

Strategies of Single Party Hegemony in Tanzania: Evidence from Survey Experiments

Kevin Croke

World Bank

Abstract. How do single party regimes maintain enduring political dominance in developing countries when democracy is formally enshrined and elections are largely free and fair? This paper uses evidence from two survey experiments and one natural or quasi-experiment to show how this works in Tanzania. First, we show that the ruling party still maintains the massive infrastructure of neighborhood representatives established during the single party era, and that in the presence of these representatives, citizens self-censor about their true political views. Second, we use new measurement techniques to develop more accurate estimates of the gift of material goods from politicians to voters at election time (“vote buying”). Finally, we use a survey experiment to show limited sensitivity of Tanzanian voters in response to information about corruption on the part of politicians. We also show heterogeneity across income classes in response to this information: Poor voters are more likely to support a candidate who promises them patronage benefits when primed with information that the candidate has participated in corruption, whereas richer voters are more likely to support a reform / anti-corruption candidate when primed with the same information.

1 Introduction

Compared to a generation ago, many more Africa countries are democracies. But genuine liberal democracies, with entrenched civil liberties, open political debate, and robust protections for minority rights and opinions, are still relatively rare. Much more common are “hybrid regimes” where the formal rules are democratic, yet political elites maintain power by using strategies including restriction or cooptation of media and civil society, manipulation of electoral rules, strategic distribution of patronage and rents (including outright purchase of votes), and intimidation of (potential or actual) opposition voters (Levitsky and Way 2002). Recent empirical work in African political economy has aimed at quantifying the extent of these strategies, as well as testing alternative interventions to combat them. With regard to voter intimidation, Vicente and Collier (2008) show the impact of a campaign in Nigeria against violence in politics. On vote buying, Vicente and Fafchamps (forthcoming) and Kramon (2011) have done recent experimental work in sub-Saharan Africa; measuring the extent of vote buying and testing strategies to combat it.¹ Wantchekon (2004) and Wantchekon and Fujiwara (2012) have examined the relative efficacy of public goods versus patronage based campaign strategies; the first paper shows the efficacy of clientelism as an electoral strategy and the latter tests a novel intervention to reduce the scope of patronage politics. Other recent experiments aimed at evaluating interventions against patronage politics have taken place in Delhi (Banerjee et al 2011), and Uttar Pradesh in India (Green, Banerjee and Pande 2007), and in Mexico City (Chong et al 2010). A particularly close analogue to our “vignette” survey experiment focused on clientelism is Banerjee et al’s (2012) experiment in Uttar Pradesh. Kramon’s (2011) survey experiments in Kenya are also quite similar in intent.

We report the results from three experiments (2 formal survey experiments and one natural or quasi-experiment) that addressed these questions in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The first took place as part of a face-to-face baseline survey, while the subsequent two were part of a mobile phone survey conducted on a subset of the original baseline sample. The first “quasi experiment” emerged through mistakes in survey administration, which meant that local ruling party representatives were present and observed respondents answer the survey (including questions on voting intentions and other political opinions) in a subset of interviews. As a result, reported vote intention and other political variables were observed both with and without the knowledge of local party cadres, which allows us to see what respondents themselves believe that they “should” say when under observation.

The second is a randomized list experiment to estimate the prevalence of vote buying. Democracy can be corrupted if candidates for political office offer, and voters accept, gifts at campaign rallies. Yet while vote buying is widely reported to be an important component of elections in many developing countries, it is difficult to measure since voters are very reluctant to admit their participation in this activity. Randomized list experiments are a survey technique to elicit information about the frequency by which respondents participate in a sensitive activity. We use a set of survey questions, culminating in a randomized list experiment, to estimate the prevalence of this practice in Dar es Salaam.

¹ Nichter (2008), Stokes (2005), Albertus (2013) Corstange (2010) among many other have examined the phenomenon outside of Africa.

Finally, we attempt to measure how respondents update vote choices in response to information about politicians' involvement in corruption. To do this we record respondents' reaction to a set of vignettes in the form of stylized political speeches read by survey enumerators. We test whether respondents are more likely to support a fictional candidate making an anti-corruption speech versus one making an appeal to patronage or clientelism-based politics, both with and without information relating to one of the candidates' involvement in corruption. In the control arm, enumerators read respondents two hypothetical political speeches, and respondents were simply asked to choose which candidate they would be more likely to vote for. In one speech, the candidate promised to fight corruption; in the other, the candidate promised to deliver patronage to the voter's neighborhood. In the treatment arm, we ask the respondent to choose between the same speeches but this time with background information on one of the candidates *which suggests that the candidate has a history of corruption*. In effect, this is an attempt to shift the information environment around vote choice, thereby simulating an effective anti-corruption information or voter education campaign.

This paper focuses on Tanzania, which is often seen to be well-governed country relative to other countries in the region, with a strong national identity and a functional democracy. Indeed, since the transition to multiparty politics in 1995, elections have been ostensibly free and fair (outside of Zanzibar), ethnic peace has been maintained, and the country is rated as less corrupt than its East African neighbors Uganda and Kenya (World Bank 2010).² Yet Tanzania's "donor darling" status is at odds with the fact that the country's politics is completely dominated by the ruling party, CCM, which has ruled the country since independence and has never had less than 60% of the presidential vote and 75% of the seats in parliament (Hoffman 2013). Tanzania may therefore be a useful setting in which to study the strategies that dominant parties use to shape political outcomes in the context of democracy in a low income setting. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the Tanzanian context, Section 3 describes the data, Sections 4 and 5 present the main results, Section 6 interprets the results, and Section 7 concludes.

2 Background

As the introduction suggests, this paper is motivated by questions about the quality of democracy in practice in sub-Saharan Africa. However, since the particulars are specific to the Tanzanian context, this section will focus on Tanzanian political economy in some detail.

Since independence in 1964, Tanzania has been ruled by a single party, which was known as Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) until 1977, and as Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) after its merger in that year with Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi party. The country was a de facto single party state since independence, led by *Baba wa Taifa* ("Father of the Nation") Julius Nyerere. He retired in 1985, and in 1995, Tanzania had its first multi-party election. Yet in the 15-plus years of multiparty politics, CCM's hold on power has never been threatened, as the party has maintained between 60-80% of the vote and 70-90% of the seats in Parliament.

What explains such single party dominance? The "official" story is that Tanzanians appreciate CCM for its role in maintaining peace and stability, and for creating their country's robust sense of national identity. CCM also benefits from its continued association with the revered Julius Nyerere. Despite his economically disastrous experiments in rural collectivism, Nyerere was beloved for his

² According to the 2010 Ibrahim Index, for example, Tanzania is the 13th best governed country on the African continent; in sub-Saharan Africa (and excluding microstates), it ranks behind only Ghana, South Africa, Namibia, Benin, and Botswana.

personal integrity and his far-sighted policies to promote a Tanzanian sense of nationhood in place of ethnic and subnational identity. There is indeed evidence to support the view that CCM is genuinely very popular: It regularly wins large electoral majorities, and the 2008 Afrobarometer poll shows that 81% of Tanzanians report that they trust CCM “a lot” or “somewhat.” In 2012, the corresponding figure from Afrobarometer was 66%.

There is an alternative interpretation of Tanzanian politics, however, which stresses that while CCM is legitimately quite popular, it is also very skilled at manipulating the institutional environment to ensure its continued reign. Hoffman and Robinson (2009) note that various aspects of Tanzania’s institutional framework help CCM maintain its hold on power. The first-past-the-post electoral system gives CCM a roughly 20% “seat bonus”: for example in 2005 it gained almost 90% of directly-elected seats in Parliament with 70% of the popular vote. The allocation criteria for appointed “special seats” in Parliament for women, youth, and the disabled (even though allocated in proportion to the number of seats in parliament) further pads out the ruling party’s parliamentary majority (Bueno de Mesquita, 2009). The public campaign finance system awards funding in proportion to percentage of presidential vote share and percentage of parliamentary and local government seats held by a given party (Hoffman and Robinson 2009), meaning that successful parties (i.e. CCM) are given the means to further entrench their political domination. Tanzania also has what Fish (1997) refers to as a super-presidentialist division of powers³, in which the executive branch uses its massive advantage in resources to dominate the legislature, the judiciary, and sub-national political institutions. Moreover, other checks on the power of the state, such as civil society, are historically relatively weak: Nyerere brought all civil society organizations such as farmers’ groups and trade unions under the single party (Barkan 1994, p. 6), thereby cutting off the natural growth and development of local civil society.

CCM also benefits from a still somewhat-fuzzy boundary between state and party institutions. With the advent of multiparty democracy in the 1990s, party and state, which had been completely fused during the single-party era, were officially separated. Civil servants and soldiers no longer had to be CCM members, for example, and regional and district commissioners were made part of the civil service (previously they were the chief representatives of both the central government and the party in their area). Yet despite these reforms, several political economy scholars over the past decade have described the ways in which macro-level institutional reform in Tanzania has been incomplete. Tucker et al. (2003), for example, observe that “a variety of formal and informal systems...to limit the expression of dissent” (14), ensure that “the political culture of the single party state – one marked by consensus, passivity, dependence, and deference to authority – remains largely intact” (18). Similarly, Tucker et al (2010) note that “Despite Kikwete’s clear popularity, considerable evidence suggests that coercion—overt and subtle—played a role in ensuring CCM’s overwhelming victory in the election. At the local level, for example, the party routinely implored civil servants to support and campaign for CCM candidates.”

This paper allows us to test competing narratives about the role of *political institutions* such as the ten cell; *political practices*, such as vote buying, and *voter ideas and behavior*, such as the tension between programmatic and patronage appeals.

3 The ten cell leader “quasi experiment”

³ See Premph 2008 for discussion of this in the African context

In 2009, a Tanzanian NGO called *Twaweza* implemented a household survey focused on public service delivery and governance in Dar es Salaam. Twaweza (later in partnership with the World Bank) then followed up this baseline survey with more than 25 rounds of follow up surveys using mobile phones, via a call center operated by the survey firm that conducted the baseline survey. (Over 80% of households owned mobile phones at baseline, and a subsample of the remaining households were given phones by the project team).⁴ The experiments reported below were implemented as part of these surveys.

The first “experiment” – which was actually a natural or quasi-experiment - came about as part of field operations for the baseline survey. The survey team did not have access to National Bureau of Statistics enumeration area maps, which are the primary sampling units for most surveys done in Tanzania. Therefore, the survey team decided to construct a sample frame by randomly selecting the lowest administrative level (the street or *mtaa*) and listing all households in each selected *mtaa*. However, in the course of field testing, it became apparent that mtaas were too large for a cost effective census/listing exercise to be conducted. Mtaa-level officials, however, pointed out that there was a further, comprehensive but non-official administrative unit at which listing could be conducted – the party institution known as the ten cell. Conducting the listing exercise at the ten cell level could only be done by working quite closely with the ten cell leader, known in Kiswahili as the *balozi* (or *mjumbe*).⁵ Since only the balozi knew which households in a particular neighborhood were part of his ten cell, he had to accompany enumerators as they listed each household in the ten cell and made appointments to interview the selected respondents.

The quasi-experimental variation in survey implementation came about because in a number of cases, the ten cell leader (*balozi*) remained present during the actual interview. The survey team instituted a protocol to prevent this from happening, which involved bringing the ten cell leader/balozi away from the interview site to have a soda or other refreshment while interviews were actually conducted. However, for reasons which remain unclear, in a number of cases, this protocol was not followed. 17% of the sample (91 out of 550 respondents) received the questionnaire with the local ten cell leader (the *balozi* or *mjumbe*) present for part or all or part of the interview, while 83% received the questionnaire in a normal environment.⁶

Thus the first “quasi experiment” is focused on the role of the ten cell leader in Tanzania. To understand why this variation is politically meaningful in the Tanzanian context, it is necessary to discuss Tanzanian political institutions in some detail. The institution of the ten cell is rooted in the history of CCM, Tanzania’s ruling party. From the period shortly after independence, CCM developed a large, hierarchical structure which incorporated mass participation and which allowed it to penetrate deeply into Tanzanian society, ranging from the Central Committee of the National Executive Commission (with just 35 members), to the ten cell, which encompassed every ten households at the village level. The arrangement is described by Barkan (1994) in the following way:

⁴ See Croke et al 2012 for more details on this survey.

⁵ Hereafter “balozi.” The word means “ambassador” in Kiswahili; it refers to the balozi’s intended function as a messenger from the ruling party to citizens. *Mjumbe* means “messenger” in Kiswahili.

⁶ It is sometimes suggested that the ten cell system (whereby there is a CCM representative for every 10 households) is a fading relic of the past. Our survey work in Dar es Salaam suggests that this is not true. Every street (*mtaa*) office that we visited maintained a comprehensive list of balozis (often with their cell phone numbers on it), and each balozi had a list of households under his area of responsibility. While the number of houses per cell has increased, to an average of 26 rather than the originally envisioned 10, the institution still clearly exists all over Dar es Salaam.

TANU established an extensive apparatus that paralleled all state institutions down to the village level. Basic political representation in Tanzania was via party organs, the lowest of which is the neighborhood cell of ten households and the highest the National Executive Committee (NEC). Election to each organ above the cell was indirect – by the membership of the organ immediately below – thus guaranteeing that the outcomes of the elections at each level are consistent with the views of the leadership and NEC...organs from the ward on up maintain thousands of offices in the countryside from which to organize their activities. (p. 17)

Ten cells were first introduced between 1963 and 1965, first in Dar es Salaam and then progressively throughout the country (Bienen 1970). They have historically played an important role in electoral mobilization, collection of party membership dues, informing citizens about government policy, and maintenance of public order.⁷ At various points in Tanzanian history they played explicit roles in social mobilization and control: Tripp, for example, notes that in the 1980s they were used to register citizens' employment status during the “*Nguvu Kazĩ*” campaign against informal businesses, and also to collect taxes at various points. Levitsky and Way (2010) quote a senior Tanzanian politician who noted that during electoral campaigns, “the massive Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) network of 10 House Party Cells made it ‘very easy for the party to reach everyone in the country.’”⁸

According to the “official” narrative, ten leaders are purely a channel of communication, enabling the party to communicate its policies to citizens, and also allowing citizens to give feedback to the party about their views (Bienen 1970; O’Barr 1972). Others have suggested that the ten cell leader (*balozi*) plays a more insidious role, monitoring citizen behavior and perhaps ensuring loyalty to CCM.⁹ Through quasi-experimental “treatment” of balozi presence during survey implementation, this paper helps determine which of these two stories is closer to the truth. If the balozi is merely a helpful information channel, his presence should not have much effect on survey answers. On the other hand, if his presence is less benign, respondents may unintentionally give evidence of this, by censoring themselves and giving “party line” answers to questions when the balozi is in the room.

Before we can give any causal interpretation to the effect of balozi presence on answers, we must first investigate any potential selection effects. Table 1 (below) shows, the respondents that the balozis chose to monitor were similar across a range of observable demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, with exception of whether a household is urban or rural (Rural households are almost twice as likely to have the balozi present), and whether a household is in the poorest income quintile.¹⁰ In a regression framework, however, living in rural areas is the only significant predictor of balozi presence – the greater presence of the balozi for the poorest households is no longer significant. We control for rural residence and wealth quintiles in all future regressions.

⁷ They are supposed to be elected by all party members living within a group of ten households. It is not clear whether they are still elected or whether they are appointed.

⁸ Parties in other developing countries have similar structures; Levitsky and Way (2010) note that UNMO in Malaysia also has a party representative for each ten households.

⁹ Former Prime Minister Kawawa hinted at this when he told ten cell leaders that they “are the eyes of the nation... [they] must expose dangerous characters like thieves and other infiltrators who many poison our nation and put its safety at stake” (Bienen 1970). Barkan (1994) noted that Tanzania’s party structures were similar (in design at least) to repressive institutions in Eastern bloc countries, pointing out that “the mechanics of th[is] approach were remarkably similar to those set forth by Lenin in *State and Revolution* half a century before.”

¹⁰ Of the variables in table 3, the only other marginally significant (10% level) correlates of the balozi’s presence are access to piped water (which is itself highly correlated with urban/rural status) and presence in the bottom income two income quintiles.

Table 1: Comparison of the two groups

Variable	Obs	balozi present	no balozi	(1)-(0)	P-Val	Regression	P-val
rural	550	0.32	0.17	0.15	0.0007 ***	0.150966	0.001 ***
female	550	0.60	0.58	0.02	0.6887	0.047164	0.174
Years school	544	7.10	7.36	-0.26	0.501	0.003083	0.6
age	550	40.99	38.57	2.42	0.1457	0.001898	0.101
married	550	0.62	0.64	-0.02	0.6785	-0.00299	0.929
Own phone	550	0.76	0.76	0.00	0.9658	0.004177	0.915
Formal sector	550	0.09	0.14	-0.05	0.1684	-0.03522	0.468
power	550	0.51	0.54	-0.03	0.5695	0.049019	0.288
Improved sanitation	550	0.37	0.37	0.01	0.8908	0.038494	0.325
Read newspaper	550	0.67	0.70	-0.03	0.5838	0.151272	0.565
poorest	550	0.29	0.18	0.10	0.0252 **	0.096381	0.714
poor	550	0.19	0.20	-0.02	0.7312	0.054085	0.838
average	550	0.15	0.21	-0.05	0.2463	0.045179	0.865
rich	550	0.15	0.21	-0.06	0.229	0.068463	0.799
richest	550	0.22	0.19	0.03	0.5724	-0.12401	0.646

*significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level

In interviews where the balozi was present for majority of the interview (including the politics and governance module), 97% of respondents stated that they planned to vote for CCM parliamentary candidates, and 97% of respondents (n=72) said that they would vote for the CCM presidential candidate, Jakaya Kikwete, while just 3% said that they would vote for opposition candidates. By contrast, with the balozi absent (n=379), 86% of respondents report that they intend to vote for incumbent Jakaya Kikwete (for President) and the CCM candidate (for parliament), with the remaining 14% reporting that they would support one of the opposition parties. This percentage who state their intention to vote for the opposition collapses from 14% of the sample to just 3% (2 respondents) when the balozi is present.¹¹

These differences are also robust to whether the balozi was present for some of the interview but absent for political section of the interview – in this subset of cases (n=27), 100% of respondents state their intention to vote for Jakaya Kikwete for President and CCM for parliament. The differences are also robust to whether questions about vote choice were asked generically - the questions “are you planning on voting for the same party for parliament (for president) that you voted for in 2005?” were asked prior to more specific questions which asked the respondent to name their preferred party or candidate. Even in these questions, in which no specific party or candidate was named, 92% and 89% professed the same vote intention as in the previous election with the balozi present, compared to 70% and 61% with the balozi absent.

Table 2: Voting intention, with and without balozi

¹¹ The survey took place 2-3 months before the 2010 general election.

	balozi present	balozi absent
CCM President vote share	0.97	0.86
CCM Parliament vote share	0.97	0.86
Same president (generic)	0.92	0.81
Same MP/party (generic)	0.89	0.70

We can also estimate the effect of balozi presence on the likelihood that a respondent reports that he or she intends to vote for the ruling party, controlling for a range of covariates, including rural residence. Table 4 shows OLS models with only a rural dummy control variable in the first specification, with a wide range of socioeconomic controls in the second, and with the same socioeconomic covariates as well as district and ward-level fixed effects in the third.¹² Column 4 shows the increase in CCM vote in interviews where the balozi was present for some of the interview but not the politics module where vote choice questions were asked. Across the four specifications, balozi presence is highly significant and increases the likelihood of a reported vote for CCM consistently, by 9-16 percentage points.

Table 4: Regression of balozi presence and covariates on President Kikwete vote share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
balozi	0.1077**	0.0942**	0.1040**	0.1576*
	0.0417	0.0417	0.0439	0.0834
rural	0.0335	-0.0011	-0.1497	-0.1680
	0.0378	0.0413	0.1411	0.1600
Years school		-0.0087	-0.0098*	-0.0103
		0.0053	0.0056	0.0065
age		0.0026**	0.0027**	0.0032**
		0.0011	0.0011	0.0013
female		0.0821**	0.0892***	0.0962**
		0.0325	0.0335	0.0376
Wealth quintiles	no	yes	yes	yes
<i>N</i>	453	451	451	395
r ²	0.0180	0.0666	0.1405	0.1409

Standard errors in second row

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

To address potential endogeneity of balozi presence, additional specifications are presented in appendix table 1, using new control variables collected largely in mobile phone follow up interviews.¹³ Since the main driver of balozi presence is rural residence, column 1 restricts the sample to urban respondents. Column 2 addresses a different plausible endogenous driver of the balozi presence -- the relationship between the respondent and the balozi. We asked respondents in our mobile phone follow up survey if they had spoken to their balozi recently, and how much they trusted him. Trust in the balozi is indeed correlated with balozi presence, but including it in the vote choice regression does not affect results. Finally, to know if the balozi's presence was causing

¹² I present OLS rather than probit models for ease of interpretation. Probit models show almost identical marginal effects of balozi presence and very similar results in general.

¹³ Data collected through the mobile phone survey are weighted for attrition; see Croke et al (2012) for details about the mobile phone survey project.

respondents to self-censor, we would ideally know their real vote choice (in the absence of the balozi) – which we cannot observe. However, the long running nature of our panel survey does give us an opportunity to uncover more accurate information about partisan preferences and voting behavior. After five rounds of mobile phone follow up interviews, we ask again about partisan support, this time in a low pressure setting. (Respondents by this stage are familiar with the survey, and have been receiving mobile phone credit each round for participating). We ask about whether respondents voted for CCM or opposition for municipal council election. Here find that 34% of respondents admit to supporting the opposition (compared to 14% opposition support in baseline).¹⁴ If we assume that these are “true” opposition voters, we can include individual fixed effects, estimating the increased in reported ruling party vote choice when the balozi is present, *conditional on the respondent being a “true” opposition voter*. Here again we find a large and highly significant effect of balozi presence. In column 4 we use residence in an opposition controlled mtaa/street as a proxy for opposition support. Only in this specification – which is likely the least precisely estimated – do we lose significance on the balozi coefficient.

The survey also asked about trust in government institutions, participation in civic activities, and opinions about public services. Answers to most questions about trust are not statistically different between the two groups, with the notable exception of reported trust in the president, trust in the ruling party (CCM), and trust in the local headmaster. This partially reinforces and partially complicates the pattern of self-censorship observed in the vote choice data. Voters both with and without the balozi feel free, for example, to give lukewarm ratings to local leaders, even those closely associated with CCM, such as their MPs, and their ward and mtaa (street) executive officers. But views of the President and the ruling party are still quite sensitive.¹⁵

With data about respondents’ views of public services in Dar es Salaam, the story grows more complex: We see in some sense the *opposite* of self-censorship. Respondents appear to take the opportunity of the balozi’s presence to let their unhappiness with public services be known, giving significantly more *negative* opinions when the balozi is present. Moreover, these differences are large for those services that are generally held to be poor (drainage, sewage, health, water, electricity) and non-existent where services are good (mobile phones, public safety). This suggests that, in line with his official role, the balozi is still seen as a potential channel for upward communication from citizens to government.¹⁶ In terms of civic participation, the pattern that emerges is consistent with this picture. Respondents report more civic participation in “official” activities such as school committee meetings and health committee meetings, while activities that suggest possible criticism of government, such as calling in to a radio program and attending a demonstration, do not show any difference between balozi and non-balozi populations.

¹⁴ Note that the follow up question was about city council support.

¹⁵ The other somewhat surprising result is that trust in the headmaster of the local school is significantly affected by balozi presence. This may suggest that teachers play some sort of political role during election season. Khemani et al (2011) discuss various ways in which teachers have been found to play a political role in developing countries.

¹⁶ This pattern can also be examined in the education module, where respondents are asked a very detailed set of questions about their satisfaction with various aspects of education, such as teacher quality, availability of textbooks, student-teacher ratio, and the like. The pattern of more negative responses in front of the balozi persists in this section as well, including with controls for wealth, education, public (vs. private) school attendance, and urban/rural residence.

Table 6: *balozzi* effect on other attitudes and reported behaviors (scale 1-4)

	Trust in political figures	Views on public services	Civic participation
balozzi	1.3348 (1.1971)	-0.9389* (0.5698)	0.4843* (0.2049)
rural		-2.1477*** (0.6023)	0.5057* (0.2079)
constant	35.0048*** 0.9722	15.8624*** 0.5642	1.2351*** 0.1948
wealth quintiles	yes	yes	yes
N	339	470	533
r2	0.0249	0.0493	0.0549

4 Vote buying list experiment

If oversight and monitoring of citizens by ruling party representatives such as the ten cell leader is a “stick” to enforce the ruling party’s hegemony, there is also a “carrot,” in the form of material benefits that citizens can receive from political actors. There is a well-established literature describing the nature of clientelist networks in Tanzania, whereby political actors use state resources to establish patron-client networks in which material benefits are exchanged for political support (Kelsall 2002). This can be patronage from political elites to other elites, such as when state-owned firms are privatized to well-connected businessmen, or it can function at lower levels, when political cadres such as ward or street leaders are given the chance to “eat” from development projects or other public resources. (One recent example comes from Pan and Christiansen (2011), who show that 60% of agricultural input vouchers subsidies were captured by local officials in Killimanjaro region.) Finally, clientelism also takes place at the mass level, in the form of gifts from politicians to voters at election time.

There is a large political science literature about the extent to which politicians provide voters with small particularistic benefits at election time in exchange for votes. However it has often been difficult to have a clear picture of the extent of vote buying in developing countries, since in most countries it is illegal or at least socially discouraged, meaning that respondents may not admit to it. A recent literature has emerged which uses novel survey techniques that preserve anonymity to study this topic. Corstange (2012) uses a list experiment in Lebanon to study vote buying, finding that the frequency of vote buying is two times higher under list experiments than it appeared to be under standard survey conditions. Kramon (2011) uses survey experiments to study vote buying in Kenya, arguing that vote buying is actually meant as a signal that the politician will be a good patronage politician with respect to future provision of direct benefits for the poor.

In Tanzania, most discourse around this phenomenon focuses on the distribution of small gifts, (known as “*takrima*” in Kiswahili) at campaign meetings or rallies. In fact, such exchanges have a particularly controversial history in Tanzania. These activities were legalized in Tanzania before the 2000 elections in a controversial court case, with the justification that they represented a traditional form of African hospitality to attendees at campaign rallies. They were then outlawed, in another high profile court case, in 2006. Qualitative studies of Tanzanian election have pointed to the ways in which the ruling party uses its financial muscle to implement nationwide campaigns with large

rallies and distribute material benefits (Hoffman and Robinson 2009). However, relatively little work has been done to study the actual frequency of “*takrima*” in Tanzania. For example, is it important at an aggregate level? Does it have the possibility to sway election results?

We exploit two factors to elicit increasingly reliable answers: first, we rely on the fact that this long running panel survey has built trust with respondents through ongoing contact over a three year period. Second, we use a list experiment to offer anonymity to respondents and thereby elicit truthful answers.¹⁷ In our baseline survey in 2010, we asked respondents: “Are you ever given small gifts by candidates running for political office or people who are campaigning for them (for example food, soap, a t-shirt, alcohol?)” In this context, 6% responded affirmatively. We returned to this question in round 5 of the mobile phone survey, where we asked the respondents: “In the *last election*, did you ever receive a small gift (soap, food, t-shirt, etc) from any candidate running for office?” This time, despite the fact that the question referred to the last election only, twice as many respondents (13%) reported receiving such a gift.¹⁸ This is the same frequency uncovered in the 2012 Afrobarometer survey, which asked a similar question: “During the last national election, how often if ever did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food or a gift or money, in return for your vote?”


Finally, given that questions about receipt of gifts from political figures are quite sensitive, we used a randomized list experiment in a later mobile phone survey round to attempt to elicit more honest answers (Karlan and Zinman 2012). The anonymity of the list experiment appears to have enabled more honest responses, revealing that almost three out of ten respondents in Dar es Salaam received a small gift from a political candidate in the 2010 election.¹⁹

Table 8: reported frequency of vote buying in elections across survey methods

¹⁷ This allows us to answer the question about whether this is common or not. It does not let us answer many of the most interesting questions about vote buying such as: Does it actually sway voters, or do voters accept such gifts and then vote the way they had already planned? Is it primarily used by ruling or opposition parties, and is it narrowly targeted to sway “swing voters” or is it given to mobilize the base? Is the goal to affect vote choice or to mobilize turnout?

¹⁸ The effect is not driven by attrition: the results are almost identical if we look only at respondents who were present in both rounds.

¹⁹ If we re-weight responses to account for dropout, the implied frequency of vote buying is 43%.



Unfortunately, since the individual answers to this last round are anonymized by the list experiment, we cannot uncover the specific characteristics of respondents who participated in this practice. However, we can observe some patterns about the changing face of vote buying and clientelism from the baseline to the follow up round in which the vote buying question was repeated. From the baseline question, it seemed that *opposition* voters were more likely to have received gifts than ruling party voters, 16% to 8%. However, it is also possible that admitted opposition voters are simply more honest respondents, and therefore more likely to admit receipt of gifts. Indeed, in mobile phone follow up questions one year later (after trust in the survey had been built and data quality about sensitive questions was presumably stronger), *CCM voters* were more likely to have received gifts (15% to 10%). If we use a different, possibly more accurate measurement of voting intention/partisanship (information about municipal council vote preferences), then it again appears that ruling party voters were the beneficiaries of vote buying, 15% to 11%. Ultimately however we cannot draw firm conclusions about the distribution of vote buying.

From this we can conclude that traditional direct survey methods for asking about clientelistic exchange are likely to underestimate the true frequency of the phenomenon, in our case by a factor of 4-5. Data collection instruments such as high frequency mobile phone panels may build trust over time and therefore elicit more accurate answers. But more sophisticated techniques such as list experiments are likely still necessary for very sensitive topics. Second, the distortions inherent in basic survey methods can often change the picture about who is receiving such transfers. Finally, by integrating this information revealed by the list experiment with the prior information revealed by the survey quasi-experiment, we can show the vote buying is indeed a mass phenomenon in Dar es Salaam, reaching near one in three voters.

5 Vignette experiment

The final experiment that we implement is a survey experiment designed to test how respondents react to political rhetoric. Specifically, enumerators read all respondents two speeches, one promising patronage benefits and the other promising reform and efforts to fight corruption. Respondents were then asked to choose which of these candidates they were more likely to vote for. In a second, randomly selected group, respondents were presented with the same speech, but they

were also given some biographical information about the “candidates.” Specifically they were told that candidate promising to deliver patronage had previously been involved in politics but had been accused of corruption.²⁰ This experiment is in the spirit of the Wanchekon (2004) experiment in which actual campaign activities were randomized into patronage/clientelism versus national public good campaigns. It is significantly more limited than that experiment in that the “treatment” is a short speech read over the phone rather than an actual political event. It is much closer in mechanics to the experiment done by Banerjee et al (2012) in Uttar Pradesh, in which voters were given short vignettes describing whether or not political candidates were criminal or corrupt, or Kramon’s Kenya’s experiment in which voters are primed with information about a candidate’s proclivity for vote buying.

The results show that in both (treatment and control) groups, respondents prefer the anti-corruption speech by roughly 3 to 1. Respondents were also asked which speech they believe most other people in Dar es Salaam are likely to prefer. A group 3 times larger (29%) believe that most others will prefer the clientelist speech. Still, a majority (71%) believe that their fellow Dar voters will prefer anti-corruption to clientelist appeals²¹

When we introduce the experimental variation through priming, we see that respondents are only slightly more likely to prefer the anti-corruption candidate to the patronage candidate when they find out about the patronage candidate’s corrupt background: the anti-corruption candidate’s vote margin increases from 72% to 76%.²²

	Vote percentage	Number of respondents
Clientelist speech	12.5	21
Clientelist speech plus priming	12.2	19
Anti-corruption speech	72.0	121
Anti-corruption speech plus priming	76.3	119

The effect of priming about candidate background on preference for the non-corrupt politician is small in magnitude, is not statistically significant, and the magnitude grows even smaller in a regression framework when controls for randomization strata are included Nor is there any meaningful heterogeneity by randomization strata: the difference does not reach significance when treatment interactions are created with the stratification variables for district, gender, and pre-existing support for the ruling party.

²⁰ Respondents were asked if they would like to hear the speeches read a second time; 18% requested this option and were read the speeches again.

²¹ Respondents were also asked which speech is more common – which speech seemed more similar to typical speeches that they hear. 82% said that the anti-corruption speech was more common. Finally, it is sometimes theorized that voters support politicians who promise clientelist distribution over those who promise anti-corruption efforts because clientelist promises are more credible, more achievable. Our respondents report the opposite. They rate the likelihood of successful anti-corruption action as low (just 15% find it likely or very likely) but they find clientelist promises even less credible (5%).

²² Note that this is contra the theory proposed in Kramon 2011 that vote buying is about signaling the ability and willingness to deliver patronage.

Table 7: effect of corruption priming on speech preference

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
priming	0.0426	0.0164	0.1101	-0.0917	0.1084
	0.0488	0.0557	0.0899	0.0947	0.1075
CCM supporter		0.0339	0.0347	-0.0464	0.0279
		0.0584	0.0584	0.0815	0.0588
female		0.0586	0.1368	0.0571	0.0467
		0.0579	0.0826	0.0577	0.0585
Temeke district		0.1108	0.1112	0.1088	0.0944
		0.0675	0.0674	0.0674	0.0687
Ilala district		0.0614	0.0655	0.0575	0.0567
		0.0678	0.0678	0.0677	0.0684
Prime*female			-0.1514		
			0.1142		
Prime* ccm supporter				0.1640	
				0.1163	
Enumerator indicators / interactions					yes
					0.0995
constant	0.7202***	0.6227***	0.5687***	0.6784***	0.5408***
	0.0339	0.0778	0.0877	0.0871	0.0984
N	324	251	251	251	251
r2	0.0024	0.0166	0.0237	0.0246	0.0290

However, if we examine heterogeneity beyond the stratification variables into other variables which may be well theorized to have an effect on outcomes, we see one interesting pattern. Most notably, we see that individuals from the top two wealth quintiles are much more likely to vote for the reform message when they are primed that the patronage messenger is corrupt, while respondents from the bottom two wealth quintiles are less likely to vote for the reform candidate. These coefficients are not significant but they are in line with findings from the literature more generally.

Table 8: effect of corruption priming on speech preference by wealth quintile

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
priming	-0.0226	0.0654	-0.0400	0.0488
	0.0658	0.0593	0.0762	0.0668
top2 quintiles	-0.0829		-0.0708	
	0.0680		0.0796	
Prime * top quintiles	0.1444		0.1217	
	0.0981		0.1121	
Bottom2 quintiles		0.0153		0.0110
		0.0734		0.0861
Prime * bottom quintiles		-0.0707		-0.1056
		0.1050		0.1221
CCM supporter			0.0353	0.0420
			0.0586	0.0590
female			0.0574	0.0613

			0.0580	0.0580
Temeke district			0.0995	0.1183
			0.0690	0.0689
Ilala district			0.0521	0.0671
			0.0686	0.0681
_cons	0.7582***	0.7155***	0.6617***	0.6078***
	0.0460	0.0409	0.0901	0.0821
N	324	324	251	251
r2	0.0093	0.0042	0.0215	0.0214

6 Discussion

This paper started by asking why the ruling party, CCM, is so dominant in Tanzania, and attempted to shed light on this question by using a rich dataset about political attitudes and behaviors, supplemented by several survey experiments.

The experiments highlight three factors. First, it shows that the historical legacy of institutions from the single party days matter: CCM's ten cell leader network is present and active in Dar es Salaam, and apparently still powerful. Dar residents, at least, are afraid to admit opposition support in its presence. Second, vote buying (or at least provision of gifts from politicians) is pervasive during election campaigns, with a true frequency that is 2-4 times greater than might be inferred from simple survey questions. This presumably offers an advantage to the ruling party, given that it maintains a dramatic financial advantage. So purely on the mechanics of politics – classic clientelism, carrot and stick – CCM maintains massive entrenched advantages.

What about performance and public service delivery? Could opposition candidates gain traction by denouncing corruption and promising reform? In the vignette experiment, we find that while large majorities prefer a speech promising a fight against corruption to a speech promising clientelistic benefits, calling attention to a background of corruption on the part of the patronage provider changes respondent voting intentions – but not dramatically. In fact, poorer voters are actually more likely to “vote” for the patronage candidate, while richer voters are less likely to do so.

One interpretation of the balozi self-censoring phenomenon that we observe is that Tanzanians might support CCM in such large majorities in part because they fear the consequences of being *known* to be an opposition supporter. If the ballot is secret, than this should not reduce the opposition's vote – neither the balozi nor any other official would know that you were an opposition voter. Indeed in the 2012 Afrobarometer survey, for example, 90% of Tanzanians say that they feel completely free to vote for whomever they want without feeling pressured, and only 10% doubt the secrecy of the ballot. This suggests that we cannot draw clear inference from behavior in front of the balozi to behavior at the polling station. What may be at issue is *collective action*. 72% of respondents in the 2012 Afrobarometer survey say that in Tanzania, you have to be careful what you say about politics. This suggests another interpretation. CCM is perfectly willing to let Tanzanians vote freely. But they are careful, in part through the balozi network, to maintain a public sphere in which expressions of support for the opposition are rare. This inhibits collective action through the information channel. In any dominant party regime, opposition voters and activists face a collection action dilemma: No one wants to be the only activist, because in that case punishment is likely and success is impossible. But if there is a critical mass of opposition supporters, there is safety in

numbers and some chance of winning. If Tanzanians are wary of expressing public support for opposition candidates in public forums (such as village meetings) where ten cell leaders are likely to be present, then the country is more likely to stay in low activism equilibrium.²³

What does all of this say about the dynamics of CCM coalition, and more generally about Tanzanian politics going forward? Despite much talk about the growing competitiveness of Tanzanian politics after the 2010 elections, little is likely to change as long as CCM continues to enjoy such entrenched financial and institutional advantages. 2010 election results demonstrate this. While the various opposition parties won an unprecedented 91 out of 357 seats, they do not form a unified bloc and the largest party (Chadema) still only holds 49 seats. And in the constituencies that Kikwete won, his average margin was over 60 percentage points. At the constituency level, there were just 26 in which the 2010 presidential election was decided by 10 points or less.

What about new classes and coalitions? Afrobarometer data from 2008 suggests that the rural poor are more likely to vote CCM, as are women, Christians, and those with less than secondary education (see the regressions in appendix table 2). Tanzania has certainly had rapid economic growth in recent years, and large expansion of access to education. Since middle class, more educated voters are more likely to support the opposition, then perhaps change is on the horizon. However, while national accounts data suggest rapid growth, micro-data from household surveys show slow progress on poverty reduction and limited consumption and income growth for the lower half of the income distribution. Moreover, much of recorded economic growth over the past decade was driven by increases in government spending and aid inflows (World Bank 2012). It remains to be seen whether growth driven by this source is effective at creating new social classes inclined to challenge existing holders of power.²⁴

7 Conclusion

Analysts of African politics frequently point out that democracy in Africa has not translated into dramatic improvements in governance, in part because many regimes have found ways to construct electoral majorities without generating robust economic growth or delivering high quality public services. But the specific mechanisms by which this happens are often not well understood. This paper presents evidence that the ten cell system and pervasive vote buying are important mechanisms of ruling party dominance in Tanzania. Moreover, survey respondents show limited willingness to shift away from electoral candidates when presented with new information related to corruption. These results highlight the path dependency of political outcomes, and the extent to which political institutions created in the past – such as mass mobilization political parties – can establish durable equilibriums and lock in political advantage across generations. The legacy of the single party state is alive and well in Tanzania.

²³ This is consistent with the strategy that Beatriz Magaloni (2006) has reported the PRI implemented in Mexico during the single party era. The PRI used vote buying, election rigging, and other dirty tricks not to win elections – that was guaranteed – but rather to maintain a veneer of invincibility and to convince opposition activists of the futility of organizing against it.

²⁴ Education is also a correlate of opposition voting. However, the Uwezo initiative shows that while schooling has expanded rapidly, learning has lagged dramatically: for example 7 out of 10 Standard 3 students cannot read a paragraph either Kiswahili or English (Uwezo 2011).

Appendix

Table 1: Regression of balozi presence on Kikwete vote share with additional controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
balozi	0.0928*	0.1135**	0.1298**	0.0619
	0.0521	0.0532	0.0561	0.0457
Years school	-0.0105*	-0.0111	-0.0176**	-0.0065
	0.0062	0.0071	0.0077	0.0065
age	0.0024*	0.0038**	0.0030*	0.0023*
	0.0013	0.0015	0.0016	0.0014
female	0.0993**	0.1114**	0.1128**	0.1133***
	0.0385	0.0435	0.0453	0.0383
rural		-0.0019	-0.0189	0.0353
		0.0549	0.0569	0.0483
balozi_trust1		-0.0107		
		0.0401		
non_ccm			-0.0803*	
			0.0452	
opposition_mta				-0.2140***
a				0.0518
N	356	274	261	270
r2	0.0635	0.0851	0.1042	0.1315

Table 2: additional descriptive statistics from the vignette experiment

variable	Obs	Mean	St. Dev
others patronage	324	0.29	0.4545
others reform	324	0.66	0.4753
patronage speech more common	324	0.12	0.3223
reform speech more common	324	0.82	0.3840
Reform likely	324	0.15	0.3527
Patronage likely	324	0.05	0.2170

Table 4: Correlates of CCM support from 2008 Afrobarometer

	(1) reg1	(2) reg2	(3) reg3
poorest	0.0460	0.0175	0.0007
	0.0271	0.0280	0.0273
poor	0.0224	0.0090	-0.0146
	0.0246	0.0253	0.0247
rich	-0.0367	-0.0502	-0.0337
	0.0712	0.0708	0.0685
richest	-0.0543	-0.0352	-0.0247
	0.0284	0.0301	0.0292
age		0.0000	0.0001
		0.0001	0.0001
female		0.0690***	0.0711***
		0.0193	0.0183
urban		-0.0164	-0.0143
		0.0251	0.0261
Religion (Islam=1)		-0.0548**	0.0046
		0.0206	0.0264
Post primary		-0.0303	
		0.0242	
N	1062	1060	1062
r2	0.0116	0.0336	0.1562

REFERENCES

- ARD, Inc., (2003) *Democracy and Governance Assessment of Tanzania – Transitions from the Single-Party State*. Report submitted to USAID. (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacd437.pdf).
- Barkan, J., ed. (1994) *Beyond Capitalism vs. Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania*. Nairobi, Kenya: East African Education Publishers and Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Baregu, M. (1994). “The Rise and Fall of the One Party State in Tanzania.” In Widner, Jenifer (ed.) *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Barnabas, J. and J. Jerit (2010). “Are Survey Experiments Externally Valid?” *American Political Science Review*. 104(2): 226-242.
- Bienen, H. (1970) *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., and A. Smith (2010). “Tanzania’s Economic and Political Performance: A District-Level Test of Selectorate Theory.” Mimeo.
- Hoffman, B. and L. Robinson (2009), “Tanzania’s Missing Opposition,” *Journal of Democracy* 20(4): 123-136.
- Hoffman, B. 2013. The Political Economy of Tanzania. Mimeo.
- Hyden, G. (1999), “Top Down Democratization in Tanzania.” *Journal of Democracy*. 10(4): 142-155.
- Ingle, CR. (1972) “The Ten Cell System in Tanzania: A Consideration of An Emerging Village Institution.” *Journal of Developing Areas* 6:211-226.
- Kelsall, T., Lange, S., Mesaki, S., and Mmuya, M. (2005). “Understanding Patterns of Accountability in Tanzania: The Bottom Up Perspective.” Oxford, UK: Oxford Policy Management, Chr. Michelson Institute, and Research on Poverty Alleviation.
- Lawson, A. and L. Rakner, “Understanding Patterns of Accountability in Tanzania, Final Synthesis Report,” August 2005. London UK: Department for International Development.
- Levity, S., and L. Way. “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” *Journal of Democracy*. 13(2): 51-65.
- O’Barr, J.F. (1972) “Ten Cell Leaders in a Rural Tanzanian Village.” *African Studies Review*. 15(3): 437:
- Putzel, J. and S. Lindeman (2009). “State Resilience in Tanzania.” London: London School of Economics. Mimeo.
- Schedler, A. (2002). “The Menu of Manipulation.” *Journal of Democracy* 13(2): 36-50.

Tripp, A.M. (1997). *Changing the Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal Economy in Tanzania*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Vicente, P. and L. Wantchekon (2009). "Clientelism and Vote Buying: Lessons from Field Experiments in African Elections." *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*. 25(2): 292:305.

Wantchekon, L. (2004) "Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin," *World Politics*. 55: 399-422.

World Bank (2010). World Governance Indicators. Washington DC: World Bank.

Zwane, A., J. Zinman, E. Van Dusen, W. Pariente, C. Null, E. Miguel, M. Kremer, D. Karlan, R. Hornbeck, X. Giné, E. Duflo, F. Devoto, B. Crepon, A. Banerjee (2009). "Being Surveyed Can Change Behavior and Related Parameter Estimates." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 10(1073): 1-6