

# Transparency in Parliamentary Voting

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## Abstract

We exploit a recent change in voting procedures in one of the two chambers of the Swiss parliament to explore how transparency affects the votes of Members of Parliament (MPs). Until 2013, the Council of States (Ständerat) decided by hand rising. While publicly observable at the time of the vote, MPs' decisions could only be verified through time-consuming screening of online videos ex post. In 2014 - in the middle of the legislation period, the chamber switched to electronic voting. As MPs' decisions are available online, transparency and observability of MP voting increased.

Our analysis is based on individual voting behavior from all final passage votes in the 2011-2015 legislation period. In a difference-in-difference framework, the larger chamber, the National Council (Nationalrat), serves as control group. Voting procedures in the latter have not changed since 2007, the legislative text is identical in both chambers.

After the reform, members of the Council of States are significantly less likely to deviate from their party line. We also observe a higher probability to abstain even though a strong party line exists. Our results are in line with increased observability of MP votes and higher conformity pressure from parties and party groups.

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# 1 Introduction

A major question in political economy is which institutions affect politicians' accountability to voters. Information is a key element to align the interests of principal and agent. More information on agent's actions improves accountability and increases benefits to the principal, but reduces the rent the agent is able to extract (Holmström 1979). In politics, one of the most relevant actions of the main agents, the Members of Parliament (MPs), is their voting behavior. Through their vote, MPs directly affect the type of policies that are enacted.

Parliaments around the world differ how voting decisions of their members are made transparent: while some record and publicly disclose all individual voting decisions of their MPs (i.e., who voted yes or no on a certain proposal), others tend not to disclose the majority of votes.<sup>1</sup> While the theoretical literature on information disclosure in principal-agent relationships offers certain well-defined objections to full transparency in political decision making (for an overview, see, e.g., Prat 2006), the literature on legislative transparency emphasizes that voters as ultimate principals should benefit from vote transparency. It allows voters to identify MPs who do not adhere to their campaign promises. If they do not represent the electorate's preferences well, voters can punish their MPs by not reelecting them.<sup>2</sup>

In this paper, we analyze how increased vote transparency influences MPs's voting behavior. In a quasi-experimental approach we exploit an institutional change in the Swiss parliament's voting procedure. While the lower house (National Council) has been voting electronically since 1994 and fully publishing individual votes online since 2007, the upper house (Council of States) resorted to voting by hand rising for most votes. Beginning in spring 2014, it also changed to an electronic voting system. From this point on, all major voting results have been published online for each MP in both chambers. Luckily, video records of the hand-rising votes exist for the complete legislation period. These videos allowed us to recover most voting results in the upper house before 2014 by MP name.<sup>3</sup> We can therefore exploit the difference-in-difference setting of the bi-cameral parliamentary system with only the change of transparency in one chamber of parliament taking place roughly halfway the legislative period 11.2011-10.2015 and leaving everything else unchanged. Final passage

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1. Hug (2009) reports that, out of 92 parliaments, 23 do not publish any votes, 20 publish all votes, 43 publish specific votes, and 28 publish requested roll call votes.

2. For a theoretical argument why voters should care about their representatives' individual votes and not only about outcomes, see Snyder and Ting (2005).

3. Another stream of literature making use of these video records analyzes how well constituencies are represented by their respective MPs (Eichenberger, Stadelmann, and Portmann 2012; Hug and Martin 2011; Portmann and Stadelmann 2013; Stadelmann, Portmann, and Eichenberger 2012).

votes are identical in both chambers. So far, we collected data for the complete legislative period which leaves us with a sample of 225 final passage votes for each of the 200 MPs in the lower and 46 MPs in the upper house.

We show that party and party group cohesion in the Council of States increased with a higher degree of transparency. Deviations from the party (group) line decreased after the reform. Specifically, in situations with strong party (group) lines, MPs tend to abstain more often after the reform. We find no effect of reform on the probability of being absent during the sessions.

How can these result be explained? Members of parliament respond to multiple principals (see, e.g., Hix 2002; Carey 2008; Schwarz 2009). Party leadership controls assignment to leadership positions or key committees and access to other resources. Interest groups offer campaign financing or moonlighting income. Voters are, of course, relevant due to reelection constraints. In federal systems, local parties as well as national parties might be relevant for access to resources as well as candidacies. In such a multiple principle framework it is ex ante unclear which principal profits most from transparency. As these different principals have competing interests, which are often not perfectly correlated with the MPs own preferences, an increase in transparency affects MPs voting behavior in various ways. Some authors argue that vote transparency should, nevertheless, benefit voters most: inside principals such as party leadership (Carey 2008) or powerful interest groups (Snyder and Ting 2005) are able to observe MPs closely even without vote transparency. In contrast, voters usually do not have the capacity to monitor their representatives directly. If legislative insiders are able to pressure MPs even without easy access to individual votes, more transparency might better align MPs' voting behavior with the preferences of their electorate.

On the other hand, if party leaders or interest groups are not perfectly informed about MPs' voting behavior, vote disclosure will also increase information of these imperfectly informed principals. At the same time, voters inform themselves primarily through mass media (e.g., Prat and Stromberg 2013) and are thus not perfectly informed even under full and easy access to voting behavior. Consequently, the effect of publishing MPs' decisions depends on the relative importance of the additional information effect for the different principals. In our setting, parties seem to profit more from increased vote transparency and MPs prefer to withhold their vote instead of publicly standing up against their party line.<sup>4,5</sup>

Our paper differs from previous studies in two important ways. First. we exploit an important

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4. For a recent account of strategic abstention, see, e.g., Willumsen and Öhberg (2013).

5. So far, we only investigate short term effects of increased transparency. Depending on, among other things, how quickly the media pick up the topic of MP voting, long term effects might be different.

institutional change in the midst of an ongoing legislature period, which allows us to causally identify the effect of a higher degree of transparency. Second, we are able to analyze a change in transparency in only one chamber of bi-cameral parliamentary system. This setting allows us to separate the effect of the reform from general time trends in MPs' voting behavior with the help of a difference-in-difference setting. Such an approach is clearly not feasible for a similar change in transparency implemented in the European Parliament (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2013; Hug 2012; Yordanova and Mühlböck 2015).

Several authors analyzed the effect of transparency on MPs voting behavior by comparing published and unpublished roll call votes (e.g., Hug 2009; Hug and Wuest 2014; Schwarz 2005; Traber, Hug, and Sciarini 2014). For Switzerland, Hug (2009) shows that party cohesion differs remarkably between published and unpublished votes: it is higher for votes that are automatically published compared to those that are not published or only published on request. However, published roll call votes usually differ in systematic ways from unpublished votes. They often form a specific sub-sample of all votes (e.g. final passage votes or roll call votes requested by parliament). Hence, most authors emphasize the selection bias between published and unpublished votes which prevents them from establishing directions of causality.

Related to our analysis is the paper by Stadelmann, Portmann, and Eichenberger (2014) who analyze the effect of the introduction of video records of MPs votes in the Swiss Council of States on aggregate voting behavior in a difference-in-difference framework. They conclude that increased transparency due to the videos did not change collective accountability to voters. Before the appearance of video records no individual voting results were available even to researchers, limiting the scope of the paper to identify transparency affects on aggregate voting results. In this setting, it is not possible to investigate less aggregate measures such group cohesion, MPs' individual voting behavior or accountability towards voters in MPs' actual voting districts. Our paper, in contrast, focuses on an arguably larger and more relevant change in vote transparency and can analyze the effect of this increase in transparency on disaggregate measures and individual voting behavior.

Section 2 explains the main features of the Swiss Parliament and describes the reform in voting procedures of the Council of States. Section 3 describes our data. In Section 4 we explain our identification strategy and in Section 5 we present the results. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Institutional Background

### 2.1 The Swiss Federal Parliament

The Swiss Federal Parliament consists of two chambers, the Nationalrat (National Council) and the Ständerat (Council of States). The National Council has 200 members and represents the Swiss population. One seat is associated with 37'500 citizens. Voting districts are the Swiss cantons and each canton receives at least one seat even if its population is below 37'500. The largest canton, Zurich, has currently 34 seats in the National Council, while six cantons only have one seat. The Council of States is the representation of the cantons with 20 cantons delegating two members and the six half cantons each delegating one member, making a total of 46 members. Both councils have equal legislative power and federal legislation has to pass both chambers.

Table 1 summarizes some of the major characteristics and differences between the two chambers. In most cantons, members of the National Council are elected by proportional vote, whereas members of the Council of States are elected by majority vote. The differences in size and election procedure lead to different composition of the chambers. In the Council of States most members (93.5%) are from one of the four major parties and only 7 parties are represented. The National Council, on the other hand, is composed of 14 parties, whereby the four major parties make up 79%. In both councils, the individual parties are affiliated with one of seven party groups. While the party groups are relevant in the preparation phase of new legislation and give recommendations with respect to votes, they cannot formally enforce them and, by law, MPs cast their votes autonomously.

The chambers differ also by culture of deliberation: while MPs in the National Council have a regulated floor time of 5-20 minutes, there is no limit in the Council of States.

When a new piece of legislation enters the Parliamentary deliberation process, MPs vote on any detailed amendments, on the entire piece of legislation at the end of a round of deliberation (so called total vote), and, if the two chambers have been able to agree on a final proposal, on the final legislation in a final passage vote. We concentrate our analysis on the final passage votes which are identical in the two chambers and mostly take place on the exact same day.

### 2.2 Transparency Reform in the Council of States

While the National Council has been voting electronically since 1994 and fully publishing all individual votes online since 2007 (without any change thereafter), the Council of States voted by

Table 1: COMPARISON OF CHAMBERS


	National Council	Council of States
No. of seats	200	46
Distribution of seats	1 seat per 37'500 inhabitants, min. 1 seat per canton	2 seats per canton, 1 seat per half canton
Election procedure	mostly proportional vote	mostly majority vote
Parties / groups	14 parties 7 party groups	7 parties 7 party groups
Party composition	79% share of big 4 parties	93.5% share of big 4 parties
Debates	Regulated floor time (5-20 min)	Unlimited floor time
Transparency	Individual votes recorded and partly published since 1994, full online publication since 2007	Video records since 2006, individual votes recorded and partly published since 2014

hand rising until the End of 2013. Name list with individual voting behavior were only published if at least ten members supported the request. Despite this theoretical possibility, roll call votes were very rare. In the legislation period 2007-2011, there were no roll call votes and in the previous period 2003-2007 there was only one (about a proposal to introduce electronic voting). The Council of States resisted several attempts to introduce electronic voting and increase vote transparency. In 2011 a parliamentary initiative was submitted by MP This Jenny from the Swiss People's Party demanding (once again) the introduction of electronic voting and the (partial) publication of individual votes. Although the majority of the responsible parliamentary commission recommended rejecting the initiative, in June 2012, the Council of States narrowly accepted the proposal with 22 against 21 votes and 1 abstention.<sup>6</sup> With this vote the responsible commission received the mandate to draft a concrete bill. This bill was, however, rejected with 25 against 20 votes in the final vote at the end of November 2012.

A few days later Politnetz, an organization analyzing legislative behavior that had started to film the votes in the Council of States, detected a counting error. In the official result of the vote on a bill on import restrictions for snake skin the bill was rejected with 19 to 18 with the president of the council casting the deciding vote. In contrast, Politnetz' video records showed a result of 19 to 17 in favor of the bill, excluding the president's vote. This alleged counting error received huge media attention. As a result, the vote on the snake skin bill was repeated, and the Council of States decided to revisit its decision on the electronic voting bill. In March 2013, the transparency bill was

6. On request of 10 MPs, this was a roll call vote.

FIG. 1: NEWSPAPER COVERAGE



NOTE: Daily and monthly numbers of newspaper articles in major Swiss newspapers.

again debated and accepted in the final vote on March 22 with 28 to v14 votes.<sup>7</sup> The final version of the bill demanded the introduction of an electronic voting system and partial vote transparency. Name lists of all final passage votes, total votes, and of other votes upon request from 10 MPs will be published online in pdf format. The bill was enacted at the beginning of March 2014.

Figure 1 shows the number of newspaper articles from national and large local newspapers on transparency in the Council of States between March 2012 and May 2014. The red line show the number of articles per day, while the green lines aggregate the articles per month. The media attention matches the various steps in the reform process. The media attention regarding wrong counting results at the end of 2012 is particularly well visible.

Before the introduction of electronic voting in March 2014, voting in the Council of States was not completely secret. All parliamentary debates including votes are public and video records have been available on the Parliament’s homepage since 2006. Anyone interested in the voting behavior of an MP could either visit the debates personally or watch the videos online. This is however a very time-consuming and cumbersome activity. As the camera moves quickly over the room during the hand raising, it takes time to detect how an individual MP voted. The publication of name lists of the major votes therefore represents a large increase in vote transparency.

7. The bill only had to pass the Council of States and not the National Council as it is concerned with the inner organization of the Council of States.

### 2.3 Effects of the Reform

In the following, we empirically investigate to what extent this increase in transparency affects MPs' voting behavior. During the various debates on the reform, many MPs voiced their concern about increased pressure from party leaders and to some extent from interest groups if individual votes would be disclosed (Amtliches Bulletin 2012).<sup>8</sup> Others emphasized the right of voters to know how their representatives decide. The debates match well with the multiple principle framework identifying parties and their leaders, interest groups and voters as main principals. In a first step, we analyze how several measures of party and party group cohesion are affected by transparency. If party (group) pressure increases, we expect an increase in party (group) cohesion as MPs deviate less from the party line. If voters or interest groups benefit relatively more from increased transparency, as long as their interests do not perfectly match the party line, we would expect no increase but rather a decrease in party (group) cohesion.

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8. This is in contrast to the interviews by Carey (2008) where legislators in various Latin American countries indicated that party leaders are able to monitor their members well even without electronic voting or roll call votes.



### 3 Data

Our analysis is based on the legislation period starting in December 2011 until September 2014.<sup>9</sup> In total, our data set contains 225 final passage votes with around 55,000 individual MP votes.

Through the search engine of the parliamentary homepage, Curia Vista, we get contextual information about the votes, as well as aggregate voting results for both chambers. Before 2014, voting data in the Council of States are available through video recordings by the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation. All of them can be watched online. We hand-collected these data by watching the videos of the relevant final passage votes. Unfortunately, only around 86% of the MPs' decisions are visible. Reasons for not visible decisions are among other: the camera is too slow, the MP is the vote counter, or the MP sits in the corner of the room. However, through the knowledge of aggregate results, we are able to infer another 8% of individual votes. We conduct the following adjustments. First, if the vote was unanimous and we observe all abstentions, we can infer the yes and no votes.<sup>10</sup> Second, if politicians are observed inactive twice, e.g. not voting yes and not abstaining, they consequently voted no.

For the National Council and since 2014 for the Council of States, individual voting data is available online in pdf format from the homepage of the Parliament. We received the data for the National Council until summer 2014 from smartmonitor, a project that has been collecting all individual votes in a database. Afterwards and for the Council of States, we hand collected the data from the parliamentary homepage.

We also collected personal information about the MP like gender, age, party, party group and canton from the Parliament's homepage. This homepage also contains information on member mutations in case a MP dropped out of the parliament (e.g., due to retirement, illness, death, political scandal). We then retrieve information on the replacement.

This gives us data in panel form with repeated observations for the same MPs. However, some of the MPs dropped out before the end of the legislation period and were replaced by others. In order to conduct a causal analysis, we drop observations from MP without comparable observations before and after the reform. Absences constitute a similar issue. Since final passage votes mostly take place on the last day of the session, being absent on such a day means a considerable reduction in observations. We therefore drop MPs with two or more missed sessions. This leaves us with 88% of the intital observations.

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9. We are continuously updating the data with new sessions. The last relevant session takes place in Nov. 2015.

10. In our data, only unanimously accepting votes exist. There are no votes in which all MPs reject the bill.

## 4 Estimation Strategy

We begin by defining measures of cohesive voting at aggregate and individual level. In the second part, we describe the identification strategy based on a difference-in-difference framework.

### 4.1 Measures of Cohesion

The literature has developed several standard measures of cohesion in parliamentary voting at aggregate level. Denote the number of MPs voting yes in vote  $i$  by  $Y_i$ , rejecting votes by  $N_i$ , and abstentions by  $A_i$ . A simple first bivariate measure is unanimity: the variable is one if all MPs vote either yes or no, and zero else. Traditionally, the vote can be unanimous even when some MPs abstain. Next, we can calculate the share of approving votes either with or without including abstentions:

$$\frac{Y_i}{Y_i + N_i} \text{ and } \frac{Y_i}{Y_i + N_i + A_i} \quad (1)$$

An important measure is the Rice index (Rice 1928). It reflects the absolute difference between yes and no votes as share of total yes and no votes:

$$\frac{|Y_i - N_i|}{Y_i + N_i} \quad (2)$$

Its values vary between zero and one. It is one if all MPs vote unanimously yes or no. It becomes zero when the number of approving votes equals the number of rejecting votes. Disagreement is the highest then. The index is commonly criticized because it ignores the possibility of abstentions. The Agreement Index is a similar measure, however, accounting for abstainers (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2013).

$$\frac{\max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\} - \frac{1}{2}[(Y_i + N_i + A_i) - \max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\}]}{Y_i + N_i + A_i} \quad (3)$$

Similarly to the the Rice Index, the variable takes on values between zero (maximal disagreement) and one (unanimity).

The descriptives of aggregate cohesion measures are in the upper part of Table 2. Almost 40% of the votes are unanimous, with shares of yes votes of 87.7 (without abstentions) and 84.2% (with abstentions). These generally high shares reflect that we only consider final passage votes which stand at the end of several voting rounds of a bill. Most critical points have been discussed and amended until this time in the process, such that agreement is higher than in the preceding

Table 2: DESCRIPTIVES

	Mean	Std. Dev.
AGGREGATE MEASURES		
Unanimous	0.393	0.489
% Yes	0.877	0.142
% Yes (a)	0.842	0.150
Rice	0.754	0.284
Agreement	0.763	0.225
% Abstain	0.040	0.063
INDIVIDUAL MEASURES		
Yes	0.808	0.394
No	0.151	0.358
Abstain	0.040	0.197
Party deviation (90%)	0.006	0.075
Party deviation (80%)	0.012	0.110
Party deviation (70%)	0.018	0.133
Party group deviation (90%)	0.007	0.081
Party group deviation (80%)	0.015	0.121
Party group deviation (70%)	0.091	0.287

NOTE: Based on observations from 225 final passage votes. Abstention is not treated as deviating. Minimum values are always zero, maximum always 1 for individual measures.

votes. The cohesion indices also reflect relatively high agreement: the Rice Index is 0.753, and the Agreement Index only slightly higher. The share of abstainers amounts to 4% on average.

Our main goal is the analysis of voting behavior at the individual level. In particular, we are interested in how likely MPs are to deviate from the interest of their principal, i.e., vote differently than the party or the party group. First, we need to define the party (group) line. Second, it is necessary to define rule how to treat abstentions. A party line exists if  $c\%$  members of the same party vote identically. We employ several cutoffs  $c \in \{90, 80, 70\}$ . Values below 70% are conceptually infeasible since they would not suggest a consistent party (group) line.

It is a priori not clear how abstentions should be treated. Therefore, we first define abstaining as deviating from the principal's line. Then, we use specifications where abstention is not treated as deviating.

For the analysis, we have to exclude votes from our data set that do not have a party line. E.g., some votes are thematically irrelevant for the party platform such that MPs are not bound by their party's interest. These votes are less interesting because the concept of deviation is irrelevant here.

The Swiss political landscape is dominated by four parties: the SP, FDP, CVP, and SVP. The

remaining parties only occupy few seats per party in the chambers, such that the voting behavior of a single MP has a large impact on our definition of party line. Therefore, we conduct the analysis exclusively for the four large parties. However, all parties can be subsumed in 7 relatively large party groups such that we are able to use all MP observations for an analysis of party group line deviation.

Presidents of the chambers are only required to vote in case of the tie or if prescribed by law. In all other cases, they do not vote, so we drop these observations.

Descriptives at individual level are in the lower part of Table 2. From observable MP votes we have that around 81% of the votes are approving, 15% are rejecting, and 4% are abstentions. Party deviations at the 90% level occur infrequently in less than 1% of the cases. With a broader definition of party line, 1.2 (80%) and 1.8 (70%) of the observations are deviations. At the 90 and 80% level, descriptives for party group deviations are similar. However, at the 70% cutoff 9% of the observations are deviations from the party group line.


## 4.2 Identification

The goal is to estimate the causal effect of the introduction of electronic voting on cohesion of the MPs' voting behavior with respect to party and party group. We employ a difference-in-difference estimation approach, for which the National Council serves as control group.

The National Council is a suitable control group for several reasons. First, our empirical analysis is based on final passage votes only. The text of legislation voted on in both chambers is therefore identical. Second, the National Council adopted electronic voting in 1994 with full online publication of all individual votes since 2007, and there were no changes regarding voting procedures throughout the entire legislation period. Last, the comparable votes in both chambers usually take place on the same day. Therefore, there is no time for additional debates or potential influence by relevant news. Of course, there are apparently differences between the chambers, e.g. in size or election mechanism. However, they all remained stable throughout our observation time.

The most important assumption in difference-in-difference frameworks is the existence of a common trend between the treated and the control group. Exemplarily, we calculate the mean party group deviation defining abstention as not deviating for each session by chamber. We show the plot in Figure 2. The reform is plotted as a vertical line in session 10. In both chambers, we observe a large variation in mean party group deviation during the first seven sessions. Thereafter,

FIG. 2: COMMON TREND ASSUMPTION



NOTE: Mean party group deviation defining abstention as not deviating. Session 1 corresponds to December 2011, session 12 to September 2014. Reform in session 10. SR: Council of States, NR: National Council.

the mean deviation decreases and varies far less. Importantly, as expected we observe a parallel movement of deviation when comparing both chambers. At the same time, the Council of States has traditionally a higher mean deviation than the National Council. The pre-reform co-movement in mean deviation across both chamber is thus an encouraging sign regarding the validity of the common trend assumption.

As we consider an entire legislation period, this has the advantage of a fixed composition of parliament: with the exception of dropouts and their replacements, we observe most MPs for entire 4 years. It is also advantageous that the reform takes place roughly halfway the legislation period. This gives us enough observations before and after the reform. First graphical evidence from Figure 2 suggests that the reform might indeed have an effect on how MPs vote. After the reform, we observe a change to the previous pattern: mean deviation in both chamber is almost identical and very low.

First, we estimate regression based on either aggregate measures of *cohesion* from the final

passage votes  $i$ . The estimation equation has the standard form with two main effects and their interaction:  $SR_i$  is a dummy with value one for the Council of States, and zero for the National Council. The dummy  $reform_i$  is one after the reform and zero before.  $SR_i \times reform_i$  is their interaction.  $\alpha$  is the constant and  $\epsilon$  the error term.

$$cohesion_i = \alpha + \beta_1 SR_i + \beta_2 reform_i + \beta_3 SR_i \times reform_i + \epsilon_i \quad (4)$$

Second, we estimate regression of a similar form but with individual data. The dependent variable  $deviate_{im}$  becomes one if MP  $m$  votes differently than his party's  $p$  line would suggest. Analogously to above, the estimation equation is the following:

$$deviate_{imp} = \alpha + \beta_1 SR_{imp} + \beta_2 reform_{imp} + \beta_3 SR_{imp} \times reform_{imp} + \epsilon_{imp} \quad (5)$$

We conduct the regressions with linear estimators due to the linearity assumption of the difference-in-difference estimator. However, the dependent variable is bivariate, which calls for an adjustment of the estimator term to non-linearities.

Also, we run the regressions using deviation from the party group line as dependent variable.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Aggregate Level

The estimates are based on aggregate voting results from 225 passage votes in both chambers. The results are in Table 3. The first line shows the effect of the reform on cohesion in the Council of States. We find that unanimity goes down after switching to electronic voting. In Switzerland, unanimous votes are exclusively votes of agreement (no chamber unanimously votes against a bill). On average, this suggests a higher share of disagreement. Specifications (2) and (3) confirm the tendency: the share of yes voters drops, however, only significantly when taking into account abstentions. There is no significant change in the Rice index. But the Agreement index - recall, it encompasses abstentions - decreases significantly. In the last column, the coefficient regarding the share of abstainers is positive.

The aggregate analysis points in the direction of lower voting cohesion after the reform. Especially, the increased share of abstainers could play an important role.

Generally, we observe higher values of cohesion in the Council of States than in the National Council as suggested by the graphical analysis. The culture of discourse and deliberation in search for agreement is a traditional element in the Council of States, and thus not surprising. With the exception of the share of abstainers, reform has no effect on the voting in the National Council. This result is satisfactory since the control group should preferably not be affected by the treatment.

Table 3: AGGREGATE MEASURES OF COHESION

	Unanimous (1)	% Yes (2)	% Yes (a.) (3)	Rice (4)	Agreement (5)	% Abstain (6)
SR * reform	-0.141* (0.083)	-0.025 (0.019)	-0.040** (0.019)	-0.051 (0.037)	-0.060** (0.029)	0.018* (0.010)
SR	0.424*** (0.042)	0.125*** (0.010)	0.134*** (0.011)	0.250*** (0.020)	0.202*** (0.016)	-0.013* (0.007)
Reform	-0.045 (0.058)	0.006 (0.022)	0.025 (0.022)	0.013 (0.045)	0.037 (0.033)	-0.021** (0.009)
Constant	0.212*** (0.032)	0.817*** (0.012)	0.774*** (0.012)	0.633*** (0.023)	0.661*** (0.018)	0.050*** (0.007)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.01
N	450	450	450	450	450	450

NOTE: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Final passage votes in legislation period 2011-2014. Ordinary least squares.

## 5.2 Individual Level

We report individual level results for party line deviation based on four large Swiss parties in Table 4. In the first three columns party line deviation is defined such that abstention is defined as deviation from party line, and vice versa in the last three columns.

The effect of electronic voting is significantly negative in three specifications (3), (5) and (6): party line deviation decreases with the availability of easily accessible individual voting results. The effect varies between 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points. It is more significant for looser definitions of party line, and when abstention is not regarded as deviating.

When analyzing the deviation from party group line, the number of observations increases because MPs from small parties are taken into account as well. With one exception, effects are very similar to above. Indeed, the significance even increases. Surprisingly, the coefficient is positive and slightly significant in the first specification. However, since all other results are similar, this effect should not be over-interpreted.

Overall, there are more deviations from party line and party group line in the Council of States than in the National Council. Potentially, it reflects the smaller size of the chamber such that one deviating MP has a large impact in terms of percentage points. Reform has no effect on party line deviation in the National Council. However, in some specifications we find an effect of reform on party group line deviation. It might reflect that votes before and after reform differed, and the true

Table 4: PARTY LINE DEVIATION

	(90) (1)	(80) (2)	(70) (3)	(90) (4)	(80) (5)	(70) (6)
SR * reform	0.004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.009* (0.005)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.004)
SR	0.011*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.024*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.002)	0.025*** (0.002)
Reform	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Constant	0.009*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.001)	0.027*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.016*** (0.001)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	29,444	32,783	34,372	29,444	32,783	34,421

NOTE: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Final passage votes in legislation period 2011-2014. Ordinary least squares. For parties SP, FDP, CVP, and SVP. Columns 1-3 (4-5): abstention (not) defined as deviation from party line.



Table 5: PARTY GROUP LINE DEVIATION

	(90)	(80)	(70)	(90)	(80)	(70)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SR * reform	0.006* (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.046*** (0.008)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.070*** (0.007)
SR	0.012*** (0.002)	0.028*** (0.002)	0.063*** (0.004)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.027*** (0.002)	0.083*** (0.004)
Reform	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.034*** (0.004)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.003)
Constant	0.008*** (0.001)	0.017*** (0.001)	0.117*** (0.002)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.084*** (0.002)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
N	36,618	41,311	47,997	36,618	41,311	47,997

NOTE: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . Standard errors in parentheses. Final passage votes in legislation period 2011-2014. Ordinary least squares. Columns 1-3 (4-5): abstention (not) defined as deviation from party group line.

effect of reform is slightly smaller than what coefficients suggest.

For robustness, we rerun the regressions in Tables 4 and 5 with a different definition of party (group) line: in the main regressions, we calculate percentages including the number of abstaining MPs. Instead, we now calculate it without the abstainers. Results are reported in Tables 8 and 9 in the Appendix. They prove to be quantitatively similar to the main results. Interestingly, coefficients with a strong definition of party (group) line of 90% of MPs voting identically, now is significantly positive.

Both the aggregate and individual-level analysis point towards the important role abstentions play. We thus run regressions with the dependent variable being one if the MP abstained against his party.<sup>11</sup> Results are in Table 6 and confirm the main intuition: the number of abstentions increased in the Council of States after reform. Coefficients are significant throughout the definitions of party line. Electronic voting with increased transparency thus increases abstentions: MPs prefer to withhold their vote instead of publicly standing up against their party's line.

### 5.3 Absenteeism

In the public discussion evolving around the introduction of electronic voting, an increase in presence at parliamentary sessions was hoped for. We therefore conduct the same analysis for the dependent

11. If the party line was to abstain, then abstaining is defined as being in line with the party line.

Table 6: ABSTENTION AGAINST PARTY

	(90) (1)	(80) (2)	(70) (3)
SR * reform	0.019*** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)
SR	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Reform	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.003** (0.002)
Constant	0.030*** (0.001)	0.021*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.001)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	41,024	40,768	40,656

NOTE: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Final passage votes in legislation period 2011-2014. Ordinary least squares.

Table 7: ABSENTEEISM

	(1)	(2)	(3)
SR * reform	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.017)	0.004 (0.012)
SR	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.013)	0.001 (0.009)
Reform	-0.023*** (0.002)	-0.023*** (0.006)	-0.023*** (0.005)
Constant	0.032*** (0.001)	0.032*** (0.006)	0.032*** (0.004)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	50,354	50,354	50,354

NOTE: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Final passage votes in legislation period 2011-2014. Ordinary least squares. Standard errors are not clustered in (1), are session clustered in (2), and MP clustered in (3).

variable being one if a MP is missing at the session, and zero else. The results are reported in Table 7. There are no clusters in specification (1), session clustered standard errors in (2), and MP clusters in (3). Reform does not have the desired effect on absences in the Council of States. However, we find a significant decrease on the probability of not coming to a session by 2.3 percentage points in the National Council.

## 6 Concluding Remarks

We provide empirical evidence on how transparency in parliamentary decision making affects voting behavior of MPs. We exploit a unique policy change in one of the two chambers of Swiss parliament which allows us to estimate a causal effect of a higher public visibility of MPs' decisions. The introduction of electronic voting did not change the public nature of MPs' decisions, but made it more salient and easier to track for the relevant constituencies. Using the larger chamber of parliament as a control group, a difference-in-differences approach uncovers the impact of a higher level of transparency.

We find that increasing transparency significantly affects decision making in parliament: MPs are less likely to deviate from their party's line. In particular, instead of deviating from party (group) opinion in public, MPs more often withhold their vote. By abstaining, they do not oppose their party, but at the same time do not betray whatever other constituency they feel attached. The result is in line with higher pressure and easier control by parties and party groups. Another concern of the public, absenteeism in parliament, was not affected by the policy change. Presumably, once MPs are elected, parties seem to be the more important principals, while the public interested in participation of MPs has a smaller weight.

So far, we have analyzed the short-term effect of transparency. Several extensions will follow: we will complete the data set with upcoming votes until the end of the legislation period end of 2015. A larger dataset allows us to explore heterogeneous effects, such as party differences. In a further step we will take into account MPs' ideology, cantons, and interest groups/lobbies. We will also refine the econometric procedure, accounting for the binary structure of our data and the potentially restrictive linearity assumptions. Last, we will collect data for the legislation period 2007-2011 during which no changes in voting modes occurred. This will allow us to add another difference into our difference-in-differences framework.

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## Appendix

Table 8: PARTY LINE DEVIATION

	(90)	(80)	(70)	(90)	(80)	(70)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SR * reform	0.019*** (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.015*** (0.005)
SR	-0.004 (0.003)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.033*** (0.002)
reform	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.003)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Constant	0.033*** (0.001)	0.032*** (0.001)	0.041*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.001)	0.021*** (0.001)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
N	32,265	34,316	35,651	32,265	34,316	35,651

NOTE: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Final passage votes in legislation period 2011-2014. Ordinary least squares. For parties SP, FDP, CVP, and SVP. Columns 1-3 (4-5): abstention (not) defined as deviation from party line. Party line is calculated without abstentions.

Table 9: PARTY GROUP LINE DEVIATION

	(90)	(80)	(70)	(90)	(80)	(70)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SR * reform	0.027*** (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.007*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.016*** (0.004)
SR	-0.005* (0.003)	0.022*** (0.003)	0.031*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.031*** (0.002)	0.039*** (0.002)
reform	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Constant	0.033*** (0.001)	0.033*** (0.001)	0.038*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.012*** (0.001)	0.019*** (0.001)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
N	40,356	43,434	44,626	40,356	43,434	44,626

NOTE: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Final passage votes in legislation period 2011-2014. Ordinary least squares. Columns 1-3 (4-5): abstention (not) defined as deviation from party group line. Party group line is calculated without abstentions.

## Data sources

Table 10: OVERVIEW OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES

Variable	Source(s)	Description
Voting results Council of States	Videos through Amtliches Bulletin	yes, no, abstain, absent, excused
Voting results National Council	smartmonitor until summer 2014, thereafter Amtliches Bulletin	yes, no, abstain, absent, excused
Aggregate voting results	Amtliches Bulletin	Official aggregate yes, no, abstain, absent, excused for Council of States and National Council
Election results	Swiss Statistical Office	Elected/not elected, number of votes received
MP personal information	Parliament homepage	gender, age, party, party group, canton
MP opinion	Smartvotes	Responses to various policy questions

NOTE: This table provides an overview of the variables used with a short variable description, and the source from which it was retrieved.