

# Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public Investment?

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Econometric Society Meeting, Boston, June 2009

# Introduction

- Characteristic of democracy: Politicians empowered for limited time.
  - But typically care about the future.
- Choose current policy so as to influence successors' policy.
  - Traditional emphasis: Debt (Persson and Svensson, 1989, Tabellini and Alesina, 1990)
  - Another potentially powerful instrument: Physical capital (Natvik, 2009)
    - Key features: Pre-determined and purpose specific.

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  - Another potentially powerful instrument: Physical capital (Natvik, 2009)
    - Key features: Pre-determined and purpose specific.
- Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?
  - Econometric challenges: Measurement and Endogeneity

# Our Empirical Analysis

- Panel of Norwegian local governments.
  - Account data on investment and current expenditure on three main welfare services (education, elderly care, child care).

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- Panel of Norwegian local governments.
  - Account data on investment and current expenditure on three main welfare services (education, elderly care, child care).
- Utilize a unique feature of the Norwegian system:
  - The national election for parliament, held in the middle of each local election term, as signal of re-election probability.
- Capture swings in 'regional ideological sentiment'.
  - Yields variation in changes in re-election probabilities that can be treated as exogenous to local policy.

## Sketch of Model

- Dimension of political conflict: composition of government spending.
  - Politicians are benevolent, but with different preferences ( $\alpha^J$ ) for public goods  $g$  and  $f$

$$u(g_t, f_t | \alpha^J) = \frac{\left[ \left( \alpha^J g_t^{\frac{\phi-1}{\phi}} + (1 - \alpha^J) f_t^{\frac{\phi-1}{\phi}} \right)^{\frac{\phi}{\phi-1}} \right]^{1-1/\sigma}}{1 - 1/\sigma}$$

- $\sigma$  : Intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
- $\phi$  : Intratemporal elasticity of substitution between  $g$  and  $f$ .

## Sketch of Model

- Producing public goods requires capital and labor:

$$h_t = h(n_t^h, k_t^h) = \left( \gamma n_t^{h \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} + (1 - \gamma) k_t^{h \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} \right)^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}, h = f, g$$

- $\varepsilon$  : Elasticity of substitution between  $n$  and  $k$ .

Key assumptions:

- Capital is slowly accumulated, purpose-specific and "irreversible" (state variable)
- Labor is fully flexible (flow variable)
- Policy choices do not affect future voting.



## Predictions from Model

### 1 Composition effect:

If  $\phi < \varepsilon$ :  $P(\text{Re-election}) \downarrow \Rightarrow$  tilt the composition of investment away from own most preferred purpose.

### 2 Level effect:

When capital and labor are complements ( $\varepsilon$  small):  
 $P(\text{Re-election}) \downarrow \Rightarrow$  Decrease total level of investment

Mechanism: Aversion against inefficient capital utilization.

**Note:** Both predictions are reversed when public capital is considered a durable consumption good (Glazer (1989) and Beetsma and van der Ploeg (2007))

## Norwegian Local Governments

To test the predictions from theory we rely on account data from Norwegian Local Governments (1972-1999).

- Above 400 political entities operating within the same institutional environment.
- Considerable discretion concerning investment policy.

We focus on the main welfare services that local governments are responsible for:

- Child care, education and elderly care.

## Norwegian Local Governments (cont.)

Important institutional features:

- Considerable discretion concerning composition of spending.
- Municipality revenues largely given.
- Balanced budget rule:
  - Current expenditure may not be deficit financed.
  - Capital expenditure may be deficit financed, but interest payments on outstanding loans may not.

## Account Data

Investment vs. current expenditure:

- Investment  $\equiv$  Spending on new buildings and structures (including wage expenditure etc in relation to these) + maintenance – sales.
- Current expenditure  $\equiv$  Wages + equipment + external transfers + other current expenditures.

**Table:** Spending per Capita in NOK 1000 (deflated to 1998 levels)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
InvAggregate	1.138	1.242	-15.632	12.247
InvEducation	0.663	0.820	-5.198	9.017
InvElderlyCare	0.396	0.901	-16.11	10.986
InvChildCare	0.08	0.183	-1.409	3.2
CurrAggregate	10.635	4.925	3.498	48.125
CurrEducation	5.822	1.462	2.551	16.267
CurrElderlyCare	3.95	3.181	0.106	34.124
CurrChildCare	0.864	0.844	0	4.922

## Political System

- 7 main political parties plus some local parties. Main divide is left vs. right.
- Local governments with representatives from lists that cannot clearly be assigned to the left or right bloc are excluded.
- Proportional representation into local council, which elects Mayor.
- Local elections every 4 years.
- National elections held 2 years into the local election term.

Table: Descriptive Statistics: Political Variables.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
mayor_left	0.456	0.498	0	1	1723
mayor_right	0.544	0.498	0	1	1723
voteshare_left	0.449	0.146	0.062	0.832	1723
voteshare_right	0.55	0.146	0.167	0.938	1723
reelection	0.825	0.38	0	1	1706

## Preference Heterogeneity

Sørensen (1995); Survey of around 2000 local council members in the period 1987-1991:

- Left-bloc politicians want to increase the supply of child care centers at the expense of less resources to schooling.
- Right-bloc politicians want to expand both education and elderly care at the expense of child care.

A similar pattern is found in Sweden (Svaleryd, 2009)

## Empirical Challenges

Our question: How does  $P(\text{re-election})$  ( $PrR_{i,t}$ ) influence spending?

Three key challenges:

- 1 Measurement problem:  $PrR_{i,t}$  unobservable.
- 2 Omitted variable problem: Unobserved factors correlated with  $PrR_{i,t}$  and policies.
- 3 Reverse causality problem:  $PrR_{i,t}$  may be result, not cause, of policies.

## Proxy for Re-election Probabilities

Existing studies use historical measures of political instability (e.g. Grilli et al. 1991, Pettersson-Lidbom 2001, Dahlby et al. 2004).

We rely on changes in re-election probabilities within election periods.

- Conjecture: Share of votes the bloc of incumbent receive at local and national election contain information about local re-election probabilities.
- Our proxy:  $\Delta S_{i,T} = S_{i,t+2} - S_{i,t}$

where

$S_{i,t}$  = incumbent bloc's share of votes in local election at time  $t$

$S_{i,t+2}$  = incumbent bloc's share of votes in national election at time  $t + 2$



## IV Approach

Second stage:

$$\Delta Y_{i,T}^h = \psi \Delta S_{i,T} + \tau_T + \varepsilon_{i,T}, \quad (1)$$

$\Delta Y_{i,T}^h$  is the change in spending in sector  $h$  in local government  $i$  from the two first years in each election period to the two last years in each election period.

$\Delta Y_{i,T}^h$  is standardized by the relevant standard deviation.

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First stage:

$$\Delta S_{i,T} = \zeta \Delta S_{i,T}^{county} + \tau_T + \epsilon_{i,T}, \quad (2)$$

where

$$\Delta S_{i,T}^{county} = \frac{\sum_{j \neq i}^{C_i} pop_{j,t} \Delta S_{j,T}}{\sum_{j \neq i}^{C_i} pop_{j,t}},$$

## IV Approach

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$$\Delta S_{i,T}^{county} = \frac{\sum_{j \neq i}^{C_i} pop_{j,t} \Delta S_{j,T}}{\sum_{j \neq i}^{C_i} pop_{j,t}},$$

**Identifying assumption:**  $\Delta S_{i,T}^{county}$  does not affect local policy except through local re-election probability.

## Does the National Election Predict Local Re-election?

Table: Information from Parliamentary Election

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	reelection	reelection	reelection	reelection
SupportLocalElection	4.61*** (7.32)	6.71*** (9.98)	0.14 (0.10)	-0.23 (-0.17)
SupportNationalElection			5.31*** (3.54)	7.84*** (5.70)
Constant	-1.89*** (-4.79)	-2.83*** (-7.80)	-2.24*** (-5.43)	-3.23*** (-8.63)
<i>N</i>	929	777	929	777
pseudo $R^2$	0.077	0.156	0.093	0.199
Estimation Method	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit
Block of Mayor	Right	Left	Right	Left

*t* statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

▸ Predictions Right

▸ Predictions Left

# First Stage

Table: First Stage Regressions, the Dependent Variable is  $\Delta Support$

	(1) Right	(2) Left
$\Delta Support^{County}$	0.48*** (7.24)	0.60*** (8.29)
$N$	937	786
$R^2$	0.179	0.292
Estimation Method	OLS	OLS

Notes:  $t$  statistics in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Election period fixed effects included in all specifications.

## Second Stage

Table: Investment on Probability of Re-election

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	13.90*** (2.61)	9.59* (1.81)	9.16* (1.73)	2.85 (0.54)
$N$	937	937	937	937
Block of Mayor	Right	Right	Right	Right
Est. Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	52.45	52.45	52.45	52.45
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	5.86 (1.37)	1.22 (0.32)	3.45 (0.76)	16.58*** (3.53)
$N$	786	786	786	786
Block of Mayor	Left	Left	Left	Left
Estimation Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	68.75	68.75	68.75	68.75

Notes:  $t$  statistics in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Election period fixed effects included in all specifications.

## Second Stage cont.

Table: Current Expenditures on Probability of Re-election

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	0.44	0.56	0.25	0.57
	(0.66)	(0.56)	(0.30)	(0.67)
$N$	937	937	937	937
Block of Mayor	Right	Right	Right	Right
Estimation Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	52.45	52.45	52.45	52.45
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	0.07	-0.03	0.40	-1.06
	(0.11)	(-0.04)	(0.48)	(-1.63)
$N$	786	786	786	786
Block of Mayor	Left	Left	Left	Left
Estimation Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	68.75	68.75	68.75	68.75

Notes:  $t$  statistics in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Election period fixed effects included in all specifications.

## Summary of Main Findings

- $P(\text{Re-election}) \uparrow \Rightarrow \text{Investment} \uparrow$ 
  - Right bloc:
    - 5 percentage points increase in support increases aggregate investment with 0.7 standard deviations.
    - Seems to be driven by education and elderly care.
  - Left bloc:
    - No statistically significant aggregate effect.
    - 5 percentage points increase in support increases investment in child care with 0.8 standard deviations.
- Current expenditures do not respond to changes in support of incumbent.



# Sensitivity Checks

- Time-varying factors correlated with instrument?
  - ▶ Check 1 Control for local economic conditions and demographics.
- Non-linear impact of re-election probabilities?
  - ▶ Check 2 Exclude incumbents receiving more than 2/3 of votes in last local election.
- Yardstick competition?
  - ▶ Check 3a Exclude local governments where county administration is located.
  - ▶ Check 3b Exclude local governments belonging to the same labor market region, when constructing the instrument.
- Small vs. larger local governments? (baseline is  $\text{pop} > 1000$ ).
  - ▶ Check 4a Similar results for  $\text{pop} > 0$ ?
  - ▶ Check 4b Similar results for  $\text{pop} > 2500$ ?
  - ▶ Check 4c Similar results for  $\text{pop} > 4000$ ?

## Conclusion

- Empirical finding 1: Anticipated political turnover reduces saving in physical capital;  $P(\text{Re-election}) \uparrow \Rightarrow \text{Investment} \uparrow$ .
  - Inconsistent with public capital as durable goods (Glazer, 1989).
  - Consistent with public capital and current expenditure as complementary inputs in public production (Natvik, 2009).  
Mechanism: Politicians averse to suboptimal capital utilization

## Conclusion

- Empirical finding 1: Anticipated political turnover reduces saving in physical capital;  $P(\text{Re-election}) \uparrow \Rightarrow \text{Investment} \uparrow$ .
- Empirical finding 2: Left-bloc and right-bloc incumbents react differently in terms of investment composition  
 $\Rightarrow$  Seems that incumbents whose support increases, tilt investment composition toward favored purposes.
  - Inconsistent with public capital as durable goods (Glazer, 1989).
  - Consistent with public capital and current expenditure as complementary inputs in public production, and low willingness to substitute between goods ("fixed party positions") (Natvik, 2009).

## Covariates Included

◀ Back

Table: Investment on Probability of Re-election

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	13.71** (2.57)	9.25* (1.75)	9.14* (1.71)	3.18 (0.60)
$\Delta Pop$	-0.12 (-0.80)	-0.02 (-0.16)	-0.12 (-0.80)	-0.05 (-0.34)
$\Delta Children$	4.58 (0.43)	10.41 (0.98)	-5.63 (-0.53)	6.96 (0.65)
$\Delta Young$	9.80 (1.00)	28.89*** (2.96)	-11.37 (-1.16)	-12.20 (-1.24)
$\Delta Elderly$	-9.71 (-0.88)	6.38 (0.58)	-14.75 (-1.34)	-17.56 (-1.59)
$\Delta Unemp$	-4.38 (-0.50)	-10.44 (-1.20)	3.62 (0.41)	-1.95 (-0.22)
<i>N</i>	937	937	937	937
Block of Mayor	Right	Right	Right	Right
Estimation Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	51.95	51.95	51.95	51.95

Notes: *t* statistics in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Election period fixed effects included in all specifications.

## Covariates Included

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Table: Investment on Probability of Re-election

	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	5.79 (1.36)	1.40 (0.37)	3.22 (0.72)	16.37*** (3.50)
$\Delta Pop$	0.05 (0.28)	0.01 (0.07)	0.03 (0.14)	-0.02 (-0.11)
$\Delta Children$	0.58 (0.05)	11.39 (1.06)	-9.23 (-0.72)	-0.82 (-0.06)
$\Delta Young$	-11.48 (-1.03)	-4.53 (-0.45)	-8.80 (-0.74)	-15.39 (-1.25)
$\Delta Elderly$	21.56* (1.71)	10.93 (0.97)	17.19 (1.29)	7.40 (0.54)
$\Delta Unemp$	8.77 (1.13)	-1.55 (-0.22)	13.30 (1.63)	2.13 (0.25)
$N$	786	786	786	786
Block of Mayor	Left	Left	Left	Left
Estimation Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	69.14	69.14	69.14	69.14

Notes:  $t$  statistics in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Election period fixed effects included in all specifications.

Incumbents  $> 2/3$  of Votes Excluded

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Table: Investment on Probability of Re-election

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	15.10**	6.99	12.52	4.69
	(2.15)	(1.11)	(1.59)	(0.86)
$N$	550	550	550	550
Block of Mayor	Right	Right	Right	Right
Est. Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	30.81	30.81	30.81	30.81
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	5.29	0.96	2.87	16.71***
	(1.04)	(0.21)	(0.53)	(3.28)
$N$	658	658	658	658
Block of Mayor	Left	Left	Left	Left
Estimation Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	54.23	54.23	54.23	54.23

Notes:  $t$  statistics in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Election period fixed effects included in all specifications.

## County Administration Excluded

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Table: Investment on Probability of Re-election

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	12.29**	9.03*	8.22	-1.62
	(2.33)	(1.70)	(1.56)	(-0.30)
$N$	891	891	891	891
Block of Mayor	Right	Right	Right	Right
Est. Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	53.02	53.02	53.02	53.02
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	4.49	-0.78	3.51	16.15***
	(1.12)	(-0.22)	(0.82)	(3.66)
$N$	749	749	749	749
Block of Mayor	Left	Left	Left	Left
Estimation Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	76.76	76.76	76.76	76.76

Notes:  $t$  statistics in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Election period fixed effects included in all specifications.

## Alternative Instrument

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Table: Investment on Probability of Re-election

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	12.08**	11.30*	5.51	0.39
	(2.00)	(1.83)	(0.92)	(0.06)
$N$	937	937	937	937
Block of Mayor	Right	Right	Right	Right
Est. Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	39.05	39.05	39.05	39.05
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	8.25*	3.04	4.89	16.95***
	(1.69)	(0.71)	(0.96)	(3.21)
$N$	786	786	786	786
Block of Mayor	Left	Left	Left	Left
Estimation Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	53.87	53.87	53.87	53.87

Notes:  $t$  statistics in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Election period fixed effects included in all specifications.



## Loc. Gov. with Pop &gt; 0 Included

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Table: Investment on Probability of Re-election

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	14.65**	9.52	9.80*	5.08
	(2.41)	(1.60)	(1.69)	(0.92)
$N$	976	976	976	976
Block of Mayor	Right	Right	Right	Right
Est. Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	45.01	45.01	45.01	45.01
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	4.58	1.59	1.38	16.20***
	(0.98)	(0.40)	(0.27)	(3.31)
$N$	798	798	798	798
Block of Mayor	Left	Left	Left	Left
Estimation Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	58.38	58.38	58.38	58.38

Notes:  $t$  statistics in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Election period fixed effects included in all specifications.

# Loc. Gov. with Pop > 2500 Included

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Table: Investment on Probability of Re-election

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	19.79***	13.63**	13.71**	5.34
	(3.15)	(2.28)	(2.26)	(1.08)
$N$	763	763	763	763
Block of Mayor	Right	Right	Right	Right
Est. Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	34.76	34.76	34.76	34.76
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	2.54	2.89	-1.48	9.94***
	(0.61)	(0.73)	(-0.34)	(2.86)
$N$	669	669	669	669
Block of Mayor	Left	Left	Left	Left
Estimation Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	90.01	90.01	90.01	90.01

Notes:  $t$  statistics in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Election period fixed effects included in all specifications.

## Loc. Gov. with Pop &gt; 4000 Included


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Table: Investment on Probability of Re-election


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	16.92** (2.13)	11.17 (1.45)	13.16* (1.70)	-0.21 (-0.03)
$N$	513	513	513	513
Block of Mayor	Right	Right	Right	Right
Est. Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	18.83	18.83	18.83	18.83
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Aggregate	Education	Elderly Care	Child Care
$\Delta Support$	-1.85 (-0.45)	1.14 (0.31)	-5.48 (-1.22)	7.62** (2.08)
$N$	557	557	557	557
Block of Mayor	Left	Left	Left	Left
Estimation Method	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-statistic from 1st.	89.01	89.01	89.01	89.01

Notes:  $t$  statistics in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Election period fixed effects included in all specifications.


# Predictions Right-wing Incubments

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# Predictions Right-wing Incubments

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# Predictions Left-wing Incumbents

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