

# Forgetting my father's home: Marriage Migration in India

Smriti Rao<sup>1</sup>

Associate Professor, Economics and Global Studies

Assumption College

and

Kade Finnoff

Assistant Professor, Economics

University of Massachusetts, Boston

## ABSTRACT

The economics literature on internal migration in India concentrates on economic, rural-urban and urban-urban migrants who tend to be largely male, even though the single largest internal migration stream in India is the migration of millions of Indian women every year for marriage. In this paper we examine the phenomenon of rising rates of marriage migration in India and argue that this phenomenon provides us with insights into the transmission not just of gender but of economic inequality that few economists have examined seriously.

Using four rounds of NSS data from 1983 to 2007-8, we examine the socio-economic correlates of marriage migration in India and how they have changed over time. In particular we find that poor families are increasingly more likely to have brides who in-migrate. In regression analysis we find an intensification of this negative class effect over successive NSS rounds. We explain these results by arguing that widening economic inequalities within social groups in India have meant a closer matching of class-within-caste in the Indian arranged marriage system. As a result rich families are able to negotiate favorable alliances that keep their daughters close by, while the daughters of poor families are increasingly likely to migrate for marriage.

We believe this shift further consolidates and perpetuates economic inequality by reducing the likelihood of cross-class alliances. Insofar as feminists assume proximity to natal families provide women with support systems, it also means that young women from poor families are now much less likely to be able to draw on this social safety net.

---

<sup>1</sup> Corresponding author. Email: [srao@assumption.edu](mailto:srao@assumption.edu). This paper was written while both authors were research associates at Aziz Premji University.

## Forgetting my father's home: Marriage Migration in India 1983-2008

*Mein to bhool chali babul ka des,*

*Piya ka ghar pyara lage*

I forget my father's home

As I grow to love my husband's.

-Song from the Hindi movie Saraswathi Chandra, 1968

### INTRODUCTION

Given the importance of internal migration in the physical, cultural and economic transformation of India's cities and villages, there is not enough economics research on internal (as compared to international) migration in countries like India (Breman 1996, De Haan 1999, Gardner and Osella 2003, Deshingkar and Akter 2009). The economics literature on internal migration that does exist concentrates on male, rural-urban, economic migrants (Lall et al 2006, Dubey et al 2006, Kundu and Sarang 2007, Bell and Muhidin 2009) even though the single largest internal migration stream in India is the migration of millions of Indian women every year for marriage (for the few exceptions see Premi 1980, Rosenzweig and Stark 1989, Bhattacharya 2000, Sil 2008 and, most significantly, Fulford 2013).

According to National Sample Survey (NSS) data, migrants as a whole have risen slightly as a share of the Indian population –going from 23% in 1983 to 29% by 2007-08. However, 87% of this increase was accounted for by the rising share of female migrants. Women went from 75% to 80% of all migrants over these four rounds, while female migrants accounted for 47% of the female population (of all ages) by 2007-08, up from 35% in 1983. The rate of female migration in rural areas has risen from 35% to 48% of all females between 1983 and 2008, while in urban areas it has risen from 36% to 46%. The bulk of the increase in the number of female marriage migrants is accounted for by the 100 million additional women who reported migrating for marriage between 1983 and 2008, with marriage migrants going from 76% to 84% of all female migrants over this period.

The male rate of migration (of all kinds) has been stagnant over the same period, falling slightly from 12% to 11% of all men and from 18% to 15% of working age married men (figure

1). According to the NSS then, there were about 66 million male permanent migrants in 2007-08, as compared to 235 million female permanent migrants. This means that the bulk of the research on migration in India has been conducted on a relatively small, shrinking piece of the population.

Marriage exogamy rules in much of India mean that large numbers of women have always migrated to their marital homes after marriage so it is not just the prevalence of female marriage migration, but its increase over time that is interesting to us. Given that male rates of migration have remained stagnant it is unlikely that this increase in female migration is a result of women “followers” of more mobile spouses.

One possible alternative explanation that we explore in this paper is that widening economic inequalities within social groups in India have meant a closer matching of class-within-caste in the Indian arranged marriage system. If economic status is an increasingly important signal of match quality, those with such status can negotiate more favorable alliances (including keeping daughters closer) while poorer families have to increase migration in order to secure the best possible match. While it is wider increases in inequality that make such matching more desirable to families, this change in the form of marriage in turn further entrenches that trend. We argue that studying marriage migration provides us with insights into the transmission not just of gender but of economic inequality that few economists have examined seriously.

While marriage migration increased sharply, other forms of female migration have either reduced or remained stagnant in absolute as well as relative terms. The share of women migrating to “follow family members” has actually dropped, from 15% in 1983 to 11% of all female migrants in 2007-08, which corresponds to a very slight increase in absolute numbers from 18 to 23 million over this period. The share and numbers of women migrating “for studies” has increased slightly from 0.5% to 0.96% (an increase of 1.6 million), but this is an almost insignificant increase compared to the increases in marriage migration. Most surprising is the very small and declining percentage of women who report migrating for economic reasons. According to the NSS, between 1993 and 2008, this percentage has gone from 8.3% to 0.7% of all rural female migrants and 4.9% to 2.7% for all urban female migrants corresponding to a small decrease in the absolute numbers of such migrants.

What makes this surprising is the boom in services and, to a lesser extent, manufacturing that urban India has experienced in recent years. Other countries experiencing such booms – almost all of East Asia, including China, Bangladesh, Mexico through its maquiladoras, even the

United States and United Kingdom in the early years of their industrialization and development – have relied upon female labor in what Elson and Pearson (1981) called the “nimble fingers” phenomenon. Female workers, specifically young, single female migrants from rural to urban areas, have served as a docile, reliable, and low-paid reserve army for capitalists to draw upon in almost every part of the globe (Standing 1999). Every part of the globe except, it would seem, India<sup>2</sup>.

Understanding the reasons for this peculiar absence of female economic migration is a research project in and of itself, but one possibility is certainly that Census and NSS surveys are mis-classifying some economic migration by women as marriage migration. This is because the surveys ask migrants to provide only reason for their move and women may find it more socially acceptable to provide marriage as the answer (Krishnaraj 2005). We do try to investigate this hypothesis as best we can, even as we note again that the share of another form of more socially acceptable migration – that of following family members - has also decreased.<sup>3</sup>

Regardless of the classification, however, it would appear impossible to understand the dynamics of migration without closely studying a group that comprises two-thirds of all migrants and is becoming more important over time<sup>4</sup>. Yet, with too few exceptions, the literature on Indian migration has done just that. The justification for this oversight seems to lie in the assumption, made by most researchers and Indian statistical agencies, that women are indeed primarily marriage migrants, and that this is non-economic, to be explained by (unnamed) “socio-cultural factors” (Kundu 2009) and therefore uninteresting.

Until recently, similar assumptions about women’s international migration resulted in the absence of research on female international migrants who were assumed to be ‘tied’ to male father and spouses. Feminists researchers have since found that women’s international migration has important economic implications for western labor markets, for developing country growth rates (via remittances) as well as for understanding how and why cultural notions of femininity

---

<sup>2</sup> While female migrants to export processing zones in India are relatively sparse there are a few studies on the working conditions and characteristics of these workers (see Sil (2008) for an overview of these studies).

<sup>3</sup> The failure of the NSS data to capture female economic migration is partly explained by its inability to accurately capture circular migration.

<sup>4</sup> See Wright (1995) on the importance of a gendered analysis of migration in theoretical and empirical work. While Wright’s work used a gendered analysis in the Southern African context, many of her criticisms, such as the gender ‘blindness’ of economists, are pertinent to the Indian context of internal migration.

and masculinity do or do not change in source and origin countries (Parrenas 2001, Piper 2005, Donato et al 2006, Beneria, Deere and Kabeer 2012). Women's migration within India, similarly, has economic as well as cultural implications. This project arises from the conviction that understanding women's internal migration will help us better understand how a liberalizing and globalizing India is changing the lives of its men, women and children, and the extent to which India's multiple patriarchies are being contested and reshaped.

Our main research questions are thus:

1. What are the socio-economic correlates of marriage migration in India? Does this pattern differ from male migration and have these patterns changed over time?
2. What is the effect of changing patterns of marriage migration on economic and gender inequality?

## **INTERNAL MIGRATION IN INDIA**

The literature on internal migration in India has overwhelmingly focused on male economic migration and its determinants. Furthermore, because both the NSS and Census are unable to capture sporadic, temporary migration of varying durations, the literature (including our paper) also concentrates on permanent, rather than circular, migration.

Permanent economic migrants in India are largely working age men who move from rural to urban areas or within urban areas. Rural-rural migration only accounted for 32% of all male migration in 2007-08, while it accounted for 70% of female migration in the same round (NSSO 2010). Those from relatively higher castes and those who are relatively more educated have also been found to be more likely to engage in internal economic migration within and to urban areas in India (Mitra and Murayama 2008, Dubey et al 2006, Vakulabharanam and Thakuratha 2012). Kundu and Sarang( 2007) also find that these mostly male urban in-migrants tend to be relatively well-off, although neither the very richest (nor poorest), and argue that urban growth in India is "exclusionary" along economic and non-economic markers of status.

According to this data on permanent economic migration, India has lower migration rates than many other Asian countries, giving rise to some literature that attempts to explain this referring to the role of caste networks in India in reducing mobility, the government's hostility to urban in-migrants and/or arguments about the relatively under-development of labor intensive manufacturing in the Indian context (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2007, Kundu 2009).

Permanent economic migration is not, however, the only form of migration in India. Jan Breman(1996) argued long ago that India's overwhelmingly informal economy is populated by 'footloose labor' -- footloose not just in the sense that their employment is temporary and unstable and that they lack social safety nets or legal protections, but also in that they are compelled to roam greater distances in search of their livelihood. The migrations of these "doubly free" workers are, Breman argues, ad-hoc in length and location – some commute every day to sites where labor agents 'collect' workers for the day; some migrate for entire seasons; some for a few weeks or a few months. All return sooner or later to their home villages and are thus 'circular migrants', whether for a day or for several year.

Deshingkar in her various articles on the subject agrees with Breman that seasonal, temporary internal migration dwarfs 'permanent' migration in significance (Deshingkar and Akter 2009, Deshingkar and Farrington 2009) . She consistently argues that the Indian population has become more rather than less mobile over the last few decades, but in ways that are not captured by the Census or the NSS. The caveat to our study is thus that we are unable to examine women's role within this other stream of circular migration. We have no doubt that this stream comprises large numbers of women, alongside men, who travel to cities to work in construction sites and as maids in urban homes and whom our analysis is unable to capture.

### **Marriage Migration in India**

The literature on Indian marriage, and therefore on marriage migration, is based on some stylized facts that we also adopt in this paper. First, marriage in India is still overwhelmingly "arranged" by parents and other older family members. Second, most marriages in India are within-*jati* and thus constrained by the geographical distribution of *jati* members. Third, the overwhelming majority of Indian marriages are viri-local, that is the wife moves to the husband's location (usually also the location of the husband's parents). Finally, there is some cost to a bride and her family of her marrying further away from the natal home. For the bride large penalties result from the lack of natal and social support in distant marital homes(most clearly seen in the increased likelihood of intimate partner violence). For the family of the bride, there are increased economic costs of searching for a partner over a wider radius, as well as the psychic and economic costs of staying in touch with a daughter who is further away after marriage.

Clearly improvements in transportation and communications infrastructure have lowered these costs of migration over time, accounting for at least some of these increases in migration rates and we do try to control for that in the regression analysis that follows. The search process also implies that women living in larger population centers, such as in urban areas, would be more likely to find a match locally and thus not have to move.

A prior analysis of marriage migration by Rosenzweig and Stark(1989) used data for three villages in the south central and western parts of India to argue that virilocal marriage practices have evolved as an insurance mechanism in the absence of other well-developed insurance markets. They argue that in-laws (primarily the wife's/daughter-in-law's family) are a significant source of consumption loans in India, and thus that daughters are more likely to be married to families in ecologically distinct areas so that weather related shocks to agricultural income are smoothed out. They distinguish their argument from the Beckerian approach by pointing out that if marriage is primarily an attempt to insure against spatially covariant risk in the absence of well-developed credit and insurance markets, then the wealthy, who have the ability to coinsure should not need to send their daughters too far away, i.e. marriage migration would be less likely for the wealthiest, all else constant.

Their paper suffers from the problem that the region they study is culturally quite distinct from the northern parts of India in terms of how kinship structures and marriage are organized. It is difficult then to generalize for the country as a whole based upon evidence from three villages in this region. Their argument also requires that transfers between families go both ways – from natal to marital as well as the other way around. The latter seems unlikely based on what we know from sociologists about Indian marriage networks. Fulford (2013) in fact argues based on recent survey data that there is no evidence of post-marriage transfers between the households in either direction of any kind thus invalidating this possible explanation.

Fulford's recent article is more expansive, drawing upon Census, IDHS and NSS (64<sup>th</sup> round) data to analyze some hypotheses about marriage migration. As mentioned above, Fulford finds Rozenweig and Stark's arguments unsupported by the evidence. He also dismisses an alternative hypothesis based on the deterioration of sex ratios in India. This deterioration in sex ratios implies that younger age cohorts have fewer girls than older age cohorts (although Rao(1993) points out that this may be countered by India's current demographic structure which results in younger cohorts are larger than older ones) . Since Indian men usually marry younger

women, this would create a 'shortage' of girls of marriageable age increasing the need for in-migration of brides.

Fulford (2013) argues against this hypothesis for India. He points out that sex ratios have become more similar over time across districts in India making it harder to explain why this would be the primary driver of marriage migration. For the 2001 and 1991 census he also matches village/town level sex ratios with marriage migration rates and finds that marriage migration rates seem to further worsen sex ratios rather than equalize them (as would occur if female deficit regions attracted more female in-migrants). He also finds that the rate of migration required to equalize sex ratios is much lower than the actual rate of marriage migration, suggesting that this cannot be a good explanation for marriage migration in India.

He presents a model of the arranged marriage search in which parents attempt to minimize the likelihood of having an unmarried daughter, which requires increasing the search radius (and thus the likelihood of migration). They are thus trading off the greater costs associated with wider search radii, against the costs of having an unmarried daughter. His main conclusion is to argue that the value placed upon an unmarried daughter is the key driver of marriage migration. Where, as for example in North India, this value is low, parents are willing to bear higher search costs and tolerate lower quality matches, asking their daughters to migrate longer distances for marriage. By extension then, the increasing rates of marriage migration we are studying would thus be driven by the declining value placed on unmarried women.

We agree with Fulford that the negative status effects of having an unmarried daughter are an important consideration for parents – although we would stress that the failure to marry off a son, even if he can remain unmarried for longer than a daughter, is ultimately also considered to be an extremely unhappy outcome for Indian parents.

Another reason to increase the search radius, however, would be to seek out a partner with a particular set of desirable attributes – that is, to increase the quality of the possible marriage match. In particular, the larger social science literature in India has pointed to increasing levels of within-caste income and wealth inequality (Zacharias and Vakulabharanam 2011, Thorat and Dubey 2012, Motiram and Sarma 2013). It is possible then that the desire and need to match class-within-caste has strengthened, driving parents to seek out better matches over wider search radii.

### **The role of economic inequality in driving marriage migration**

From a political economy perspective, marriage not only constitutes a transfer of labor from natal to marital home but serves as a means of creating, undermining and strengthening class and/or caste alliances and of signaling and consolidating economic and non-economic status.

Anthropologists and sociologists writing in the 1950s and 1960s distinguished between the role of status in marriage in North and South India. In North India, they documented traditions of hypergamy, where families traditionally married their daughters to into “better off” families within the same *jati*, in contrast to isogamous marriages in South India. At the same time they pointed out that this notion of “better –off” was often based on traditional concepts of “wife giving versus wife receiving” families and villages, or based on upon ritual status, rather than mainly based upon class in the Weberian sense of income or wealth (Srinivas 1998, Uberoi 2012). Even in South India, where close-kin isogamous marriage was much more common, the notion of status again seems to have been based upon a number of variables, the wealth of the families being only one (Karve 1965, Trautmann 1995).

While *jati* remains a crucially important marker of both economic and non-economic status in India, there is growing evidence of class based differentiation within castes. Most of the recent research on this subject is more focused on rising inter-personal economic inequality in India, of which there is considerable evidence, particularly for the period from the 1993 NSS round to the 2004-05 NSS round (Sen and Himanshu 2004, Jayadev et al 2011, Zacharias and Vakulabharanam 2011, Vakulabharanam and De 2012) . However, some of these studies do present within-caste changes in Gini coefficients, which indicate rising within-caste inequality over this period, particularly for Tribals and ‘Other’ castes, a group that includes all castes other than Tribals and Dalits (Thorat and Dubey 2012, Motiram and Sarma 2013) . The NSS data does not allow us to do a more fine grained analysis of smaller caste groupings, but in conjunction with what we know about rising inter-personal inequality, this evidence does imply that class-within-caste is increasingly important as a measure of status. The vast literature on dowry and marriage in India certainly suggests that income and wealth are now explicitly important variables in marriage negotiations in India.

Our empirical analysis below suggests that class as income and wealth has emerged as a key marker of status and families are increasingly matching class (within caste) status in marriage decisions. This shapes marriage outcomes by more closely matching rich families with

other rich families within their *jatis* and gives richer parents of daughters a greater degree of bargaining power in the marriage market. The NSS dataset we are using here unfortunately does not provide any information about the natal family. However, we expect that factors that increase the market power of natal families also result in matches that are closer and thus less likely to require marriage migration. Men and women who lack these desirable attributes and thus have less power in the marriage market would then be searching over a larger radius to try to secure the best possible match. We expect higher economic status on the part of the bride's family to be one determinant of power in the marriage market, not least because it enables the payment of larger dowries. As we will see later, while the educational level of the bride is likely to be correlated with her family's income, it may have a more complex impact upon marriage market outcomes.

This shift in turn has implications for the deepening of economic inequality in India. In the past, if matching by class status was at least not the most important factor in marriage decisions, marriage could be used as a means of achieving upward economic mobility for the natal family. If, on the other hand, we are right in our interpretation of our empirical results, new patterns of marriage close off what was a more traditional avenue for economic mobility thus reinforcing existing patterns of economic inequality rather than undermining them.

As seen later, we do find a small correlation between sex ratios at the state level (from census data) and the likelihood of marriage in-migration by a woman (based on NSS data). The relationship is, furthermore, in the expected direction. That is, the higher the sex ratio of the population under six years of age, the greater the rate of female in-migration. As we noted, Fulford (2013) argues against a demand-supply interpretation of this hypothesis. There is a way to reconcile our finding with Fulford's arguments. It is possible that in high female-male sex ratio regions natal families also have somewhat greater bargaining power in the process of the marriage search. Thus if there is indeed a cost to the natal family that is associated with the out migration of the daughter, in such regions women would be less likely to out-migrate, all else constant. If female-male sex ratios are interpreted as markers of female empowerment, this would suggest that higher female:male sex ratios would be associated with lower levels of female migration.

## **EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS**

The empirical analysis in the following sections relies upon the four most recent rounds of the NSS employment-unemployment survey that have asked detailed questions about migration. These are the 38<sup>th</sup> round conducted in 1983, the 43<sup>rd</sup> round in 1987-88 and, skipping forward a decade and a half, the 55<sup>th</sup> round conducted in 1999-2000 and the 2007-08 64<sup>th</sup> round<sup>5</sup>. This means we have data for the 1980s, no data for most of the 1990s, and then data for 21<sup>st</sup> century post-liberalization India via the 55<sup>th</sup> and 64<sup>th</sup> rounds. Our comparisons are thus between 1980s India and India in the 2000s.

In each case the NSS asks if the current place of enumeration of each household member differs from the last ‘usual place of residence’ and then the reason for leaving the last ‘usual place of residence’. The answer to the first questions helps us define the category of ‘migrants’ – those who answer ‘yes’ ; while the category of marriage migrants comprises those who choose marriage as the reason for migration. The descriptive statistics below are reported using NSS population weights. We then included in the NSS data set state level averages for the sex ratio of the population under six years of age from successive rounds of the Census (1981 for the round 38 data, 1991 for the round 43 data, 2001 for round 55 and 2011 for round 64).

Note that when women report being marriage migrants, they are already in their marital homes. Female marriage migration statistics thus represent in-migration to the marital household and region. Given that the NSS does not ask about the woman’s natal family, we only have income, occupation and other socio-economic characteristics of the marital household into which the woman has migrated.

As a general introduction to the dataset, over these four NSS rounds the median age of the sample population rose from 20 years in rounds 38 and 43 to 22 and 24 years in the 55<sup>th</sup> and 64<sup>th</sup> rounds. The rural share of the population fell slightly from around 77% in the 1980s to 74% in round 64, while the female share of the NSS population estimate held steady at close to 49%. The regional distribution of these NSS rounds, which is relevant for the analysis below, has changed a little. The north central or ‘Hindi heartland’ states of Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana, Chandigarh, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and, in the 64<sup>th</sup> round, Uttaranchal, Chattisgarh and Jharkhand accounted for 45%, 46%, 47% and 48% of the estimated population in the four rounds.

---

<sup>5</sup> The three earlier surveys are ‘thick’ rounds of the quinquennial Consumption Expenditure Survey and the latter 2006-7 is a ‘thin’ round from an annual survey on household consumption expenditures.

Real expenditure was arrived at by deflating monthly per capita household consumption expenditure by the appropriate value of the CPI (AL) for rural households and CPI(IW) for urban households. These values are reported in 2011-12 Rs. We note that the real median per capita expenditure (in 2011-12 Rs) for the population has risen slowly over these four rounds, but the mean real per capita expenditure rose between 1983 and 1988, dropped quite sharply by 1999-00 and then rose again in 2007-08, but to a level only slightly higher than in 1983 (Table 1).

As the real expenditure figures suggest, the economic context within which we are studying these changing patterns of migration and marriage changed considerably over this period. The 1980s have been characterized as a period of high growth with stagnant inequality, while the 1990s and 2000s have been marked by rising growth but also, most studies argue, rising economic inequality post-liberalization (Vakulabharanam and De 2012, Thorat and Dubey 2012). This increase in economic inequality has been the subject of much research by social scientists in India but we believe that marriage migration provides us with a mechanism for the transmission not just of gender but of economic inequality that few economists have examined seriously.

We know from several studies of largely male economic migrants that most male migration is rural-urban/urban-urban and positively and significantly correlated with education, income and higher caste status. The question is whether and why the class and caste and other correlates of female migration differ from those for male migration and whether these patterns have been shifting over the years.

### **The Socio-Economic Correlates of Women's Marriage Migration**

Bell and Muhidin (2009) point out that rates of migration can be influenced by demographic shifts. For example, a baby boom generation reaching working age could increase the rate of economic migration – not because of an underlying change in the dynamics of migration, but simply due to an increase in the relative size of the group most likely to migrate. To try to minimize this problem, in this section we restrict our analysis to the working age (15-64 years), married population, thus eliminating those who are young and unmarried, as well as those older than 64 who are unlikely to migrate for economic reasons.

Within the married, working age population, women migrants went from 63% to 79% of the female population across the four rounds. The bulk of this increase was due to an increase in

marriage migration. Female marriage migrants accounted for 71% of the working age, married female population in 2007-08, up from 53% in 1983.

As Table 2 shows, this increase was greater in the northcentral states (+28 percentage points between rounds 38 and 64 versus +10 in the rest of India), and in rural areas +21 percentage points). The explanation for the disproportionate increase in the north central states may indeed lie in the fact that the value of an unmarried daughter has declined faster there. The result for the rural area is expected given the greater search options within a large urban population center.

Interestingly, while Hindus had higher levels of migration, the rate of increase was not different for Hindus and non-Hindus (+19 points each). In contrast to the findings for male permanent economic migrants across caste groups, rates of migration were higher amongst Dalits while the increase in rates was greatest for Tribals.

When we look across expenditure quintiles in each round we find that rates of marriage migration amongst women were quite similar across quintiles in 1983 (table 2 contd.). The richest quintile had the lowest rate (51%) but only by two percentage points. That started to change from round 43. The marriage migration rates of the top quintile increased by only a few percentage points over the four rounds, up to 55% in 2007-08. On the other hand, the rates for the bottom three quintiles jumped by more than 20 percentage points, the increase being largest for the bottom quintile. The fourth, or second richest quintile, did see a slightly smaller increase of 16 percentage points. Thus, by round 64 there was a clear negative relationship between expenditure quintile and the rate of female marriage migration, with women in the bottom three quintiles much more likely to report being in-migrants for marriage.

A negative relationship also existed between female educational status and the rate of marriage migration by women within each round, although this negative relationship was quite strong even in 1983. Over time, those with college level education (only 4% of women in India even in 2007-08) saw less of an increase in the rate of marriage migration over the four rounds (+16 points) than did women with less than a college education. However, the increases were very similar for women without any education, women with some primary education and women with some secondary education. In the case of education then, there is little evidence of a change in pattern over time, although the number of educated women and men has clearly grown over the years.

Quite contrary to most male migration, female marriage migration seems to be more likely amongst those who are less privileged in terms of income and educational attainment.

Using the NSS data on gender and the relationship of each member of the household to the household head we were also able to uniquely identify the male spouses of around 98% of working age married women and thus also identify the spouse's age, level of education and migration status. We see a strong and growing positive correlation between the spouses' ages (the coefficient rises from 0.82 to 0.86 over successive rounds) and educational status (Table 3). Thus marriages in India do tend to match age and educational status and this tendency has grown stronger between 1983 and 1999-00. There are further complexities here that we come back to later in the paper.

There is a negative and strengthening correlation between the husband being a migrant and the in-migration of his bride – the correlation coefficient went from -0.2 to -0.33 over these twenty five years and was statistically significant. Since the literature suggests that male permanent migrants tend to be amongst the most privileged, this once again confirms our result thus far that it is less privileged men whose brides in-migrate, and, if matching is occurring, that these brides are in turn less privileged women.

State average sex ratios, which we include based on the earlier discussion of their possible significance, also seem to be associated with state average female marriage migration rates, although they are not statistically significantly associated with male migration rates (table 4). At the household level, the average sex ratio of the state is negatively and significantly correlated with female marriage migration. Over time, this correlation has become slightly smaller in size, while remaining negative and statistically significant. In part this might be because of the decreasing variance of sex ratios across the country as states in the south and west have seen falling sex ratios that are now closer to those in North India.

## **DISGUISED ECONOMIC MIGRATION**

A plausible explanation for rising female marriage migration is that it is the result of disguised economic migration. Here we would expect to find that married women move with their husbands with the intent of working at the destination point, much as the husband does, but then report their move as a move “for marriage”. There are two ways we investigate this possibility.

Firstly, if workforce participation was driving female marriage migration, we would expect to see higher economic activity rates for married female migrants. If we look at married working age women who report that their principal economic activity status was “attending to domestic duties” (in some cases alongside “free collection of goods”), migrant women do report slightly lower rates of this principal activity status but the gap between migrants and non-migrants has shrunk over the rounds. In 1983, 62% of migrants reported that they mainly attended to domestic duties, as compared to 66% of non-migrants. By 2007-08 these percentages were 70% and 73%.

The strongest pattern in this data is in fact the increasing proportion of married women in both groups reporting their principal activity as attending to domestic duties. The low workforce participation rates of Indian women remain a subject of ongoing research, but there does seem to be strong evidence for an income effect, whereby rising household income leads to a withdrawal of female labor force participation (Abraham 2013). As well see below, marriage migrants tend to be economically worse off, so that some of the gap in workforce participation rates that remains between these two groups may be due to this income effect. Overall then there does not seem to be compelling evidence that increases in marriage migration rates can be correlated with increasing economic activity rates for marriage in-migrants.

Secondly, if marriage migration is disguised economic migration, the actual journey made by men and women is identical – they are both, for example, moving to the same destination, and we would expect the underlying geographic and socio-economic correlates of the moves to be similar if not identical. The negative correlation seen earlier between male permanent migration and female marriage migration would suggest that there are few couples within the NSS dataset of permanent migrants who make the joint economic journey described above. Additionally, we know from several studies that male migration is primarily rural-urban and positively and significantly correlated with education, income and higher caste status (Mitra and Murayama 2008, Dubey et al 2006 and Vakulabharanam and Thakuratha 2012). Female marriage migration is primarily rural-rural and negatively correlated with education and income. Based on the evidence so far, it appears that the NSS data on male migration and female marriage migration have distinctly different geographic, socio-economic and demographic drivers.

It is hard to argue, therefore, that the increases in female marriage migration rates within the NSS data are a result of increases in economic migration by women disguised as marriage migration<sup>6</sup>. The explanation, it seems, must lie in the changing dynamics of marriage itself.

When it comes to the circular migration of “footloose labor”, the story is likely to be quite different. Evidence from construction sites across India suggests that women and men move with their families and the paid and unpaid work of women is a key aspect of the economic calculus of the move. As we know, the NSS data does not capture this form of migration and so cannot help us tell this story.

In the section below we use regression analysis to test whether the negative income effect upon migration that emerged in descriptive statistics persists after controlling for age, education, caste group, rural population centers, average sex ratios in the state, changes in transportation costs over time as well as state fixed effects. We then discuss a possible interpretation of our results.

## **CORRELATES OF MARRIAGE MIGRATION: THE ROLE OF EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC STATUS**

We conduct a logistic regression with the dependent variable being a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a woman has in-migrated for marriage, and 0 if she has not. We restrict the regression to working age married women, and merge the data from the four rounds, creating a time dummy to represent each of the first three rounds. We cannot use sample weights since we are combining data across all four rounds.

The independent variables we use are those discussed above. We include the woman’s age in years, the caste group of the marital household, the average sex ratio for the state in which the marital household is located and a dummy for whether the marital household is located in a rural area. We also include dummies for three educational categories: some primary, some secondary, and some post-secondary, the comparison category being illiterate. We then include the log real per capita expenditure of the marital household and time dummies for the first four round, the comparison category being the 2007-08 round. We expect to find a negative significant impact of real expenditure upon marriage migration after controlling for the other

---

<sup>6</sup> This is not to diminish the importance of female economic migration, which has been neglected in the literature, it is just not the focus of this paper.

correlates. Table 5, Model 1 displays the results, which are largely in line with what we have seen earlier.

In Model 2, we introduce interaction terms between the log of real consumption and the time dummies to capture any changes in the impact of economic status upon female marriage migration over time. We then use STATA's margins command to compute the average marginal effect of a unit change in (log)real expenditure upon the probability of marriage migration at different values of the time dummies that represent the four different rounds. These average marginal effects are presented in Table 7.

The average marginal effects for Model 2 confirm that there has in fact been a steady increase in the negative influence of the economic status of the marital household upon the likelihood of marriage in-migration by the woman. From a small positive impact in 1983, the effect grows to be negative by 2007-08, with a unit increase in the log real consumption causing a 9% decline in the probability of female marriage in-migration.

We then split the sample into two groups: the bottom three quintiles, which have experienced the most increase in migration rates, and the top two quintiles (table 6). We report the results of regressions with time-expenditure interaction terms, which are now showing us the dynamics within each group. We find that the strengthening negative income effect still persists over time within both groups. For the top two quintiles, the results are identical to those for the full sample. In the case of the bottom three quintiles, the average marginal effect of per capita expenditure starts out as positive in 1983, turns negative but statistically insignificant in the next two rounds, and then, turns negative and statistically significant in 2007. Amongst the poorest Indians this negative income effect is thus more recent than it is for the richest Indians.

The results for the bottom three quintiles differ in two other ways. One is that the result for Dalit households is statistically insignificant once we control for the change in the income effect over time. This would suggest that most of the caste effect for this group is really an income effect.

The second is that the results for educational attainment look somewhat different. The coefficient for women with some primary education is statistically insignificant from those with no education. If the woman has some education at the secondary level, this slightly increases the likelihood of migration. The insignificant effect of college education is likely due to the almost non-existent share of women and men with post-secondary education in the bottom three

quintiles (1% of working age married women and only 2% of their male spouses even in 2007-08).

The statistical insignificance of primary education and the small positive effect of middle and high school education are, we believe, related to the dynamics of the spousal matching process within this segment of the population. It turns out that 71% of working age male spouses in the bottom three quintiles were either illiterate or have only attended primary school, as compared to 84% of married women (61% illiterate and 23% having attended primary school). The rarity of educational attainment may mean that it is not an important attribute to match, and may not be a widely used signal of 'match quality' one way or another within this group, given the very large proportion of both men and women who have barely any education. On the other hand, 62% of working age married men had at least some secondary or post-secondary education in the top two quintiles, as compared to 49% of women, suggesting that in this group education may be expected and thus considered a key signal of the strength of the match.

But today if education is not generally seen as strong signal of marriage quality amongst the poorest 60% of the population, families of women with secondary education do not have the market power that allows them to keep their daughters close. Indeed, they may have to search harder and wider to make an appropriate match, increasing the likelihood of migration. We think this helps explain the small positive coefficient on secondary education for the bottom three quintiles, but it also points to the sharp difference between the social and cultural worlds of the richest Indians and the rest. It may also help explain two paradoxical observations made by researchers of education, that there is amongst some groups a marriage penalty for a girl's education (more education means it is harder to find her a husband) while at the same time other young women explain that they are in college because that means they can 'find a better husband'. As the percentages of educated men and women amongst the poorest Indian increase (which they have been doing, but very slowly) we expect education to become a more and more important match-able attribute across all groups.

The greatest increases in migration rates have occurred amongst the groups with the fastest increasing correlation coefficients between spousal education levels. Returning to table 3, we can see that the correlation between the spouses' level of education has increased to a greater degree for the bottom quintile, particularly for migrants, even if, as we expect from the prior discussion, the overall level of matching by education is still not as high as for the top quintiles.

Female education is correlated with income in all segments of the Indian population and what the regression analysis seems to suggest is that it is income rather than education that is doing most of work in producing these matches in the bottom three quintiles.

Having analyzed expenditure based sub-groups, we were also curious about any regional or sectoral variations in this class effects.

First, we ran regressions identical to the ones above for rural and urban residents separately, obtaining very similar results in both cases. Full results are available upon request, but Table 8 lists the average marginal effects of real expenditure upon the probability of marriage migration showing the same strengthening, negative impact of class in both sub-groups.

We also split our sample into North-central India and Rest of India. Full results are once again available upon request, but the average marginal effects of expenditure for North-central India are similar to those discussed above (Table 8). The only difference for the Rest of India is a slight weakening of the negative class effect upon marriage migration in 99-00, only to strengthen again in 07-08.

Based upon the average marginal effects in Tables 7 and 8, the largest changes in the 'class effect' upon marriage migration have been amongst the bottom three quintiles, rural in-migrants and residents of the north-central states all of whom have seen per capita expenditure go from being positively to negatively related to the probability of marriage in-migration. These are also population groups that saw the biggest percentage increases in marriage migration rates over the period we are studying (Table 2).

Thus per capita household expenditure, our proxy for income, seems to work as a strongly positive signal of match quality within both groups. After 1983, being richer seems to mean that brides are less likely to migrate in from far away, and this effect has been strengthening. Given that keeping daughters closer would appear to be a positive outcome for natal families, this suggests that as matching by class becomes more the norm in Indian arranged marriages, well-off families are more able to secure favorable matches. This in turn further reinforcing economic inequality by strengthening alliances based on class. Unfortunately we have no data on the natal family's economic status, so we cannot test our hypothesis by examining the degree of matching by class, which we would expect to find is rising.

## **MARRIAGE MIGRATION AND GENDER INEQUALITY**

Rising marriage migration, as we are seeing in the Indian context, may have contradictory effects on gender inequality. Feminists have long recognized the intersectionality of gender with not just class but caste, ethnicity and even geography in India (Bardhan 1986, Kapadia 1995, Deshpande 2002). There is a rich body of work that tries to outline the particularities of each of the many ‘multiple patriarchies’ that exist in India (Sangari 1995a and 1995b). In particular this literature has attempted to understand the way in which it is in the most economically and socially deprived groups in India that some conventional aspects of women’s intra-household autonomy – such as labor force participation, some control over family resources or somewhat less rigid notions of female sexuality (although not sexual violence against women) – may be most prevalent. Given the economic and physical violence perpetrated against these women outside of the household, this may just show how flawed these conventional measures of autonomy are, but for many feminists in India it does suggest the possibility of contradictions between gender equality and economic growth at the household and national level (Kapadia 1995, Deshpande 2012). The influential thesis of sanskritization also implies that an improvement in the economic or political status of a group in India may result in greater rather than less control exercised over women’s economic and sexual agency (Srinivas 1998).

Most of the literature does, however, assume that within the constraints that Indian women face, proximity to and continuous contact with the natal family helps rather than hurts married women. The buffer of natal family support is particularly acute in violence against women by their intimate partners<sup>7</sup> (Jewkes 2002, International Clinical Epidemiologists Network 2000). If what we are seeing is higher rates of marriage migration amongst the most deprived social groups, it is these women who bear the brunt of isolation from their natal families, while more educated women from higher income groups remain close to their already more resource-rich natal families. This would suggest convergence rather than divergence between intra-household gender inequality and economic inequality and a worsening of the status of young brides in poorer households.

On the other hand, the literature also assumes that hypergamy of the kind found in Northern India – where women marry into ‘better-off’ families (however that is measured) –

---

<sup>7</sup> The Indian Demographic and Health Survey (2005-6) found 37% of ever married Indian women reported physical or sexual violence by their spouses.

further lowered the status of the bride, who entered her marital family as a member of an inferior gender and an inferior family/village (Karve 1965, Srinivas 1998) . A more explicit isogamy (in class terms) might thus result in better outcomes for women entering their marital homes as at least the members of a non-inferior family, even if still as members of an inferior gender.

Our analysis does not allow us to come to conclusions of the relative strengths of these different effects, but we hope further research will probe some of these questions more deeply.

## CONCLUSION

The growing body of research on economic inequality in India has tended to look to market and state to understand how inequality is generated and transmitted and how patterns of inequality have changed over time. This body of research has not, however, explored enough the ways in which changing family structure or changing forms of marriage may serve to reinforce or undermine economic inequality. Our interpretation of the NSS data on migration is that marriage migration is enabling the further reinforcement of economic inequality in India, with potentially contradictory outcomes for intra-household gender inequality and the status of brides within their marital homes.

We think an even more important conclusion to draw from our analysis is that marriage migration in India is at least partly ‘economic’ in its function in that it is both affected by and affects wider changes in the Indian economy. It certainly deserves more attention from social scientists in India, and economists in particular.

### Tables and Figures

Table 1: Expenditure per capita across NSS rounds

	<b>Monthly per capita expenditure(Current Rs)</b>	<b>Real monthly per capita expenditure (2011-12 Rs)</b>
<b>Round 38: Mean</b>	144.36	1278.31
<b>Median</b>	100.69	835.38
<b>Round 43: Mean</b>	384.21	2485.6
<b>Median</b>	138.84	836.78
<b>Round 55: Mean</b>	525.64	1183.19
<b>Median</b>	423.25	890.0
<b>Round 64: Mean</b>	843.43	1484.16
<b>Median</b>	644.63	1074.22

Source: Authors’ calculations based on NSS data

Table 2: The share of marriage migrants amongst married, working age women.

	1983	1987-88	1999-00	2007-08
<b>By rural/urban</b>				
Rural	57	65	71	78
Urban	39	44	47	51
<b>By region</b>				
Northcentral	53	65	74	81
Rest of India	53	57	56	63
<b>By religious group</b>				
Hindu	54	62	66	73
Non-Hindu	45	54	59	64
<b>By caste group:</b>				
Tribal	52	57	59	72
Dalit	57	66	70	75
Other	52	60	65	70

Source: Authors' calculations based on NSS data

Table 2(contd.) : The share of marriage migrants amongst married, working age women

	1983	1987-88	1999-00	2007-08
<b>By expenditure quintile</b>				
First/Bottom Quintile	53	64	68	79
Second Quintile	54	63	70	78
Third Quintile	54	62	69	75
Fourth Quintile	54	61	66	70
Fifth Quintile	51	54	54	55
<b>By educational attainment of the woman</b>				
Illiterate	55	64	69	77
Primary or less	50	56	64	70
Secondary or less	44	50	58	66
Above secondary	36	40	43	52

Source: Authors' calculations based on NSS data

Table 3: Correlation coefficient between spouses' educational levels

	1983	87-88	99-00	2007-08
All working age married women	0.5967	0.6116	0.64	0.64

Bottom three quintiles				
Non-migrant	0.48	0.5	0.54	0.57
Migrant	0.43	0.44	0.48	0.53
Top two quintiles				
Non-migrant	0.65	0.65	0.66	0.64
Migrant	0.59	0.6	0.61	0.61

Note: All coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level except if italicized (which implies not significant at the 5% level)

Source: Authors' calculations based on NSS data

Table 4: Correlation between state level average sex ratios and state level average migration rates

	1983	1987-88	1999-00	2007-08
Sex ratio and female marriage migration rate	-0.41**	-0.45**	-0.46***	-0.43***
N	30	30	32	35
Sex ratio and male migration rate	-0.2	-0.33	-0.12	-0.02
N	30	30	32	35

\*\* significant at the 5% level

\*\*\* significant at the 1% level

Source: Authors' calculations based on NSS data

Table 5: Binary logistic regression analysis (using STATA factor entry method)

Dependent variable: Female marriage migrant (yes=1, no=0)

Model 1			Model 2		
Number of obs		521342	Number of obs		521342
LR chi2(48)		128380.6	LR chi2(48)		129580.7
Prob > chi2		0	Prob > chi2		0
Pseudo R2		0.18	Pseudo R2		0.1817
Log likelihood		-292334	Log likelihood		-291734
	Odds Ratio	Std error	Coefficient	Odds ratio	Std error
Age	0.992	0.000	-0.008	0.992	0.000
Rural	2.472	0.018	0.808	2.243	0.007
Education: primary or less	0.968	0.009	-0.040	0.961	0.009
Education: between primary and secondary	0.963	0.010	<i>-0.014</i>	<i>0.986</i>	<i>0.010</i>
Education: Some College	0.770	0.014	-0.163	0.850	0.018
Hindu	1.423	0.012	0.357	1.429	0.009
Tribal	0.652	0.008	-0.424	0.654	0.012
Dalit	0.970	0.009	-0.030	0.970	0.009
State average sexratio of under six population	0.826	0.005	-0.002	0.998	0.000
(log)mpce(1960 rs)	0.999	0.000	-0.449	0.638	0.012

Year_1983	0.389	0.007	-4.335	0.102
Year_1987-88	0.571	0.007	-2.364	0.100
Year_1999-00	0.750	0.008	-1.452	0.104
Interaction: mpce and 1983 dummy			0.483	0.014
Interaction: mpce and 1987-88 dummy			0.251	0.014
Interaction: mpce and 1999-00 dummy			0.159	0.015

Note: All coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level except if italicized (which implies not significant at the 5% level)

State dummies were included, results available upon request

Table 6: Binary logistic regression analysis by quintile (using STATA factor entry method)  
Dependent variable: Female marriage migrant (yes=1, no=0)

Model 3: Bottom three expenditure quintiles				Model 4: Top two quintiles		
Number of obs		260936		Number of obs		260406
LR chi2(48)		60802.2		LR chi2(48)		65393.8
Prob > chi2		0		Prob > chi2		0
Pseudo R2		0.175		Pseudo R2		0.1815
Log likelihood		-143218		Log likelihood		-147621
	Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Std error	Coefficient	Odds ratio	Std error
Age	-0.004	0.996	0.000	-0.011	0.989	0.000
Rural	0.752	2.121	0.012	0.858	2.358	0.010
Education: primary or less	<i>0.018</i>	<i>1.018</i>	<i>0.013</i>	-0.086	0.918	0.012
Education: between primary and secondary	0.064	1.066	0.017	-0.054	0.947	0.013
Education: Some College	<i>0.044</i>	<i>1.045</i>	<i>0.069</i>	-0.167	0.846	0.020
Hindu	0.360	1.433	0.013	0.348	1.416	0.012
Tribal	-0.335	0.715	0.015	-0.532	0.587	0.021
Dalit	<i>0.000</i>	<i>1.000</i>	<i>0.012</i>	-0.053	0.948	0.015
State average sexratio of under six population	-0.001	0.999	0.001	-0.002	0.998	0.000
(log)mpce(1960 rs)	-0.309	0.734	0.036	-0.416	0.660	0.022
Year_1983	-4.147		0.276	-3.010		0.197
Year_1987-88	-2.467		0.285	-1.764		0.186
Year_1999-00	-2.254		0.312	-0.765		0.198
Interaction: mpce and 1983 dummy	0.452		0.041	0.316		0.026
Interaction: mpce and 1987-88	0.269		0.043	0.175		0.024

dummy				
Interaction: mpce and 1999-00				
dummy	0.283	0.046	0.072	0.026

Note: All coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level except if italicized (which implies not significant at the 5% level)

State dummies were included, results available upon request

Table 7: Average marginal effects for log per capita real expenditure by NSS round (average change in probability of female marriage migration for a unit increase in (log) real mpce)

<b>Model 2: All working age married women</b>	<b>Model 3: Bottom three quintiles</b>	<b>Model 4: Top two quintiles</b>
ln 1983: 0.007	1983 0.029	1983 - 0.020
ln 87-88: -0.039	1987-88 <i>-0.008</i>	1987-88 -0.047
ln 99-00: -0.054	1999-2000 <i>-0.005</i>	1999-2000 -0.066
ln 07-08: -0.077	2007-08 -0.049	2007-08 -0.077

Note: All coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level except if italicized (which implies not significant at the 5% level)


Table 8: Average marginal effects for log per capita real expenditure by NSS round, by location (average change in probability of female marriage migration for a unit increase in (log) real mpce)

<b>Rural only</b>	<b>Urban only</b>	<b>North_central only</b>	<b>Rest of India</b>
ln 1983: 0.024	1983 0.069	1983 0.024	-0.02
ln 87-88: -0.012	1987-88 -0.	1987-88 -0.036	-0.04
ln 99-00: -0.027	1999-2000 -0.095	1999-2000 -0.060	-0.022
ln 07-08: -0.072	2007-08 -0.107	2007-08 -0.064	-0.055

Note: All coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level except if italicized (which implies not significant at the 5% level)

Full results for these regressions available upon request

Figure 1: Migrants as a share of the working age married population



Source: Authors' calculations based on NSS data

## REFERENCES

- Bagchi, Amiya Kumar. 2011. "Mobility: Internal and International." *Development and Change* 42.1 (2011): 419-36.
- Bardhan, Kalpana, (1985). "Women's Work, Welfare and Status: Forces of Tradition and Change in India", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 20(51/52), pp 2261-2269.
- Basu, Alaka Malwade. "Fertility Decline and Increasing Gender Imbalance in India, Including a Possible South Indian Turnaround." *Development and Change* 30.2 (1999): 237-63.
- Bhattacharya Prabir C. 2000. "An analysis of rural-to-rural migration in India". *Journal of International Development*. Volume 12, Issue 5, pages 655–667, July 2000
- Bell, Martin and Salut Muhidin. 2009. "Cross-National Comparisons of Internal Migration." *Human Development Research Paper 2009/30*, July 2009.

Benería, Lourdes, Carmen Diana Deere and Naila Kabeer. 2012. Gender and International Migration: Globalization, Development, and Governance. *Feminist Economics*, Vol. 18(2), pages 1-33.

Breman, Jan. 1996. *Footloose Labor: Working in India's Informal Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

DeHaan Arjan. 1999. "Livelihoods and Poverty: The Role of Migration – A Critical Review of the Migration Literature." *Journal of Development Studies*, 36(2).

Deshingkar, Priya and Shaheen Akter. 2009. "Migration and Human Development in India". *Human Development Research Paper 2009/13*.

Deshingkar Priya and John Farrington. 2009. "A Framework for Understanding Circular Migration." In *Circular Migration and Multilocational Strategies in Rural India*. Deshingkar Priya and John Farrington eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Deshpande, Ashwini. (2002). "Assets versus Autonomy: The Changing Face of the Gender Caste Overlap in India". *Feminist Economics*, 8(2), pp 19-35.

Deshpande, Ashwini (2012). *The Grammar of Caste: Economic Discrimination in Contemporary India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Donato KM, D Gabaccia, J Holdaway, M Manalansan, P Pessar. 2006. "A glass half-full? Gender in migration studies." *International Migration Review*, 40(1): 3-26.

Dubey, Amaresh, Richard Palmer-Jones and Kunal Sen. 2006. "Surplus Labor, Social Structure and Rural to Urban Migration: Evidence from Indian Data." *The European Journal of Development Research*, 18(1).

Ehrenreich, Barbara and Arlie Russell Hochschild, eds. 2002. *Global Woman: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy*. New York: Henry Holt.

Elson, Diane and Ruth Pearson. 1981. 'Nimble Fingers Make Cheap Workers': An Analysis of Women's Employment in Third World Export Manufacturing. *Feminist Review*, 7, pp 87–107.

Fulford, Scott. 2013. "Marriage migration in India". Boston College Working Paper 820, Boston College Economics Department.

Gardner Katy and Filippo Osella. 2003. "Migration, modernity and social transformation in South Asia : An Overview." *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 27(2)

Garikpati, Supriya. 2008. "Agricultural Wage Work, Seasonal Migration and the Widening Gender Gap: Evidence from a Semi-arid Region of Andhra Pradesh", *The European Journal of Development Research*, 20(4), pp 629-648.

Iversen Vegard, Kunal Sen, Arjan Verschoor And Amaresh Dubey. 2009. Job Recruitment Networks and Migration to Cities in India. *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 45 (4), pp 522–543.

Jayadev, Arjun, Vamsi Vakulabharanam and Sripad Motiram . 2011. "Patterns of Wealth Disparities in India: 1991-2002," in *Understanding India's New Political Economy: A Great Transformation?* Ruperelia et al. editors, Routledge 2011.

Kapadia, Karin. (1995). *Siva and Her Sisters*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Karve, Irawati. (1965). *Kinship Organization in India*. Calcutta: Asia Publishing House.

Kundu Amitabh. 2009. "Urbanization and Migration: An Analysis of Trends, Patterns and Policies in Asia." Human Development Research Paper 2009/16.

Kundu, Amitabh and Sarangi, Niranjana. 2007. "Migration, Employment Status and Poverty", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42 (4), pp. 299-306.

Lall Somik V., Harris Selod and Zmarak Shalizi. 2006. "Rural-Urban Migration in Developing Countries: A Survey of Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Findings." *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 3915.

Munshi Kaivan and Mark Rozenzweig. 2007. "Why is Mobility in India so Low? Social Insurance, Inequality and Growth." *International Policy Center Working Paper Series*, Number 68.

National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO). 2010. Migration in India: 2007-08. NSS Report No. 533 (64/10.2/2).

Pfeiffer Lisa, Susan Richter, Peri Fletcher and J Edward Taylor. 2007. "Gender in Economic Research on International Migration and its Impacts: A Critical Review." in *The International Migration of Women* eds Maurice Schiff, Andrew R. Morrison and Mirja Sjöblom. Washington D C: World Bank.

Krishnaraj Shanthi. 2005. "Gender dimensions in rural- urban migration in India: policy imperatives." Paper presented at the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population XXV International Population Conference Tours, France, July 18-23, 2005

Parrenas, Rhacel S. 2001. *Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration, and Domestic Work*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Rao, Aparna and Michael J. Casimir. 2003. *Nomadism in South Asia*. Delhi: Oxford in India Readings in Sociology and Social Anthropology.

Rao, Nitya. "Male ?Providers? and Female ?Housewives?: A Gendered Co-Performance in Rural North India." *Development and Change* 43.5 (2012): 1025-48.

Rao, Vijayendra. (1993). "The Rising Price of Husbands: A Hedonic Analysis of Dowry Increases in Rural India", *Journal of Political Economy*, 101, 666-777.

Rosenzweig, Mark and Oded Stark. 1989. "Consumption Smoothing, Migration, and Marriage: Evidence from Rural India." *Journal of Political Economy*, 97(4), pp 905-26.

Sen Abhijit and Himanshu. 2004 "Poverty and Inequality in India: II: Widening Disparities during the 1990s. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 39(39), pp. 4361-4375

Sangari, Kumkum. (1995a). "Politics of Diversity -I". *Economic and Political Weekly*. December 23, 3287-3307.

Sangari, Kumkum. (1995b). "Politics of Diversity -II". *Economic and Political Weekly*. December 30, 3381-3389.

Srinivas, M.N. (1998). *Village, Caste, Gender and Method: Essays in Indian Social Anthropology*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Standing, Guy, 1999. Global Feminization Through Flexible Labor: A Theme Revisited. *World Development*, 27( 3), pp. 583 -602.

Thorat, Sukhdeo and Amaresh Dubey. 2012. Has Growth Been Socially Inclusive during 1993-94 – 2009-10? . *Economic & Political Weekly*, 47(10), pp 43-54

Trautmann, Thomas. (1995). *Dravidian Kinship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Uberoi, Patricia. 2012. *Family, Kinship and Marriage in India* ed. Patricia Uberoi. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Vakulabharanam, Vamsi and Saswata Thakuratha. 2012. Why do Migrants do better than Non-migrants at Destination? Migration, Class and Inequality Dynamics in India. Mimeo.

Vakulabharanam, Vamsi and Rahul De. 2012. Growth and Distribution Regimes in India after Independence. Paper presented at the conference, *China and India: Comparing Paths to*

*Development and Their Significance for Asia*, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, December 10-11, 2012.

Wright, Caroline. 1995. "Gender Awareness in Migration Theory: Synthesizing Actor and Structure in Southern Africa." *Development and Change* 26.4 (1995): 771-92. Web.

Zacharias Ajit and Vakulabharanam, Vamsi. 2011. Caste Stratification and Wealth Inequality in India. *World Development*, 39(10), pp 1820-1833