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Trickle-Down Ethnic Politics: Drunk and Absent in the Kenya Police Force (1957-1970)

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Abstract

Using a panel of 6,784 Kenyan police officers, we show how the rise of ethnic politics encroached on their daily behavior during Kenya's independence period (1957-1970). We find a significant deterioration in discipline after Kenya's first multiparty election in 1961 for those police officers of ethnic groups associated with the dominant KANU party. These effects are not driven by the selection of policemen, as individual officers change their behavior when their ethnic group gains political power. While we find no evidence of favoritism within the police, we show that shocks to political dominance can still change attitudes and job performance.

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1 Introduction


The efficient provision of public goods relies on a well-functioning public service. Many developing countries lack an efficient public sector. Most well-documented is the widespread absenteeism in the health and education sectors (World Bank, 2004; Banerjee and Duflo, 2006; Duflo, Hanna and Ryan, 2012; Callen et al., 2016). This is despite the fact that public sector positions are often relatively well-paid, typically tenured, and invariably sought after.¹ Finan, Olken and Pande (2016) emphasize three aspects that are key to understand the behavior of public servants: selection, incentive structures, and monitoring. We emphasize a fourth factor: political institutions that can encroach on the day-to-day behavior of public servants.

In this paper we use new, absolutely unique, and extremely detailed data obtained from personnel records that allow us to track 6,784 Kenyan police officers over their entire career. These records keep track of the offenses committed by each police officer, including incidents of absenteeism, untidiness, drunkenness, disobedience, and (in rare cases) violence. We study the period 1957-1970, to investigate how the rise of ethnic politics affected the performance of policemen. Ever since the first multi-party elections in 1961, ethnic politics has featured prominently in Kenya. We show that the 1961 elections were quickly succeeded by changing patterns in discipline: police officers from ethnic groups that were part of the dominant Kenya African National Union (KANU) party started to behave significantly worse.

Figure 1 visualizes this striking pattern, by comparing offense probabilities

¹Finan, Olken and Pande (2016), for example, estimate that public sector workers in Kenya, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria and Tanzania earn more than double the average wage in the private sector. Even when taking into account differences in occupational structures of the two sectors, a premium of about 20% remains.

Figure 1: Misconduct by ethnic groups in ruling party



Notes: The year 1961 marks Kenya's first multiparty elections. KANU is a time varying variable including officers of all ethnic groups affiliated with the Kenya African National Union (KANU). That is the Gema (Kikuyu, Embu, Meru) alliance throughout, the Luo until 1965, and the Kamatusa (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu) after 1964.

for policemen whose ethnicities were represented in the dominant KANU party, with those of ethnic groups in opposition and out of power. We investigate the channels that underly this pattern, scrutinizing the three aspects that are put forward as key channels: selection, incentive structures, and monitoring (Finan, Olken and Pande, 2016). First, we are able to rule out personnel selection: we find that neither the quality of policemen entering nor the quality of those exiting the force changed significantly after 1961. In contrast, the deterioration in misconduct appears to be driven by individual policemen changing their behavior. Second, the effect is strongest for objective offenses such as absenteeism and drunkenness, but weak for more subjective offenses such as disobedience. This goes against the hypothesis of discriminatory reporting. We also argue that the

context in which the original data is generated, as well as the evidence on potential mechanisms, are inconsistent with systematic misreporting. Third, we examine police reorganization, but neither police division characteristics nor the ethnic or geographic distance to the place of work can explain the result. Fourth, we test whether favoritism distorted incentives. We confirm that a history of misconduct affected promotion opportunities and increased the probability of being dismissed. However, KANU ethnicities were not treated differently in this respect. These results suggest that the deterioration of behavior is not a response to changing incentives within the police. However, an explanation that is consistent with our results is that ethnic politics created a general sense of being empowered, which emboldened the policemen of the ruling ethnic groups.

Our paper adds to three strands of literature. First, we contribute to a fast-expanding research area that Finan, Olken and Pande (2016) describe as the “personnel economics of the state”.² Understanding the determinants of public sector performance is central to this literature. But, there is a dearth of work on police performance in low income countries, in spite of the importance of law enforcement (World Bank, 2000). One notable exception is Banerjee et al. (2012), who use an RCT to study the effects of work conditions and monitoring of policemen in Rajasthan. They find that better training and a freeze on transfers improved police effectiveness and its public image. Our paper also complements recent studies on the performance of high-level bureaucrats. Among the determinants of bureaucratic effectiveness, existing work has emphasized the

²The police is more complex than other public services. Financially incentivizing easily observable tasks (e.g. arrests made, fines issued) may lead to overzealous and inaccurate enforcement and crowd out other important but non-incentivized tasks. Moreover, in contrast to the health and education sectors that are characterized by a common interest of the state and its citizens – both want public servants (teachers, doctors, nurses) to provide high quality services, there is a tension between the interest of the government and the citizens at the receiving end of the police work (the alleged criminals). Recent innovations rest on such common interest by enlisting the help of citizens (Banerjee and Duflo, 2006; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005).

role of training and career background (Bertrand et al., 2015), personality traits (Callen et al., 2015), turn-over (Iyer and Mani, 2012), and patronage networks (Xu, 2016). Bo, Finan and Rossi (2013) study how advertised work conditions for bureaucratic posts affect the pool of applicants. However, the literature has paid little attention to how ethnic politics shapes the behavior of public servants. Moreover, researchers rarely have access to the complete personnel records of public servants at the level of policemen, who are the bottom of the public sector hierarchy. Relying on unique historical data, our paper shows that political shocks can affect the day-to-day job performance of the state's rank-and-file.

Second, our work adds to research on the economic costs of ethnic diversity. There is a large literature that links ethnic diversity to poor economic growth at the macro level (Easterly and Levine, 1997; De Luca et al., 2015; Desmet, Ortuno-Ortin and Wacziarg, 2012). At the local level, ethnic diversity is typically associated with poor public goods provision (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Habyarimana et al., 2007). For Kenya, Miguel and Gugerty (2005) show that ethnic diversity is associated with worse schooling facilities and access to water. Burgess et al. (2015) show how Kenyan road building was concentrated in the districts that share the same ethnicity as the president in power - an effect that disappears during democratic times. Similarly, Kramon and Posner (2016) find positive impacts on education levels for the coethnics of the minister of education, even in periods of multi-party elections.³ Our paper provides micro-evidence on how the rise of ethnic politics - which instrumentalizes ethnic diversity - disrupts the functioning of the state's bureaucracy and affects the performance of its personnel.⁴ In contrast to Hjort (2014), who documents how ethnic tensions

³François, Rainer and Trebbi (2015) qualify these findings by showing that allocation of minister posts in African governments tends to reflect the population share of ethnic groups.

⁴While our paper takes differences between ethnic groups or alliances as given, Posner (2004)

reduce productivity in ethnically heterogeneous production teams, we find that it is not ethnic diversity in itself, but the political dominance of certain ethnic groups that drives poor performance. This result could reflect that both the nature of political shocks (violent ethnic conflict versus increased political power) and the nature of the organization (private firms producing in teams versus public service) matter for the relationship between ethnic politics and job performance.

Finally, we contribute to a small but growing, quantitative literature on police organization. Functioning law-enforcing institutions are important for economic development (Auerbach, 2003; World Bank, 2000); protecting citizens and their property is one of the most fundamental public goods that the state provides.⁵ Crawford and Disney (2014) study pension reforms on ill-retirement in the police in England and Wales, and Mas (2006) finds that pay raises for the police below a reference point reduces job performance. Sierra and Titecay (2016) shed light on illicit rent-sharing agreements between lower and senior ranks of the traffic police in the DRC. Sharing our focus on ethnic politics in Kenya, Hassan (forthcoming) provides evidence on how political interference perverted the purpose of the police. She finds that co-ethnic police officers were strategically placed to swing constituencies in the 1992 and 1997 Kenyan elections. Our paper shows that ethnic politics has impacts that are not limited to the policing of elections. Even

studies the conditions under which ethnic cleavages become politically salient by comparing the relations between the same set of ethnic groups in the very different political environments of Zambia and Malawi.

⁵Still, Kenya's Police of today lacks discipline and effectiveness (World Bank, 2009). It consistently ranks among the top five most corrupt police forces in the world (Transparency International, 2013). The ruling party and powerful individuals interfere in the police. At the same time, the police is perceived as highly inefficient in preventing and detecting crime (Anderson, 2002; Ruteere, 2011; Okia, 2011; Akech, 2005). The failure and shortcomings of the police as well as the ethnic dimension have been most well-documented for the 2007/08 post-election ethnic clashes that followed after the disputed victory of Kibaki over Odinga that left 1,133 dead and about 350,000 people displaced (Waki, 2008, p.351,358). Kibaki drew support among Kikuyu, Embu and Meru, whereas Odinga ran on an alliance of Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin, and coastal peoples.

without the direct interference of politicians, it can undermine the effectiveness and discipline of police officers.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we give a background of ethnic politics and police organization in Kenya. Section 3 describes the data and the measurement of police performance. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 describes the main results. Section 6 explores the channels of poor performance. Section 7 interprets the empirical results and discusses potential mechanisms. Section 8 concludes.

2 Background

2.1 The Rise of Ethnic Politics

Kenya's population is made up of more than forty ethnic groups. These ethnic groups predate British colonial rule but boundaries between them were often fluid (Parsons, 2012).⁶ Centralized political structures based on ethnic lines were largely absent. Authority was typically personal and at the village level, often a function of lineage, age, and wealth and not ethnic allegiance (Mamdani, 1996; Herbst, 2000; Lynch, 2011).

The politicization of ethnicity has its roots in settler capitalism and its uneven penetration of ethnic homelands. In the Central Province, the homeland of the Kikuyu, the colonial economic penetration destroyed pre-colonial production modes and resulted in a proletarianization on a considerable scale, which led to

⁶Kenyans assumed new ethnic identities through migration, trade, enslavement, intermarriage, and adoption. Besides, ethnic identity may be a political construct - the "Kalenjin" ethnic group, for example, formed in the 20th century in order to more effectively oppose Kikuyu domination (Lynch, 2011). In this paper, we use the ethnicity that policemen reported at recruitment aggregating them into the categories that fit the context of ethnic divisions in Kenya.

the creation of a landed and propertied class and concentration of wealth (Cowen and Kinyanjui, 1977). Nyanza province, in contrast, remained largely unaffected by settler capitalism, leaving pre-colonial modes of production intact. Confronted with minimal agricultural potential, lack of infrastructure, and markets for wage goods, the Luo responded to the colonial economy as suppliers of labor, primarily as railway workers and eventually as dock workers in Mombasa (Ajulu, 2002; Omolo, 2002). Thus, Kenya's settler economy created stark economic differences between ethnic groups, which found their reflection in the later African political organizations. In addition, colonial land policies favoring European settlers and African population growth created a latent conflict over land.

While Africans attempted to form pan-ethnic political organizations (e.g., the East African Association (EAA) in 1919 and the Kenyan African Union (KAU) in 1946), these were short-lived and banned within a couple of years of their inception (Ajulu, 2002). The colonial government's "divide-and-rule" policy discouraged the formation of nation-wide African political activity, and instead encouraged ethnic- and trade-specific associations, which over time resulted in a proliferation of such organizations and contributed to the differentiation of ethnicities with distinct political interests (Omolo, 2002). By 1957 the following politically relevant ethnic divisions had emerged: the Kikuyu (19.7%), which together with the Meru (5.3%) and Embu (1.2%) later formed the ethnic coalition called Gema; the Kalenjin (10.8%), which together with the Maasai (1.9%), Turkana (2.2%), and Samburu (0.59%) form the ethnic coalition labeled Kamatusa; the Luo (13.8%); the Luhya (13.1%); and the Kamba (11.2%) (Morgan, 2000; Posner, 2004).

For our empirical analysis 1957-1970, the following course of events is particularly relevant. After the defeat of the (Kikuyu-led) Mau Mau uprising in 1956,


restrictions on political activity were relaxed. Political parties were allowed at district level, at the approval of colonial officers (Anderson, 2005). In 1957 the first direct (although severely limited franchise) African elections to the legislative council took place. Acknowledging the “Wind of Change”, the British government was willing to grant independence. The years 1960-61 were characterised by the electoral run-up to the first open, nation-wide, multi-party election that would choose the transition government and write up of the constitution. African political parties were fully sanctioned at the Lancaster House Conference in January 1960. In May 1960 the Kenya African National Union (KANU) was formed from existing organizations, such as the Kenya Federation of Labor and the Kenya Independence Movement. KANU headed by Jomo Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) became an intensely anti-colonial and nationalist party but drew most of its leadership, membership, and support from the Gema coalition and the Luo. Fearing this Kikuyu and Luo dominance, minority ethnic groups (the Kamatusa and coastal populations) responded forming the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) (Ndegwa, 1997, 605). Led by Ronald Ngala (a Mijikenda from Kenya’s coastal province), KADU advocated “majimboism”, a quasi-federalist constitution that would give significant powers on issues such as land, education, infrastructure investments, and the composition of the Civil Service to the regions (in some of which those ethnic groups held a majority) (Ajulu, 2002; Anderson, 2005). Ethnic rhetoric and antagonism ran high in the campaign. From 1961, ethnic clashes swept through Rift Valley Province, seeing displacements of Kikuyu, Luhya and other ethnic groups (Ajulu, 2002). KANU won the 1961 election with 67% of the votes over KADU’s 16% (winning 19 and 11 of the 33 open seats respectively). While the British government forced KANU into a coalition with KADU 1961-63 that negotiated the constitutional structure of the new state and agreed on

majimbo elements, the 1961 election results are important as they gave a clear indication that KANU would emerge as the dominant power post-independence: As Manners (1962) commented there was “little reason to believe the next vote will be very different.” Indeed when the two parties contested the “independence election” in 1963, KANU won overwhelmingly taking 66 seats against KADU’s 31 in the lower house and 19 seats against KADU’s 16 in the Senate (Bennett, 1961). Kenyatta became prime minister and later president. By 1964, KADU and KANU had merged (Ndegwa, 1997, 606). As a result of this merger, Ngala was made Minister of Cooperatives and Social Services and Daniel Arap Moi (a Kalenjin), a vice-president in KADU at the time, became Home Minister and directly responsible for the police.⁷

The merger of KANU and KADU shifted the balance of power within the ruling party in favor of the conservative elements, which led to the defection of the left-leaning Luo-led wing, the Kenya People’s Union (KPU) in 1965. They opposed the perceived growing conservatism and pro-western orientation of Kenyatta and the KANU leadership, which by then was composed exclusively of members of the Gema and Kamatusa alliance (Ajulu, 2002, 260). In the subsequently held “Little General Election”, KANU expanded its majority in both houses of parliament. The constitution was amended canceling majimboism. Following the anti-communist logic of the Cold War, it banned the KPU in 1969 on national security grounds, ushering in a more than 20 year period of single party rule. Figure 2 summarizes the political events that mark the inclusion and exclusion of ethnic groups to power. These are the political shocks which our paper exploits to estimate the impact on police performance.

⁷The president and the Home Minister were the two positions most relevant for the police. Hence, from 1964 onwards, control of the police was in the hands of the Gema-Kamatusa alliance that dominated KANU. Still, in line with the findings of François, Rainer and Trebbi (2015), other ministerial portfolios were more broadly shared among ethnic groups.

Figure 2: Timeline of Events around Kenya’s Independence



2.2 Police Organization and Development

The *Kenya Police* is Kenya’s main law enforcing body. It has also always been an instrument of regime protection. During colonial times, the police answered only to the Governor. At independence this unchecked concentration of power passed to the President (Auerbach, 2003). The police is therefore vulnerable to political influence, which may ultimately affect the performance of its personnel. Our study covers the last years of colonial rule 1957-1963 and the first years of independence 1963-1970. It excludes the Mau Mau uprising 1952-1956.

There was always an ethnic component in the composition of the Police Force (Throup, 1992). British officers hoped to find men of soldierly qualities and whose loyalty could be trusted among the Kamba and Kalenjin (the so-called “martial races”). In contrast, very few Kikuyus entered the Police Force.⁸ Only after the

⁸In 1956, 22.6%, 21.6% and 3.2% of police officers were Kalenjin, Kamba and Kikuyus, whereas the 1962 Census population put their share at 10.8%, 10.5% and 18.8% respectively (Kenya Police Annual Reports; Census 1962).

end of Mau Mau and in anticipation of Kenya's independence and the coming of African rule a deliberate attempt was made to bring the ethnic composition in line with that of the population (Clayton, 1989). Around 1960 Police Commissioner Richard Catling initiated a process of Africanization in the higher ranks (Throup, 1992). Hastily trained, newly-promoted African officers gradually replaced Asian and European senior officers.

After Jomo Kenyatta took control in 1963 changes in the police followed the same pattern as in the most important ministries (Hornsby, 2012). Kenyatta relied on ethnic loyalties and alliances. He appointed Bernard Hinga, an ethnic Kikuyu, as Police Commissioner in 1964 and by 1967 all branches and departments were led by an ethnic Kikuyu (except the Criminal Investigation Department which went to a Kikuyu in 1973).⁹ Kenyatta particularly relied on the *General Service Unit* (GSU). The GSU is a paramilitary branch of the police, well-equipped and well-trained, and highly political. It was employed against internal political threads, and specifically formed a counterweight to the army. Kenyatta shifted the GSU's officer corps and ethnic composition in favor of the Kikuyu, especially Luo officers had to go. These appointments were clearly politically motivated. Kenyatta used his presidential powers to bypass the Police Service Commission Board, ignoring for example seniority as criterion for promotions (Frazer, 1994, as cited in N'Diaye, 2002).

The geographical organization followed a fourfold hierarchy with the headquarter in Nairobi, then police divisions, stations, and finally, police posts that could be as small as a road block.¹⁰ The Kenya Police was not evenly or equally distributed. Reflecting longstanding colonial interests, the police was heavily

⁹Kenya's second president, Daniel Arap Moi, an ethnic Kalenjin, acted similarly and moved Kalenjin into important positions (Hornsby, 2012).

¹⁰Policing areas did not necessarily overlap with administrative divisions.

concentrated in the urban commercial and European residential areas. They also served the ‘White Highlands’ where Europeans owned farms. In 1957 as a legacy of Mau Mau, the police was also well presented in Kikuyu and the bordering Kalenjin areas (Throup, 1992). With the end of violence, however, the number of police posts were reduced in those areas. The majority of African rural areas in contrast were under-served.¹¹ After independence the policing network expanded, particularly to African areas. Our data indicates that Kikuyu and Kalenjin areas, which were also the most politically volatile regions, still received a disproportionate share of policing.

A related issue to where police divisions were located is who was stationed there. The colonial regime feared fraternization and abuses, if police officers were policing their own ethnic kin or homeland. Police regulations in 1957 permitted up to 45% of personnel serving in their own home area (Clayton, 1989).¹² Being stationed close to home was certainly more attractive to police officers.

3 Data and Measurements

3.1 Collection and Sampling

Our primary data source are the *Kenya Police Service Registers*. These service records contain systematic and comprehensive information about a police officer over the full length of his career.¹³ In particular, the service registers

¹¹African reserves were originally policed by the “Tribal Police” (it became the “Administration Police” in 1958), which dealt with offenses against district council by-laws and customary law. The Kenya Police dealt with offenses against the Penal Code and general legislation (TNA CO1037/41).

¹²Previous rules were stricter allowing policemen in their home area only after six years of service when they had demonstrated their loyalty.

¹³The Service Registers were introduced in the late 1930s. By the early 1940s all active policemen were covered.

recorded personal details at recruitment (name, ethnicity, height, marital status, place of birth and residence), any training beyond the obligatory six months, names of divisions at which the police officer served with dates of transfers, any misconducts/commendations and corresponding punishments/rewards, promotions/demotions and particulars of discharge (date, reason, overall conduct).

These personnel files are from non-active police officers and were sorted out for destruction in 2009. Awaiting appraisal by the Kenya National Archives the files were dumped in a depot at the outskirts of Nairobi.¹⁴ The files did not follow any obvious order and leaks in the roof destroyed a good share of the records. Our sampling strategy was to collect all readable registers, with the exception of police officers of Kamba ethnic origin recruited before 1950, who we deliberately undersampled as they were numerous in the Police Force before 1950.¹⁵ While our sampling procedure does not raise any obvious concerns that our sample may be non-random (apart from the undersampling of Kamba police officers pre-1950), we checked whether the ethnic composition in our sample follows the statistics officially reported in the *Kenya Police Annual Reports*.¹⁶ With the exception of the Kamba before 1950, there is a very strong agreement between the two sources. We are therefore confident that our sample is largely representative of the Kenya Police Force, especially for the time period we focus on, starting in 1957.

This type of individual level data on police officers is absolutely unique. For our purposes, we bring the data into a police officer - service year panel structure. Our panel has 6,784 policemen doing their service between 1957 and 1970.¹⁷ We

¹⁴We thank Kenya Police HQ for granting us access to the records, and Kenya National Archives for support in retrieving them.

¹⁵It was easy to identify the year of recruitment as the colour of the service registers turned from blue to red in the 1950s.

¹⁶Figure A.1 in the appendix shows the comparison. The Kamba undersampling is visible, while different reporting of "others" is probably due to differences in categorization of smaller groups. The administrative data on the share of ethnic groups ends in 1962.

¹⁷Policemen enter our sample after the typical training period of six months, or their "pro-

choose 1957 as the starting point of our conduct sample, as it is the first year after the end of the Mau Mau uprising. This sample still includes four years of data before the 1961 elections that made the KANU party Kenya’s dominant political force.

3.2 Measurement

For each police officer, we know the dates of entry and exit, family background, ethnic group, education, place of birth, a full promotion record, assignment history, salary, acts of misconduct, punishment for misconduct, good behavior, training undertaken, rewards for good performance, and the character assessment on discharge. Among these variables, the richest information is contained in the conduct and punishment variables.¹⁸ These cover an extremely wide range of misbehavior by policemen, and are recorded at relatively high frequency. We observe 11,406 offenses in our sample of 44,689 officer-years. The original personnel records describe these offenses in great detail. For example, one officer is reported to have stolen a “leopard’s skin”. We assign these acts of misconduct to a limited number of categories. The most common offenses are failure to attend duty and absence without leave (4,125 cases out of 11,406), drunkenness (1,167

motion” from recruit to constable – whichever occurred earlier.

¹⁸Rules and procedures are laid down in Ordinance No. 79 of 1948 “An Ordinance to Provide for the Organization, Discipline, Powers and Duties of the Police Force” (subsequent amendments did not make substantial changes in principle and in any case would not discriminate against ethnicities). Oversight of discipline was strictly hierarchical. “Superior officers” (ranks above assistant superintendent) investigated cases of misconduct and if they found officers guilty imposed punishments. To an overwhelming degree the Police Force (and our sample) consisted of “subordinate officers” such as Constables, Corporals and Sergeants. Article 41 lists 44 categories of offenses; Article 43 lists the punishments ranging from reprimands, fines, withdrawal of efficiency allowances, extra drills, confinement to barracks to demotion. Harsher sentences including dismissals could be imposed by the Police Commissioner. Officers had the right to appeal. We do not have information about who provided the evidence or accusation. Many offenses such as absenteeism, allowing prisoners to escape and disobedience, however, are internal and would let us assume that evidence was put forward by higher ranked officers within the police.

cases), being dirty (872 cases), disobedience (948 cases), falling asleep on duty (484 cases), and allowing prisoners to escape (352 cases). 60% of policemen commit at least one offense. In the main specifications, we rely on a binary offense variable, indicating whether an individual has committed any offenses in a given year. This annual offense probability is around 20%.

Table 1 presents summary statistics for key variables. About 16% of officers serve in regions where their own ethnicity is the largest group (i.e., their ethnic homelands), and a similar percentage serves in police divisions in which their own ethnic group is dominant either at large or in the senior ranks. About 33% of policemen signed their booklet, while the remaining officers provided just a thumbprint. Formal education is limited, with only about 30% having any formal education. The rank of every policeman is summarized on a 0 to 3 scale, where 0 corresponds to constables and recruits; 1 to Corporals; 2 to Sergeants; and 3 to Inspectors and higher ranks. The average rank is close to 0. The police booklets also provide a character assessment at discharge, ranging from "Bad" to "Exemplary", which we code on a scale between 0 and 4, where the sample mean is around 2.

Acts of misconduct can be fined, and conditional on committing an offense the average fine in our sample is about 16 Kenyan Shilling. Fines are by far the most common form of punishment, and imposed in 76% of offenses. In another 10% of cases the offense is punished in another way, for example with drills, hard labour, suspension, or in extreme cases detention. Not included in this punishment dummy are mere "reprimands".

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Standard deviation	Observations
Offense (0-1)	0.192	0.394	44,689
Absent (0-1)	0.080	0.272	44,689
Drunk (0-1)	0.024	0.149	44,689
Dirty or untidy (0-1)	0.018	0.133	44,689
Disobedient (0-1)	0.020	0.135	44,689
Serious offense (0-1)	0.021	0.144	44,689
Commendable behaviour (0-1)	0.004	0.066	44,689
Number of offenses	0.255	0.604	44,689
Gema	0.208	0.406	44,689
Kamatusa	0.292	0.454	44,689
Luo	0.078	0.268	44,689
KANU	0.409	0.492	44,689
Kikuyu	0.132	0.338	44,689
Kalenjin	0.222	0.415	44,689
Character at discharge (0-4)	2.337	0.99 3	37,969
Tenure	7.318	5.597	44,689
Rank index (0-3)	0.222	0.538	35,102
Stationed in ethnic homeland	0.170	0.376	41,449
Stationed in district of birth	0.092	0.289	39,653
Share of ethnicity in division	0.213	0.134	41,449
Share of ethnicity in higher ranks	0.146	0.150	41,415
Ethnic diversity (ELF) in division	0.858	0.036	41,449
Literacy (signed booklet)	0.327	0.469	38,917
Any education	0.307	0.461	44,689
Promotion	0.014	0.119	44,689
Dismissal	0.243	0.429	44,689
Resignation	0.103	0.304	44,689
Fine (Ksh)	16.34	21.91	8,561
Any Fine (dummy)	0.767	21.91	8,561
Any Punishment (Dummy)	0.871	0.334	8,561

Notes: Observations at the individual-year level for 6,784 officers who served between 1957 and 1970. Serious offense includes fighting, assaults, theft, discharging a rifle, allowing a prisoner to escape, corruption, creating a disturbance, and rarer types of serious misbehavior. The rank index is 0 for a constable and 3 for an Inspector or above. Homeland indicates whether a policeman serves in a police division located in his ethnic homeland. Share of an ethnicity in higher ranks measures the proportion of senior officers (corporal or above) in the division who belong to the officer's ethnic group. Literacy is approximated by whether the individual has signed his service register or given a thumbprint. Fines are conditional on committing an offense, and "any punishment" is one if there is a recorded punishment of any type (other than a reprimand).

4 Empirical Strategy

4.1 Identifying the KANU treatment effect

Our paper studies how the behavior of policemen changes when their group holds political power. The empirical strategy exploit three shocks to political power: (1) KANU winning Kenya’s first multi-party elections in 1961, bringing the Luo and the Gema groups (led by the Kikuyu) to power; (2) KANU absorbing the Kamatusa alliance (headed by the Kalenjin) in 1964, and (3) the Luo leaving KANU in 1965. As different groups gain and lose political power at different points in time, our main treatment varies across time and across ethnic groups. Intuitively, our approach amounts to a difference-in-difference strategy, in which we compare an ethnic group that gains power through KANU to a group that does not, and time periods during which this group is in power to when it is out of power. As three groups (Gema, Kamatusa, and the Luo) gain or lose power at three different points in time (1961, 1964, and 1965), we pool three difference-in-difference estimators in our main specification. As additional results, we also report each of the corresponding coefficients separately. Our base-line econometric specification is:

$$\text{Offense}_{i,e,t} = \beta * \text{KANU}_{i,e,t} * \text{Post1961}_t + \delta_e + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{i,e,t} \quad (1)$$

The dependent variable is an indicator of whether policeman i , of ethnic group e , commits an offense in year t .¹⁹ For the main results, we rely on a binary offense

¹⁹The first and last calendar years of service can be incomplete. We control for the share of the first and last year served to account for the mechanical relationship between the time served during a given year and the probability of offending in that year.

measure, for which effects are more precisely estimated than for offense counts.²⁰ $KANU_{i,e,t}$ is a dummy variable equal to one for those policemen whose ethnic group is part of the KANU alliance. This variable is equal to one throughout the sample for the Gema groups, it is one for the Luo until 1965, and it switches to one for the Kamatusa groups in 1964.

In our sample, policemen enter and leave the sample on a rolling basis. Hence, our main specification does not allow us to identify whether differences in the offense probabilities of KANU policemen after 1961 are driven by changing behavior of existing policemen or by selective recruitment and dismissal of policemen. Evidence on behavioral change comes from the inclusion of individual fixed effects in our main specification. In this approach, the estimation of β relies on individuals who serve in the force before and while (and/or after) their ethnic group has political power.²¹ In order to provide explicit evidence on selection, we also look at the cumulative offense profile of policemen leaving the force at certain points in time, and at the behavior of new policemen in their first, second, and third year of service.

Causal identification of the difference-in-difference coefficient δ relies on the common trend assumption: i.e., in the absence of political changes, KANU policemen would have followed the same trends as the other ethnic groups. Figure 3 provides evidence in support of this assumption. It is further corroborated through a placebo test in which we shift the timing of the treatment 2 years forward for each ethnic group that becomes part of KANU (table 2). The analysis of pre-treatment trends, however, does not address the concern that the KANU

²⁰The main result by ethnic group for offense counts are reported in table A.3. The fixed effects results for offense counts are reported in table A.4. These results are robust to estimating a Poisson model instead of OLS.

²¹It is natural to restrict the analysis to a balanced panel of policemen in this case, even though these policemen are not randomly selected. In the result tables, we report the findings of fixed effects models for both the full sample and a balanced panel.

groups could have had certain characteristics that affected behavior differentially over time. This concern is particularly relevant, because socio-economic differences between ethnic groups existed before 1961.²² Our treatment group might also have been assigned selectively to divisions with higher offense probabilities. To address these questions, we augment the baseline specification to include control variables, and their differential effects over time. We can also allow for time-varying controls to have effects specific to the three ethnic groups that make up KANU, but that do not change over time – in contrast to the KANU-power treatment. Results for these control strategies are reported in detail as part of the online appendix.

In addition to exploring the role of individual and division-level characteristics as potential confounders, we can also examine them as sources of heterogeneity. Individual and division characteristics could also give rise to heterogeneous treatment effects and shed light on the channels linking changing offense rates to the political clout of ethnic groups. These effects are captured by a triple interaction added to our main specification above, and we describe these results in section 6.1 below.

4.2 Reporting concerns

Our reliance on reported rather than independently observed offenses gives rise to obvious limitations. It is conceivable that the recording of offenses for politically powerful ethnic groups changes even if their actual behavior remains unaltered. While we cannot rule out such a reporting effect a priori, a number of factors support our interpretation of the recorded offenses as a reflection of

²²In Appendix Table A.1 we show that before 1961 KANU officers differed significantly from other ethnic groups in certain characteristics.

actual behavior.

1. The police records were kept for internal use only, so the consequences of being booked as such are mild.
2. The police has a certain discretion in how to punish a given offense: fines of varying amounts, dismissal, or delayed promotion. While ethnic favoritism or discrimination could give rise to reporting bias in offenses, punishments offer a more effective and powerful instrument for such (positive or negative) ethnic discrimination. However, we do not find a differential treatment in punishments.
3. One would typically expect reporting bias in the direction that politically powerful groups have *less* recorded offenses for the same actual behavior. Our findings go in the opposite direction: KANU policemen have *more* recorded offenses.
4. The most senior police officers (who were often European, even after independence) had built up their careers during the colonial period, which ensured consistency in administrative records and reporting practices.
5. Systematic under- or over-reporting of offenses for particular ethnic groups has to be implemented by senior officers, but we find no evidence that the ethnic composition of the senior officer corps matters for the misbehavior we document.
6. We can distinguish between offense types, and compare results for more objective offenses (like absenteeism and drunkenness), and more subjective offenses (such as disobedience). Our results are strongest for objective

offenses. Similarly, we do not find evidence of differential "commendable behavior", of which the reporting is more at the discretion of senior officers.

The results referred to in this list are discussed in detail in subsequent sections. Taken together, we think our findings are not consistent with the hypothesis that systematic reporting errors generate differential misconduct for KANU policemen.


5 Main Results

Figure 3 shows the annual offense probability of KANU officers, non-KANU officers, and the difference together with its 95% confidence interval. It nicely illustrates our main result. The top left graph shows the pattern for the Gema, the top right for the Kamatusa, the bottom left for the Luo, and the bottom right for all KANU (i.e., Gema, Kamatusa, and Luo) officers. The vertical lines indicate the year in which an ethnic group comes to power through KANU (or leaves, in the case of the Luo in 1965).²³

Between 1957 and the first election in 1961 the difference in offense probability is near and statistically indistinguishable from zero. After the first election the difference in offense rates in the Gema, Luo and KANU graphs are greater than zero and the confidence interval includes zero only at the margin. We see a similar pattern for Kamatusa officers: once KANU absorbed KADU in 1963, their offense probability also increases compared to non-KANU officers. This difference persists throughout our time period, with the 95% confidence interval including zero only at the margin. Moreover, we also see a reversal of the pattern when an officer's ethnic group leaves power: the difference in offense probability between

²³The baseline includes all policemen whose ethnicities are never part of KANU in the case of comparisons to individual ethnic groups. It includes all policemen who are not part of KANU in a given year for the KANU graph in the bottom right panel.

Figure 3: Offense Probability and Difference of KANU groups and Other Ethnicities



Notes: 1961 marks Kenya's first multiparty elections. KANU is a time varying variable including officers of all ethnic groups affiliated with the Kenya African National Union (KANU). That is the Gema alliance throughout, the Luo until 1965, and the Kamatusa after 1964.

Luo and non-KANU officers becomes negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero.

The difference in offense probabilities is substantively meaningful. While the average offense likelihood of all police officers increases after the first election, the increase for KANU officers is considerably larger. Between 1961 and 1970 the probability of a non-KANU officer committing at least one offense in a given year increased from 15% to 21% per year (i.e., 140% increase), whereas the likelihood of a KANU officer committing at least one offense in a given year rises from 15% to 25% (i.e., 167% increase) during the same time period, which is a 27 percentage

point difference.

In table 2, we move beyond the graphical analysis and employ the regression framework specified in the previous section. In each column we interact the groups with a variable indicating their inclusion in the ruling coalition and a placebo for the two years immediately before that. Columns 1 and 2 present the results for the subgroups composing KANU and columns 3 and 4 present the estimates for the KANU coalition as a whole.

Columns 1 and 2 confirms the pattern shown in figure 3. Gema officers are significantly more likely to commit offenses than non-KANU officers after the first election. On average a Gema officer is 3.7% more likely to commit an offense after 1961 than a non-KANU officer. The same holds true for Kamatusa officers: upon joining the KANU coalition in 1964, they are on average 3.6% more likely to commit an offense in a given year than non-KANU officers. Finally, the pattern for Luo officers is a bit more nuanced due to their entrance and exit of power during the time period under investigation. While not statistically significant, a Luo officer is on average 3.2% more likely commit an office than non-KANU officers. But upon leaving the KANU coalition, their probability of committing an offense decreases by 3.7% compared to Gema and Kamatusa officers, which is statistically significant at the 5%-level. Finally, note that all placebo interactions are positive, but relatively small compared to the groups' main effects and statistically insignificant.

Columns 3 and 4 present the results for the KANU coalition. They are qualitatively identical to the coefficient estimates presented in Columns 1 and 2: on average a KANU officer is between 3.5 and 4% more likely to commit an offense than a non-KANU officer in any give year after 1961. Again, the placebo interaction for the two years prior to getting to power is small and statistically

Table 2: Difference in Offense Probabilities between KANU and Non-KANU Officers

	Offense			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
β_1 : Gema	0.012 (0.017)			
β_2 : Gema \times Placebo 59-60	0.003 (0.021)	0.002 (0.021)		
β_3 : Gema \times Post 61	0.033* (0.018)	0.032* (0.018)		
β_4 : Kamatusa	0.002 (0.008)			
β_5 : Kamatusa \times Placebo 62-63	0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.013)		
β_6 : Kamatusa \times Post 64	0.034*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)		
β_7 : Luo	-0.002 (0.017)			
β_8 : Luo \times Placebo 59-60	0.017 (0.021)	0.017 (0.021)		
β_9 : Luo \times 61-65	0.028 (0.021)	0.029 (0.021)		
β_{10} : Luo \times Post 65	-0.011 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.022)		
KANU			0.004 (0.013)	
KANU \times Placebo 59-60			0.010 (0.016)	0.008 (0.015)
KANU \times Post 61			0.036*** (0.014)	0.030** (0.014)
Ethnic Group Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	44689	44689	44689	44689
Clusters	6784	6784	6784	6784
$\beta_9 - \beta_{10}$:	0.039** (0.018)	0.036* (0.019)		

Notes: All regressions include year fixed effects, and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

indistinguishable from zero.²⁴

In the following two subsections we investigate whether the increase in offense probability for KANU officers is due to selection or due to changes in behavior.

5.1 Selection Effects

Ethnic patronage in public sector jobs after the 1961 elections is a potential reason for the observed decrease in discipline among the KANU officers. Table 3 presents the results of our investigation of selection effects. Columns 1-2 present the results on entry selection, and Columns 3 and 4 on exit selection.

Table 3: Selection Effects

Offense	Entry Selection		Exit Selection	
	1st Year	2nd Year	Last Year	Conduct at Exit
	(1)	(2)	(4)	(5)
KANU	0.024 (0.028)	0.008 (0.038)	0.024 (0.041)	0.017 (0.098)
KANU × Enlisted Post 61	-0.031 (0.026)	0.046 (0.036)		
KANU × Exit Post 61			-0.018 (0.042)	-0.064 (0.099)
Observations	3712	3764	3635	3087

Notes: All regressions include year fixed effects, and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

²⁴Appendix table A.2 presents results from identical regressions as in first two columns of table 2, but limiting the sample to the five main ethnic groups (i.e., Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luo, Luhya, and Kamba). Overall the pattern is identical, although the coefficients are estimated somewhat less precisely due to the smaller sample size: Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luo officers, when their ethnic group is part of the KANU coalition, are more likely to commit an offense than Luhya and Kamba officers, whose ethnic groups were never part of KANU. Appendix table A.3 re-estimates the main models using the number of offenses committed in a year rather than our preferred dichotomous measure. Again, we find that KANU officers are more likely to commit offenses although some of the effects are not statistically significant due to the noisier outcome measure.

Column 1 shows the difference in the probability of committing an offense between KANU and non-KANU recruits before and after 1961 for their first year of service. We find no statistically significant difference in the likelihood of committing an offense. Column 2 performs the same analysis for officers in their second and third year of enlistment. Again, we find no statistically significant difference in offense probability between the KANU and non-KANU officers before or after the first election. This suggests that the difference in performance between KANU and non-KANU officers cannot be explained by lower quality recruits. It also addresses the concern that increased recruitment of certain groups might lower the quality in the pool of applicants from that particular group.²⁵

Column 3 considers the offense probability of police officers in their final year of service. As in columns 1-2 we find no significant difference in offense probability between KANU and non-KANU officers before or after 1961. Column 4 looks at a different outcome: the exiting officer's final character assessment, which may range from "Bad" (0) to "Exemplary" (4). Again we find that KANU officers leaving the force after the first election had a slightly worse overall conduct than their fellow non-KANU exiting officers, but that difference is not statistically significant. Overall, these results suggest that the observed deteriorating discipline of KANU officers after 1961 is not due to an exit of disproportionately well-performing KANU policemen.

²⁵The proportion of GEMA officers (and Kikuyu in particular) increased steadily over our sample period, while the proportion of Kamatusa and Luo officers was (slightly) declining. But, the performance effects are visible for all three ethnic groups, and a "pool" effect cannot account for the main results. This is shown in figure A.2.

Table 4: Behavioral Effects

	Offense						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
KANU × Post 61	0.026*** (0.008)	0.027*** (0.011)	0.033*** (0.010)				
Gema × Post 61				0.051** (0.023)			
Kamatusa × Post 64				0.025 (0.017)			
Luo × 61-65					0.025 (0.028)		
Luo × Post 65							-0.118*** (0.032)
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	44689	13266	18567	8503	8988	4464	4675
Clusters	6784	1206	2053	773	1284	744	935
Sample	Full Sample	Balanced	Combined	Balanced	Balanced	Balanced	Balanced
Years included	[1957,1970]	[1958,1968]	[1958,1968]	[1958,1968]	[1962,1968]	[1958,1963]	[1964,1968]

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects, and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. The fully balanced panel in column (2) takes all policemen serving between 1958 and 1970. The balanced panels in columns (4)-(7) include all policemen serving in the indicated time windows around a given political shock, and exclude all KANU ethnicities other than the one for which the effect is estimated. The 'combined' panel (3) takes the union of the balanced panels in columns (4)-(7). Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.


5.2 Behavioral Change

Table 4 presents the results of a series of individual fixed-effects regressions assessing the extent to which our main finding can be explained by behavioral changes. Columns 1-3 compare KANU to non-KANU officers and columns 4-7 look at the KANU ethnic groups separately. To ensure that we are capturing behavioral changes of officers serving throughout the period of changing ethnic power status, we construct a series of temporal, “balanced” panels that restrict the sample to officers who served throughout that time, excluding all men who entered or exited during the same time period.

Column 1 presents results with individual fixed effects for the full sample. Column 2 presents the results for officers that served for at least ten years (1958-1968) and experienced all the political shocks we are interested in. Column 3 shows the coefficient estimates for a slightly less restrictive set of officers; those that served at least during one of the panels in columns 4-7. In all cases, the interaction term suggests that the average KANU officer was about 3% more likely to commit an offense post-1961 than a non-KANU officer. Note the similarity in the size of the effect compared to column 4 in table 2. Columns 3-6 show that this behavioral effect holds for narrower time windows and each of the main ethnic groups within the KANU coalition, although these individual effects are not always significant. Most importantly, the results in column 7 suggest that KANU police officers do not just change their behavior when their group becomes part of the ruling party, but also when it drops out: a Luo officer serving between 1964 and 1968 reduces his probability of committing an offense on average by 11% after 1965 compared to a non-KANU officer. Overall, these results suggest that a consistent behavioral shift accounts for the observed ethnic differentials in

discipline post-1961.²⁶

Figure 4: Effect of KANU treatment on different offense outcomes



Notes: The figure plots coefficients of our main specification with individual fixed effects in the balanced panel of 1206 policemen and the full sample of 6784 policemen. The corresponding table can be found in the online appendix (table A.6).

Figure 4 shows effects for different types of offenses separately, relying on the fixed effects specification. The deterioration in behavior appears to be driven by absenteeism and drunkenness. The effects are small for the most subjective offense types, dirtiness and disobedience in particular. At the bottom, we show the effects of the KANU treatment on “commendable behavior”. Recorded good behavior is much rarer in our sample than bad behaviour (there are just 208 such cases, and it includes for example “solving crimes” and “arresting criminals”). The corresponding coefficient is insignificant, so KANU officers do not appear to reduce “commendable behavior”. Overall, these results alleviate concerns of biased reporting by the senior officers who enter offenses. The increased misbehavior is strongest for more objective acts of misconduct. In addition, we

²⁶Table A.4 shows the main results with and without fixed effects for offense counts in OLS and Poisson. Table A.5 presents a temporal placebo test for the fixed effects specification, by shifting the KANU treatment two years forward.

do not see a decrease in “commendable behavior”. Commendable behavior is an outcome of which the reporting (conditional on behavior) should be more at the discretion of the senior officers than the reporting of bad behavior. So, the insignificant positive effect provides additional evidence against discriminatory reporting.

6 Further results


6.1 Division and individual characteristics

While the fixed effect analysis of table 4 accounts for a large set of confounding factors, the results could still capture the time-varying impact of characteristics that are correlated with ethnicity. In addition, the background and assignment characteristics of policemen also help to understand who is most responsive to the KANU treatment. Such heterogeneous effects could help us to uncover the mechanism through which political dominance affects behavior. This section explores the role of these division-level and individual-level characteristics.

In principle, the changing behavior observed in Table 4 could be the result of peer effects and the assignment of KANU officers to divisions with poorer discipline after 1961. The police records track assignment to 30 (geographical) police divisions, but does not provide information on postings to smaller units. Table 5 introduces division-year fixed effects in addition to individual fixed effects, which allow each division to experience shocks to behaviour that are common to all ethnic groups. Even in this demanding specification, using only within-division variation, we find that policemen behave worse when they gain political power through KANU.²⁷ Hence, division-level peer effects are unable to explain the poor

²⁷Division-level measures of ethnic diversity and the General Service Unit (the most political

Figure 5: Heterogeneous effects



Notes: This figure shows the role of 6 covariates. We estimate the main specification, with KANU-ethnicity-covariate fixed effects, year-covariate fixed effects, and the interaction of our KANU treatment variable with the covariate. The corresponding tables, which also include specifications controlling for each covariate, can be found in the online appendix tables A.7, A.8, A.9, A.10, A.11, A.12.

Table 5: Division Fixed Effects

	Offense		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
KANU \times Post 61	0.029*** (0.009)	0.034*** (0.011)	0.026** (0.012)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Division-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	41449	17882	13056
Clusters	6146	1966	1191
Sample	Full Sample [1957,1970]	Combined [1958,1968]	Balanced Panel [1958,1968]

Notes: All regressions include individual and division-year fixed effects. They also control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. The “combined” panels are described in the notes of table 4. Observations without division information are dropped from the sample. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

performance of KANU officers.

Apart from peer effects at the level of police divisions, the geography of the posting could also matter. In the colonial period, the extent to which ethnic groups could police their own homelands was limited. Theoretically, the effect of serving in the homelands is not clear-cut. On the one hand, being stationed in homelands might provide more leisure opportunities and make them more likely to shirk. On the other hand, being stationed close to their families might make policemen more keen to keep their jobs, and serving far away from one’s home might reduce work satisfaction. For example, Bo, Finan and Rossi (2013) estimate the compensation public servants require to work in remote locations.²⁸

Figure 5 investigates heterogeneity in the KANU power effect, and the upper left police unit) are not driving the results (tables A.15 and A.13), nor do they strengthen the KANU power effect.

²⁸Being stationed in homelands could also improve police effectiveness through the interactions with the local population: Lyall (2010) finds for example that co-ethnic security personnel are more effective counter-insurgents. Of course, our measure of police performance is strictly internal, and may not capture such effects.

sub-figure investigates the role of being stationed in one’s ethnic homeland. There is no evidence that the main treatment effect is stronger for KANU officers serving in their homeland. The upper right coefficient plot looks at the role of being stationed in one’s district of birth, and similarly finds no evidence of differential effects. The corresponding tables in the online appendix (tables A.7 and A.8) include different measures of being posted in one’s home region as controls – these measures not explain the changing behavior of KANU policemen.

Three of the central plots in figure 5 test whether the KANU effect is stronger for policemen whose ethnicity is more prominent in their division. The changing behavior of KANU officers takes place in a context of increased power of their ethnic groups at the national level. However, the “local dominance” of one’s own ethnic group, at the level of police divisions, does not appear to contribute to the deterioration of discipline. This is the case both for a measure of overall numerical strength, and measures for the representation of one’s ethnic group among the higher police ranks, who could in principle have been more lenient.²⁹ We also cannot confirm the opposite hypothesis: that officers misbehave more when they are matched to seniors from other ethnicities, either because such a mismatch is conducive for misbehavior, or because senior officers are more likely to report the offenses of non-co-ethnic juniors when the latter’s ethnic groups are in power.

A third set of plots in figure 5 examines the role of individual characteristics. A policeman’s rank does not clearly affect the KANU power effect. It is interesting to notice that the increased offenses are not driven by lower ranks (which would

²⁹In line with the idea that dominance matters at a higher level than the division, we find a positive interaction of our main treatment variable with an indicator for whether the “Provincial Police Officer” –the officer commanding a police region (combining multiple and hierarchically above police divisions) is from the same ethnic group. This interaction is large in magnitude but not significant (table A.14).

imply a negative triple interaction). In the light of this result, it seems unlikely for example that KANU policemen are bullied into misbehavior by higher-level officers. Moving to the bottom plots, the KANU power effect is clearly stronger for better educated policemen. We use two measures of educational background. First, the personnel records state whether the recruit signed or thumb-printed his service register, which can be interpreted as a proxy for literacy.³⁰ We also have information about whether the policeman has any formal schooling, which is the case for about 30% of our main sample. It is possible that literate policemen are more responsive to the KANU power treatment because they are more politically aware. Alternatively, literate policemen could have better outside options - in reality or in (irrational) expectation. The plausibility of outside options as a driver of shirking behaviour will be explored further in the next subsections.

6.2 Promotion and punishment

One way to rationalize the increased misconduct of KANU officers is through the internal career progression in the police. The way the police disciplines its rank-and-file might be such that politically powerful ethnic groups are punished less for misconduct. Punishments can take different forms in this context. Offenders can be denied promotion opportunities, they can be fined, and they can be dismissed. We will test if these responses to offense histories change when ethnic groups lose or gain power through KANU.

In table 6, we test how the average annual number of offenses in a policeman's career affect his promotion prospects. In general, higher past offense rates make promotions less likely and dismissals more likely. Interestingly, there is no evidence that KANU officers are promoted or dismissed differently, both when

³⁰Signature literacy is widely used among historians (Rachal, 1987).

Table 6: Career Progression Conditional on Conduct

	Promotion		Dismissal		Resignation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
KANU \times Post 61	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.014 (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.009)
Cumulative offense rate (per year)	-0.017*** (0.002)		0.316*** (0.017)		0.010 (0.011)	
KANU \times Post 61 \times Cumulative offense rate	0.001 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.001 (0.025)	0.033 (0.037)	-0.024 (0.015)	-0.055** (0.024)
Offense-KANU Ethnic Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Offense-Year Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	44689	44689	44689	44689	44689	44689
Clusters	6784	6784	6784	6784	6784	6784

Notes: Regressions for the full sample period (1957-1970). All regressions include year, tenure, and ethnic group fixed effects. We also control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. Offense-KANU ethnic fixed effects interact the cumulative offense rate variable with a dummy equal to one for all ethnicities that are part of KANU at some point (Gema, Kamatusa, and Luo). The outcome in columns (1) and (2) is a rank index taking values between 0 and 3. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table 7: Punishment Conditional on Committing an Offense

	Log(Fine)		Any Punishment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
KANU \times Post 61	0.005 (0.036)	0.113 (0.093)	0.007 (0.019)	-0.029 (0.044)
Ethnic group Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No
Individual Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	6555	6555	8561	8561
Clusters	3701	3701	4263	4263

Notes: Regressions for the full sample period (1957-1970). All regressions are limited to officer-year observations with at least one offense (and a positive fine amount, for columns 1 and 2). They include tenure fixed effects, year fixed effects by offense type (as in figure 5), and interactions of each offense type with a dummy equal to one for all ethnicities that are part of KANU at some point (Gema, Kamatusa, and Luo). Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

they do and when they do not have an offense history. One way to square these results with the increased offense probabilities of KANU officers is through better outside options. If KANU policemen think they can benefit from political patronage outside of the police, they could be willing to shirk and carry the risk of dismissal. However, the resignation results do not appear to confirm this interpretation. KANU policemen are not more likely to resign voluntarily. Finally, table 7 analyzes the fines in a sample of officer-years with at least one offense. The first two columns focus on fine amounts, while the latter two columns focus on whether an officer is punished at all. In both cases, we control very flexibly for the number and types of offenses committed, so that we capture whether the KANU treatment explains the part of fines or punishment unexplained by the offense details and other officer characteristics. For both fine amounts and the punishment indicator, there is no evidence of preferential treatment. The absence of favoritism in the immediate punishments also mitigates the broader concern of reporting bias to some extent. If senior officers try to make life harder for KANU groups, one would expect them to increase punishments conditional on offenses as well. There is no evidence of such discriminatory short-run disciplining.

7 Discussion

We can rule out that the KANU effect is driven by groups in power recruiting worse policemen. Instead, specifications with officer fixed effects showed that individuals change behavior when their group comes to power. The heterogeneous effects in table 5 and figure 5 indicate that this cannot be attributed to the place of posting or to the ethnic composition at the division level. The police does not seem to discriminate KANU officers positively or negatively. Conditional on

offending, KANU policemen are not promoted, dismissed, or fined differently, as shown in tables 6 and 7. But then, why would policemen change behavior when their ethnic group is in power?

If the incentives for misbehavior are not internal to the police, they could still be external, through improved outside options. While we have no data on the job market prospects of policemen, we do observe voluntary resignations from the force. If KANU officers fare much better in the general labor market, we would expect them to leave the police more often on a voluntary basis. Table 6 suggests that this does not happen. This is mild (but clearly not conclusive) evidence against outside career options driving our findings. An alternative explanation is that the improved prospects for KANU officers are linked to their role in the police, for example if they have more opportunities to participate in corrupt activities. Such behavior could account for the increase in absenteeism, if policemen are willing to trade off these earning opportunities against the risk of missing promotions or even dismissal. However, it is harder to rationalize the increased drunkenness in this explanation. One mechanism that we cannot test directly, but is consistent with all our findings is a “warm glow” effect of political power. Political shocks might prime ethnic superiority, and lead to worse discipline of the treated policemen, even if the objective and material incentives for such behavior do not change. The literature on ethnic diversity has identified behavioral priming effects in very different contexts. In a randomized control trial in India, Hoff and Pandey (2012) for example find that lower-caste school children perform worse when their caste is mentioned before taking a test. In our context, it is hard to prove directly that we are capturing the mere priming of ethnic dominance – we are naturally constrained by our historical data. Still, our results show that sudden political shocks can change the relationship

between ethnic identities and job performance through individual behaviour. In particular, we find that an ethnic group's inclusion in the ruling party has immediate effects on the day-to-day functioning of their group members in one of the most important branches of the state's administration, the police. We observe these changes in behavior even though there are no clear career incentives. This means that the effects of political dominance can only be explained by subtle mechanisms, such as a confidence boost triggered by political shocks.

8 Conclusions

During Kenya's political transition KANU emerged as the dominant political power, absorbing or outlawing its competitors. While favoritism and political patronage have been documented in previous research on Kenya (e.g., Burgess et al., 2015; Kramon and Posner, 2016), our paper leverages unique data on the day-to-day behavior of individual public servants in one of the most important public administrations: the police. Using individual records of 6,784 Kenyan policemen between 1957 and 1970, we find that after the first multiparty election in 1961 police officers from ethnicities associated with KANU start conducting offenses at a significantly higher rate than non-KANU officers. Investigating this result further, we show that this is not due to selecting worse recruits or exiting of particularly good performing officers, but due to a change in behavior of the same individuals after 1961. This shift in behavior does not seem to be driven or strengthened by the characteristics of the divisions in which these policemen were serving, but seems to be more prominent in literate and more highly educated officers. Finding no evidence of differential promotion or punishment between KANU and non-KANU, we dismiss mechanisms relying on outside options based

on political patronage appointments. Instead our findings seem to be consistent with a “warm glow” of power effect. The emergence of ethnic politics in the aftermath of the first election might have created a sense of being empowered, which influenced the behavior of those officers ethnically associated with the ruling party.

The micro-evidence of this paper suggests that ethnic politics shape public service provision, not just through the direct allocation of public goods, but also through the behavior of ethnic groups within the state’s bureaucracy. Re-building and forming the public service in proportion to population shares of ethnicities or regions is a declared goal of Kenya’s Police and Army (Constitution of Kenya Article 246/4 and 241/4), and François, Rainer and Trebbi (2015) document such proportionality at higher levels of government more generally in Africa. However, such policies may not counter the effects of political dominance documented in our paper.

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
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A Oline Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures

Figure A.1: Representativeness of Police Sample by Ethnicity Over Time



Graphs by Ethnic Group

Notes: The figure plots for each ethnic group and year the proportion of police men in the booklets (i.e., the personnel records from which we use information between 1957 and 1970 for our sample), and their proportion in the official colonial police statistics between 1920 and 1961.

Figure A.2: Proportions of different ethnic groups over time




Table A.1: Pre-independence differences between KANU and other groups

	(1) KANU (ever)	(2) Other groups	(3) T-stat (2)-(1)
Offense indicator	0.21	0.22	1.09
Character at discharge (0-4)	2.21	2.26	1.75
Maximum tenure	6.39	6.72	2.25
Maximum rank index (1-4)	0.20	0.23	1.73
Literacy (signed booklet)	0.22	0.23	0.76
Any schooling	0.16	0.11	-4.54
Observations	2325	2222	

Notes: Observations at the level of individual officers who served between 1957 and 1960 (time-varying characteristics are averaged over this period). KANU includes all ethnic groups that are part of KANU at some point (Gema, Kamatusa, and Luo). Literacy is approximated by whether the individual has signed his personnel booklet or given a thumbprint. The number of observations reported do not reflect missing values for individual variables.

Table A.2: Difference in Offenses between Kikuyu/Kalenjin and Non-KANU Officers (main groups only)

	Offense	
	(1)	(2)
β_1 : Kikuyu	-0.010 (0.023)	
β_2 : Kikuyu \times Placebo 59-60	0.005 (0.029)	0.006 (0.029)
β_3 : Kikuyu \times Post-First Election 61	0.059** (0.024)	0.060** (0.024)
β_4 : Kalenjin	0.002 (0.010)	
β_5 : Kalenjin \times Placebo 62-63	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.015)
β_6 : Kalenjin \times Post-Independence 64	0.022* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)
β_7 : Luo	-0.003 (0.018)	
β_8 : Luo \times Placebo 59-60	0.005 (0.021)	0.005 (0.021)
β_9 : Luo \times 61-65	0.013 (0.022)	0.014 (0.022)
β_{10} : Luo \times Post 65	-0.007 (0.023)	-0.005 (0.023)
Ethnic Fixed Effects	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.012	0.012
Observations	28764	28764
Clusters	4352	4352
$\beta_9 - \beta_{10}$:	0.020 (0.019)	0.019 (0.019)

Notes: All regressions include year fixed effects and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.3: Number of Offenses

	Number of offenses					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
β_1 : Gema	0.032 (0.029)					
β_2 : Gema \times Placebo 59-60	0.010 (0.036)	0.009 (0.036)				
β_3 : Gema \times Post 61	0.044 (0.030)	0.042 (0.031)				
β_4 : Kamatusa	-0.008 (0.012)					
β_5 : Kamatusa \times Placebo 62-63	0.016 (0.018)	0.017 (0.018)				
β_6 : Kamatusa \times Post 64	0.068*** (0.016)	0.073*** (0.016)				
β_7 : Luo	0.009 (0.035)					
β_8 : Luo \times Placebo 59-60	-0.007 (0.035)	-0.007 (0.035)			-0.021 (0.036)	-0.021 (0.036)
β_9 : Luo \times 61-65	0.030 (0.035)	0.031 (0.035)			0.012 (0.037)	0.014 (0.037)
β_{10} : Luo \times Post 65	-0.005 (0.037)	0.001 (0.037)			0.004 (0.039)	0.005 (0.039)
β_{11} : KANU			0.022 (0.022)			
β_{12} : KANU \times Placebo 59-60			0.005 (0.027)	0.002 (0.027)		
β_{13} : KANU \times Post 61			0.044* (0.023)	0.037 (0.024)		
β_{14} : Kikuyu					0.035 (0.047)	
β_{15} : Kikuyu \times Placebo 59-60					-0.011 (0.054)	-0.011 (0.054)
β_{16} : Kikuyu \times Post 61					0.038 (0.048)	0.040 (0.048)
β_{17} : Kalenjin					-0.012 (0.015)	
β_{18} : Kalenjin \times Placebo 62-63					-0.010 (0.023)	-0.009 (0.023)
β_{19} : Kalenjin \times Post 64					0.049** (0.020)	0.050** (0.020)
Ethnic Group Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Main groups only	No	Np	No	No	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.012	0.013	0.012	0.013	0.011	0.011
Observations	44689	44689	44689	44689	28764	28764
Clusters	6784	6784	6784	6784	4352	4352
$\beta_9 - \beta_{10}$:	0.035 (0.028)	0.031 (0.028)			0.009 (0.029)	0.008 (0.029)

Notes: All regressions include year fixed effects, and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. Observations with no recorded ethnic group are omitted from the sample. The sample in Columns 5 and 6 is limited to the five main ethnic groups in the police (i.e., Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luo, Luhya, and Kamba). Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.4: Number of offenses for fixed effects specifications

	Number of offenses					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
KANU \times Post 61	0.046*** (0.012)	0.214*** (0.056)	0.047*** (0.014)	0.263*** (0.080)	0.043*** (0.015)	0.247*** (0.090)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	44689	44689	18567	18567	13266	13266
Clusters	6784	6784	2053	2053	1206	1206
Model	OLS	Poisson	OLS	Poisson	OLS	Poisson
Sample	Full Sample (1)-(2)		Combined Panels [1958,1968]		Balanced Panel [1958,1968]	

Notes: All regressions include year fixed effects, and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. See table 4 for how the combined panel is constructed. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.5: Placebo Regression: Moving the KANU Treatment Forward

	Offense		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$(KANU \times Post\ 61)_{t+2}$	-0.001 (0.010)	0.007 (0.013)	0.010 (0.013)
$(KANU \times Post\ 61)_t$	0.026*** (0.010)	0.037*** (0.013)	0.031** (0.013)
Observations	44684	18566	13266
Clusters	6784	2053	1206
Sample	Full Sample	Combined Panels [1958,1968]	Balanced Panel [1958,1968]

Notes: KANU in this table is one for ethnic groups that are part of KANU after 1961. All regressions include individual and division-year fixed effects, and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. See table 4 for how the combined panel is constructed. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.6: Offense Types and Commendable Behaviour

	Offense	Absent	Drunk	Serious Offense	Dirty	Disobedient	Commendable Behaviour
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Full Sample</i>							
KANU × Post 1961	0.026*** (0.008)	0.014** (0.005)	0.009** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	44689	44689	44689	44689	44689	44689	44689
Clusters	6784	6784	6784	6784	6784	6784	6784
<i>Balanced Panel: [1958,1968]</i>							
KANU × Post 1961	0.027*** (0.011)	0.014** (0.007)	0.009** (0.004)	0.007* (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.000 (0.002)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	13266	13266	13266	13266	13266	13266	13266
Clusters	1206	1206	1206	1206	1206	1206	1206

Notes: All regressions include year fixed effects, and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.7: Homelands

	Offense					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
KANU \times Post 61	0.027*** (0.009)	0.024*** (0.009)	0.023*** (0.009)	0.027** (0.011)	0.021* (0.013)	0.021* (0.013)
Homeland	0.001 (0.012)			-0.016 (0.018)		
KANU \times Homeland \times Post 61			0.006 (0.023)			-0.001 (0.032)
Homeland - KANU Ethnic Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Homeland - Year Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	41449	41449	41449	13056	13056	13056
Clusters	6146	6146	6146	1191	1191	1191
Sample	Full Sample, columns (1)-(3)			Balanced Panel [1958,1968], (4)-(6)		

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects, and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. Homeland \times KANU-ethnic effects interact the homeland dummy with a dummy equal to one for all ethnicities that are part of KANU at some point, i.e. Gema, Kamatusa, and Luo. Homeland is a dummy indicating whether a person serves in a division that is stationed in his ethnic homeland. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.8: Serving in home division

	Offense					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Distance between village of birth and police division of service</i>						
KANU × Post 61	0.027** (0.011)	0.026** (0.011)	0.026** (0.011)	0.037** (0.015)	0.034** (0.015)	0.036** (0.015)
Log(distance)	0.008 (0.005)			0.011 (0.008)		
KANU × Log(distance) × Post 61			-0.015 (0.011)			-0.024 (0.015)
Distance - KANU Ethnic Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Distance - Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	25749	25749	25749	7644	7644	7644
Clusters	3899	3899	3899	697	697	697
<i>Serving in 'home' police division based on district of birth</i>						
KANU × Post 61	0.029*** (0.009)	0.028*** (0.009)	0.030*** (0.009)	0.027** (0.012)	0.026** (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)
Home division	-0.025** (0.013)			-0.012 (0.020)		
KANU × Home division × Post 61			-0.014 (0.028)			0.030 (0.040)
Home division - KANU Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Home division - Year Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	39653	39653	39653	12539	12539	12539
Clusters	5885	5885	5885	1144	1144	1144
<i>Serving in 'home' police division based on district of registration</i>						
KANU × Post 61	0.027*** (0.009)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.027** (0.012)	0.027** (0.012)	0.028** (0.013)
Home division	-0.026* (0.015)			-0.032 (0.022)		
KANU × Home division × Post 61			-0.023 (0.027)			-0.010 (0.034)
Home division - KANU Ethnic Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Home division - Year Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	31827	31827	31827	10379	10379	10379
Clusters	4341	4341	4341	947	947	947
Sample	Full Sample, columns (1)-(3)			Balanced Panel [1958,1968], (4)-(6)		

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects, and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. Home × KANU-ethnic effects interact the distance or home variables with a dummy equal to one for all ethnicities that are part of KANU at some point (Gema, Kamatusa, and Luo). Log(distance) is standardized at its mean. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.9: Ethnic Dominance in Division

	Offense					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
KANU \times Post 61	0.027*** (0.009)	0.027*** (0.010)	0.025* (0.011)	0.027** (0.011)	0.034** (0.014)	0.026** (0.015)
Ethnic division share	-0.000 (0.005)			0.015 (0.056)		
KANU \times Ethnic division share \times Post 61			-0.007 (0.012)			-0.021 (0.016)
Ethnic share - KANU Ethnic Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ethnic share - Year Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	41449	41449	41449	13056	13056	13056
Clusters	6146	6146	6146	1191	1191	1191
Sample	Full Sample, columns (1)-(3) Balanced Panel [1958,1968], (4)-(6)					

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects, and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. Ethnic group share is calculated for each individual in his division. Ethnic share \times KANU-ethnic effects interact the ethnic division share with a dummy equal to one for all ethnicities that are part of KANU at some point (Gema, Kamatusa, and Luo). The ethnic share is standardized at its mean. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with * (*, ***). "Dominant" indicates Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.10: Ethnic Dominance in Higher Ranks

	Offense					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Senior: Corporal or higher</i>						
KANU × Post 61	0.026*** (0.009)	0.028*** (0.009)	0.037*** (0.012)	0.027** (0.011)	0.028** (0.011)	0.043** (0.017)
Ethnic senior share	0.001 (0.003)			-0.001 (0.004)		
KANU × Ethnic senior share × Post 61			-0.009 (0.008)			-0.014 (0.011)
<i>Senior: Sergeant or higher</i>						
KANU × Post 61	0.022** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.022* (0.012)	0.015 (0.015)
Ethnic senior share	0.001 (0.008)			-0.002 (0.010)		
KANU × Ethnic senior share × Post 61			-0.002 (0.008)			0.008 (0.010)
Senior Share - KANU Ethnic Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Senior Share - Year Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	40017	40017	40017	12472	12472	12472
Clusters	6123	6123	6123	1191	1191	1191
Sample	Full Sample, columns (1)-(3) Balanced Panel [1958,1968], (4)-(6)					

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects, and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. Senior share × KANU-ethnic effects interact the ethnic division share with a dummy equal to one for all ethnicities that are part of KANU at some point (Gema, Kamatusa, and Luo). Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.11: Rank

	Offense					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
KANU \times Post 61	0.027*** (0.009)	0.026*** (0.009)	0.028*** (0.011)	0.022* (0.011)	0.020 (0.012)	0.018 (0.013)
Rank	-0.009 (0.009)			-0.006 (0.013)		
KANU \times Rank \times Post 61			-0.008 (0.012)			0.009 (0.015)
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rank - KANU Ethnic Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Rank - Year Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	35102	35102	35102	12399	12399	12399
Clusters	5020	5020	5020	1148	1148	1148
Sample	Full Sample, columns (1)-(3)			Balanced Panel [1958,1968], (4)-(6)		

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects, and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. Rank \times KANU-ethnic fixed effects interact the rank variable with a dummy equal to one for all ethnicities that are part of KANU at some point (Gema, Kamatusa, and Luo). Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.12: Signed booklet (versus thumbprint) and Years of Schooling

	Offense							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
KANU \times Post 61	0.024*** (0.009)	0.014 (0.011)	0.019** (0.010)	0.014 (0.012)	0.019 (0.012)	0.010 (0.014)	0.023* (0.012)	0.006 (0.014)
KANU \times Literate \times Post 61		0.044** (0.020)				0.054* (0.031)		
KANU \times Schooling \times Post 61			0.029 (0.021)				0.025 (0.036)	
KANU \times Schooling/Literate \times Post 61				0.027 (0.017)				0.053** (0.023)
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education - KANU Ethnic Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education - Year Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	38917	38917	44689	44689	11176	11176	13266	13266
Clusters	5943	5943	6784	6784	1016	1016	1206	1206
Sample	Full Sample, columns (1)-(4)			Balanced Panel [1958,1968], (5)-(8)				

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects, and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. Education \times KANU-ethnic effects interact the relevant education variable with a dummy equal to one for all ethnicities that are part of KANU at some point (Gema, Kamatusa, and Luo). Literacy is approximated by whether the individual has signed his booklet or provided a thumbprint. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.13: Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization

	Offense					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
KANU × Post 61	0.027*** (0.009)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.027** (0.011)	0.026** (0.011)	0.027** (0.011)
Ethnic Fractionalization (ELF)	-0.060 (0.086)			0.073 (0.117)		
KANU × Post 61 × ELF			0.069 (0.225)			0.263 (0.317)
ELF - KANU Ethnic Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
ELF - Year Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	41449	41449	41449	13056	13056	13056
Clusters	6146	6146	6146	1191	1191	1191
Sample	Full Sample, (1)-(3)			Balanced Panel [1958,1968]		

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects, and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. ELF-ethnicity fixed effects interact the ELF variable with a dummy equal to one for all ethnicities that are part of KANU at some point (Gema, Kamatusa, and Luo). Ethnic diversity is measured as fractionalisation at the division level. ELF standardized at its mean in the full sample. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.14: Regional Commander Match

	Offense			
	Full Sample		Balanced Panel [1958,1968]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
KANU \times Post 61	0.025*** (0.008)	0.024*** (0.008)	0.027** (0.011)	0.026** (0.011)
Regional Commander match	-0.035** (0.014)		-0.001 (0.022)	
KANU \times Post 61 \times Regional Commander match		0.031 (0.030)		0.058 (0.068)
Observations	44689	44689	13266	13266
Clusters	6784	6784	1206	1206
Sample	Full Sample		Balanced Panel [1958,1968]	

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects, and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. "Regional Commander Match" is one if the individual shares the ethnicity with the officer commanding a police region (there are 8 regions, above the division level). Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.15: General Service Unit

	Offense					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
KANU \times Post 61	0.027*** (0.009)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.026*** (0.009)	0.027** (0.011)	0.028** (0.011)	0.029** (0.011)
GSU	0.012 (0.015)			0.001 (0.025)		0.005 (0.061)
KANU \times GSU \times Post 61			0.030 (0.039)			-0.035 (0.063)
GSU - KANU Ethnic Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
GSU - Year Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	41449	41449	41449	13056	13056	13056
Clusters	6146	6146	6146	1191	1191	1191
Sample	Full Sample, columns (1)-(3)			Balanced Panel [1958,1968]		

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects, and control for the length of the year in the first and final year of service. GSU \times KANU-ethnic effects interact the GSU dummy with a dummy equal to one for all ethnicities that are part of KANU at some point (Gema, Kamatusa, and Luo). Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.