Head age	0.017***	(0.004)	0.003***	(0.001)
Female head	-1.039***	(0.303)	-0.084	(0.099)
Illiterate head	-0.045	(0.148)	-0.006	(0.039)
# Sick members	-0.037	(0.142)	-0.067*	(0.034)
# household workers	0.032	(0.024)	0.004	(0.006)
Land owned (hectares)	0.012**	(0.005)	0.002***	(0.001)
Self-reported high-quality land	0.816**	(0.311)	0.089	(0.091)
Role: Alkalo	1.796***	(0.495)	0.389***	(0.107)
Role: Village dev. committee	0.735***	(0.181)	0.156***	(0.044)
Role: Traditional healer	-0.192	(0.191)	-0.089	(0.055)
Role: Imam	0.332	(0.415)	-0.046	(0.111)
Role: Marabout	0.581	(0.382)	0.091	(0.095)
Farming	0.266*	(0.153)	0.115**	(0.044)
Muslim	0.152	(0.689)	0.159	(0.141)
Marital status1: unmarried	0.324	(0.471)	0.101	(0.135)
Marital status2: monogamous	0.340	(0.400)	0.083	(0.105)
Marital status3: polygamous	0.620	(0.378)	0.154	(0.098)
Relative wealth 2: second quantile	-0.067	(0.149)	0.005	(0.046)
Relative wealth 3: third quantile	-0.206	(0.205)	-0.022	(0.063)
Relative wealth 4: highest quantile	0.227	(0.474)	0.273**	(0.128)
Agricultural income	0.012***	(0.002)	0.002***	(0.001)
Number of corrugated huts	0.489***	(0.081)	0.098***	(0.019)
Number of grass-roof huts	0.016	(0.056)	-0.009	(0.020)
Observations	2,110		2,110	

Notes: This table show correlations of the two network centrality measures with household characteristics. The high correlations with some variables indicate that network centrality is likely endogenously determined. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses.

** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 8: OLS results

Outcome variable	(1) Road construction	(2) Community buildings	(3) Water well construction	(4) Public health	(5) Public education	(6) Total contribution
Panel A: Correlations between network centrality and public good contribution						
Obs. = 2,205						
Degree	-0.000 (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.015*** (0.005)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.020* (0.011)
Eigenvector Cent.	0.013 (0.016)	0.022* (0.013)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.014 (0.017)	0.073*** (0.017)	0.079* (0.044)
Household char.	no	no	no	no	no	no
Panel B: OLS controlling for household characteristics						
Obs. = 2,110						
Degree	-0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.012** (0.005)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.009* (0.005)	0.010 (0.011)
Eigenvector Cent.	0.011 (0.017)	0.009 (0.013)	0.053*** (0.016)	-0.017 (0.019)	0.062*** (0.016)	0.048 (0.049)
Household char.	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Mean of outcome	0.61	0.71	0.5	0.67	0.44	3.1

Notes: This table shows the OLS estimates from regressing public good contribution on household network centrality. Each cell presents the main coefficient of interest for each separate regression. All specifications include ethnic-group FE and village FE. The set of household characteristics include log income, household size, age of household head, whether head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household members, number of workers, size of land owned, whether land is of high quality, role as the village chief, role as a traditional healer, role as a village development committee, role as a imam, role as a marabout, religion, marital status, relative wealth, agricultural income, number of corrugated huts and number of grass-roof huts. The coefficients of household characteristics are not reported here, but are available upon request. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 9: Main results: household ethnic fraction as an IV for kin network centrality

Outcome variable:	(1) Road construction	(2) Community buildings	(3) Water well construction	(4) Public health	(5) Public education	(6) Total construction	First stage F-stat
Kin networks							
Degree cent.	0.006 (0.012)	0.016 (0.013)	0.028* (0.014)	0.009 (0.009)	0.011 (0.011)	0.050** (0.023)	61.03
Eigenvector cent.	0.028 (0.056)	0.071 (0.056)	0.127* (0.069)	0.040 (0.040)	0.048 (0.050)	0.227** (0.097)	94.45
Mean of outcome	0.61	0.71	0.5	0.67	0.44	3.1	
Number of observations	2,110						

Notes: This table shows the IV estimates using *household ethnic fraction* as an IV for network centrality. Each cell presents the main coefficient of interest for each separate regression. All specifications include ethnic-group FE and village FE. The set of household characteristics include log income, household size, age of household head, whether head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household members, number of workers, size of land owned, whether land is of high quality, role as the village chief, role as a traditional healer, role as a village development committee, role as an imam, role as a marabout, religion, marital status, relative wealth, agricultural income, number of corrugated huts and number of grass-roof huts. The coefficients of household characteristics are not reported here, but are available upon request. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 10: Robustness checks

Panel A: Additional controls - external links and enumerator effects						
Outcome variable:	(1) Road construction	(2) Community buildings	(3) Water well construction	(4) Public health	(5) Public education	(6) Total contribution
Obs: 2,110						
Degree cent.	0.012 (0.014)	0.021 (0.013)	0.029* (0.015)	0.010 (0.010)	0.012 (0.010)	0.064** (0.027)
Eigenvector cent.	0.054 (0.061)	0.096 (0.057)	0.133* (0.074)	0.044 (0.044)	0.054 (0.045)	0.292** (0.110)
Mean of outcome	0.61	0.71	0.5	0.67	0.44	3.1
Panel B: Full sample						
Obs: 2,718						
Degree cent.	0.006 (0.010)	0.019* (0.010)	0.031*** (0.011)	0.006 (0.008)	0.021** (0.010)	0.058** (0.024)
Eigenvector cent.	0.025 (0.044)	0.083* (0.044)	0.135*** (0.049)	0.026 (0.037)	0.092** (0.042)	0.253** (0.100)
Mean of outcome	0.62	0.71	0.51	0.67	0.44	3.11
Panel C: Full sample excluding households with ethnic fraction greater than 0.98 or less than 0.02						
Obs: 2,339						
Degree cent.	0.006 (0.011)	0.021** (0.010)	0.031*** (0.011)	0.004 (0.009)	0.022** (0.010)	0.056** (0.026)
Eigenvector cent.	0.026 (0.048)	0.091** (0.044)	0.136*** (0.049)	0.017 (0.041)	0.094** (0.042)	0.244** (0.107)
Mean of outcome	0.58	0.71	0.45	0.68	0.48	3.16

Notes: This table shows the 3 robustness checks as described in Section 5. Panel A reestimates the IV regressions controlling for an extensive set of external network variables and enumerator FE. Panel B expand the sample to the full sample as described in Section 4. Panel C restrict the sample to exclude households at the extreme tails of the ethnic fraction distribution. Each cell presents the main coefficient of interest for each separate regression. All specifications include ethnic-group FE, village FE, and the following characteristics: log income, household size, age of household head, whether head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household members, number of workers, size of land owned, whether land is of high quality, role as the village chief, role as a traditional healer, role as a village development committee, role as a imam, role as a marabout, religion, marital status, relative wealth, agricultural income, number of corrugated huts and number of grass-roof huts. The coefficients of other variables are not reported here, but are available upon request. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 11: OLS regressions with squared terms

Outcome Variable	(1) Road construction	(2) Community building	(3) Water well construction	(4) Public health	(5) Public education	(6) Total contribution
Panel A: Degree centrality						
Degree cent.	-0.002 (0.010)	0.012 (0.010)	0.016 (0.010)	0.004 (0.008)	0.005 (0.011)	0.024 (0.024)
Degree cent. squared	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)
Panel B: Eigenvector centrality						
Eigenvector cent.	-0.074 (0.096)	0.070 (0.070)	0.205 (0.125)	-0.054 (0.095)	0.198** (0.092)	0.086 (0.243)
Eigen. cent. squared	0.195 (0.285)	0.029 (0.217)	0.386 (0.364)	-0.047 (0.283)	-0.120 (0.199)	0.009 (0.717)
Mean of outcome	0.58	0.70	0.48	0.66	0.48	3.11
Number of obs.	2,100					

Notes: This table shows the OLS estimates similar to those in Panel B of Table 8 but with a squared term of network centrality. This purpose of this estimation is to investigate the possibility of non-linear relationship between public good contribution and network centrality. Each cell presents the main coefficients of interest for each separate regression. All specifications include ethnic-group FE and village FE. The set of household characteristics include log income, household size, age of household head, whether head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household members, number of workers, size of land owned, whether land is of high quality, role as the village chief, role as a traditional healer, role as a village development committee, role as a imam, role as a marabout, religion, marital status, relative wealth, agricultural income, number of corrugated huts and number of grass-roof huts. The coefficients of household characteristics are not reported here, but are available upon request. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 12: Nonlinear relationships between network degree centrality and public good contributions for combined networks

Outcome Variable	(1) Road construction	(2) Community building	(3) Water well construction	(4) Public health	(5) Public education	(6) Total contribution
Degree: 1-2	-0.036 (0.042)	0.036 (0.035)	0.062 (0.043)	0.039 (0.028)	0.036 (0.031)	0.115 (0.082)
Degree: 3-4	-0.022 (0.038)	0.051 (0.039)	0.060 (0.051)	0.037 (0.031)	-0.010 (0.040)	0.094 (0.096)
Degree: 5-6	-0.029 (0.042)	0.055 (0.041)	0.093* (0.047)	0.032 (0.035)	0.061 (0.041)	0.151 (0.111)
Degree: 7+	-0.027 (0.041)	0.040 (0.045)	0.126** (0.057)	0.023 (0.038)	0.074* (0.043)	0.133 (0.115)
R-squared	0.410	0.425	0.350	0.418	0.400	0.507
Observations	2,110					

Notes: This table shows the OLS estimates similar to those in Panel B of Table 8. Instead of degree centrality, I use categorical variables for different levels of degree centrality to investigate the possibility of non-linear relationship between public good contribution and network centrality. Each cell presents the main coefficients of interest for each separate regression. All specifications include ethnic-group FE and village FE. The set of household characteristics include log income, household size, age of household head, whether head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household members, number of workers, size of land owned, whether land is of high quality, role as the village chief, role as a traditional healer, role as a village development committee, role as a imam, role as a marabout, religion, marital status, relative wealth, agricultural income, number of corrugated huts and number of grass-roof huts. The coefficients of household characteristics are not reported here, but are available upon request. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 13: Peer effects specifications

Outcome Variable	(1) Road construction	(2) Community building	(3) Water well construction	(4) Public health	(5) Public education	(6) Total contribution
# Links who contribute	0.010* (0.006)	0.005* (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.008 (0.007)	0.010 (0.007)	0.002 (0.002)
# Links (Degree cent.)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.007 (0.005)	0.004 (0.006)	0.005 (0.015)
Number of Obs.	2,100					

Notes: This table shows the OLS estimates from a standard peer-effects specification ([Manski \(1993\)](#)) which regresses household contribution on its peers' average contribution. Each cell presents the main coefficient of interest for each separate regression. All specifications include ethnic-group FE and village FE. The set of household characteristics include log income, household size, age of household head, whether head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household members, number of workers, size of land owned, whether land is of high quality, role as the village chief, role as a traditional healer, role as a village development committee, role as a imam, role as a marabout, religion, marital status, relative wealth, agricultural income, number of corrugated huts and number of grass-roof huts. The coefficients of household characteristics are not reported here, but are available upon request. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix A: Network Terminology

This appendix describes formal definitions of network terminology. For definitions of other network terminology, see [Jackson \(2007\)](#).

A graph (N, G) consists of a set of nodes (in this setting, households), $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$, and a $n \times n$ binary matrix, G , where g_{ij} represents the relation between i and j . g_{ij} is equal to 1, if i and j are connected and is equal to 0 otherwise.

- **Degree centrality**

Degree centrality refers to the number of nodes connected to a given node i in a graph.

$$d_i(G) = \#\{j : g_{ij} = 1\} = \sum_j g_{ij}.$$

- **Bonacich centrality** ([Bonacich \(1987\)](#))

Let $c_i(\alpha, \beta)$ denote the Bonacich centrality of a network, G . The β parameter reflects the degree to which a node's centrality score is a function of the scores of those to whom it is connected.

$$c_i(\alpha, \beta) = \sum_j (\alpha + \beta c_j) g_{ij}$$

In matrix notation,

$$c(\alpha, \beta) = \alpha(I - \beta G)^{-1} G \mathbf{1}$$

where “ $\mathbf{1}$ ” is a column vector of ones and I is an identity matrix. For the matrix in the parentheses to be invertible, it must be that $\beta \in (-\frac{1}{\lambda_g}, \frac{1}{\lambda_g})$, where λ_g is the largest eigenvalue of G . The α parameter only affects the length of $c(\alpha, \beta)$. It is a normalizing factor generally selected so that the Euclidean norm of the vector equals the number of nodes in the network: $\sum_i c_i(\alpha, \beta)^2 = n$.

- **Eigenvector centrality** ([Bonacich \(1972\)](#))

Let e_i denote the eigenvector centrality associated with a network, G . The centrality of a node is proportional to the sum of the centrality of its connected nodes:

$$\lambda e_i = g_{i1}e_1 + g_{i2}e_2 + \dots + g_{in}e_n = \sum_j g_{ij}e_j.$$

In matrix notation: $\lambda e = Ge$, where λ is a proportionality factor. e is an eigenvector of G and λ is its corresponding eigenvalue (the largest eigenvalue, λ_g , to ensure positive entries in e).

Another way to interpret the eigenvector centrality is to view it as the limiting case of the Bonacich centrality where the β -parameter approaches the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of G (see a discussion in [Bonacich \(2007\)](#)). The eigenvector centrality of a node is then a weighted sum of walks that that node has starting from it. A walk of length 1 is assigned a value $1/\lambda'_g$ where $\lambda'_g \rightarrow \lambda_g$. A walk of length 2 is $(1/\lambda'_g)^2$ and so on.

- **Network density**

Network density measures how connected a network is relative to all possible links. n is the number of nodes in N .

$$\text{density} = \frac{\#\text{all links}}{\binom{n}{2}}.$$

- **Undirected and unweighted links**

An undirected link refers to a link in which if i is linked to j , then j is linked to i . An unweighted link refers to a relationship that does not have any intensity level associated with. The value of links as represented in an adjacency matrix is either 0 or 1.

Online Appendix

Additional Tables

Table A.1: Reduced-form results

Outcome Variable	(1) Road construction	(2) Community buildings	(3) Water well construction	(4) Public health	(5) Public education	(6) Total contribution
HH ethnic fraction	0.020 (0.056)	0.080 (0.051)	0.123* (0.063)	0.026 (0.038)	0.034 (0.049)	0.187* (0.097)
Number of observations	2,083					

Notes: This table shows the reduced-form estimates from regressing public good contribution directly on the IV, household ethnic group size. Each column presents the coefficient of household ethnic fraction for each type of public good contribution. All specifications include ethnic-group FE and village FE. The set of household characteristics include log income, household size, age of household head, whether head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household members, number of workers, size of land owned, whether land is of high quality, role as the village chief, role as a traditional healer, role as a village development committee, role as a imam, role as a marabout, religion, marital status, relative wealth, agricultural income, number of corrugated huts and number of grass-roof huts. The coefficients of household characteristics are not reported here, but are available upon request. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A.2: Ethnic composition at the national level across time

Year	Sources	Mandinka	Fula/Fulani	Wolof	Jola/Dyola	Sarehuleh	Serer	Manjago	Others
1983	The Gambia Resource page	36.6	17	13.2	9.4	7.4	2.3	1.6	
1992	The Gambia Resource page (1992 Priority survey)	33.4	17	12.8	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1993	Alesina et al. 2003 (Britannica)	34.1	16.2	12.6	9.2	7.7	n/a	n/a	n/a
2003	Gambia census 2003	36	22	14	11	8	3	2	4
2007	Current sample	48	21.8	9.6	7.5	2	4.8	0.9	5.4

Notes: The data in this table is based on the 1993 and 2003 censuses carried out by the Gambia Bureau of Statistics.

Table A.3: Changes in village ethnic composition between 1993 and 2003

Variable	Mean	S.D.
Percentage change of ethnic group size		
- Mandinka	-0.015	0.08
- Fula	0.012	0.08
- Wolof	0.004	0.04
- Jola	0.005	0.03
- Serahule	0.003	0.02
- Serere	-0.001	0.03
- Aku	0.000	0.00
- Manjago	0.000	0.01
- Bambara	0.003	0.02
- Others	-0.012	0.10
- Non-residents	0.001	0.03
Village ethnic diversity Herfindahl index in 1993	0.280	0.28
Village ethnic diversity Herfindahl index in 2003	0.320	0.27
Population percentage change	44.276	73.90
Number of Observations:	60	

Notes: The data in this table is based on the 1993 and 2003 censuses carried out by the Gambia Bureau of Statistics. A positive mean value represents an increase change; a negative mean value is a decrease.

Economic-exchange networks

In addition to kin networks, the survey also contains information on economic interactions of households within the village. Two given households are considered to have an *economic-exchange link* if they had transacted on land, labor, credit, or production inputs such as tools and fertilizer within one year prior to the survey. I refer to a network of this relationship as an *economic-exchange network*.³³

For economic-exchange networks, the IV, *household ethnic fraction*, is not strong enough to predict household centrality. Even though there is a positive relationship between having economic transactions and belonging to the same ethnic group, such correlation does not translate to enough predictive power, especially when conditioning on having a kin link (Arcand and Jaimovich (2012)). This weak correlation, on the other hand, also emphasizes the fact that ethnic identity is not very salient in the Gambia setting. Ethnicity does not influence with whom households choose to engage in economic activities. Nonetheless, the descriptive results can help understanding the bigger picture of how different types of network relationships influence public good decisions in comparisons to the main results. I use the same OLS specification analogous to that in Table 8:

$$Contribute_{ijk} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 Centrality_{ijk} + \gamma_2 X_{ijk} + ETH_j + v_k + \epsilon_{ijk} \quad (1)$$

Next, I combine both kin networks and economic-exchange networks. In this case, the same IV passes the weak instrument test. This stronger relationship is mainly driven by kin networks; therefore, the results must be interpreted as a supplement to the kin network results. Table A.4 reports the economic-exchange network and combined network results. The signs of the centrality coefficients align with the results for kin networks.

However, only community building contribution has the strongest positive correlation with centrality. The IV results for combined networks show the same signs and significance patterns as the kin network results. This is expected mainly because kin networks comprise a larger portion of combined networks than economic exchange networks. To conclude, it seems that kin networks rather than economic exchange networks is the key factor influencing household decisions to contribute to public goods.

³³I combine all types of economic transactions, following Jaimovich (2011).

Table A.4: Analysis of economic-exchange and combined network centrality

Outcome variable:	(1) Road construction	(2) Communal buildings	(3) Water wells construction	(4) Public health	(5) Public education	(6) Total contribution
Panel A: OLS estimates						
Econ networks						
Degree cent.	-0.002 (0.003)	0.006** (0.002)	0.007** (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.010** (0.004)	0.015* (0.009)
Eigenvector cent.	0.002 (0.013)	0.025** (0.010)	0.026 (0.019)	0.005 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.015)	0.090** (0.035)
Combined networks						
Degree cent.	0.001 (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.008*** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.005** (0.003)	0.003 (0.005)
Eigenvector cent.	0.026 (0.022)	0.018 (0.016)	0.079*** (0.026)	-0.012 (0.023)	0.092*** (0.020)	0.112* (0.061)
Panel B: IV estimates						
Combined networks						
Degree cent.	0.005 (0.010)	0.013 (0.010)	0.022* (0.012)	0.007 (0.007)	0.008 (0.009)	0.040** (0.017)
Eigenvector cent.	0.039 (0.077)	0.099 (0.081)	0.175* (0.095)	0.055 (0.055)	0.066 (0.064)	0.313** (0.124)
Mean of outcome	0.61	0.71	0.5	0.67	0.44	3.1

Notes: This table shows the OLS and 2SLS estimates similar to those in Panel B of Table 8 and Table 9. Instead of kin networks, I consider economic-exchange networks and combined networks here. The first stage regressions of the 2SLS results are reported in Table 6. Each cell presents the main coefficients of interest for each separate regression. All specifications include ethnic-group FE and village FE. The set of household characteristics include log income, household size, age of household head, whether head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household members, number of workers, size of land owned, whether land is of high quality, role as the village chief, role as a traditional healer, role as a village development committee, role as an imam, role as a marabout, religion, marital status, relative wealth, agricultural income, number of corrugated huts and number of grass-roof huts. The coefficients of household characteristics are not reported here, but are available upon request. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1