Financial Constraints and Franchising Decisions*

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Abstract

We study how the financial constraints of agents affect the behavior of principals in the context of franchising. We develop an empirical model of franchising starting with a principal-agent framework that emphasizes the role of franchisees’ collateral from an incentive perspective. We estimate the determinants of chains’ entry (into franchising) and growth decisions using data on franchised chains and data on local macroeconomic conditions. In particular, we use collateralizable housing wealth at the state level as an inverse measure of the average financial constraints of potential franchisees. We find that a decrease in collateralizable housing wealth in the local economy leads to later entry into franchising by local franchisors, and slower growth in the number of franchised – and total – outlets in these chains. We show that the corresponding job losses can be substantial.

Keywords: Contract, franchising, incentive

JEL: L14, L22, D22, D82, L8

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1 Introduction

The recent decline in household wealth has been touted as a major factor affecting the viability and growth of small businesses in general, and as a major factor affecting the development and growth of franchised chains in particular.\(^1\)

In this paper, we examine how agents’ financial constraints affect principals’ entry and growth decisions, applying this idea specifically to the context of franchising. The issue of franchisees having access to financing to invest in a franchised outlet has always been a major concern for participants in the industry. Most franchisors, including established franchisors with access to capital markets, require that their franchisees provide significant portions of the capital needed to open their franchise. They argue that this is required for franchisee incentives, so they have “skin in the game.” But given this need for franchisees to bring capital to the business for franchisee incentive purposes, the financial constraints that franchisees face can affect the value of franchising to the chain. This in turn would reduce the value of entering into franchising for those chains that have not yet invested in developing a franchise capability, and also slow down the growth of the many chains that rely on franchising in the retail and service sectors.\(^2\) But despite the central role of the financial constraints of potential franchisees in the decisions of chains to franchise, this issue has not been studied in the theoretical or empirical contract literature.\(^3\)

In what follows, we begin by setting up a principal-agent model where franchisee effort and the profitability of franchised outlets depend on how much collateral a franchisee is able to put up. In the model, the franchisee decides on her effort level before revenue is realized. She then decides whether or not to default on her debt contract. A higher collateral means higher costs of defaulting, and hence a greater incentive to choose high effort. Given agent heterogeneity in terms of collateralizable wealth, the chain chooses the optimal contract. Simulation results suggest that at the equilibrium, the expected profit generated by a franchised outlet for the chain is increasing in the average collateral of potential franchisees as well as other factors such as the number of potential franchisees and the importance of franchisee effort in the business. We then derive profit functions that describe the expected value of opening a company-owned outlet and a franchised outlet for the chain. Which option is most profitable determines both the timing of the chain’s entry into franchising – an aspect of franchisors’ decision processes that has never been examined empirically before – as well as the extent to which the chain grows via company-owned and franchised outlets.

In our empirical analyses, we estimate the determinants of the timing of chains’ entry into

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\(^1\)See for example Reuteman (2009) and Needleman (2011).

\(^2\)For evidence on the increasing role of chains in the retail and service sectors, see Jarmin, Klimek and Miranda (2009).

\(^3\)One notable exception is Laffont and Matoussi (1995), who consider the role of agents’ financial constraints in an agrarian context. In their model, when a tenant is financially constrained, it is impossible for her to sign a contract that offers a high share of output because such contracts also require a high upfront rental fee. In our context, franchisee wealth is used as a collateral, and the extent of collateral serves as an additional source of incentives beyond residual claims.
franchising and their growth decisions pre and post entry into franchising. The estimation is based on data from 945 chains that started in business, and subsequently started franchising, sometime between 1984 and 2006. We combine our chain-level data with other information about local macroeconomic conditions. In particular, we use collateralizable housing wealth, measured at the state level, to capture the average financial resources of potential franchisees in that state. Financial resources for small businesses have been linked specifically to housing values. For example, in their report for the Cleveland Fed, Schweitzer and Shane (2010) write “We analyze information from a variety of sources and find that homes do constitute an important source of capital for small business owners and that the impact of the recent decline in housing prices is significant enough to be a real constraint on small business finances.”

The estimation results are intuitive and consistent with the predictions of our agency-theory model. In particular, we find that collateralizable housing wealth has a positive effect on the value of opening a franchised outlet relative to opening a company-owned outlet. This is in line with the intuition that franchisee borrowing against their collateral to start their business increases their incentives to work hard, and hence the profitability of franchising to franchisors. Conversely, and consistent with the same intuition, we find that both the amount of capital required to open an outlet and the interest rate have a negative effect on the extent of franchising. Finally, we find that the benefit of franchising is greatest for chains involved in the provision of at-home services and auto and repair shops, both types of businesses for which it is vital for managers to put effort into the supervision of workers and oversight of operations.

To understand the magnitude of the effect of franchisees’ financial constraints on franchisors’ decisions, and quantify the potential impact of the recent decline in house value on franchising, we simulate the effect of a 30% decrease in the collateralizable housing wealth of potential franchisees. We find that chains enter into franchising somewhat later, and open fewer franchised and, more importantly from a job creation perspective, fewer total outlets. Specifically, we find that the number of total outlets of chains five years after they start in business decreases by 2.64 on average. The average decrease in the number of total outlets ten years after a chain start in business is 4.70. Combined with Census Bureau information about the importance of franchising in the U.S. economy, our results suggest that such a decrease in collateralizable housing wealth for franchisees could affect as many as 542,700 to 759,000 jobs.

This paper contributes to several streams of literature. First and foremost, it contributes to the empirical literature on contracting and contract theory. To this day, there is little empirical work on contracting relative to the large amount of theoretical research in this area. Moreover, much of the empirical literature regresses contract types, or the relative use of one contract type versus the other, on principal and agent characteristics (for example, Brickley and Dark (1987), Lafontaine (1992), Laffont and Matoussi (1995), Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), Dubois (2002)
In the present paper, we study instead the effect of agents’ financial constraints on the growth paths of franchised chains, and the importance that this has on the timing of entry into franchising for principals.

This paper also relates to a new literature in macroeconomics on deleveraging, which considers how a decline in home equity borrowing can lead to a recession (e.g. Philippon and Midrigan (2011), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), Mian and Sufi (2012)). In these papers, tighter borrowing constraints lead to a decline in aggregate demand and eventually a recession. We highlight a different channel through which decreased collateralizable housing values can affect economic growth and jobs. In our paper, a decrease in collateralizable housing wealth makes a potential franchisee unattractive to a chain by decreasing the power of incentives. As a result, fewer stores are opened and fewer jobs are created. We highlight this channel in our simulations by varying the collateralizable housing wealth while holding other macroeconomic variables, including our measure of income, namely per-capita gross state product (GSP), constant.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the data in the next section, Section 2. In Section 3, we develop the empirical model starting with a theoretical principal-agent framework. The estimation results are described in Section 4. We discuss the robustness of our results in Section 5. Section 6 quantifies how much tighter financial constraints of potential franchisees influence the franchising decision of chains. We conclude in Section 7.

2 Data

2.1 Data Sources and Variable Definitions

In this section, we describe our main data sources and how we measure the variables of interest. Further details on these also can be found in Appendix A.

Our data on franchised chains, or franchisors, are from various issues of the Entrepreneur magazine’s “Annual Franchise 500” surveys and the yearly “Source Book of Franchise Opportunities,” now called “Bond’s Franchise Guide.” Our data are about business-format franchised chains. Business-format franchisors are those that provide “turn-key” operations to franchisees in exchange for the payment of royalties on revenues and a fixed upfront franchise fee. They account for all of the growth in number of franchised outlets since at least the 1970’s (see Blair and Lafontaine (2005)),

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4See Chiappori and Salanié (2003) for a survey of studies in agrarian markets and Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for a survey of studies in franchising. A separate set of papers examines executive or salesforce compensation. Most of these focus on the terms of the contract, however, rather than the choice of contract type. Work on inter-firm contracting, on the other hand, typically has been policy driven, focusing on the effects of various contract terms, i.e. specific vertical restraints. Recent contributions in this area include Askir (2005), Brenkers and Verboven (2006), on exclusive dealing, Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), on bundling, and Ho, Ho and Mortimer (2012) on full-line forcing. Others have examined the use and effect of non-linear wholesale prices (Villas-Boas (2007), Bonnet and Dubois (2010)) or revenue sharing in distribution contracts (Mortimer (2008), Gil and Lafontaine (2012)). See Lafontaine and Slade (2012) for a review of the empirical literature on inter-firm contracts.
Figure 2-1), and are an important factor in the growth of chains in the U.S. economy. According to the Census bureau, business format franchisors operated more than 387,000 establishments in 2007, and employed a total of 6.4 million employees. Traditional franchising, which comprises car dealerships and gasoline stations, in contrast accounted for about 66,000 establishments, and 1.5 million employees.

For each franchisor in our data, we observe when the chain first started in business and when it started franchising. We refer to the difference between the two as the waiting time. For example, if a chain starts franchising in the same year that it goes into business, the waiting time variable is simply zero. In addition, we observe the U.S. state where each chain is headquartered, its business activity, the amount of capital required to open an outlet (Capital Required) and the number of employees that the typical outlet needs (Number of Employees). We view the Capital Required and Number of Employees needed to run the business as intrinsically determined by the nature of the business concept, which itself is intrinsically connected to the brand name. As such, we treat these characteristics as fixed over time for a given franchisor. Yet we find some variation in the data. We use the average across all the observations we have for these two variables for each franchised chain under the presumption that most of the differences over time reflect noise in the data. Finally, for each year when a franchised chain is present in the data, we also observe the number of company-owned outlets and the number of franchised outlets. These two variables describe a chain’s growth pattern over time.

We expect differences in the type of business activity to affect the value of franchising for the chains. We therefore divide the chains among six “sectors” according to their business activity: 1- the set of chains that sell to other businesses rather than end consumers (Business Products and Services), 2- restaurants and fast-food (Restaurants), 3- home maintenance and related services, where the service provider visits the consumer at home (Home Services), 4- services consumed at the place of business of the service provider, such as health and fitness, or beauty salons (Go To Services), 5- the set of chains that sell car-related products and repair services (Auto; Repair), and 6- retail stores (Retailer).5

Our main explanatory variable of interest, however, is a measure of franchisee collateralizable wealth. We construct this variable by combining information from several sources. First, we obtained yearly housing values per state from the Federal Housing Finance Agency and the Census Bureau. Second, we obtained yearly data about home ownership rates across states from the Census Bureau. Finally, we obtained a region/year-level measure of average proportion of mortgage outstanding for homeowners using data from the joint Census-Housing and Urban Development (HUD) biennial reports, which summarize information on mortgages on a regional basis (Northeast, 

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5We exclude hotel chains from our data because we have too few of them, and the type of services they offer cannot easily be grouped with the categories we use. Moreover, in this industry, firms use a third contractual form, namely management contracts, in addition to franchising and company ownership. Finally, there is much more brand switching in this sector than in any other franchising sector.
Midwest, South and West). Since the reports are biennial, we ascribe the value to the year of, and to the year before, the report. As the first report was published in 1985, this implies that the data we need to generate our main explanatory variable of interest begin in 1984. All states within a region receive the same value for these variables in the same year. We then combine this information with the state-level time series of housing value and home ownership rate to calculate our measure of Collateralizable Housing Wealth: \((1 - \text{the average proportion of mortgage still owed}) \times (\text{the home ownership rate}) \times (\text{housing value for each state/year})\). See Appendix A for further details.

2.2 Linking Chain-Level and State-Level Data

Because we are interested in how the chains grow as well as how long they wait, after starting in business, until they begin franchising, we need to observe the macroeconomic conditions that each chain faces from the time it starts its business. Since the data for collateralizable wealth is only available from 1984 onward, we must restrict our analyses to franchisors that started in business from that year on. Our data sources provide information on 1344 such US-based franchisors.\(^6\)

After eliminating franchised chains for which we have some missing data, as well as hotel chains (for reasons explained in footnote 5), and deleting observations for 72 outlier franchisors who either grow very fast (the number of outlets increases by more than 100 in a year) or shrink very fast,\(^7\) our final sample consists of 3872 observations covering 945 distinct franchised chains headquartered in 48 states, all of which started in business – and hence also franchising – in 1984 or later. Therefore, the franchised chains in our data are mostly young regional chains. They started in business in 1990 and start franchising a few years later, in 1993 on average.

We combine the data on chains with our state/year collateralizable wealth and other yearly state-level macroeconomic data, namely data on the local level of economic activity, i.e. per capita Gross State Product (GSP), which we interpret as a measure of average yearly income, and yearly state population. Our goal, with these macroeconomic variables, is to capture the environment within which the chain is likely to want to expand and seek franchisees. Franchised or not, chains typically expand first in their state of headquarters and then move on to establish outlets in other, mostly nearby or related states (e.g. see Holmes (2011) for the case of Wal-Mart). We can see this tendency also in our data because in post-1991 survey years, franchisors report the states where they operate the most outlets. For example, one of the largest chains in our data is Two Men and a Truck, a Michigan-based chain founded in 1984 that started franchising in 1989, and had 162 franchised and 8 company-owned outlets in 2006. Two Men and a Truck had more outlets in Michigan than anywhere else until 2005, more than 20 years after its founding. Its second largest

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\(^6\)Note that this constraint moreover means that well-known and established brands such as McDonald’s and Burger King and many others, established in the 1950s and 1960s, are excluded from our analyses.

\(^7\)A franchisor is considered shrinking very fast if more than half of the existing outlets exit in a year. To avoid removing small chains, however, for which a decrease in outlets from say 2 to 1 or 4 to 2 might well occur, we also require that the probability of such amount of exits be less than 1e-10 even when the exit rate is as high as 50%.
number of outlets was in Ohio until the late 1990’s. By the early 2000’s, Florida had become the state where it had its second largest number of outlets, but it took until 2006, 22 years after founding, for its number of outlets in that state to become larger than its number of outlets in Michigan. Back Yard Burgers, another rather large chain in our data, is a Nashville, Tennessee-based chain that started in 1987, and began franchising in 1988. It had 135 franchised and 44 company-owned outlets by the end of our data period, in 2006. Back Yard Burgers followed a similar expansion process, going into Arkansas and Mississippi after expanding first in its home state. By 2006, it still had more outlets in Tennessee than in any other state.

Given that we are trying to capture expansion patterns for relatively young franchised chains, we use the information for the 1049 franchisors in our data that we observe at least once within 15 years after they start franchising – i.e. we include some chains that are excluded from our main analyses for lack of data on other variables – to construct a square matrix, the element \((i,j)\) of which is the percentage of franchisors in the data that are headquartered in state \(i\) and report state \(j\) as the state where they have the most outlets. We use only one year of data per franchisor, namely the latest year within this 15 year period, to construct the matrix. The resulting matrix, in Appendix A.4, confirms that most young chains operate most of their outlets in the state where they are headquartered. This can be seen by the fact that the diagonal elements of the matrix are fairly large, typically larger than any off-diagonal element. However, holding the state of origin constant and looking along a row in this matrix, it is also clear that franchisors headquartered in certain, typically smaller states, view some other, usually nearby states, as good candidates to expand into even early on in their development. For example, 25% of the franchisors from Nevada have more outlets in California than in any other state. Only 13% of them report having more outlets in Nevada than anywhere else. Similarly, many franchisors headquartered in Utah (48% of them) have expanded into California to a greater extent than they have in their own state. Only 36% of them have most of their establishments in Utah proper.

We interpret this matrix as an indication of where the franchisors from each state in our data are most likely to want to expand during the period that we observe them. We therefore use the elements of this matrix, along a row – i.e. given a state of headquarters – to weigh our state/year-level macroeconomic variables and match them to our chain/year variables. In our robustness analyses, we consider an alternative matrix where we account for the proportion of each chain’s outlets in the top three states in the construction of the weights. Appendix A provides further details.

2.3 Summary Statistics and Basic Data Patterns

Summary statistics for all our variables, including our weighted macroeconomic and collateralizable wealth measures, are presented in Table 1. We also present here summary statistics for our
one national macroeconomic variable, which is the national annual interest rate, obtained from the Federal Reserve.

As mentioned above, most of the chains in our data waited only a few years after starting in business to become involved in franchising, with an average of only 3 years between the two. The majority of the chains in our data also are small, and they rely on franchising a lot: the mean number of franchised outlets is 36, while the mean number of company-owned outlets is only 3.45. After they start franchising, the chains tend to open mostly franchised outlets. They also do not grow as fast as perhaps some might expect. For example, the median growth in franchised outlets three years after a chain starts franchising is 10, while the median change in number of company-owned outlets during these three years is zero. Similarly, the median growth in franchised and company-owned outlets in the five years after a chain starts franchising are 19 and 0, respectively.

In terms of our chain-level explanatory variables, Table 1 shows that the typical outlet in these chains employs four or five employees. Chains also are not very capital intensive, with an average amount of capital required to open an outlet at $92,000. The variation around this mean, however, is quite large. Franchisors in our data are also distributed fairly evenly across our main sectors, with the exception of Auto; Repair which is the least populated of our sectors.

Finally, the descriptive statistics for our state/year level weighted macroeconomic variables show that individuals held about 36K in collateralizable housing wealth in 1982-84 constant dollars over the 1984 - 2006 period, while per capita real income averaged 19K over the same period. (Also see 3 and related discussion for more on the descriptive statistics for these variables using different weights.)

Figure 1 gives more detail about the overall growth in the number of outlets across the chain/years in our data. Specifically, for each chain, we compute the yearly change in the total number of outlets (including both company-owned outlets and franchised outlets).\(^8\) In the figure, we include each chain only once, by taking the average of the calculated yearly growth in number of outlets over the years we observe each chain. We show this average yearly growth in number of outlets against the chain’s waiting time (i.e. the number of years between when it starts in business and when it begins franchising). Figure 1 shows that chains that enter into franchising faster also grow faster on average. This is true across all sectors.

Similarly, we show the relative growth in the number of franchised outlets in Figure 2. In this figure, for each chain, we compute the yearly change in the number of franchised outlets and the yearly change in the number of company-owned outlets separately, and then we average the yearly ratios of these two over time.\(^9\) Figure 2 shows that chains that start franchising faster not only grow

\(^{8}\)When the data on the number of outlets is missing for all chains, as in, for example, 1999, we compute the change in number of outlets from 1998 to 2000 and divide the result by 2 to compute the yearly change.

\(^{9}\)When there is no change in the number of company-owned outlets between two years, we replace the ratio by the change in number of franchised outlets, thereby treating the number of company outlets as if it has increased by 1, to avoid division by 0.
Table 1: Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>S. D.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Obs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Waiting Time (Years)</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company-owned Outlets</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franchised Outlets</td>
<td>36.34</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>44.74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>3872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required Employees</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>7.67</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>112.5</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required Capital (Constant 82-84 $100K)</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19.72</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Products &amp; Services</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Services</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go To Services</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto; Repair</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coll. Housing Wealth (82-84 $10K)</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>14.17</td>
<td>1104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (Million)</td>
<td>8.84</td>
<td>8.23</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>31.68</td>
<td>1104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per-Capita Gross State Product (82-84 $10K)</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>7.47</td>
<td>1104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (Million)</td>
<td>8.84</td>
<td>8.23</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>31.68</td>
<td>1104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Funds Rate (%)</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>10.23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( ^a \)At the chain level  
\( ^b \)At the chain/year level  
\( ^c \)At the state/year level, for 48 states between 1984 and 2006.  
\( ^d \)At the year level

faster overall (per Figure 1) but also grow relatively faster through franchised outlets. This is quite intuitive. Chains make decisions about entry into franchising based on their expectations of growth after entry. In the context of franchising, a chain with a business model that is particularly suitable for franchising and that has a lot of opportunities to open outlets probably starts franchising earlier. In other words, the decisions on the timing of entry into franchising and expansion paths – in terms of both company-owned and franchised outlets – are intrinsically linked. Our model below takes this fact into account explicitly.

3 The Model

In this section, we develop our empirical model of franchisors’ franchising decision. We begin with a theoretical principal-agent model with a typical chain who faces a set of heterogeneous potential franchisees. Specifically, franchisees differ in the amount of collateral they can put forth. The model emphasizes how these differences in collateralizable wealth affect the chain’s decisions. We use this simple theoretical model to provide intuition and guide our empirical specification. From the theoretical model, we derive linearized profit functions that describe the expected value of opening a company-owned outlet and a franchised outlet for this chain. Which option is most profitable then determines when the chain starts franchising and its growth via company-owned
Figure 1: Entry and Growth by Sector (Average Yearly Growth in Total Outlets and Waiting Time before Franchising)

Figure 2: Entry and Relative Growth by Sector (Average Ratio of Growth in Franchised Outlets to Growth in Company-owned Outlets and Waiting Time before Franchising)
and franchised outlets. In the next Section, we take the model predictions to data and estimate the determinants of franchised chains’ entry (into franchising) and growth decisions.

### 3.1 A Principal-Agent Model of Franchising

Suppose that revenue for a specific chain outlet can be written as a function $G(\theta, a)$. The variable $\theta$ captures the quality of the idea of the chain, the local conditions for that specific outlet and a profit shock. It is random and drawn from some distribution $F(\theta)$. Let $a$ be the effort level of the manager/franchisee of the outlet. The revenue function is increasing in both $\theta$ and $a$. The cost of effort is given by a cost function $\Psi(a)$, which is increasing and strictly convex with $\lim_{a \to \infty} \Psi'(a) = \infty$ and $\Psi(a) > 0$ for any $a > 0$.

Suppose that opening an outlet in this chain requires capital of $I$. We assume that the franchisor can borrow $I$ or use her own capital whenever it wants to open a corporate outlet. However, we assume that a franchisee’s wealth is smaller than $I$ so that she needs to borrow from a bank in the form of a debt contract $(R, C)$, where $R$ denotes the repayment and $C$ is the collateral that the bank receives in case the debtor defaults on the payment of $R$.

We first describe the franchisee’s effort choice and her decision to default or not on the obligation to repay the bank given a collateral amount $C$. We then discuss the chain’s decision-making process facing a set of potential franchisees with heterogeneous collateralizable wealth.

The franchisee’s problem is illustrated in Figure 3. After signing both the franchise and the debt contracts, the franchisee chooses her effort level $a$. The revenue shock $\theta$ is then realized. Let $s$ be the royalty rate, namely the share of revenues that the franchisee pays to the franchisor. The franchisee thus keeps $(1 - s) G(\theta, a)$ amount of revenue. If the business turns out to be profitable, the franchisee will choose not to default on her obligation, i.e. she will pay the repayment $R$. Doing so is worthwhile because it allows her to keep her collateral $C$ and to share in the continuation value.

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10 This is a simplified version of a debt contract that allows us to incorporate main factors that we care about in a simple way.

11 Royalty payments are almost always a proportion of top-line revenues in business-format franchising.
of the outlet, which we take to be $W(\theta, a)$. In other words, the continuation value is affected by the first period effort level and the true $\theta$. The franchisee’s payoff is thus $(1 - s) G(\theta, a) + C + (1 - s) W(\theta, a) - R - \Psi(a)$ when she does not default. Note that very often chains charge not only a fraction of revenues $s$ for the right to operate a franchise, but also a lump-sum one-time fixed fee (i.e. a franchise fee). Since this fee is a constant, we incorporate it in the cost function $\Psi(a)$. For simplicity, we assume that the franchisee incurs no other costs beside those associated with her effort and access to capital.

If the franchisee chooses to default, the bank seizes the collateral $C$ and any money from the liquidation of the outlet assets. The franchisee’s payoff then is $(1 - s) G(\theta, a) - \Psi(a)$. The franchisee defaults if and only if $C + (1 - s) W(\theta, a) - R < 0$. Let $\theta^*$ be the critical state of the world below which default occurs. In other words,

$$R - (1 - s) W(\theta^*, a) = C. \tag{1}$$

In the discussion below, we make the dependence of the repayment $R$ on the amount of money borrowed $(I)$ and the collateral $(C)$ explicit: we denote it by $R(C, I)$. For given $I$ in a debt contract, the repayment should be decreasing in $C$. We assume that the continuation value is increasing in the revenue shock $\theta$ and the franchisee effort $a$. Under these assumptions, $\frac{\partial \theta^*}{\partial C} < 0$. In other words, as the collateral increases, the repayment is smaller and it is less likely that the franchisee will default.

Suppose the franchisee is risk averse and her utility function is $-e^{-\rho w}$, where $\rho > 0$ is her constant absolute risk aversion parameter and $w$ is her payoff. Then, the expected utility of the franchisee can be written as:

$$U = \int_{-\infty}^{\theta^*} -e^{-\rho[(1-s)G(\theta, a) - \Psi(a)]} dF(\theta) + \int_{\theta^*}^{\infty} -e^{-\rho[(1-s)G(\theta, a) + C + (1-s)W(\theta, a) - R(C, I) - \Psi(a)]} dF(\theta) \tag{2}$$

---

12 $W(\theta, a)$ is a reduced-form continuation value at the optimal second-period effort that also takes into account the cost of that effort.

13 In this expression, we let the franchisee share the continuation value per the usual royalty rate. But the royalty rate is typically applied to sales revenues, while the continuation value should reflect profit. Our application of the royalty rate to the continuation value overestimates the value of the future to the franchisee. Thus the franchisee is incentivized to put forth more effort in the startup period in our simple model than he would in reality. However, our formulation is simpler and this simplification does not affect the comparative statics regarding the franchisee’s collateralizable wealth.

14 We assume that the scrap value of the outlet plus $C$ is smaller than $R$, implying that the bank incurs some losses when the franchisee defaults.

15 Besides the collateral $C$, there might be other costs of defaulting such as the adverse effect of defaulting on the franchisee’s credit record. We ignore such costs for simplicity. Adding a constant to represent these costs would not affect our results qualitatively. We also assume that the franchisee still gets access to $(1 - s) G(\theta, a)$ if she defaults because these monies become available before the decision to default is made and are consumed in the interim.

16 See Einav, Jenkins and Levin (2012) for evidence that credit contract design also matters in the consumer credit market for subprime loans. In particular, higher down payment requirements reduce the number of loans, and the likelihood of repayment is substantially lower for larger loans.
For any given $I$, $C$ and $s$, the franchisee maximizes (2) by choosing her effort level $a$. The first-order condition is

$$\frac{\partial U}{\partial a} = \rho \int_{-\infty}^{a^*} \left[ (1-s) \frac{\partial G(\theta,a)}{\partial a} - \Psi'(a) \right] e^{-\rho((1-s)G(\theta,a) - \Psi(a))} dF(\theta)$$

$$+ \rho \int_{a^*}^{\infty} \left[ (1-s) \left( \frac{\partial G(\theta,a)}{\partial a} + \frac{\partial W(\theta,a)}{\partial a} \right) - \Psi'(a) \right] e^{-\rho((1-s)(G(\theta,a) + W(\theta,a)) + C - R(C,I) - \Psi(a))} dF(\theta) = 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

In Supplemental Appendix D, we show that when the risk aversion coefficient $\rho$ is small, $\frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial a \partial C} > 0$ at $a^*$, the interior solution of this utility maximization problem. Therefore, $\frac{\partial a^*}{\partial C} > 0$ by the implicit theorem and the second-order condition $\frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial a^2} < 0$. Intuitively, for fixed $I$, as collateral increases, and thus repayment decreases, the marginal benefit from not defaulting increases. In other words, the marginal utility from increasing effort so as to avoid defaulting increases with $C$. Therefore, the more collateralizable wealth a franchisee has, the higher her effort level.\textsuperscript{17} In the end, the franchisee’s expected utility depends on $C$, $s$, and the fixed fee $L$, which is embedded in the cost function $\Psi(\cdot)$. We denote her expected utility by $\tilde{\pi}_f(s, L, C)$. As for the franchisor, her expected profit is $\tilde{\pi}_f(s, L, C) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} [sG(\theta, a^*) + sW(\theta, a^*) \mathbf{1}(\theta > \theta^*)] dF(\theta) + L$.

We now describe the franchisor’s problem. Suppose that for each specific opportunity that a franchisor has for opening an outlet, there are $N$ potential franchisees each of whom has a collateralizable wealth $C_i$ drawn from a distribution $F_C$. Let $F_N$ be the distribution of $N$. If the fixed fee that the chain charges is high enough, some potential franchisees may find that their participation constraint $(\tilde{\pi}_f(s, L, C_i) > -e^{-\rho W}|_{w=C_i} = -e^{-\rho C_i})$ is not satisfied. From the remaining set of potential franchisees, the chain picks the one that generates the most expected profit. It then compares this expected profit from establishing a franchised outlet to the expected profit from a company-owned outlet. We assume that a minimum level of effort $a_0$ can be induced even for an employed manager. This can be thought of as an observable component of effort or a minimum standard that can be monitored at low cost. The profit of a company-owned outlet is therefore

\textsuperscript{17}Our model emphasizes the moral hazard problem in that we focus on how the amount of collateral that the franchisee provides affects her incentives to put forth effort. Asymmetric information – or hidden information – issues could also play a role in the franchisor’s decision to require franchisees to rely on their collateral. For example, some franchisees may have a lower cost of exerting effort, and franchisors would want to select such franchisees. Since only franchisees who have low costs of exerting effort would agree to put a lot down as collateral, the collateral requirement can help resolve this asymmetric information problem as well. Note that in such a scenario, the selected franchisees also work hard, which is consistent with the intuition we highlight in our model. It is unclear, therefore, what kind of intrinsic quality of a manager would matter without interacting with the effort they provide. Moreover, franchisors utilize several different types of mechanisms to evaluate and screen potential franchisees over a period of several months typically, including several face to face meetings, often extensive periods of training, and so on. Finally, we focus on effort and moral hazard because franchisors indicate that franchisee effort is a major reason why they use franchising. Some franchisors include an explicit clause in their franchise contracts imposing a requirement for best and full-time effort. For example, McDonald’s 2003 contract includes the following clause: 13. Best efforts. Franchisee shall diligently and fully exploit the rights granted in this Franchise by personally devoting full time and best efforts [...] Franchisee shall keep free from conflicting enterprises or any other activities which would be detrimental or interfere with the business of the Restaurant. [McDonald’s corporation Franchise Agreement, p. 6.]
determined by $a_0$ and $\theta$. We denote the expected profit of a company-owned outlet, net of the compensation of the manager, by $\tilde{\pi}_c$. For given $(F_N, F_C)$, the chain chooses the franchise contract $(s, L)$, i.e. it chooses the royalty rate $s$ and the fixed fee $L$, to maximize its expected profit. In summary, the franchisor’s problem is

$$\tilde{\pi} = \max_{(s, L)} E_N E_{(C_1, \ldots, C_N)} \left\{ \max_{i=1, \ldots, N} \tilde{\pi}_f (s, L, C_i) 1 \left( \tilde{U} (s, L, C_i) > -e^{-\rho C_i} \right), \tilde{\pi}_c, 0 \right\}. \quad (4)$$

Since we cannot derive a full analytical solution to a general model such as the one above, with uncertainty of defaulting and heterogeneous franchisees, in the next Section, we use a parameterized version of the model to illustrate some properties of the franchisee’s behavior and the franchisor’s profit function.

### 3.2 An Illustrative Example

We describe the parameterized version of the model fully in Appendix B, and only introduce some necessary notation here. Let $\bar{N}$ be the mean of the number of potential franchisees for a given opportunity, and $\bar{C}$ be the mean of potential franchisees’ collateralizable wealth. We assume that the revenue function $G(\theta, a) = \theta + \beta a$, where $\beta$ captures the importance of the outlet manager’s effort.

For fixed royalty rate $s = 5\%$, we can compute the optimal effort level as the importance of the manager’s effort ($\beta$) and the collateralizable wealth of a potential franchisee ($C$) vary. Results are shown in Figure 4. The figure illustrates our model prediction above that the franchisee’s choice of effort level will be increasing in $C$. When the collateral $C$ increases, the franchisee has more incentive to work hard as the marginal benefit from not defaulting is higher. Per the standard result in the literature, Figure 4 also shows that the optimal effort level is increasing in the importance of the manager’s effort $\beta$. A similar intuition applies: as $\beta$ increases, the marginal utility of effort increases, which leads to a higher optimal effort level.

![Figure 4: Franchisee’s Effort](image)
The parameterized model also yields a number of intuitively appealing properties for the chain’s expected profit function. Figure 5 provides a graphical illustration of these properties. Note that the profit of opening a company-owned outlet in our example is 7, which is based on the normalization that a hired manager’s effort $a_0$ is 0.

Figure 5: Chain’s Expected Profit: $\hat{\pi}$ in equation (4)

Four features of the expected profit for the chain can be seen from Figure 5. First, the chain’s expected profit is increasing in the average collateralizable wealth of the potential franchisees. This is intuitive as the chain’s expected profit is increasing in the franchisee’s effort, which is itself increasing in $C$. In that sense, our model explains the common practice of franchisors to insist that franchisees put their own wealth at stake. Second, it is increasing in the importance of the franchisee effort $\beta$ as a larger $\beta$ also means a higher incentive for the franchisee to exert effort. Third, the slope of the chain’s profit with respect to $C$ is increasing in $\beta$, implying that the marginal effect of $C$ on profit is increasing in $\beta$. This is again intuitive because the revenue function is $\theta + \beta a$, where the effort level is increasing in $C$. Fourth and finally, as we can see by looking across the four panels in Figure 5, the chain’s profit is increasing in the average number of potential franchisees $\bar{N}$. In other words, for a given distribution of collateralizable wealth, more potential franchisees means that there is a greater chance of finding a franchisee with sufficient collateralizable wealth to make her a good candidate for the chain.
3.3 The Empirical Model

Our data describe the timing of when a chain starts franchising and how it grows – and sometimes shrinks – over time through a combination of company-owned and franchised outlets. The model above gives predictions on the relative attractiveness of a franchised outlet to a chain, which then determines the timing of its entry into franchising and its growth decisions. One empirical approach we could adopt given this would be to parameterize the model above as in Appendix B and take its implications to data and estimate the primitives of that model. However, this approach is computationally intensive. For each trial of the model parameters, we would have to solve a principal-agent model with heterogeneous agents and uncertainty about default. This makes it costly to incorporate covariates. This approach also requires that we make functional form assumptions on primitives on which the data and context provide little information. We therefore take a different approach and use the findings above as guidance to specify the profit functions directly.

Specifically, we assume that the value of a company-owned outlet and that of a franchised outlet for the chain are, respectively

\[ \pi_{ci\tau} = x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c + u_{ci} + \varepsilon_{ci\tau}, \]
\[ \pi_{fi\tau} = \pi_{ci\tau} + x_{it}^{(f)} \beta_f + u_{fi} + \varepsilon_{fi\tau}, \]

where \( x_{it}^{(c)} \) is a vector of observable chain \( i \), or chain \( i/\text{year} \ t \), specific variables that affect the profitability of opening an outlet, i.e., the distribution of \( \theta \) in Section 3.1. The vector \( x_{it}^{(f)} \) consists of the observables that influence the relative profitability of a franchised outlet relative to a company owned outlet. According to the results in Section 3.2 this vector includes the financial constraints of chain \( i \)’s potential franchisee pool. It also includes determinants of the importance of manager effort (\( \beta \)) such as the number of employees, given that employee supervision is a major task for managers in the types of businesses that are franchised, as well as the interaction of the number of employees and the average collateralizable wealth, per the third effect on chain profit described above. Finally, it depends on the population in the relevant market environment since the population level influences the number of potential franchisees.\(^{18}\) Let \( u_i = (u_{ci}, u_{fi}) \) capture the unobserved profitability of a company-owned and a franchised outlet. The former captures the unobserved value of the chain’s product. The latter accounts for the fact that some business formats are more amenable to franchising than others. In particular, brand value matters more for some types of businesses than others. As a result, they are more susceptible to franchisee free riding, namely the possibility that franchisees will behave in ways that are beneficial to them but detrimental to the chain, by for example not incurring the costs of keeping the premises clean or the product fresh (see e.g.\footnote{The chain’s profit from a franchised outlet also depends on the royalty rate and fixed fee. However, these are chosen based on the factors we emphasize and thus this effect is implicitly accounted for in our reduced-form profit functions.}}
Brickley and Dark (1987) and Blair and Lafontaine (2005) for more on this. The unobserved relative profitability of franchising will be lower for such chains. The error terms $\varepsilon_{ci\tau}$ and $\varepsilon_{fi\tau}$ capture the unobserved factors that affect the profitability of each type of outlet given opportunity $\tau$.

We assume that opportunities to open outlets arrive exogenously. For example, an opportunity can arise when a store in a mall goes out of business and makes the site available. We assume that the arrival of opportunities follows a Poisson process with rate $m_i$ for chain $i$, where $m_i = \exp(m + u_{mi})$ and $u_{mi}$’s are i.i.d. and follow a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance $\sigma_m^2$.\(^{19}\) When an opportunity $\tau$ arrives in year $t$ after chain $i$ has started franchising, the owner can choose to open a company-owned outlet, a franchised outlet or pass on the opportunity. Let $x_{it} = (x_{it}^{(c)}, x_{it}^{(f)})$. We assume that $\varepsilon_{ci\tau} = \varepsilon_{ci\tau} - \varepsilon_{0i\tau}$ and $\varepsilon_{fi\tau} = \varepsilon_{fi\tau} - \varepsilon_{ci\tau}$, and that $(\varepsilon_{ci\tau}, \varepsilon_{fi\tau}, \varepsilon_{0i\tau})$ are i.i.d. and drawn from a type-1 extreme value distribution. Then, the probability that chain $i$ opens a company-owned outlet conditional on the arrival of an opportunity is

$$p_{ac}(x_{it}, u_i) = \frac{\exp(x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c + u_{ci})}{\exp(x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c + u_{ci}) + \exp(x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c + u_{ci} + x_{it}^{(f)} \beta_f + u_{fi}) + 1}, \quad (6)$$

where the subscript $a$ stands for “after” (after starting franchising) and the subscript $c$ represents “company-owned”. Similarly, the probability of opening a franchised outlet conditional on the arrival of an opportunity is

$$p_{af}(x_{it}, u_i) = \frac{\exp(x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c + u_{ci} + x_{it}^{(f)} \beta_f + u_{fi})}{\exp(x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c + u_{ci}) + \exp(x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c + u_{ci} + x_{it}^{(f)} \beta_f + u_{fi}) + 1}. \quad (7)$$

If, however, chain $i$ has not started franchising by year $t$, the probability of opening a company-owned outlet conditional on the arrival of an opportunity is

$$p_{bc}(x_{it}, u_i) = \frac{\exp(x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c + u_{ci})}{\exp(x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c + u_{ci}) + 1}, \quad (8)$$

where the subscript $b$ stands for “before” (before starting franchising).

Given that the opportunity arrival process follows a Poisson distribution with rate $m_i$ for chain $i$, the number of new company-owned outlets opened in year $t$ before chain $i$ starts franchising follows a Poisson distribution with mean $m_i p_{bc}(x_{it}, u_i)$. Similarly, the number of new company-owned outlets opened after chain $i$ starts franchising follows a Poisson distribution with mean $m_i p_{ac}(x_{it}, u_i)$; and the number of new franchised outlets has mean $m_i p_{af}(x_{it}, u_i)$.

\(^{19}\)Our approach does not allow for strategic considerations in the decision processes of the chains. We do not believe that such considerations are really major concerns for the young small franchised chains in our data.
It is difficult to separately identify the opportunity arrival rate and the overall profitability of opening an outlet. For example, when we observe that a chain opens a small number of outlets per year, it is difficult to know whether this is because the chain had only a few opportunities during the year, or because it decided to take only a small proportion of a large number of opportunities. That said, we do have some information that helps to separately identify them; we come back to this issue further below. In any case, we normalize $u_{ci}$ to be 0. We assume that $u_{fi}$ follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance $\sigma_u^2$. Having set $u_{ci}$ equal to 0, in terms of notation we drop this term and replace $u_{fi}$ by $u_i$ in the remainder of the paper.

We now describe a chain’s decision to start franchising. When an owner starts her business, she may or may not be aware that franchising exists, or that it could be a viable option for her kind of business. We capture this in our model by allowing the owner to be aware or thinking about franchising in their first year in business with some probability $q_0 < 1$. For every other year after the first, for those that are not yet aware, they become aware that franchising is a viable option for their business with some probability, $q_1$. Once the owner becomes aware, at the beginning of each year from that point on, she decides whether to pay the sunk cost to start franchising. The start of franchising is costly because franchisors must develop operating manuals, contracts, disclosure documents – to abide by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) disclosure requirements and those of the many states that have such rules if the chain plans to expand in any of those – and processes to support and control franchisees when they become involved in franchising. The business owner must devote significant amounts of time to these activities, in addition to relying on lawyers and accountants, and they risk affecting the existing business adversely in the process.\(^{20}\) Note that all of these costs are sunk: none of them are recoverable in the event that the business owner decides to stop franchising or goes out of business. Let $\omega_{it}$ be the sunk cost that chain $i$ has to pay to start franchising. This cost is chain-specific because the owner’s time and ability, and the complexity of the business format, for example, affect this cost, and these are all chain specific. This decision therefore depends on how the value of entry into franchising minus the setup cost compares with the value of waiting.

The value of entry is the expected net present value of all future opportunities after entry into franchising. The expected value of each opportunity $\tau$ after entry into franchising is

$$E_{\{\epsilon_{cit}, \epsilon_{fit}\}} \max \{\pi_{cit}, \pi_{fit}, 0\}$$

$$= \log \left( \exp \left( x_{it}(c) \beta_c \right) + \exp \left( x_{it}(c) \beta_c + x_{it}(f) \beta_f + u_i \right) + 1 \right)$$

\(^{20}\)There are specialized consulting firms that can help with this process. Hiring such firms easily costs a few hundreds of thousands of dollars, however. These are substantial amounts for most of the retail and small-scale service firms in our data. But the cost of the owner spending time investigating and considering how to organize a franchise, which often is incurred at the expense of time on the business itself, takes the form of increased likelihood of failure and lower profits as well.
Given that the expected number of opportunities is \( m_i \), the expected value of all opportunities in period \( t \) when the chain can franchise is \( m_i \log \left( \exp \left( x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c \right) + \exp \left( x_{it}^{(f)} \beta_f + u_i \right) + 1 \right) \).

We assume that \( x_{it} \) follows a Markov process. Thus, the value of entry satisfies

\[
VE_i(x_{it}) = m_i \log \left( \exp \left( x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c \right) + \exp \left( x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c + x_{it}^{(f)} \beta_f + u_i \right) + 1 \right) + \delta E_{x_{it+1}|x_{it}} VE_i(x_{it+1}),
\]

where \( \delta \) is the discount factor. Note that for notational simplicity, we denote the value of entry by \( VE_i(x_{it}) \) instead of \( VE(x_{it}, \nu_i, u_i) \) where \( \nu_i \) and \( u_i \) are the unobservable components in the opportunity arrival rate and in the relative profitability of a franchised outlet, respectively.

If chain \( i \) has not entered into franchising at the beginning of year \( t \), it can only choose to open a company-owned outlet – or do nothing – when an opportunity arises in year \( t \). The expected value of opportunities in year \( t \) is therefore \( m_i E_{\pi_{it}} \max \{ \pi_{it}, 0 \} = m_i \log \left( \exp \left( x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c \right) + 1 \right) \). As for the continuation value, note that if the chain pays the sunk cost to enter into franchising next year, it gets the value of entry \( VE_i(x_{it+1}) \). Otherwise, it gets the value of waiting \( VW_i(x_{it+1}) \). So the value of waiting this year is

\[
VW_i(x_{it}) = m_i E_{\pi_{it}} \log \left( \exp \left( x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c \right) + 1 \right) + \delta E_{x_{it+1}|x_{it}} E_{\omega_{it+1}} \max \{ VE_i(x_{it+1}) - \omega_{it+1}, VW_i(x_{it+1}) \}.
\]

Let \( V_i(x_{it}) \) be the difference between the value of entry and the value of waiting: \( V_i(x_{it}) = VE_i(x_{it}) - VW_i(x_{it}) \). Subtracting equation (10) from equation (9) yields

\[
V_i(x_{it}) = m_i \left[ \log \left( \exp \left( x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c \right) + \exp \left( x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c + x_{it}^{(f)} \beta_f + u_i \right) + 1 \right) - \log \left( \exp \left( x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c \right) + 1 \right) \right] + \delta E_{x_{it+1}|x_{it}} E_{\omega_{it+1}} \min \{ \omega_{it+1}, V_i(x_{it+1}) \}
\]

In the second part of equation (11),

\[
E_\omega \min \{ \omega, V \} = E(\omega|\omega < V) \Pr(\omega < V) + V(1 - \Pr(\omega < V))
\]

Therefore, the Bellman equation (11) can be rewritten as

\[
V_i(x_{it}) = m_i \left[ \log \left( \exp \left( x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c \right) + \exp \left( x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c + x_{it}^{(f)} \beta_f + u_i \right) + 1 \right) - \log \left( \exp \left( x_{it}^{(c)} \beta_c \right) + 1 \right) \right] + \delta E_{x_{it+1}|x_{it}} [E(\omega_{it+1}|\omega_{it+1} < V_i(x_{it+1})) \Pr(\omega_{it+1} < V_i(x_{it+1}))
\]

\[
+ V_i(x_{it+1}) (1 - \Pr(\omega_{it+1} < V_i(x_{it+1})))].
\]

Chain \( i \) starts franchising at the beginning of year \( t \) if and only if the difference between the
value of entry and the value of waiting is larger than the setup cost, i.e., \( V_i(x_{it}) \geq \omega_{it} \). We assume that the entry cost shock \( \omega_{it} \) follows a log-normal distribution with mean and standard deviation parameters \( \omega \) and \( \sigma_\omega \). Let \( \Phi(\cdot, \sigma_\omega) \) be the distribution function of a standard normal random variable. Then, the probability of entry conditional on \( i \) thinking about franchising is given by

\[
g(x_{it}; \nu_i, u_i) = \Phi \left( \frac{\log V(x_{it}; \nu_i, u_i) - \omega}{\sigma_\omega} \right),
\]

(13)

where we replace \( V_i(x_{it}) \) by \( V(x_{it}; \nu_i, u_i) \).

The parameters of the model are estimated by maximizing the likelihood function of the sample using simulated maximum likelihood. We conclude this section with a description of the log-likelihood function.

For each chain \( i \) in the data, we observe when it starts in business (denoted by \( B_i \), and treated as exogenous) and when it starts franchising (denoted by \( F_i \)). So, one component of the likelihood function is the likelihood of observing \( F_i \) conditional on chain \( i \)'s unobservable component of the arrival rate \( (\nu_i) \) and its unobservable profitability of opening a franchised outlet \( (u_i) \):

\[
p(F_i|\nu_i, u_i).
\]

(14)

See Supplementary Appendix E for details on this component of the likelihood.

We also observe the number of company-owned outlets (denoted by \( n_{cit} \)) and the number of franchised outlets (denoted by \( n_{fit} \)) for \( t = F_i, ..., 2006 \).\(^\text{21}\) Therefore, another component of the likelihood function is the likelihood of observing \( (n_{cit}, n_{fit}; t = F_i, ..., 2006) \) conditional on chain \( i \)'s timing of franchising \( (F_i) \) and the unobservables \( (\nu_i \text{ and } u_i) \):

\[
p(n_{cit}, n_{fit}; t = F_i, ..., 2006|F_i; \nu_i, u_i).
\]

(15)

For more than 25% of the chains in the data, the number of outlets decreases at least once during the time period we observe this chain. To explain these negative changes in number of outlets, we assume that an outlet, franchised or company-owned, can exit during a year with probability \( \gamma \). The number of company-owned outlets in year \( t \) is therefore

\[
n_{cit} = n_{cit-1} - \text{exits}_{cit} + (\text{new outlets})_{cit},
\]

(16)

where \( \text{exits}_{cit} \) follows a binomial distribution parameterized by \( n_{cit-1} \) and \( \gamma \). As explained above, \( (\text{new outlets})_{cit} \) follows a Poisson distribution with mean \( m_i p_{ac}(x_{it}; u_i) \) or \( m_i p_{bc}(x_{it}, u_i) \) depending

\(^{21}\)Since our data source is a survey on franchisors, we only observe the number of outlets of a chain after it starts franchising. The last year of our sample is 2006.
on whether the chain starts franchising before year \( t \) or not. Similarly,

\[
n_{fit} = n_{fit-1} - \text{exits}_{fit} + (\text{new outlets})_{fit}, \tag{17}
\]

where \((\text{new outlets})_{fit}\) follows a Poisson distribution with mean \( m_ip_{af}(x_{it},u_i) \). The recursive equations (16) and (17) are used to derive the probability (15). See Supplementary Appendix E for further details.

Since our data source is about franchised chains, we only observe a chain if it starts franchising before the last year of our data, which is 2006. Therefore, the likelihood of observing chain \( i \)'s choice as to when it starts franchising \((F_i)\) and observing its outlets \((n_{cit},n_{fit}; t = F_i,...,2006)\) in the sample depends on the density of \((F_i,n_{cit},n_{fit}; t = F_i,...,2006)\) conditional on the fact that we observe it, i.e., \( F_i \leq 2006 \). This selection issue implies, for example, that only chains that find franchising particularly appealing, among those that start in business in the later years of our data, will appear in our sample. We account for this in the likelihood function by conditioning as follows:

\[
L_i = \frac{\int \int p(F_i|\nu_i,u_i) \cdot p(n_{cit},n_{fit}; t = F_i,...,2006|F_i;\nu_i,u_i) \, dP_{\nu_i} \, dP_{u_i}}{\int \int p(F_i \leq 2006|\nu_i,u_i) \, dP_{\nu_i} \, dP_{u_i}}. \tag{18}
\]

The log-likelihood function is obtained by taking the log and summing up over all chains.

Our estimates of the parameters \( \beta_c, \beta_f, m, \sigma_m, \sigma_u, \omega, \sigma_\omega, q_0, q_1 \) maximize the log-likelihood function (18). Data on the growth of franchised outlets relative to the growth of company-owned outlets help us identify the parameters in the relative profitability of a franchised outlet \((\beta_f)\). For example, if chains in high collateralizable housing wealth states grow more rapidly through franchised outlets relative to their growth in company-owned outlets, the coefficient of collateralizable housing wealth in the relative profitability of a franchised outlet (an element of \( \beta_f \)) will be positive.\(^{22}\) Variation in the total number of outlets, however, can arise not only from variation in the profitability of outlets for this chain but also from variation in the arrival rate that is specific to this chain. We therefore cannot include the same covariates in the arrival rate and in the profitability of a company-owned outlet. This exclusion restriction allows us to identify the coefficients in the general profitability of an outlet and the arrival rate separately. We do allow a constant term in the profitability of an outlet and need to identify it separately from the average opportunity arrival rate \( m \). This identification is possible because for some chains, we observe them in the data in the year when they start franchising. In other words, we observe the accumulated number of company-owned out-

\(^{22}\)We assume that the unobservable profitability of a chain and the unobservable relative attractiveness of franchising to a chain are uncorrelated with the observable covariates. In particular, they are uncorrelated with the average collateralizable housing wealth in this chain’s market. This is reasonable because franchisees are a small proportion of all households in a state. One chain’s profitability, which may affect its franchisees’ ability to pay off mortgage and hence affect their collateralizable housing wealth, does not affect the average collateralizable housing wealth in a state. Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) study how the value of real estate of one firm affects the investment of this firm and use local constraints on land supply to deal with the endogeneity problem.
lets they have chosen to open (minus any closings) before they started franchising, which provides information on their overall growth before they have the option to franchise. Once the relative profitability of a franchised outlet is identified as well, the ratio of the overall growth before and after a chain starts franchising identifies the constant term in the general profitability of an outlet. When a chain is very profitable even when it is constrained to open only company-owned outlets, adding the option of franchising has a smaller impact on its overall growth, and vice versa. When this constant is identified, variation in the total growth can be used to pin down the average arrival rate.

Dispersion in the total number of outlets identifies the standard deviation of the arrival rate ($\sigma_m$). Dispersion in relative growth identifies the variation of the unobserved relative profitability of a franchised outlet ($\sigma^2_u$). Given the growth pattern, data on waiting time (the difference between when a chain starts franchising and when a chain starts in business) identifies the distribution of the cost of entering into franchising, i.e., ($\omega, \sigma_\omega$). Furthermore, the probabilities of being aware or thinking about franchising in the first and then in later years in business ($q_0$ and $q_1$) also are identified by the observed variation in waiting time.

4 Estimation Results

The estimation results from our baseline specification are shown in Table 2. From the table, we can see that both population and per-capita gross state product, our measure of income, affect the profitability of outlets positively, presumably through affecting the demand for the product of the chain. In our robustness analyses, in the next section, we show results for a specification where we include collateralizable housing wealth also in the general profitability function.

Our main explanatory variable of interest, collateralizable housing wealth, has a positive effect on the value of opening a franchised outlet relative to opening a company-owned outlet. In other words, when franchisee financial constraints are less binding, namely they have more collateral to put forth, the chains increase their reliance on franchising relative to company ownership. This is in line with the predictions of our principal-agent model, where franchisee borrowing against their collateral to start their business increases their incentives to work hard and hence the profitability of franchising to the franchisors.

Other results from our baseline specification are also in line with predictions of our model. First, we find that the interest rate affects the attractiveness of franchising negatively. Since a higher interest rate implies a higher repayment for given collateral, an increase in the interest rate decreases the opportunity cost of defaulting, which leads to reduced incentives for the franchisee and hence a lower value of franchising to the franchisor. Similarly, when the amount to be borrowed goes up, the opportunity cost of defaulting decreases, which makes franchising less appealing to a chain. This explains the negative effect of required capital on the relative profitability of franchising. The
Table 2: Estimation Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of opportunity arrival rate</td>
<td>constant</td>
<td>3.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>std. dev.</td>
<td>1.275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profitability of a company-owned outlet</td>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-3.711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>population</td>
<td>0.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>per-capita state product</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative profitability of a franchised outlet</td>
<td>collateralizable housing wealth</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>interest rate</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>capital needed</td>
<td>-0.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>population</td>
<td>-0.0017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>employees</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(coll. housing wealth)×(employees)</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>business products &amp; services</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>home services</td>
<td>0.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>go to services</td>
<td>-0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>auto; repair</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>restaurant</td>
<td>-0.569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>constant (retailer)</td>
<td>2.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>std. dev.</td>
<td>1.895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlet exiting rate</td>
<td>mean</td>
<td>0.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>std. dev.</td>
<td>0.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of thinking of franchising</td>
<td>at the time starting business</td>
<td>0.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in subsequent years</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
estimated coefficient of population in the relative profitability of a franchised outlet is statistically insignificant. One interpretation of this result is that the main effect of population operates through the demand for the product of the chain, rather than through the availability of franchisees. We use the amount of labor needed to measure the importance of the manager’s effort. The estimated coefficient for this variable is positive – in line with the idea that incentives for the manager are an important factor leading chains to favor franchising. And while the estimate of the effect of the number of employees is statistically insignificant, we find a statistically significant positive effect for the interaction of collateralizable wealth with the amount of labor. This is consistent with the theoretical finding that franchisee incentives arising from having more collateral at stake are particularly valuable in businesses where the manager’s role is more important to the success of the business. Similarly, the coefficients for the sector dummy variables suggest that, controlling for the level of labor and capital needed, the benefit of franchising is greatest for home services and auto repairs, i.e. that these types of businesses are particularly well suited to having an owner operator, rather than a hired manager, on site to supervise workers and oversee operations more generally. These results again provide support for the idea that franchisee effort is a central factor in franchisors’ franchising decisions.

We also find a large and highly significant rate of closure of outlets in our data. Our estimate implies that about 31% of all outlets close every year. This is larger than the 15% exit rate documented in Jarmin, Klimek and Miranda (2009) for single retail establishments. Most likely this is in part because our data includes relatively more chains from industries with higher than average exit rates (e.g. restaurants per their analyses).23 Also, our data comprises mostly new franchised chains in their first years in franchising. Two things happen to these chains that can explain our high exit rate. First, many of them are experimenting and developing their concept while opening establishments. Some of this experimentation, in terms of product as well as location types – e.g. rural, suburban and urban, in strip malls or stand alone, in high or low income areas, and so on – will not pan out, resulting in a number of establishments being closed down. Second, when chains begin to franchise, they often transform some of the outlets they had established earlier as company outlets into franchised outlets. In our outlet counts, such transfers would show up as an increase in number of franchised outlets, combined with a reduction, and thus exit, of a number of company owned outlets.

Finally, we find evidence that only a fraction of the chains in our data are aware or thinking of franchising from the time they start in business. The majority of them, namely (100%-15%), or 85%, do not think of franchising in their first year in business.24 The probability that they

---

23See also Parsa, Self, Njite and King (2005) who tracked new restaurants from 1996-1999 and found that around 60 percent of them closed within those three years. The failure rate in the first year was 26%.

24Note that around 17% of chains in our data start franchising right away, which is greater than our estimate of 15% who are aware of franchising when they start their business. This discrepancy arises because the observed proportion is conditional on starting to franchise by 2006.
become aware or start thinking about franchising the next year or the years after that is larger, at 17% each year. The estimated average entry cost – the cost of starting to franchise – is 17.75 \(= e^{2.788+0.420^2/2}\). According to our estimates, this is about 11 times the average value of franchised outlets that the chains choose to open.\(^{25}\) In the data, on average, 7 franchised outlets are opened in the first year when a chain starts franchising. The average growth in franchised outlet in the first two years since franchising is 17. So, it takes on average between 1 and 2 years for a chain to grow 11 franchised outlets.

To see how well our estimated model fits the entry and the expansion patterns of the chains in the data, we compare the distribution of the waiting time from the data – left panel of Figure 5(a) – to the same distribution predicted by the model conditional on a chain having started franchising by 2006. Since a chain is included in our data only after it started franchising and the last year of our sample is 2006, this conditional distribution is the model counterpart of the distribution in the data. We make a similar comparison for the distributions of the number of company-owned and franchised outlets also in Figures 6(b) and 6(c), respectively. \(^{26}\) In all cases, we can see that our estimated model fits the data rather well but, not surprisingly, the distributions predicted by the model are smoother than those in the data.

In Supplemental Appendix F, we also simulate the distribution of the number of company-owned and franchised outlets when the decision on the timing of entry into franchising is taken as exogenous, i.e. the selection issue is ignored. In this case, the simulation underestimates the number of franchised outlets quite a bit. This is because ignoring selection means that we draw the unobservable profitability of a franchised outlet from the unconditional distribution so that, even when the draw is so small that the chain should not have started franchising, the simulated number of franchised outlets corresponding to this draw is included to compute the distribution of the predicted number of franchised outlets.

5 Robustness Analyses

In our analyses so far, we have focused on the empirical specification that we view as most directly linked to our theoretical model. Nonetheless, in this Section, we discuss the robustness of our empirical findings to two important alternative ways to think about linking our model to our empirics. First, to alleviate concerns that our results might be too dependent on the specific way in which we linked local macroeconomic variables to the franchise chain data, we estimate the model using a different weight matrix. This alternative weight matrix uses not only information about where each chain headquartered in state “i” has the most outlets, but incorporates information

\(^{25}\)The value of an opened franchised outlet is \(E(\pi_{f/c} | \pi_{f/c} > \pi_{c/c} \text{ and } \pi_{f/c} > 0)\). It is 1.56 on average (across chain/years) according to our estimates.

\(^{26}\)Since there are only a few chain/years with more than 50 company-owned outlets, and more than 200 franchised outlets, we truncate the graphs on the right at 50 and 200 respectively for readability.
Figure 6: Fit of the Model

(a) Distribution of Waiting Time: Data vs. Simulation

(b) Distribution of the Number of Company-owned Outlets: Data vs. Simulation

(c) Distribution of the Number of Franchised Outlets: Data vs. Simulation
concerning the proportion of each chain’s outlets in its top three states (three states where it has the most outlets). The construction of this weight matrix is described further, and the actual matrix is also shown, in Appendix A.4. The estimation results, in Table 4 in Appendix C, show that our estimation results are robust to the way we link the macroeconomic data to our data on chains. In fact, using the alternative weight matrix yields results that are very similar to those we presented above. In terms of our main variable of interest, in fact, we get a coefficient for collateralizable wealth that is even larger than in our baseline specification.

Second, one might be concerned that per capital GSP and population may not be the only relevant demand shifters, and that in fact our main variable of interest, namely collateralizable housing wealth, may affect the demand for the products of these chains. To account for this possibility, we introduce this variable also in the general profitability of outlets, in addition to allowing it to have a differential effect on the profitability of franchised outlets. Comparing results obtained with this specification, in Table 5 in Appendix C, with those in Table 2 in Section 4 reveals that all estimates remain very similar. Moreover, we find that the coefficient of collateralizable housing wealth in the general profitability function has a negative coefficient, rather than the positive coefficient as one would have expected if our measure captured wealth and wealth was a demand shifter. In other words, once we control for income (per capita gross state product) and our other macroeconomic variables, collateralizable wealth operates in a negative way, reducing how much consumers want to consume the products of the chains. One explanation for this result might be that rent will tend to be high in those regions where collateralizable housing wealth is high, making outlets less profitable. Alternatively, for given income, higher wealth may indeed have a negative effect on the demand for the products sold by these chains. In any case, in terms of our main result of interest, the effect of collateralizable wealth in the profitability of franchising remains positive, and of similar magnitude, whether or not we include this variable in the overall profitability of outlets directly.

6 The Effect of Collateralizable Wealth

In this Section, we use our baseline results to conduct a simulation where collateralizable housing wealth is decreased by 30% in all state/years in the data. This exercise serves two purposes. First, it helps us understand the economic magnitude of the estimated effect of collateralizable housing wealth on the extent of franchising and the expansion of the chains. Second, it allows us to explore the likely effect of the reduction in housing values that occurred in the recent years – yet outside our data period – on the growth of small businesses, in this case franchised establishments.²⁷

²⁷Median net worth fell 38.8 percent between 2007-2010 mostly because of the reduction in housing values (see Bricker, Kennickell, Moore and Sabelhaus (2012)). Note that our data end in 2006. So our estimates are obtained based on information that predates the housing crisis.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of the average change in waiting time that results from this change in collateralizable wealth. For each chain/simulation draw, we compute the waiting time with and without a 30% decrease in local collateralizable housing wealth. We then compute the average waiting time across simulations for this chain. The histogram of these average changes in waiting time is presented in Figure 7. We use the simulated distribution without the decrease in collateralizable housing wealth rather than the empirical distribution directly from the data as the benchmark for two reasons. First, we do not want estimation errors to contribute to the observed differences between the distributions with and without the decrease in collateralizable housing wealth. Second, since we are interested in the effect of tightening franchisee’s financial constraints on waiting time, we need to plot the unconditional distribution of the waiting time, which is not observable in the data. In the data, we only observe the distribution conditional on entry into franchising before 2006.

Figure 7: The Effect of Potential Franchisees’ Financial Constraints on Chain’s Waiting Time

From Figure 7, we can see that all chains in our data go into franchising on average (averaged over simulations) later with than without the change in franchisee financial constraints. The average effect of decreased collateral wealth on the chains’ decisions to start franchising is 0.21 years. The average waiting time is 3.15 years. So, the average delay is about 7% of the average waiting time.

Figure 8 shows the average change in the number of company-owned outlets and franchised outlets that results from the 30% decrease in potential franchisee collateralizable wealth. The results of our simulations imply that the number of total outlets of chains five years after they start in business decreases by 2.64 on average (averaged over simulations and the 764 chains in our sample that started in business no later than 2002). In total, these 764 chains would fail to open

\footnote{The average number of outlets five years after a chain starts its business is 25.78 in the data. The simulated}
2017 outlets with 12996 jobs – according to our data on number of employees per establishment – in the process.\textsuperscript{29} Similarly, there are 447 chains in our sample that started franchising no later than 1997. Our simulation indicates that these chains would have 2101 fewer outlets ten years after starting in business, or 4.70 fewer outlets each on average. The direct corresponding job loss would be 14887.

Of course, the franchised chains in our sample are only a subset of all franchisors – they are the business-format chains that started in business after 1984 but before 1997 or 2002, and that started franchising before 2006, and that were included in our data sources. To understand the overall impact of the tightening of franchisees’ financial constraints might be, we can use the average percentage changes in the number of outlets five and ten years after a chain starts its business. They are, respectively, 6.67\% and 8.48\%. Per the 2007 Economic Census information, business-format franchised chains had more than 380,000 establishments, and accounted for 6.4 million jobs in the U.S. Using the latter figure, and the percentage changes in outlets that we obtain, the predicted number of jobs affected could be as large as 542,700 to 759,000. This, however, is a partial equilibrium result. The lack of growth of franchised chains, for example, might allow other firms to go into business. However, the financial constraints faced by franchisees has been touted\footnote{The jobs numbers also are averaged over simulations. We can simulate the lack of job creation because we observe the typical number of employees needed in an outlet for each chain.} counterpart (without any change in collateralizable housing wealth) is 24.60.
as a major factor impeding the growth of small businesses generally. Hence it is not clear that the reduction in number of outlets we document could be made up by an increase in the number of other businesses.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we have shown theoretically and empirically that the entry of a chain into franchising and its growth via franchised relative to company-owned outlets are intrinsically linked. We have also shown that both of these depend in a systematic way on the availability of financial resources of potential franchisees. The magnitude of the effects is sizable, suggesting that financial constraints play an important role for the type of small business owners that franchisors try to attract into their ranks. In other words, our results show that franchisees’ investments in their businesses are an important component of the way franchisors organize their relationships with their franchisees. When the opportunities for such investments are constrained, franchising as a mode of organization becomes less efficient, and the chains rely on it less. This, in turn, reduces their total output.

Though we have not emphasized this in our discussion thus far, we view the incentive effect of collateralizable wealth as particularly complementary to that of the residual claims that are the typical focus of the agency literature. This is because collateralizable wealth gives incentives to franchisees in the early years of operation for their business, a period during which profits, and hence residual claims, are often negative but the amount of wealth put up in the business is at its maximum.

Finally, from a methodological perspective, our data, like those that are typically available to study small businesses, only show the net change in number of outlets each year. Nonetheless, our paper provides a framework to estimate the creation and exit of outlets separately, and explains the data variation needed for the identification. More generally, we view our empirical model as a step toward developing empirically tractable analyses of factors that principal-agent models suggest are important, but that are often difficult to capture empirically within the confines of what are often limited, and in our case, aggregated data on firm decisions. Authors often face similar data constraints, and so we hope that our approach may provide some useful building blocks for them as well.
References


Reuteman, Rob (2009), The State of Franchising in the Credit-Crunched U.S.


Appendices

A  Data Appendix

This appendix provides further details on data and measurement issues.

A.1  Franchisor Sample and Characteristics

We constructed our sample of franchised chains from yearly issues of the Entrepreneur Magazine from 1981-1993, and an annual listing called the Bond’s Franchise Guide (previously the Source Book of Franchise Opportunities) for 1994-2007. In each case, the publication is published a year late relative to the year of data collection, so we obtain the 1980 to 1992 data from the first and 1993 to 2006 data from the latter source. The last year of our sample is 2006 (from the 2007 publication). Also, because the Bong Guide was not published in 2000 and 2003, we are missing data for all franchisors for 1999 and 2002.
Because our state-level macroeconomic variables of interest are only available from 1984 onward, we must constrain our sample to US-based franchisors that started in business in 1984 or later. This means that our sample comprises mostly young brands, with small number of establishments: well-known brands such as McDonald’s and Burger King for example were established in the 1950s and 1960s. After eliminating chains with missing data and some others for reasons discussed in the text, our final sample consists of 3872 observations covering 945 distinct franchised chains, for an average of four observations on average per chain. This short duration for our panel is explained in part by the large number of entry into and exit from franchising (or business) of the chains (see e.g. Blair and Lafontaine (2005) for more on the entry and exit rate of chains) as well as the lack of data for 1999 and 2002.

For each franchisor/year in our sample, we have data on the amount of capital required to open an outlet (Capital Required) and the number of employees that the typical outlet needs (Number of Employees). We transform the former to constant 1982-84 dollars using Consumer Price Index data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For the latter, we count part-time employees as equivalent to 0.5 of a full-time employee.

We view the Capital Required (in constant dollars) and the Number of Employees needed to run the business as intrinsically determined by the nature of the business concept, which itself is intrinsically connected to the brand name. So, they should not change from year to year. Yet we find some variation in the data. Since the data are collected via surveys, they are subject to some errors from respondents or transcription. We therefore use the average across all the observations we have for these two variables for each franchised chain under the presumption that most of the differences over time reflect noise in the type of survey data collected by our sources. There is also some variation in the reported years in which the chain begins franchising and when it starts in business. For these variables, we use the earliest date given because we see that franchisors sometimes revise these dates to more current values for reasons we do not fully understand. However, we make sure that the year of first franchising is after the first year in business. We also push the year of franchising to later if we have data indicating no franchised establishments in the years when the chain states it starts franchising.

A.2 Collateralizable Housing Wealth

We measure collateralizable housing wealth using

- data on a yearly housing price index at the state level from the Federal Housing Finance Agency. These data are revised at the source quite frequently, perhaps as often as every time a new quarter is added. They also have been moved around several web sites. The version used here is the “States through 2010Q3 (Not Seasonally Adjusted) [TXT/CSV]” series in the All-Transactions Indexes section at http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=87. The
base period of the index is 1980Q1;

- data on housing values by state in 1980 from the Census Bureau (the base year of the aforementioned housing price index). These data are in constant year 2000 based dollars. We transform them to constant 1983-84 based constant dollars using the Consumer Price Index. The combination of the above two sets of data allows us to generate time series of yearly housing values per state, from 1980 onward. We then complement these with the following:

- yearly data about home ownership rates across states from the Census Bureau’s Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division;

- data from the joint Census-Housing and Urban Development (HUD) biennial reports, based on the American Housing Surveys, which summarize information on mortgages on a regional basis (Northeast, Midwest, South and West). Specifically, from this source, we obtained measures of regional housing values, total outstanding principal amount, and number of houses owned free and clear of any mortgage. These can be found in Tables 3-14 and 3-15 of the biennial reports. The data for housing values and for total outstanding principal are reported in the form of frequencies for ranges of values. We use the middle value for each range and the frequencies to calculate expected values for these. We then combine these data to calculate the average proportion of mortgage outstanding for homeowners in the region each year. Specifically, we calculate
\[
\left(\frac{\text{TOPA} - \text{NTOPA}}{\text{NTOPA} + \text{NF}}\right) \times \text{(HousingValues)},
\]
where TOPA is Total Outstanding Principal Amount, NTOPA is the Number of Households that Reported Outstanding Principal, and NF is the Number of Households with Houses owned Free and Clear of any mortgage. Since the data on TOPA, NTOPA, and NF are by region, we ascribe the regional expected value to all states in each region. Also, since the joint Census-Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reports are biennial, we ascribe the value to the year of, and to the year before, the report. This means that we can generate our main explanatory variable of interest below from 1984 onward.

In the end, we combine the information on the proportion of outstanding mortgage for homeowners (data in item 4 above) with the state home ownership rate (item 3) and housing value time series (combination of items 1 and 2) to calculate our measure of Collateralizable Housing Wealth, given by: \((1 - \text{the average proportion of mortgage still owed}) \times \text{(the home ownership rate)} \times \text{(housing value for each state/year)}\).

A.3 Macroeconomic Variables

Real GSP data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We deflate nominal annual GSP data using the Consumer Price Index also from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and obtain per
capita GSP after dividing by population. The annual population data were downloaded from: http://www.census.gov/popest/states/. The interest rate data series we use is the Federal Funds annual data (downloaded from the Federal Reserve web site, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm on 03/26/2009). The data are in percent.

A.4 Weighing Matrices

As described in the body of the paper, we create our main weighing matrix using information from the 1049 franchisors in our data that we observe at least once within 15 years after they start franchising. We use only one year of data per franchisor, namely the latest year within this 15 year period, to construct the matrix. For each state pair \((s_1, s_2)\), the weight is defined as

\[
\sum_{j \in J_{s_1}} 1(s_2 \text{ is the top state for chain } j) / \#(J_{s_1}),
\]

where \(J_{s_1}\) is the set of chains that headquarter in state \(s_1\), \(\#(J_{s_1})\) is the cardinality of the set \(J_{s_1}\), and \(1(s_2 \text{ is } j\text{'s top 1 state})\) is a dummy variable capturing whether chain \(j\) reports \(s_2\) as the state where they have most of their outlets. In other words, the weight is the proportion of chains headquartered in \(s_1\) that report \(s_2\) as the state where they have most of their outlets. The resulting matrix is shown below as Matrix A.

We rely on an alternative set of weights in our robustness analyses. The source data identifies three (or the two, or one if there are only two or one) U.S. states where the chain has the most outlets, and for each of those, it states how many outlets it has. Our alternative weighing matrix takes all this into account, namely it uses data from all top three states (as opposed to only the top one state in Matrix A) as well as the relative importance of these top three states, in the form of the proportion of outlets in each state relative to the total in all three (as opposed to only using a dummy to capture whether a state is the top state as in Matrix A). Specifically, for each chain \(j\), we calculate

\[
N_{3j} = n_{i1j} + n_{i2j} + n_{i3j},
\]

where \(n_{ij}\) is the number of establishments of the chain in its top three states \(i = 1, 2\) or 3. We then calculate \(p_{ij} = n_{ij}/N_{3j}\). For each state pair \((s_1, s_2)\), we then calculate the average proportion of establishments in origin state \(s_1\) and destination state \(s_2\) pairs across all the chains headquartered in state \(s_1\) as

\[
\sum_{j \in J_{s_1}} [p_{1j}1(s_2 \text{ is franchisor } j\text{'s state with the most outlets}) + p_{2j}1(s_2 \text{ is franchisor } j\text{'s state with the second most outlets}) + p_{3j}1(s_2 \text{ is franchisor } j\text{'s state with the third most outlets})] / \#(J_{s_1}).
\]

Note that the sum of these average proportions across destination states \(s_2\) for each origin state \(s_1\) is 1.

The resulting matrix is shown below as Matrix B. As can be seen from a comparison of the matrices, the matrix we rely on in our main specification (Matrix A) allocates some weight to macro conditions outside of the chain’s headquarters state, but not as much as Matrix B does. The latter is a little more dispersed. However, per the descriptive statistics in 3 below, the macroeconomic variables are similar in the two matrices. Compared to using the macroeconomic variables of the home state only, with no weights, the mean and standard deviation of population in particular is quite different once we apply our weights. This confirms the fact that, as noted in the body of the
paper, franchisors headquartered in relatively small (i.e. low population) states tend to move into other, more populated states faster than do those headquartered in larger markets. Similarly the descriptive statistics suggest that franchisors in low collateralizable housing wealth states grow into others with slightly more such wealth earlier on.

Table 3: Summary Statistics for Macroeconomic Variables for Different Weight Matrices: At the state/year level, for 48 states between 1984 and 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>S. D.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Obs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No weights</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coll. Housing Wealth (82-84 $10K)</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>14.17</td>
<td>1104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (Million)</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>36.12</td>
<td>1104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per-Capita Gross State Product (82-84 $10K)</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>7.47</td>
<td>1104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Matrix (Matrix A)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coll. Housing Wealth (82-84 $10K)</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>14.17</td>
<td>1104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (Million)</td>
<td>8.84</td>
<td>8.23</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>31.68</td>
<td>1104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per-Capita Gross State Product (82-84 $10K)</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>7.47</td>
<td>1104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alternative Matrix (Matrix B)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coll. Housing Wealth (82-84 $10K)</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>13.21</td>
<td>1104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (Million)</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>28.92</td>
<td>1104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per-Capita Gross State Product (82-84 $10K)</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>1104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Matrix A: The Main Weighing Matrix Used in Constructing Values for Macroeconomic Variables Relevant to each Chain

|       | WA  | MN  | MO  | MT  | NH  | OH  | OR  | CO  | DC  | UT  | PA  | SD  | AZ  | TX  | KY  | NJ  | FL  | IA  | UT  | KY  | NV  | AZ  | CA  | WA  | CA  | MI  | FL  | CA  |
|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| WA    | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 1.0 | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |
| MN    | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0.04| 0.08| 0.02| 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |
| MO    | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0.10| 0.05| 0.10| 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |
| MT    | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 1.0 | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   ...

Weights larger than or equal to 0.1 are highlighted.
For a chain whose home state is AL, for example, its macroeconomic variable is the weighted sum of the macroeconomic variable in the 51 states where the weights are given by the first row.
B Details on the Parametric Model in Section 3.2

In this Appendix, we describe the parametric model for our analysis in Section 3.2. In this parametric model, we assume a linear revenue function $G(\theta,a) = \theta + \beta a$ and a linear continuation value $W(\theta,a) = \theta + 2a$. The profit shock $\theta$ follows a normal distribution with mean 6 and a variance of 9. Opening an outlet in this chain requires capital $I = 5$. In the debt contract, the repayment $R$ depends on the amount of money borrowed ($I$) and the collateral ($C$) according to the following linear function: $R = (1 + r)I$ where $r = 0.5 - 0.01C/I$. In other words, the interest rate is 50% when $C = 0$ and 1% when $C = I$.

The franchisee’s utility function is $-e^{-\rho w}$ where $\rho = 0.025$ is her absolute risk aversion parameter and $w$ is her payoff. It is costly for her to exert effort. The cost is $\Psi(a) = e^{a} + L$.

We assume that the number of potential franchisees $N$ follows a Poisson distribution with mean $\bar{N}$. The collateralizable wealth that each potential franchisee has follows a truncated normal distribution with mean $\bar{C}$ and a variance of 1. It is truncated on the left at 0.

The expected profit from a company-owned outlet is $\tilde{\pi}_c = E_\theta [G(\theta,a_0) + W(\theta,a_0) 1(W(\theta,a_0) > 0)] - I$. We normalize the hired manager’s effort $a_0$ to be 0 and the corresponding compensation to be 0. Thus, $\tilde{\pi}_c = 7$ in our example.

C Robustness Analyses Results

In this Section, we report the estimation results using a different weight matrix (Table 4) and the estimation results from a different specification where collateralizable housing wealth is included in the general profitability function using both weight matrices (Table 5).
Table 4: Robustness Analyses: Different Weight Matrix to Link Chain-level and State-level Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of opportunity arrival rate</td>
<td>constant</td>
<td>3.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>std. dev.</td>
<td>1.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profitability of a company-owned outlet</td>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-3.850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>population</td>
<td>0.264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>per-capita state product</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative profitability of a franchised outlet</td>
<td>collateralizable housing wealth</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>interest rate</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>capital needed</td>
<td>-0.388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>population</td>
<td>-0.0023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>employees</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(coll. housing wealth)×(employees)</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>business products &amp; services</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>home services</td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>go to services</td>
<td>-0.239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>auto; repair</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>restaurant</td>
<td>-0.637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>constant (retailer)</td>
<td>2.614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>std. dev.</td>
<td>1.961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlet exiting rate</td>
<td>mean</td>
<td>0.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>std. dev.</td>
<td>0.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of thinking of franchising</td>
<td>at the time starting business</td>
<td>0.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in subsequent years</td>
<td>0.174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Robustness Analyses: Including Collateralizable Housing Wealth in the General Profitability of an Outlet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>original weight matrix</th>
<th>alternative weight matrix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>est.</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of opportunity arrival rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>3.093</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std. dev.</td>
<td>1.267</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profitability of a company-owned outlet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-3.379</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per-capita state product</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collateralizable housing wealth</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative profitability of a franchised outlet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collateralizable housing wealth</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest rate</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capital needed</td>
<td>-0.355</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employees</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(coll. housing wealth)×(employees)</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>business products &amp; services</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>home services</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>go to services</td>
<td>-0.189</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>auto; repair</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>restaurant</td>
<td>-0.634</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant (retailer)</td>
<td>2.510</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std. dev.</td>
<td>2.002</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlet exiting rate</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of entry cost</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
<td>2.685</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std. dev.</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of thinking of franchising</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at the time starting business</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in subsequent years</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


D Proofs for Section 3.1

In this Section, we show that \( \frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial a \partial C} > 0 \) at the interior solution to the franchisee’s utility maximization problem. Note that the effect of increasing \( C \) on the marginal utility of effort is

\[
\frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial a \partial C} = \rho \left[ (1 - s) \frac{\partial G(\theta^*, a)}{\partial a} - \Psi'(a) \right] e^{-\rho[(1-s)G(\theta^*,a)-\Psi(a)]} f(\theta^*) \frac{\partial \theta^*}{\partial C} \quad \text{(D.19)}
\]

\[
+ \rho^2 \frac{\partial R}{\partial C} \int_{\theta^*}^{\infty} \left[ (1 - s) \left( \frac{\partial G(\theta, a)}{\partial a} + \frac{\partial W(\theta, a)}{\partial a} \right) - \Psi'(a) \right] e^{-\rho[(1-s)(G(\theta,a)+W(\theta,a))+C-R(C,I)-\Psi(a)]} dF(\theta) \]

\[
- \rho \left[ (1 - s) \left( \frac{\partial G(\theta^*, a)}{\partial a} + \frac{\partial W(\theta^*, a)}{\partial a} \right) - \Psi'(a) \right] e^{-\rho[(1-s)(G(\theta^*,a)+W(\theta^*,a))+C-R(C,I)-\Psi(a)]} f(\theta^*) \frac{\partial \theta^*}{\partial C} . \quad \text{(D.20)}
\]

Given that \( R(C,I) - (1 - s)W(\theta^*, a) = C \) according to (1), the above expression can be simplified as follows:

\[
\rho^2 \left( \frac{\partial R}{\partial C} - 1 \right) \int_{\theta^*}^{\infty} \left[ (1 - s) \left( \frac{\partial G(\theta, a)}{\partial a} + \frac{\partial W(\theta, a)}{\partial a} \right) - \Psi'(a) \right] e^{-\rho[(1-s)(G(\theta,a)+W(\theta,a))+C-R(C,I)-\Psi(a)]} dF(\theta) \]

\[
- \rho (1 - s) \frac{\partial W(\theta^*, a)}{\partial a} e^{-\rho[(1-s)(G(\theta^*,a)+W(\theta^*,a))+C-R(C,I)-\Psi(a)]} f(\theta^*) \frac{\partial \theta^*}{\partial C} . \quad \text{(D.20)}
\]

The second term in (D.20) is positive because \( \frac{\partial \theta^*}{\partial C} < 0 \). This term captures the effect of an increase in \( C \) on the franchisee’s incentive to work hard so as to avoid defaulting. As \( C \) increases, the opportunity cost of defaulting increases. As a result, the franchisee has more incentives to decrease the probability of defaulting by working hard and shifting the critical state \( \theta^* \) downwards.

The first term captures the effect of wealth on incentives through affecting the marginal utility of effort. For illustration, suppose that the revenue function and the continuation value function are separable in the shock \( \theta \) and the effort \( a \). Specifically, \( G(\theta, a) = G_1(\theta) + G_2(a) \) and \( W(\theta, a) = W_1(\theta) + W_2(\theta) \). The franchisee’s marginal utility from effort is

\[
\frac{\partial U}{\partial a} = \rho \left[ (1 - s) G_2(a) - \Psi'(a) \right] \int_{-\infty}^{\theta^*} e^{-\rho[(1-s)G(\theta,a)-\Psi(a)]} dF(\theta) \]

\[
+ \rho \left[ (1 - s) G_2(a) + (1 - s) W_2(a) - \Psi'(a) \right] \int_{\theta^*}^{\infty} e^{-\rho[(1-s)(G(\theta,a)+W(\theta,a))+C-R(C,I)-\Psi(a)]} dF(\theta) .
\]

The first-order condition \( \frac{\partial U}{\partial a} = 0 \) implies that \( (1 - s) G_2(a) - \Psi'(a) < 0 \) and \( (1 - s) (G_2(a) + W_2(a)) - \Psi'(a) > 0 \) at the optimal effort level. In other words, at the optimal effort level, the franchisee would have worked too much if she knew that she would default (Note that her marginal payoff of effort \( (1 - s) G_2(a) - \Psi'(a) \) is negative) and would have worked too little if she knew that she would not default (The marginal payoff of effort \( (1 - s) (G_2(a) + W_2(a)) - \Psi'(a) \) is positive).

When collateral \( C \) increases, the repayment \( R \) decreases. As a result, her wealth when she does not default \((1 - s) G_2(a) + W (\theta, a) + C - R(C,I) - \Psi(a)\) increases, and her marginal utility from wealth decreases. Therefore, the marginal utility from the positive marginal payoff is decreasing in
C, implying a negative effect of an increase in C on marginal utility \( \frac{\partial U}{\partial a} \), i.e., incentives. Intuitively, less wealthy agents get more utility from an increase in wealth and therefore have more incentives to work hard to increase wealth. The magnitude of this negative effect of an increase in C on the franchisee’s incentive to work is governed by \( \rho \). Thus, when \( \rho \) is small, the positive effect of C on incentives (i.e., higher incentives to decrease the probability of defaulting) dominates the negative effect of C on incentives (i.e., lower incentives to increase payoff for given a probability of defaulting).

### E Details on the Log-likelihood Function

In this Section, we derive the log-likelihood function (18). It consists of three components: the likelihood that chain \( i \) starts franchising in year \( F_i \), \( p(F_i)\); the likelihood that this chain is in the sample \( p(F_i \leq 2006)\) and the likelihood of observing its growth paths of the number of company-owned and franchised outlets \( p(n_{cit}, n_{fit}; t = F_i, ..., 2006 | F_i)\).

First, the likelihood of observing \( F_i \) conditional on chain \( i \)’s unobservable component of the arrival rate \( (\nu_i) \) and its unobservable profitability of opening a franchised outlet \( (u_i) \) is

\[
p(F_i | \nu_i, u_i) = \sum_{t = B_i}^{F_i - 1} \prod_{t = B_i}^{t'} (1 - q_t) \cdot q_{t'} \prod_{t = t'}^{F_i - 1} (1 - g(x_{it}; \nu_i, u_i)) \cdot g(x_{iF_i}; \nu_i, u_i)
\]

(E.21)

where \( q_t \) is the probability that the chain is thinking about franchising in a specific year. As explained above, \( q_t = q_0 \) when \( t = B_i \) and \( q_t = q_1 \) when \( t > B_i \). Thus, the first summand in (E.21), \( q_0 \cdot \prod_{t = B_i}^{F_i - 1} (1 - g(x_{it}; \nu_i, u_i)) \cdot g(x_{iF_i}; \nu_i, u_i) \), is the probability that chain \( i \) is thinking of franchising from the very beginning, but chooses not to start franchising until year \( F_i \). Similarly, the second summand in (E.21), \( (1 - q_0)q_1 \cdot \prod_{t = B_i + 1}^{F_i - 1} (1 - g(x_{it}; \nu_i, u_i)) \cdot g(x_{iF_i}; \nu_i, u_i) \), is the probability that chain \( i \) starts to think of franchising one year after it starts its business, but does not start franchising until year \( F_i \). The sum of all such terms gives us the probability of starting franchising in year \( F_i \).

Second, the likelihood of observing chain \( i \) in the sample, which requires that \( F_i \leq 2006 \), is thus the sum of the probability that chain \( i \) starts franchising right away \( (F_i = B_i) \), the probability that

\[30\text{The second term in (D.20) can be written as } \rho \left( 1 - \frac{\partial R}{\partial a} \right) e^{-\rho[1-s]g(\theta^*, a) + W(\theta^*, a) + C - R(C, I) - \Psi(a)} f(\theta^*) \text{ when we plug in } (1-s) \frac{\partial W(\theta^*, a)}{\partial a} \frac{\partial g(\theta, a)}{\partial c} = \frac{\partial R}{\partial a} - 1, \text{ which is obtained by total differentiation of equation (11) with respect to } C. \text{ The condition for } \frac{\partial g(\theta, a)}{\partial a} > 0 \text{ is therefore } \rho < -e^{-\rho[1-s]g(\theta^*, a) + W(\theta^*, a) + C - R(C, I) - \Psi(a)} f(\theta^*) / \int_{\theta_{min}}^{\theta_{max}} (1-s) \frac{\partial G(\theta, a)}{\partial a} - \Psi'(a) e^{-\rho[1-s]g(\theta, a) - \Psi(a)} dF(\theta).}
it starts one year later \((F_i = B_i + 1)\), ..., the probability that it starts in 2006, i.e.,

\[
p(F_i \leq 2006 | \nu_i, u_i) = \sum_{F = B_i}^{2006} p(F | \nu_i, u_i).
\]

Third, to derive the likelihood of observing the two growth paths \((n_{cit}, n_{fit}; t = F_i, ..., 2006)\) of chain \(i\) conditional on its timing of franchising, note that the number of company-owned outlets in year \(t\) is given by equation (16), copied below:

\[
n_{cit} = n_{cit-1} - \text{exits}_{cit} + (\text{new outlets})_{cit},
\]

where \(\text{exits}_{cit}\) follows a binomial distribution parameterized by \(n_{cit-1}\) and \(\gamma\), the outlet exit rate; and \((\text{new outlets})_{cit}\) follows a Poisson distribution with mean \(m_i p_{ac} (x_{it}, u_i)\) or \(m_i p_{bc} (x_{it}, u_i)\) depending on whether the chain starts franchising before year \(t\) or not. Given that the mixture of a Poisson distribution and a binomial distribution is a Poisson distribution\(^{31}\) and the sum of two independent Poisson random variables follows a Poisson distribution, \(n_{cit}\) follows a Poisson distribution with mean \(\sum_{k = B_i}^{t} m_i p_c (x_{ik}, u_i) (1 - \gamma)^{t - k}\), where \(p_c (x_{ik}, u_i) = p_{bc} (x_{ik}, u_i)\) for \(k < F_i\) and \(p_c (x_{ik}, u_i) = p_{ac} (x_{ik}, u_i)\) for \(k \geq F_i\). The likelihood of observing \(n_{cit}\) in the year the chain starts franchising (i.e., in the first year that we can observe this chain in the data) conditional on it starting franchising in year \(F_i\) is therefore

\[
p_{n_{cit}|F_i} (\nu_i, u_i) = \Pr \left( n_{cit}; \sum_{k = B_i}^{t} m_i p_c (x_{ik}, u_i) (1 - \gamma)^{t - k} \right) \text{ for } t = F_i.
\]

For subsequent years \((t = F_i + 1, ..., 2006)\), we need to compute the likelihood of observing \(n_{cit}\) conditional on \(F_i\) as well as \(n_{cit-1}\). According to equation (16), this conditional probability is the convolution of a binomial distribution (“\(n_{cit-1} - \text{exits}_{cit}\)” follows a binomial distribution with parameters \(n_{cit-1}\) and \(1 - \gamma\)) and a Poisson distribution \((\text{new outlets})_{cit}\) follows a Poisson distribution with mean \(m_i p_{ac} (x_{it}, u_i)\):

\[
P_{n_{cit}|n_{cit-1}, F_i} (\nu_i, u_i) = \sum_{Y = 0}^{n_{cit-1}} \Pr (K | n_{cit-1}; 1 - \gamma) \Pr ((\text{new outlets})_{cit} = n_{cit} - K; m_i p_{ac} (x_{it}, u_i)).
\]

The conditional probabilities \(p_{n_{fit}|F_i} (\nu_i, u_i)\) and \(P_{n_{fit}|n_{fit-1}, F_i} (\nu_i, u_i)\) can be computed analogously. Since Poisson events that result in company-owned and franchised outlet expansions are

\(^{31}\)If \(X\) follows a binomial distribution with parameters \((M, p)\) and \(M\) itself follows a Poisson distribution with mean \(\bar{M}\), then \(X\) follows a Poisson distribution with mean \(\bar{M}p\). Note that \(n_{cit-1} - \text{exits}_{cit}\) in equation (16) follows a binomial distribution with parameters \(n_{cit-1}\) and \(1 - \gamma\).
independent events (because Poisson events are independent), the likelihood of observing chain $i$’s growth path is

$$p(n_{cit}, n_{fit}; t = F_i, ..., 2006 | F_i; \nu_i, u_i) = p_{n_{cit}|F_i}(\nu_i, u_i) \cdot \prod_{t=F_i+1}^{2006} p_{n_{cit}|n_{cit-1}, F_i} \cdot p_{n_{fit}|F_i}(\nu_i, u_i) \cdot \prod_{t=F_i+1}^{2006} p_{n_{fit}|n_{fit-1}, F_i}.$$  

In our likelihood function, we also handle missing data. For example, data in 1999 and 2002 were not collected. When $n_{cit-1}$ is not observable but $n_{cit-2}$ is, we need to compute $P_{n_{cit}|n_{cit-2}, F_i}$. Note that $n_{cit} = n_{cit-2} - \text{exits}_{cit-1} + (\text{new outlets})_{cit-1} - \text{exits}_{cit} + (\text{new outlets})_{cit}$, which can be rewritten as

$$\text{outlets in } n_{cit-2} \text{ that do not exit before } t$$
$$+ \text{new outlets in } t - 1 \text{ that do not exit before } t$$
$$+ \text{new outlets in } t,$$

where “outlets in $n_{cit-2}$ that do not exit before $t$” follows a binomial distribution with parameters $(n_{cit-2}, (1 - \gamma)^2)$, “new outlets in $t - 1$ that do not exit before $t$” follows a Poisson distribution with mean $m_ipac(x_{it-1}, u_i)(1 - \gamma)$ and “new outlets in $t$” follows a Poisson distribution with mean $m_ipac(x_{it}, u_i)$. Therefore,

$$P_{n_{cit}|n_{cit-2}, F_i}(\nu_i, u_i) = \sum_{Y=0}^{n_{cit-1}} \Pr(K|n_{cit-1}; (1 - \gamma)^2) \Pr(\text{(new outlets)}_{cit} = n_{cit} - K; m_ipac(x_{it-1}, u_i)(1 - \gamma) + m_ipac(x_{it}, u_i)).$$

When more than one year of data is missing, we compute the corresponding conditional probability analogously. We then replace $P_{n_{cit}|n_{cit-1}, F_i}$ and $P_{n_{fit}|n_{fit-1}, F_i}$ by $P_{n_{cit}|n_{cit-2}, F_i}$ and $P_{n_{fit}|n_{fit-2}, F_i}$ when the observation of a year, by $P_{n_{cit}|n_{cit-3}, F_i}$ and $P_{n_{fit}|n_{fit-3}, F_i}$ when data of two years are missing, so on and so forth.

F Simulated Distributions of the Number of Outlets when Selection is Ignored

In this Section, we show simulated distributions of the number of company-owned and franchised outlets when the decision on the timing of entry into franchising is ignored. Specifically, in these simulations we take the observed waiting time in the data as exogenously given. The simulated distributions are shown in the right panels of Figures 9(a) and 9(b). We include the two panels
in Figure 6(b) (and 6(c)) as the left and the middle panels in Figure 9(a) (and Figure 9(b)) for comparison. When we compare the middle panel of Figure 9(a) (the simulated distribution of the number of company-owned outlets when selection is considered) and the right panel of the same figure (the simulated distribution when the timing of entry is ignored), we can see that these two distributions are very similar. This is because two effects are at play, and they presumably cancel each other out. On the one hand, chains that enter into franchising quickly tend to grow faster overall either because they are presented with more opportunities to open outlets or because outlets of these chains are more likely to be profitable. This effect is illustrated in Figure 1. On the other hand, chains that enter into franchising fast are chains for which a franchised outlet is likely to be particularly profitable relative to a company-owned outlet. This effect is suggested by Figure 2. The latter effect shifts the distribution of the number of company-owned outlets to the left, while the first effect shifts the same distribution to the right.

The second effect is also consistent with the comparison of the middle panel and the right panel of Figure 9(b) for the number of franchised outlets. The simulated distribution of the number of franchised outlets when the entry decision is taken as exogenous (in the right panel) is shifted to the left from the simulated distribution where the entry decision is endogenized (in the middle panel). This is because when we simulate the distribution in the right panel, we draw the unobservable profitability of a franchised outlet from the unconditional distribution. So even if the draw is not in favor of a chain opening a franchised outlet when an opportunity arrives, the simulated number of franchised outlets corresponding to this draw, which is most likely to be very small, is included to compute the distribution. When the timing of entry is taken into account, however, a chain with unfavorable draws is likely to delay its entry into franchising, and therefore it is not included in the computation of the conditional distribution of the number of franchised outlets.
Figure 9: Simulated Distributions of the Number of Outlets when Selection is Ignored

(a) Number of Company-owned Outlets

(b) Number of Franchised Outlets