Entry and Competition in Takeover Auctions

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October 26, 2014

Abstract

This paper examines how the answer to the question "How should a firm be sold?" depends on the relative ability of auctions and negotiations to generate high prices for the shareholders of target companies. We show that possible participants in takeover auctions face substantial uncertainty prior to their entry into an auction, and that less than half of invited bidders choose to participate. Many potential bidders with high willingness to pay are thus regularly absent from the pool of participating bidders. We show, however, that potential bidders' uncertainty need not substantially impair the ability of auctions to create value and that this is because higher uncertainty encourages bidder participation in the auction overall. Accounting for the endogenous determination of the size and composition of the bidder pool, we show that even though auctions are surprisingly resilient in the face of high uncertainty, in many cases target shareholders would obtain higher prices if their company was sold via a negotiation, rather than an auction, even in absence of a formal go-shop procedure. Our results call into question claims that target directors violate their fiduciary duty by selling a company via a negotiated transaction, even in the absence of a formal market check.

Keywords. Takeover Auctions; Mergers and Acquisitions

JEL Classification Numbers: D44 G44.

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A commonly held view is that auctions, in contrast to negotiated sales, yield higher average prices for shareholders of target companies: acquirers prefer negotiated transactions while sell-side advisors regularly prescribe broad-based auctions. For example, Wasserstein (2000) reports that “A wide-ranging auction generally maximizes value . . . sophisticated bidders will do their best to circumvent the auction format,” and the “acquisition criteria” section of Warren Buffett’s annual reports states “We don’t participate in auctions.” A recent survey showed that many buyers overwhelmingly prefer to participate in negotiated purchases but sell companies via auction (Auction Process Roundtable, Mergers and Acquisitions, December 2006, pp. 31-32).

The view that auctions revenue-dominate negotiations has its origin in Bulow and Klemperer (1996), who show that auctions always in principle yield higher revenue than negotiated sales, a theoretical conclusion that Bulow and Klemperer (2009) demonstrate extends to the situation where negotiation bids are shaded upward to deter entry by potential competitors.

Recent research has found that financial markets react similarly to auctions and negotiations, which could be interpreted as evidence that the impact of potential competition on deterrence bids in negotiations is sufficient to generate prices similar to auctions (Boone and Mulherin (2007), Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2010)). Yet there still exists little empirical evidence about how a firm should be sold. One approach to answering this question would be to compare observed deal premia resulting from transactions structured as auctions with deal premia resulting from negotiations. Such an approach would have the potential to yield insights about how firms are sold, but there are at least two reasons why it cannot be informative about how a firm should be sold.

First, the relative optimality of auctions and negotiations depends critically on the size and composition of the pool of participating bidders, yet in practice this pool is not exogenously given. As we show, less than half of invited potential bidders choose to participate in takeover auctions. The relative performance of auctions and negotiations depends
on the quantities that determine a potential bidder’s entry decision, which include uncer-

tainty about realizable synergies with the target and the costs of overcoming it, but these
quantities are not directly observed in the data. A structural approach is thus required to
characterize how a firm should be sold (e.g., Gorbenko and Malenko (2013), Roberts and
Sweeting (2013)). We formally show that failure to account for endogeneity in the size and
composition of the entering bidder pool leads to systematic overestimation of the return to
auctions relative to negotiations.

Second, while takeover auctions have become relatively standardized in practice (Hansen
(2001)), transactions involving a single bidder, which are typically classified as “negotia-
tions,” can take a variety of observationally indistinguishable forms, each of which produce
different levels of expected revenue for target shareholders. This is because negotiations
are not homogenous in their ability to induce high offer prices by a standing negotiating
potential buyer in its attempt to deter entry by other potential competitors. An observed
single-bidder sale could, for example, reflect either a successful one-shot negotiation or it
could reflect a successful first stage in a sequential negotiation.

We overcome these challenges in two ways. First, we develop and estimate a struc-
tural empirical framework that recovers estimates of the takeover market unobservables that
determine the mapping between observed bids and the distribution of all bidder valuations
on the one hand, and the mapping between the distribution of entering bidder valuations and
the distribution of potential bidder valuations on the other. The estimates allow us to quan-
tify how the answer to the question “How should a firm be sold?” systematically depends
on potential bidders’ entry decisions. Second, we use the estimates to characterize how deal
premia would change if the targets that chose to sell their company using an auction format
were instead sold using one of several well-defined negotiation procedures, the effectiveness
of which are characterized by the takeover market primitives recovered by our estimation
procedure. In the framework, potential bidders differ in their valuations for the target and
are invited to participate in a standard takeover auction. Each bidder’s valuation comprises
a target-specific common component and an unobserved bidder-target specific asset complementarity, with uncertainty mitigated upon entry through due diligence conducted on the target.

Our estimation framework introduces several innovations to the empirical finance literature. First, it incorporates and allows us to estimate any level of average pre-entry uncertainty faced by potential bidders. This parameter is required to characterize endogenous entry patterns that determine the size and composition of the pool of entering bidders. Second, our structural empirical approach simultaneously accommodates endogeneity in the major decisions made by a seller and potential buyers including the target’s choice of sale procedure, each potential bidder’s decision to participate in the auction, and strategic bidding by entrants, all of which are conditioned on information about entry costs, the size of the potential bidder pool, the average degree of pre-entry uncertainty faced by potential bidders, and variation across potential bidders in realizable synergies (asset complementarities net integration costs) associated with purchase of the target. Third, we introduce a procedure widely used in the empirical structural auction literature that makes our estimates robust to possible endogeneity along a wide array of sale-level dimensions that are necessarily unobservable to a researcher but not to market participants.

We begin the analysis by using an empirical generalization of our model along with hand-collected data obtained from takeover filings submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission to recover the fundamental primitives that characterize takeover environments. These primitives permit a comparison of the relative performance of auctions and negotiations but also reveal new insights about takeover markets.

Our main findings are as follows. First, we uncover the existence of high uncertainty faced by potential bidders about their valuations for the target, with pre-entry beliefs about values embodying more noise than information. When such uncertainty is high, many invited potential entrants with unfavorable initial beliefs about their values for the target will decline to participate in competitive bidding, even though many of them would have dis-
covered information upon entry that would have led them to revise their valuations upward. High pre-entry uncertainty thus implies that high-value bidders regularly will be absent from the participating bidder pool, and we show that in about 36 percent of takeover auctions the potential bidder with the highest ex post valuation of the target will decline to participate. Our estimates also reveal that potential bidders are extremely heterogeneous in their valuations of a target. This finding suggests that the absence of the potential bidder with the highest valuation from the bidder pool that results when pre-entry uncertainty is present could lead to a substantial loss in revenue for target shareholders.

Second, we use the estimated primitives to quantify how and to what extent pre-entry uncertainty impairs the ability of takeover auctions to create value for target shareholders. To do this, we distinguish between two competing effects of uncertainty on target revenue in takeover auctions. First, the “composition effect” refers to the negative effect of uncertainty on the participation of relatively high-valuation potential bidders, described above. On the other hand, when uncertainty is high, potential entrants with lower pre-entry beliefs about their own valuations know that on average they will on entry face less competition from high-valuation bidders, some of whom will be absent from the entering bidder pool. Potential entrants with marginal beliefs are thus more likely to enter. We show that high uncertainty leads to more entry overall, and we refer to the positive effect of pre-entry uncertainty on the size of entering bidder pool as the “size effect.” We show that, in practice, the existence of high pre-entry uncertainty is less detrimental to target shareholder revenue than might be initially suspected, and our estimates imply that a change to a counterfactual world of perfect pre-entry information would raise target revenue by less than three percent relative to current levels. Endogenous entry thus explains why takeover auction markets are surprisingly resilient to the high level of uncertainty, even though the “right buyers” are regularly absent from the participating bidder pool.

Third, we formally demonstrate that failing to account for endogeneity in the size and composition of the entering bidder pool systematically leads to overestimation of expected
revenue that would accrue to target shareholders by structuring the sale as an auction, relative to a negotiation. We first formally demonstrate that the relative optimality of auctions and negotiations depends on the ability of each to leverage potential competition but that auctions and negotiations leverage potential competition differently. Auctions effectively leverage potential competition through endogenous entry patterns that generate a large and competitive pool of entering bidders. Negotiations leverage potential competition primarily when a standing bidder shades up their offer price to deter entry by additional competitors. We show that uncertainty crucially impacts the relative performance of auctions and negotiations through its influence on endogenous entry in auctions and because it determines the effectiveness of deterrence bidding in negotiations. We further show that failing to account for endogenous entry in takeover auctions is tantamount to assuming that potential bidders’ pre-entry beliefs about their values for the target are pure noise. Our estimates imply that a researcher who failed to account for pre-entry uncertainty and endogenous entry would over-estimate the relative return to target shareholders from auctions by about six percent.

Fourth, we account for endogenous determination of the size and competition of the set of bidders and show that negotiations often leverage potential competition more effectively than do auctions. To do this, we conduct two counterfactual comparisons. We first compare expected revenue from holding a takeover auction with expected revenue from conducting a one-shot negotiation followed by a market check (i.e., a “go-shop”), where a standing bid is publicly posted and potential bidders are invited to submit a higher bid. This structure is a stylized version of negotiation structures widely used in practice (e.g., Subramanian (2008), Wasserstein (2000)). The one-shot negotiation with a market check thus presents a simple and realistic alternative to standard takeover auctions that incorporates pressure on current negotiating bidders to shade up their offers to deter entry by potential competitors (e.g., Bulow and Klemperer (2009)). We show that auctions and negotiations with a market check yield statistically indistinguishable expected revenue, consistent with the current interpretation of Delaware’s Revlon ruling, which views the target’s board of directors as “auctioneers
charged with getting the best price for the stockholders” but where this function can be satisfied when a negotiation is followed by a formal go-shop.

We next compare expected auction revenue with expected revenue arising from a canonical one-on-one negotiation that allows the target to terminate negotiations with a standing bidder and to successively negotiate with additional bidders. Similar sequential mechanisms have been widely examined in the theoretical and empirical literature on optimal sale design (e.g., Fishman (1988), Betton and Eckbo (2000), Horner and Sahuguet (2007), Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2011)). The sequential negotiation also leads to a situation where a standing bidder shades up their offer price to deter potential competitors. We find that targets on average would have obtained 2.5 percent higher deal premia by structuring the sale of their company as a sequential negotiation rather than as an auction. The positive effect of potential competition on expected deal premia is stronger for sequential negotiations than it is in auctions, since in both auctions and the go-shop negotiation uncertainty attenuates entry, thus leading to a degradation in the size and composition of the entering bidder pool. Successive one-shot negotiations thus have the potential to leverage potential competition more effectively than can traditional auction-based procedures. These findings call into question claims that target directors necessarily violate their fiduciary when they elect to sell their company via a negotiation, even if it is not followed by a formal go-shop procedure.

A novel by-product of our structural methodology are estimates permitting exploration of the extent to which the aggregate results previously documented also hold for individual targets. We show that cross-sectional averages mask dramatic variation across targets in the relative returns to auctions and negotiations: while the majority of targets would have obtained higher revenue via a negotiated transaction, this is masked in cross-sectional averages by a small fraction of targets that would obtain significantly higher deal premia through sale via auction. We next show that differences across targets in the relative optimality of auctions and negotiations can be systematically explained by differences across targets in the average degree of uncertainty faced by potential bidders and the costs of over-
coming it, with these two variables jointly explaining about forty percent of the variation across targets in the relative optimality of auctions and negotiations.

Fifth, our methodology uncovers a counterintuitive trade-off between maximizing revenue to target shareholders and maximizing overall takeover value creation: for many targets a decrease in uncertainty leads to higher value creation while also lowering expected deal premia. This finding rationalizes the widespread practice of withholding non-public information from potential bidders prior to their entry into competitive bidding (Hansen (2001)). Our estimates thus provide a new rationale for why targets may withhold, or even obfuscate, nonpublic information before a potential acquirer elects to participate in competitive bidding by signing a confidentiality agreement.

Our work is related to several papers. Boone and Mulherin (2007) analyze 400 takeovers of large public targets and show that about half are structured as auctions. Though our sample is larger and involves more recent takeovers, we also find - using their method to classify auctions - that less than half of takeovers are structured as auctions and that less than half of invited bidders choose to participate in takeover auctions. They use regression analysis to study market reactions to takeovers but, unlike our study, does not examine deal premia, which are more important for our purpose of asking which sale procedures lead to higher sale prices.

This paper is also related to Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2010), who construct proxies for potential competition and in a regression context show that these proxies are positively related to observed bid premia. At the same time, they do not answer the question of how this effect impacts the relative desirability of negotiations and auctions as we do.

Our work is most similar to Gorbenko and Malenko (2013), who build and estimate a structural econometric model on hand-collected data drawn from SEC statements to recover information about the distribution of bidder valuations, and to Roberts and Sweeting (2013), who estimate a model of government timber auctions with entry. Gorbenko and Malenko (2013) take as given the size and composition of the bidder pool and seek to understand
the role played by different bidder types rather than to characterize how uncertainty and endogenous entry impact the relative optimality of auctions and negotiations as we do.

The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a background on takeover auctions with endogenous entry. Section II develops the baseline framework. Section III develops the empirical generalization of the baseline framework. Section IV describes our hand-collected data and reports summary statistics. Section V characterizes takeover environments and uses estimated primitives to understand takeover market efficiency. Section VI compares the performance of auctions and negotiations. Section VII concludes.

I. Institutional Background

This section describes a typical takeover auction. Takeover auctions follow a relatively standardized format, which has been discussed extensively elsewhere (see, for example, Hansen (2001), Boone and Mulherin (2007), Gorbenko and Malenko (2013)). This section restricts attention to aspects relevant to our study.

An auctioning board recruits a sell-side advisor to identify and contact potential bidders, i.e., firms with a possible willingness and ability to acquire the target. Potential bidders are contacted individually and invited to participate in competitive bidding for the target, and participation becomes formal when a potential bidder signs a confidentiality agreement, which determines conditions under which non-public information about the target will be disclosed to the bidder. Access to this non-public information allows the bidder to conduct due-diligence (a costly examination of the target’s finances, operations, and business prospects) before submitting an indication of interest, or a formal bid, since in practice acquirer valuations depend both on a common component (the stand-alone value of the target) but also on asset complementarities specific to a particular merging firm pair. Due diligence may take up to several months and involves analysis of the bidder’s management and in-house deal team, and also by the buy-side advisor’s deal team. Due diligence typically focuses on aspects of the target’s non-public operations relevant for valuating pair-specific asset comple-
mentarities and post-merger integration costs and includes analysis of supply chains, software and machine technology, R&D overlap, intellectual property, marketing programs, potential technology transfer, retiree pension and medical benefits, debt covenants, complementarities in strategic operations, customer perceptions of both companies, the compatibility of corporate cultures and other human resources, strategic reactions of competitors, and customer perceptions of the two companies, among others. From the perspective of a potential acquirer, entry into a takeover auction is thus costly, both in terms of direct pecuniary costs and advisor fees, but also in terms of non-pecuniary costs associated with foregone acquisition opportunities while negotiations are ongoing, risk of reputational capital if negotiations fail, potential revelation of proprietary information if a competing bidder wins the takeover competition, and diversion of the management, board, and deal team’s time.

Information about several aspects of the sale process are specifically restricted by confidentiality agreements. An entering bidder is typically precluded from revealing the fact that the target is up for sale, the value of its indications or bids, or the fact that it is participating in the takeover auction (Kirman (2008)). Potential bidders thus decide whether to enter the auction without knowing whether other firms have entered and, upon entry, must make bids without knowing how many other firms have entered or the value of their bids. This dramatically simplifies analysis of entry and bidding decisions, since it eliminates confounding signaling or timing effects that would arise if entry decisions were observed concurrently by potential entrants, and it also precludes jump bidding or other activities designed to signal or deter other bidders. This also rules out potentially complex forms of collusive behavior (Rosenbaum and Pearl (2009)).

Competing bids are not generally disclosed, even by the target. Bidders instead receive feedback about their offers by receiving communication from the target’s board who indicate whether a bid is “adequate” (i.e., above the target’s reservation price or in striking distance of the highest standing bid). After feedback is delivered, bidders with low bids either raise their bids or exit the auction, and remaining bidders submit more competitive bids. As
before, the target may respond to a bid by indicating that a binding offer is inadequate, and this process repeats until the bidder with the highest value is identified. If the highest bid is above the target board’s reservation price, the deal is announced publicly. This bidding structure most closely resembles an ascending auction with a reserve price in which bidders successively drop out until the bidder with the highest valuation remains (e.g., Subramanian, p. 59 (2011)).

II. Baseline Model Specification

A. Information and Entry

A takeover auction $j$ is initiated when $N_j$ potential bidders $j = \{1, \ldots, J\}$ are contacted and invited to participate in competitive bidding for a target. It well-known in auction theory that expected profits are strictly increasing in the number of potential bidders, so is not surprising that, when asked to conduct a broad-based auction, sell-side advisors generally seek to identify and contact all available potential bidders, though as we will see many potential bidders will endogenously decline to participate. The set of potential bidders is thus viewed as determined by exogenously-given characteristics of the target and its industry (e.g., size, market positioning, industry consolidation), though of course the set of participating bidders will be endogenously determined.

Each potential bidder next chooses whether to enter the auction. Potential bidders formally enter by executing confidentiality agreements with the target and conducting due diligence at cost $c_j$ (e.g., Hansen (2001), Boone and Mulherin (2007)).

Each of the $n_j$ entering bidders engage in competitive bidding for the target, with bidding based on valuations discovered during the entry process. Sale occurs if the final purchase price is greater than the target’s reservation value $V_{0j}$.

We now develop a tractable approach to parameterizing a potential bidder’s information about potential asset complementarities and integration costs associated with the acquisition. Let $V_{ij}$ denote potential bidder’s $i$’s valuation for target $j$, which is observed
after a potential bidder enters, receives access to nonpublic information, and conducts due
diligence. Valuations depend both on a common stand-alone component \( (M_j) \) and an idio-
syncratic asset complementarity net of integration costs \( (\nu_{ij}) \), specific to a particular acquirer
and target pair. Following Gorbenko and Malenko (2013), we specify the unconditional dis-
tribution of valuations \( V_{ij} \) among potential acquirers for target \( j \) as follows:

\[
V_{ij} = M_j \exp\{\nu_{ij}\}.
\]

The distribution of \( V_{ij} \) reflects a heterogeneity across bidders along an array of dimensions
(e.g., industrial or product market similarity to the target, strategic vs financial bidders, etc.), that determine asset complementarities and integration costs, which are in practice likely to be different across bidders. The \( \nu_{it} \) are drawn independently from a Gaussian
distribution with target-specific mean \( \mu_{v_{ij}} \) and variance \( \sigma^2_{v_{ij}} \). By allowing primitives to be
target-specific, both components of target valuations are allowed to be correlated through
both the vector of observed target and market characteristics \( (X_j) \) and a vector of target- and market-level unobservables (e.g., \( \mu_{\nu_{ij}} \)). Our empirical implementation will accommodate both forms of correlation, which are likely to be non-zero in the data.

Each potential acquirer \( i \) observes \( M_j \) and a private signal \( S_{ij} \) of its uncertain valuation
\( V_{ij} \) prior to entry. Conventional studies of auctions with entry have focused on one of two
knife-edge cases: no pre-entry information \( (S_{ij} \perp V_{ij}) \), which has its origins in Samuelson
(1985), and perfect pre-entry information \( (V_{ij} = h(S_{ij}) \) for some function \( h(\cdot) \), originally
developed by Levin and Smith (1994). These assumptions have important implications for
how a company should be sold: the assumption of no pre-entry information, employed by
Bulow and Klemperer (1996) implies that potential bidders randomly choose to enter into
competitive bidding, which in turn generates the now-famous conclusion that auctions always
generate higher returns to target shareholders than do negotiations.
These polar extreme assumptions simplify auction models, but in practice the degree of pre-entry uncertainty faced by potential bidders is never directly observed, yet entry behavior (and as a consequence the relative optimality of auctions and negotiations) depends crucially on it. The framework laid out above, in contrast, implies the following unconditional dependence on $V_{ij}$:

$$S_{ij} = V_{ij} \exp\{\varepsilon_{ij}\},$$

where errors $\varepsilon_{ij}$ are Gaussian white-noise with target-specific standard deviation $\sigma_{\varepsilon j}$. Since monotone transformations of a signal preserve information, the marginal distribution of $S_{ij}$ is irrelevant; all that matters is the dependence between $V_{ij}$ and $S_{ij}$. This is important because it implies that any normalization for $S_{ij}$ will generate identical empirical results if the copula between $V_{ij}$ and $S_{ij}$ is preserved. A potential bidder’s ex ante pre-entry uncertainty about their valuation of the target is parameterized using the following noise-to-signal ratio:

$$\alpha_j = \sigma_{\varepsilon j}^2 / (\sigma_{v j}^2 + \sigma_{\varepsilon j}^2) \in [0, 1].$$

This definition of the noise-to-signal ratio implies that an $\alpha_j$ closer to 0 implies a more informative signal, which as we will see leads potential bidders to place stronger credence on their pre-entry signals.

Our general entry framework thus overcomes the need to make an extreme assumption about the average level of potential bidder’s pre-entry information: rather than making an extreme assumption about of unobserved pre-entry information and entry behavior by accommodating virtually any entry structure subject to the weak constraint that higher signals on average signal higher values. By imbedding the informativeness of signal precisions into the empirical model, we are able to directly estimate it to recover the first empirical measure of the degree to which potential bidders have confidence about their relative values.
for the target, prior to entry. This in turn will allow us to characterize entry patterns in corporate takeover auctions.

B. Expected Entry Profits

This section characterizes an entrant’s expected profit, which depends on equilibrium in the bidding stage. This profit will be used in the next section to characterize equilibrium in the entry stage. All variables are target-specific, though we suppress the $j$ subscripts in this section to ease exposition.

Entering bidders compete in a standard auction for the target. Recall that bids in takeover auctions are in practice sealed in the sense that standard confidentiality agreements prevent bidders from having access to information about competing bids or the number of entering bidders. The dominant strategy in such an environment, for an entrant with value realization $v_i$ is to bid until the current posted price reaches $v_i$, and to exit when the target indicates that a bid $b_i > v_i$ is required to remain in competitive bidding. This structure mirrors an ascending button auction. If no entrant has a valuation above the target’s reservation price, the auction will end when the final bidder drops out, and the auction results in no sale. Otherwise, bidding will continue until the purchase price reaches the maximum of the second-highest entrant valuation and the target’s reservation price, at which point competitive bidding will conclude.

Let $F^*(\cdot|N)$ be the CDF of the equilibrium distribution of valuations among $n$ entering bidders and let $V_{0t}$ be drawn a target-specific reserve distribution $F_0(\cdot)$ with $V_{0t} = M_t \exp\{\nu_{0t}\}$ and where $\nu_{0t}$ is normally distributed with parameters $\{\mu_{vt}, \sigma_{vt}\}$. Appendix A shows that so the expected profit of an entrant with valuation $v_i$ is given as

$$\pi^*(v_i; n, N) = \int_0^{v_i} F_0(y) \cdot F^*(y|N)^{n-1} \, dy.$$
C. Entry Behavior

This section characterizes a potential bidder’s entry decision, which depends in potentially complicated ways on a potential bidder’s expectations of its own valuation and those of other bidders, the expected number of competitors faced upon entry, competitors’ potential synergies with the target, and the target’s reservation value. We now show that this complexity can be appreciably reduced by recognizing that a potential bidder’s optimal entry decision can be characterized by a signal threshold rule where the potential bidder enters if its expected profit from participating in the auction is greater than zero.

It can be shown that any equilibrium of the form considered here has a representation in threshold strategies. An important consideration is that in the knife-edge case $S_i \perp V_i$ there may exist equilibria in which bidders can do no better than randomizing their entry decisions. Gentry and Li (2014) show that in that case randomization on the basis of a threshold is equivalent to any other rule for randomization, so focusing on the threshold equilibrium involves no loss of generality.

We seek a symmetric pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which entry decisions can be characterized by a signal threshold $s^*_N$ such that bidder $i$ chooses to enter if and only if $S_i \geq s^*_N$. Let $F^*(\cdot; s^*_N)$ denote the distribution of valuations conditional on the event

$$S_i \geq s^*_N : F^*(v; s^*_N) = F(v|S_i \geq s^*_N) = \frac{1}{1 - F_s(s^*_N)} \int_{s^*_N}^{\infty} F(v|t) f_s(t) \, dt.$$ 

The following identity will be useful: for any $(v, s^*)$,

$$(1 - F_s(s^*)) F^*(v; s^*) = \int_{s^*}^{\infty} F(v|t) f_s(t) \, dt = F_v(v) - F(v, s^*). \quad (0.1)$$
Independence of signals implies that the total number of entrants \( n \) will follow a binomial distribution based on entry probability \( [1 - F_s(s_N^*)] \):

\[
\Pr(n|N, s_N^*) = \binom{N}{n} F_s(s_N^*)^{N-n} \cdot [1 - F_s(s_N^*)]^n.
\]

Further, by construction, the probability that any given entrant draws a value below \( v \) is

\[
F^*(v|N) = F^*(v; s_N^*).
\]

Now consider the entry decision of potential acquirer \( i \) drawing signal realization \( S_i = s_i \). Conditional on own signal \( s_i \), the equilibrium threshold \( s_N^* \), and total competition \( N \), this acquirer forecasts profits \( \Pi(s_i; s_N^*, N) \). Expanding this term yields,

\[
E_V[E_n[\pi^*(v_i; n, N)|n \geq 1]|S_i = s_i] = \int_0^\infty \int_0^v \left[ F_0(y) \sum_{n=1}^N \binom{N-1}{n-1} F_s(s_N^*)^{N-n} [1 - F_s(s_N^*)]^{n-1} \cdot F^*(y; s_N^*)^{n-1} \right] dy \, dF(v|s_i)
\]
\[
= \int_0^\infty \int_0^v \left[ F_0(y) \sum_{n=1}^N \binom{N-1}{n-1} F_s(s_N^*)^{N-n} ([1 - F_s(s_N^*)]F^*(y; s_N^*))^{n-1} \right] dy \, dF(v|s_i)
\]
\[
= \int_0^\infty \int_0^v \left[ F_0(y) [F_s(s_N^*) + (1 - F_s(s_N^*))F^*(y; s_N^*)]^{N-1} \right] dy \, dF(v|s_i)
\]
\[
= \int_0^\infty \int_0^v \left[ F_0(y) [F_s(s_N^*) + F_v(y) - F(y, s_N^*)]^{N-1} \right] dy \, dF(v|s_i),
\]

where the fourth equality follows by properties of binomial series.

Reversing the order of integration yields our main expression for *ex ante* expected profit.
of potential acquirer with Stage 1 signal $S_i = s_i$:

$$\Pi(s_i; s_N^*, N) = \int_0^\infty [1 - F(v|s_i)] \cdot F_0(y) \cdot [F_s(s_N^*) + F_v(y) - F(y, s_N^*)]^{N-1} dy.$$ 

$F(v|s_i)$ is decreasing in $s_i$, by stochastic dominance, $F_s(s_N^*) + F_v(y) - F(y, s_N^*)$ is increasing in $s_N^*$ by the identity

$$F_s(s_N^*) + F_v(y) - F(y, s_N^*) = F_s(s_N^*) + \int_{s^*}^{s_N} F(v|t) f_s(t) \, dt$$

and it is easy to show that $F_s(s_N^*) + F_v(y) - F(y, s_N^*) \in [0, 1]$.

We now pause to discuss several aspects of the intuition behind this expression. First, ex ante expected profit $\Pi(s_i; s_N^*, N)$ is increasing in $s_i$: a potential entrant who receives a high signal is more likely to be a relatively high-valuation bidder and is thus more likely to win the auction upon entry and, conditional on winning, is likely to obtain higher surplus. Second, this effect will be higher when pre-entry uncertainty is low, since in that case a potential bidder will place stronger credence on their signal as an indicator of realizable synergies net of integration costs.

Third, expected profit is increasing in $s_N^*$, all else equal, since a higher equilibrium signal threshold implies less entry by all potential bidders, which will result in a smaller set of post-entry competitors, again raising a potential entrant’s probability of winning and the surplus that might obtain from winning.

Finally, expected entry profits are decreasing in the set of potential bidders, since more competition immediately decreases the probability that a given signal reflects a winning underlying valuation. Thus, all else equal, potential bidder $i$ prefers a higher own signal, prefers potential rivals to have a lower probability of entry, and prefers to purchase a target situated in an industry where there is less potential competition.
We now characterize equilibrium entry. Bidder $i$ will enter into competitive bidding if expected profit from doing so is positive:

$$
\Pi(s_i; s^*_N, N) - c \geq 0.
$$

The equilibrium threshold $s^*_N$ must thus satisfy the break even condition:

$$
\Pi(s^*_N; s^*_N, N) - c = 0; \quad (0.2)
$$

that is, a marginal potential bidder with signal $S_i = s^*_N$ must be indifferent between entering and not. $\Pi(s_i; s^*_N, N)$ is increasing in its first argument and strictly increasing in its second, so the break even condition (0.2) will have a unique solution $s^*_N$. Further, since $\Pi(s_i; s^*_N, N)$ is decreasing in $N$, this solution $s^*_N$ will be increasing in $N$. Finally, by form of the entry rule, the distribution of valuations among bidders choosing to enter in equilibrium will be $F^*(v; s^*_N) = F(v|S_i \geq s^*)$. Thus the signal threshold $s^*_N$ is sufficient to characterize equilibrium entry and bidding behavior.

III. Empirical Generalization

We now generalize the framework to develop an structural empirical model. First denote the observed premium obtaining from auction of target $j$, defined as the sale price normalized by the target’s market value four weeks prior to announcement, as $p_j$. Let $sale_j$ be an indicator variable that takes a value of unity if an initiated auction results in sale. The goal is to recover information about the target-specific vector of fundamental primitives $\theta_j = \{\mu_{vj}, \sigma_{vj}, \mu_{0j}, \sigma_{0j}, c_j, \alpha_j\}$, conditional on observing auctions resulting in sale.

Our empirical approach addresses two empirical challenges. The first challenge is that any study of observed takeover auctions is conducted on a nonrandom sample due to
the existence of unobserved failed auctions not resulting in public announcement. During the process of manually collecting data on the pre-announcement sale process, we encountered a number of instances where proxy statements associated with successful transactions reported the existence of previous failed sale attempts. Such selection would perturb the mapping between observed data and primitives characterizing takeover environments. In particular, this form of selection could lead to unobserved differences between the distribution of potential entrant valuations and the distribution of entering bidders’ valuations, even after explicitly conditioning on target characteristics, since the distribution of target characteristics conditional on sale will differ from the unconditional unobserved distribution of target characteristics. This form of sample selection will operate through two channels. First, conditional on any realization $\theta_j$, selection based on sale will increase the likelihood of observing higher sale prices and the likelihood of observing a higher number of entrants. Second, since the vector $\theta_j$ is heterogeneous across targets in the population, the distribution of $\theta_j$ conditional on sale would, without correction, be biased toward realizations that increase the conditional probability that a sale will occur.

The second empirical challenge is that the target-level primitives are only imperfectly predicted by observable characteristics. Better targets thus attract more entry and at the same time lead to higher prices. Failure to correct for this potential endogeneity in target characteristics would lead to bias in the estimated fundamental parameters. To the extent that analysis controls for sale-level observables, such endogeneity is less problematic. By taking as given the decision to conduct an auction, our empirical approach circumvents endogeneity in the choice of sale procedure, but it cannot rule out the existence of unobserved factors that cannot be directly measured by a researcher, but which could influence deal premia in a way that was non-random.

To see how we do this, allow targets to differ both along observable dimensions ($X_j$) and along unobservable dimensions that influence target-level primitives $\theta_j$ but which are never directly observed. To flexibly accommodate both forms of heterogeneity, we allow $\theta_j$ to
be drawn unobservably from a joint distribution $g(\cdot)$, which depends on $X_j$ through a vector of parameters $\Gamma$. This approach can approximate to arbitrary precision a traditional likelihood framework in which $\theta_j$ is deterministic given $X_j$, while simultaneously accommodating the far more important case where sale-level characteristics differ in ways fundamentally unobservable to the econometrician.

To gain intuition, first consider how we would implement estimation when $\theta_j$ is completely determined by $X_j$ (e.g., $\theta_j = X_j \Gamma$). Let $\Pr(\text{sale}_j|N_j, \theta_j)$ denote the probability that an auction with $N_j$ bidders for a target with characteristics $\theta_j$ results in sale, and $\Pr(n_j, p_j, \text{sale}_j|N_j; \theta_j)$ denote the probability of the joint event “$n_j$ of $N_j$ bidders enter, the sale price is $p_j$, and the auction results in sale” for a target with characteristics $\theta_j$. Setting $\theta_j = X_j \Gamma$, the likelihood contribution of target $j$ at parameters $\Gamma$ would then be:

$$L(p_j, n_j|\text{sale}_j, N_j, X_j, \Gamma) = \frac{\Pr(p_j, \text{sale}_j, n_j|N_j; \theta_j = X_j \Gamma)}{\Pr(\text{sale}_j|N_j; \theta_j = X_j \Gamma).} \quad (0.3)$$

Our bidding model yields analytic forms for $\Pr(\text{sale}_j|N_j, \theta_j)$ and $\Pr(n_j, p_j, \text{sale}_j|N_j; \theta_j)$ (see Appendix B). Thus estimation of $\Gamma$ would simply reduce to maximizing (0.3) across targets in the sample.

Now consider estimation in the more realistic case when target-level primitives $\theta_j$ are only imperfectly predicted by $X_j$. In this case, as is well-known in the auction literature, failure to account for variation in $\theta_j$ over and above that predicted by $X_j$ will overestimate the variance of valuations among bidders and therefore lead to upward-biased estimates of parameters such as entry costs (e.g., Krasnokutskaya (2012)). More generally, the econometrician is unlikely to observe all factors that determine target values, while some of these may be observable to entrants. Explicitly accounting for such unobserved target-level heterogeneity thus adds an additional dimension of robustness to the analysis. We proceed as follows. Let $g(\theta|X_j, \Gamma)$ denote the distribution of $\theta_j$ given $X_j$ at parameters $\Gamma$. Integrat-
ing out unobserved $\theta_j$ and adjusting for selection of targets on the basis of sale, we thus ultimately obtain the observable target-level likelihood function

$$L_j(p_j, n_j|\text{sale}_j, N_j, X_j, \Gamma) = \frac{\int \Pr(p_j, \text{sale}_j, n_j|N_j; \theta_j) \ g(\theta_j|X_j, \Gamma) \ d\theta_j}{\int \Pr(\text{sale}_j|N_j; \theta_j) \ g(\theta_j|X_j, \Gamma) \ d\theta_j}. \quad (0.4)$$

As above, our primitives of interest are the parameters $\Gamma$, which describe the relationship between parameters $\theta_j$ and observables $X_j$. Accounting for unobservable target-level differences, however, these now describe the entire distribution of $\theta_j$ given $X_j$ rather than just its mean. Maximization of the likelihood function (0.4) with respect to $\Gamma$ will yield an estimate $\hat{\Gamma}$ robust to both rich unobserved target-level heterogeneity and sample selection based on sale. In turn, since these characterize the entire distribution $g(\theta|X_j, \Gamma)$ rather than just its mean, we ultimately obtain the ability to perform counterfactuals along both observable and unobservable dimensions of target heterogeneity. This is a novel feature in our analysis and yields a rich set of predictions not available with a traditional maximum likelihood analysis.

Direct evaluation of the likelihood function (0.4) using standard simulation procedures is computationally prohibitive. We circumvent this difficulty by applying the importance sampling procedure proposed by Ackerberg (2009) and implemented by Roberts and Sweeting (2013). The essence of this procedure is to draw a large random sample of primitives $\{\theta_r\}_{r=1}^R$ from any proposal density $\tilde{g}(\cdot)$; standard choices for $\tilde{g}(\cdot)$ would be normal or uniform distributions, though convergence implies that the estimated parameters are insensitive to the initial proposal distribution. Taking logs of (0.4) and simulating integrals by the importance sample $\{\theta_r\}_{r=1}^R$ from $\tilde{g}(\cdot)$, we obtain the following tractable target-level log
likelihood, maximization of which yields our estimated parameters:

\[
\ln L(p_j, n_j|\text{sale}_j, N_j, X_j, \Gamma) = \ln \left( \sum_{r=1}^{R} \Pr(p_j, \text{sale}_j, n_j|N_j; \theta_r) \frac{g(\theta_r|X_j, \Gamma)}{\tilde{g}(\theta_r)} \right) - \ln \left( \sum_{r=1}^{R} \Pr(\text{sale}_j|N_j; \theta_r) \frac{g(\theta_r|X_j, \Gamma)}{\tilde{g}(\theta_r)} \right).
\]  

(0.5)

Note given \(\{\theta_r\}_{r=1}^{R}\), (0.5) depends on \(\Gamma\) only through the density function \(g(\cdot|X, \Gamma)\). This leads to significant computation savings relative to the initial formulation (0.4), as we need only compute \(\Pr(p_j, \text{sale}_j, n_j|N_j; \theta_r)\) and \(\Pr(\text{sale}_j|N_j; \theta_r)\) once for each \(\theta_r\).

We now pause to conceptually describe how maximization of this function recovers target-level primitives (a more formal and detailed description can be found in Appendix B). The initial draws \(\{\theta_r\}_{r=1}^{R}\) yield a sample of hypothetical targets, where (as usual in importance sampling) weighting by \(1/\tilde{g}(\theta_r)\) corrects for the fact that these are drawn from \(\tilde{g}\) rather than \(g\). Maximization of (0.5) with respect to \(\Gamma\) is then equivalent to choosing weights \(g(\cdot|X_j, \Gamma)\) on these hypothetical targets to maximize the likelihood of the observed data. In other words, we first generate a universe of possible firms, then choose \(\Gamma\) to select the subset of these that are empirically relevant. As shown by Ackerberg (2009) and Roberts and Sweeting (2013), the result is an estimator \(\hat{\Gamma}\) consistent for the true parameters \(\Gamma\).

### IV. Data and Summary Statistics

We analyze a set of corporate takeovers announced between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2009 drawn from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) mergers and acquisitions database and satisfying the following set of conditions:

- The target is a publicly-traded U.S. company listed in the S&P 1500
- The deal value greater than $1 million
• The acquirer owns 100% as a consequence of the deal

• Financial data on the target is available from Standard and Poor’s *Compustat* database

Proxy statements submitted by the target or acquirer to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) were used to manually collect information on the number of potential and participating bidders in each auction.\(^1\) For a takeover to be included in the sample, we required that these background sections were available on the SEC Edgar online filing system.

We also required that data on the final sale price - the deal premium - be available from Thomson’s *SDC Platinum*. We also manually coded information on winning bids from takeover press releases and proxy statements, which we used these to cross-check reported premia data from SDC. In our context, possible misvaluation of reported stock bids would show up as a form of measurement error, and would be captured by our heterogeneity distributions, described below. As a robustness check, we also estimated our model parameters on the sample of all-cash bids and found similar results to our main estimates.

This procedure yielded a sample of 980 takeovers. Following Boone and Mulherin (2007) and Gorbenko and Malenko (2013), we define participating bidders as those signing a confidentiality agreement with the target, and we classify takeovers as auctions if multiple buyers were contacted by the target. Table 1 reports the number of auction and negotiated transactions for each year in our sample.

![Table 1](#)

Characteristics of the target come from *Compustat* database. We collect and construct the following target characteristics: firm size defined as the book value of the target’s total assets, market leverage, q-ratio (market-to-book), cash and intangibles relative to target book assets, and the target’s industry. We follow standard assumptions used in the corporate

finance literature to filter out implausible or unreasonable values. Specifically, we exclude
from the sample observations with q-ratio in excess of 10, instances in which the ratio of
the winning bid to the target’s value under the current management is less than unity
and instances with bid premia above 200%. We also exclude nonclassifiable establishments
from the sample. After applying these filters, our estimation sample contains 565 takeover
auctions.

Table 2 reports the average number of potential bidders, entrants, and deal premia, for
auctions, negotiations, and the full sample. Negotiations and auctions yield similar average
deal premia. Almost 60 percent takeovers involve targets sold via auction, and among these
only 43 percent of invited potential bidders elect to participate in competitive bidding for
the target. Limited participation is thus an important stylized feature of the data.

Table 3 reports average characteristics of targets sold via auction and negotiation,
and shows that these firms are very similar in their market to book ratios, cash to asset
ratios, leverage, and intangibles to asset ratios. The top row also shows that large targets
tend to be sold via negotiation, with targets sold via auction having total assets averaging
$1.60 billion while targets sold via negotiation having total assets averaging $2.95 billion.
This size differential is consistent with the view that because there may exist only a single
exogenously-given potential bidder with the ability to finance the deal or integrate the target
into its operations, the largest targets will be sold via negotiation.

V. Characterizing Takeover Environments

This section uses the structural empirical framework along with our hand-collected
data on the pre-announcement takeover process to recover distributions of the sale-level
primitives characterizing the takeover markets in which both auctions and negotiations take
place. Before proceeding, we pause and ask what new information these estimates could
convey about takeover markets.
First, information about these primitives cannot be recovered via standard regression techniques, since the relevant quantities, such as the average degree of potential entrant uncertainty about their values for the target, are never directly observed. In addition, a potential bidder’s entry decision depends on the entire distribution of potential bidders values, yet neither observed winning bids nor direct proxies for potential competition are sufficient to recover the entire distribution of non-entrant or losing bidder valuations, so a structural approach is required to characterize how entry and competition impact takeover markets.

Second, our framework’s generality nests many possible models of empirical takeover markets, and the estimated parameters will characterize how takeover markets function in practice. Consider, for example, the role played by uncertain information about potential synergies: a model of takeover auctions without entry emerges if maximal pre-entry is assumed, since in this case the distribution of entering bidders is identical to the distribution of potential bidders, while the set of entering bidders is smaller than the set of potential bidders because not all potential bidders choose to participate. Similarly, in a world with high uncertainty but where potential bidders’ signals contain some information, a high-signal potential entrant is unsure whether this reflects high takeover synergies, or something else. This in turn implies that high-synergy potential bidders are less likely to enter the auction, which in equilibrium results in fewer value-creating mergers.

A. Recovering Fundamental Takeover Market Primitives

We recover estimates of the fundamental parameters via maximization of equation (??) over the data vector \((n_j, p_j, X_j, N_j, sale_j)\). Table IV reports quantiles of the estimated sale-level parameter distributions evaluated at mean values of observables and median values of the heterogeneity distributions (Panel A) and at quantiles of the posterior likelihood evaluated at median observables (Panel B).

[[[ Insert Table IV About Here ]]]
Table IV reports the results. The mean of the potential entrant valuation distribution in Column (1) of Panel A is 0.19, which implies that the average willingness to pay of potential entrants would is equivalent to a 19% deal premium, well below the 42% mean deal premium observed in the data. This finding provides an initial answer to the question about the ability of observed sale procedures to maximize revenue for target shareholders: takeover auctions extract deal premia 22 percentage points higher than an alternate sale procedure that randomly paired the target with a random potential bidder and split the surplus.

Column (2) of Panel A shows that potential bidders differ dramatically in their ex post valuations for the target: The variance of potential acquirer valuations ($\sigma_{vj}$) is centered at 0.16, which is almost as large as the mean ex post potential bidder valuation. This dramatic variation across potential acquirers in realizable synergies implies that the identity of the ultimate buyer potentially plays an important role in determining the ability of takeover markets to create value. Limited participation and endogenous entry are thus likely to play an important role in determining the extent to which auctions extract value for target shareholders.

Column (4) reports estimates of the average degree of potential entrant’s pre-entry uncertainty. The estimates of $\alpha$ are well between zero and one, with a mean of 0.64, indicating that in practice potential bidders are neither perfectly informed nor completely uninformed about their value for the target, prior to entry. Using using (??) and the mean estimate in Column (4) demonstrates that potential entrants’ signals contain more noise than information and implies that some potential entrants will, prior to entry, be unaware about the existence of high asset complementarities (or conversely, low integration costs), and may not elect to participate in a competitive auction for the target. Thus, even if takeover markets are efficient in all other aspects, the existence of imperfect information implies that the “right buyer” will regularly not be an ultimate acquirer, and takeover markets may generate less value relative to a world of perfect pre-entry information. Combined with the finding
that valuations are widely-dispersed across potential bidders, the finding of large average
total uncertainty raises the possibility that high uncertainty has a substantial negative
impact on revenue accruing to target shareholders from a takeover auction sale. This issues
will be formally addressed in Section V.B.

Rows (3) and (4) of Panel A show that the aggregate estimates conceal dramatic
variation across targets in the parameters that characterize individual takeover markets. For
example, $\alpha$ is less than 0.45 for 25 percent of targets while also being greater than 0.86 for 25
percent of targets, with the potential buyers of some targets being extremely uncertain about
possible valuations, prior to entry. Heterogeneity in the cross-section of takeover markets is
thus an important feature of the data, raising the possibility that an effort to identify a “one
size fits all” prescription for how a company should be sold may prove fruitless.

The mean of the entry cost distribution, reported in Column (3), is equal to about 1%
of the deal value. As a comparison, advisory fees charged to acquirers average approximately
0.5% of deal value.

B. Characterizing Takeover Auctions

Having estimated primitives that characterize the competitive environment in which
companies are sold, we now explore how the existence of high pre-entry uncertainty, docu-
mented in Section V.A. impacts the ability of takeover auctions to generate high premia for
target shareholders. Holding constant the average level of asset complementarities available
to potential entrants, the ability of any sale mechanism to elicit a high price will be deter-
mined by the entry patterns that endogenously determine the size and composition of the
entering bidder pool, which in expectation influences the maximal valuation - and thus the
maximal bid.

Section V.B. has shown that substantial pre-entry uncertainty exists in takeover mar-
kets. How does this uncertainty affect target shareholder revenue? Pre-entry uncertainty
impairs the ability of potential entrants to assess their possible values for the target, prior
to conducting due-diligence, implying that some potential entrants will initially have unfa-
vorarable - and possibly weak - priors about their values for the target, and will decline to participate in competitive bidding. Yet had these firms elected to enter, some would have discovered relatively high valuations for the target, and would thus have a high willingness to pay, and this would have led to higher realized deal premia. Thus, given a fixed size of the entering bidder pool, an auction will generate higher expected revenue for target shareholders if the entering bidder pool contains relatively more high-valuation bidders with a high willingness to pay. Our structural estimates allow us to calculate the probability that the “right buyer” (i.e. the potential entrant with the highest valuation) declines to enter a takeover auction. We compute this probability for a typical takeover environment with $\alpha = 0.64$ and find that the “right buyer,” declines an invitation to participate in competitive bidding about 36 percent of the time.

We refer to the influence of uncertainty on the quality of the bidder pool, which operates through endogenous entry patterns, as the “composition effect” and define it as follows. The composition effect is measured as the difference between the expected price that would maintain if the composition of the entering and potential bidder pools were identical. Notice that the composition of the entering and potential bidder pools will be identical only when entry decisions are random, and this in turn will endogenously occur only when pre-entry signals are pure noise, i.e. when $\alpha = 1.0$. As pre-entry uncertainty falls, relatively high-value potential bidders become more certain about their values and become more likely to enter, holding the size of the entering bidder pool fixed.

To formally examine the composition effect we focus on a typical takeover auction, which henceforth will indicate one defined by median values of $\mu_{vj}$, $\sigma_{vj}$, and $c_j$ with $V_{0j} = 1$ and $N = 8$ for mean observed $(X_j)$ and unobserved $(\Gamma_j)$ sale-level heterogeneity.\(^2\) To do this,

\(^2\)A unique feature of our structural approach, in contrast to standard regression analysis, is that it in principle allows for computation of estimates for a variety of possible targets rather than estimates for the average target.

For tractability we focus our analysis on a typical target, though our main results are robust across a wide array of parameter and covariate estimates.
we hold the overall level of entry constant and compute the probability that different types of potential entrants elect to participate in competitive bidding. Specifically, we compute the relative probability that the \( p \)th percentile highest value bidder enters for \( \alpha = 0.64 \). We next re-compute these entry probabilities at various levels of pre-entry uncertainty.

Figure I reports the relative probability that different types of bidders elect to enter. As uncertainty rises, the entering bidder pool becomes composed of more relatively low-valuation bidders. This is because as uncertainty increases, relatively high-valuation bidders receive lower signals while relatively low-valuation bidders receive higher signals, and this leads the former to elect not to participate while encouraging the latter to participate. Thus, holding the size of the entering bidder pool fixed, an increase in pre-entry uncertainty relative to its average level degrades the overall quality of the entering bidder pool, and the composition effect is decreasing in \( \alpha \).

The finding that uncertainty leads to less entry by relatively high valuation bidder could be interpreted to suggest that uncertainty substantially inhibits the ability of takeover auctions to generate high prices for target shareholders. Surprisingly, however, endogenous entry implies that this need not be the case, since higher uncertainty might in equilibrium lead to more entry overall, even while it degrades the quality of the entering bidder pool, and this could raise expected prices if some low-signal entrants upon entry discover higher valuations for the target. Thus, fixing the relative composition of the entering bidder pool, an auction will generate higher expected revenue if the endogenously-determined size of the entering bidder pool is larger. We refer to possible channel as the “size effect,” and note that in a world with pre-entry uncertainty, some high-valuation bidders are likely to be absent from the entering bidder pool, which raises the probability that other potential entrants will win a bidding competition upon entry while at the same time high uncertainty implies that potential entrants with low signals place less credence on their unfavorable pre-entry beliefs. Formally, we define the size effect for an auction with \( n \) entering bidders as the
difference between the actual deal premium and the one that would result if the distribution of potential and entering bidders were identical, i.e. relative to the baseline case where \( \alpha = 1 \), and entry is random. The sum of the size and composition effects thus by definition equals the observed takeover premium.

\[
\text{[Insert Figure II About Here]}
\]

We now examine the possibility that high pre-entry uncertainty encourages entry, i.e. that the size effect is positive. To do this we iteratively compute the probability that individual invited bidders choose to enter, determined by the break even threshold (0.2) and combine these to obtain the expected fraction of invited potential bidders that elect to participate in the takeover auction. We begin by computing this quantity for the observed mean of uncertainty, \( \alpha = 0.64 \), and then iteratively alter \( \alpha \) and re-compute the entry probabilities.

Figure II reports the estimated degree of limited participation for various levels of pre-entry uncertainty. At mean uncertainty, about half of invited bidders choose to participate, with the size of the entering bidder pool increasing monotonically in \( \alpha \). Over 90 percent of invited bidders participate in auctions of highly opaque targets, i.e. those for which \( \alpha \) is close to one.

Uncertainty thus negatively impacts expected takeover auction revenue through its influence on the composition of the entering bidder pool but raises expected revenue through its effect on the size of the entering bidder pool. Auctions thus leverage potential competition by inducing entry to generate a large pool of high-value bidders, yet it is unclear whether uncertainty ultimately impairs the ability of takeover auctions to create value for the shareholders of selling companies. The effect of uncertainty on takeover auction revenue thus ultimately depends on the relative magnitudes of the size and composition effects.

We compute the size and composition effects across different levels of pre-entry uncertainty. The composition effect accounts for up to 13.4 percentage points or equivalently about a third of takeover auction deal premia. The composition component of the observed
deal premia declines monotonically in pre-entry uncertainty, accounting for 7.6 percentage points of observed deal premia at the mean level of uncertainty and falling gradually to zero at complete pre-entry uncertainty. The size effect accounts for a larger share of takeover revenue, consistent with the popular view that the virtue of auctions is their ability to attract competition among a large number of bidders. At the same time, the substantial estimated size of the composition effect indicates that a complete understanding of the effectiveness of auctions relative to negotiations should account for the effect of fundamental takeover market characteristics on both the size and composition effects.

Does the high level of uncertainty present in takeover markets impair the ability of auctions to generate value for target shareholders? It is tempting to conclude that the answer to this question is “no,” since it may be easier to imagine that more potential bidders will enter when they on average are more sure about possible synergies obtainable from acquisition of a target. Yet the logic developed in this paper shows that when entry is endogenous and costly, uncertainty encourages entry by presenting many potential bidders with an environment in which the prospect of losing a bidding war upon entry is not a foregone conclusion.

We now formalize the relationship between expected revenue and uncertainty by combining the size and composition effects in Figure III, which plots expected takeover revenue against pre-entry uncertainty. This figure shows that target shareholder revenue is increasing in pre-entry uncertainty, implying that the positive influence of uncertainty on the size of the entering bidder pool is more important than the negative influence of uncertainty on the composition of the entering bidder pool. Our framework shows that taking endogenous entry into account produces a counterintuitive conclusion: an increase in potential acquirers’ access to nonpublic information about potential targets (for example, though technological developments or more stringent disclosure requirements) would lead to less entry into competitive bidding and lower takeover premia for target shareholders.

[[[ Insert Figure III About Here ]]]
These findings provide insight about the widespread practice whereby targets and their advisors disseminate only public or vague information to potential bidders as part of an invitation to participate in a takeover auction. Indeed, one tempting conclusion is that targets would attract more interest, entry and ultimately higher prices, if it provided potential bidders with pitch books that contained a more nonpublic information. Our estimates show in contrast that when entry is endogenous, takeover premia is higher when targets restrict pre-entry access to nonpublic information. Our results thus provide a systematic rationale for the widespread practice of withholding non-public information prior to entry (e.g. Hansen (2001)).

VI. Comparing Auctions and Negotiations

Thus far we have seen that takeover auctions are surprisingly resilient mechanisms for creating target shareholder value in the presence of market impediments that might otherwise be expected to inhibit the ability of auctions to attract a large and well-composed pool of bidders. Yet the same takeover market primitives that determine the effectiveness of auctions also influence how well negotiations generate revenue for target shareholders. In this section we use our structural estimates to assess whether takeover premiums would have been different if auctioned targets had instead been sold via a negotiation. Before reporting the results, it may be instructive to consider what could be inferred from an approach that regressed observed takeover premiums on a variable that indicates the type of sale method chosen. Unfortunately, there are two reasons why such an approach cannot provide information that is sufficient to answer the question about how a firm should be sold.

First, for any particular target, the relative benefits of auctions and negotiated transactions depends on quantities not directly observable to researchers, and observed winning bids by themselves are not by themselves informative about the degree of potential competition, which is captured by the distribution of potential and actual entrant values. Second,
the impact of potential competition on bidding aggressiveness in negotiations depends crucially on both entry costs and the degree of uncertainty about potential synergies, neither of which are directly observed in the data. These features imply that observed deal premia may appear similar across auctions and negotiations in cross-sectional averages, while one sale mechanism will unambiguously revenue dominate the other for an individual target or a non-random subset of targets.

Second, unlike auction sales, which have a fairly standardized structure, sales classified under the “negotiations” umbrella can in practice take a variety of specific forms that are observationally indistinguishable from ex post data provided in SEC takeover proxy filings. This complicates the task of interpreting any results obtained by lumping together a heterogeneous set of single-bidder sale procedures.

Our structural approach circumvents both challenges: it is able to recover information about the unobservable primitives that characterize expected target shareholder revenue in both auctions and negotiations, but does so by recovering from data on takeover auctions those features of the takeover environment such as average pre-entry uncertainty that characterize both auctions and negotiations, and we then use those primitives to quantify the possible revenue consequences of selling a target via a well-defined negotiation procedure, rather than an auction.

A. Negotiation Formats

This section formalizes two negotiation frameworks that have found support in the finance and economics literatures and whose expected revenue are determined by the fundamental takeover market primitives estimated in Section V.A. The first, a one-shot negotiation followed by a market check is a simple realistic alternative to a formal takeover auction that has is used widely in practice (e.g., Subramanian (2008), Wasserstein (2000)). The second, which has been extensively studied in the theoretical and empirical literature on optimal sale design allows the target to terminate negotiations and to approach an additional bidder if a standing bidder’s best offer is not deemed adequate (e.g., Fishman (1988), Betton and
Eckbo (2000), Horner and Sahuguet (2007), Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2011), Roberts and Sweeting (2013)). Importantly, each of these negotiation frameworks incorporate the insight that in practice a standing bidder in a negotiation is not fully shielded from competition, since the target has the outside option of rejecting the negotiating bidder’s best offer as inadequate and negotiating with a different bidder instead (e.g., Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2010), Bulow and Klemperer (2009)).

We now define a standard one-shot negotiation followed by a market-check (a “go-shop”) as follows: the target approaches potential buyer $j$ with an invitation to participate in negotiations. Based on own signal $S_j$ and the entry cost $c$, potential buyer $j$ determines whether to enter the negotiation. Conditional on choosing to enter, potential buyer $j$ learns its valuation $V_j$ and submits a bid for the target. If, after negotiations between this bidder and the target conclude, the agreed-upon price is higher than the target’s reservation value, the bid is publicly-announced and all potential buyers are invited to simultaneously enter and make a higher bid for the target. Based on own signal $S_j$ and the entry and the posted price acquirer $j$ determines whether to enter the negotiation at cost $c$ and make a bid. The bidder with the highest bid acquires the target.

The generalized sequential negotiation procedure proceeds in $N$ rounds, one for each potential buyer. The sequence of events within each round $j$ is as follows:

1. The target approaches potential buyer $j$ with an invitation to participate in a negotiated transaction. Based on own signal $S_j$ and the entry and bidding history of the game to date, potential buyer $j$ determines whether to enter the negotiation at cost $c$.

2. Conditional on choosing to enter, potential buyer $j$ learns its valuation $V_j$. If another negotiating bidder has previously entered, potential buyer $j$ and the current incumbent compete in an ascending button auction for the right to remain in the auction. The loser of this bidding round exits and the winner becomes the incumbent, with the current standing price the level at which the loser drops out.
3. Conditional on outbidding the current incumbent, potential buyer \( j \) may submit a bid above the current standing price. If submitted, this jump bid is observed by all subsequent potential buyers, and becomes the standing price in round \( j + 1 \).

The separating equilibrium will be one at which the jump bid submitted by a new incumbent at time \( j \) communicates the current standing value \( V_j \) to all subsequent potential entrants. For such separating behavior to be an equilibrium, potential buyer \( j \) must prefer truthful bidding based on \( V_j \) to impersonating any other valuation \( Z \), which in turn implies a set of local best-response conditions which must be satisfied by equilibrium bidding behavior. These restrictions uniquely define a separating equilibrium of the form desired, and that this is the only equilibrium to survive the standard D1 refinement of Cho and Kreps (1987). Intuitively, the D1 refinement specifies that beliefs place positive weight only on the types “most likely” to deviate. More formally, for any two types \( v_j \) and \( v'_j \) and any equilibrium bid function \( \beta(\cdot) \), if type \( v'_j \) strictly prefers bid \( \beta(z) \) whenever type \( v_j \) weakly prefers bid \( \beta(z) \), then equilibrium beliefs upon observing bid \( \beta(z) \) should place no weight on type \( v_j \). The D1 refinement is standard in analysis of signaling games, and yields a unique equilibrium whenever (as here) the underlying equilibrium payoffs satisfy an appropriate single-crossing condition. As in the auction setup for our estimated model, the target has reservation value \( V_0 \) drawn from \( F_v(\cdot; \theta) \), with the realization \( v_0 \) representing the point of departure for Round 1 bidding.

B. Comparing the Average Performance of Auctions and Negotiations

Do auctions or negotiations generate on average generate higher revenue for target shareholders? We begin by examining the relative performance of auctions and negotiations across the entire sample, and in the next section examine how the findings vary across takeover markets.

We first construct the unconditional posterior revenue distribution for each of the three sale mechanisms described above by obtaining information on the primitives associated with the sale of target \( j \) and drawing the vectors \((X_j, \theta_j)\) from the prior likelihood.
function. The takeover environment defined in Section II and fundamental parameters from Section V.A. are next used to construct expected revenue under each sale procedure. The unconditional posteriors of the resulting revenue functions, $R(X_j, \theta_j, \text{Sale Procedure})$, are obtained by repeating this procedure 10,000 times.

Table V reports moments of the resulting posterior distributions. Expected deal premia in the first row are 39.9 percent for auctions and are 40.2% percent for one-shot negotiations followed by a market check. This difference is extremely small in practice and indicates that auctions do not obviously revenue dominate simple negotiations followed by a market-check. The expected deal premia arising from sequential negotiations is 3.5 percent higher than expected deal premia arising from auctions, and this number implies that a target of average size in our sample would on average obtain an additional 30.5 million dollars by structuring the sale as a sequential negotiation, rather than as a standard auction. Though not large, these findings cast doubt on the view that in practice target boards should always sell their company via an auction.

We next ask how the optimality of auctions or negotiations varies in the cross-section of takeover markets. To do this, we first define the revenue difference function $D(X_j, \theta_j, \text{Sequential}) = R(X_j, \theta_j, \text{Auction}) - R(X_j, \theta_j, \text{Sequential})$ and $D(X_j, \theta_j, \text{Market Check}) = R(X_j, \theta_j, \text{Auction}) - R(X_j, \theta_j, \text{Market Check})$, which measure the difference between expected revenue obtaining in an auction, relative to that obtaining from a negotiation for a particular target $j$. The unconditional posterior distribution of the $D(X_j, \theta_j, \text{Sequential})$ and $D(X_j, \theta_j, \text{Market Check})$ are formed by drawing a vector, $(X_j, \theta_j)$, and constructing revenue for each of the sale mechanisms, for each target, and iterating this procedure 10,000 times.

Figure IV displays the cumulative distribution of the revenue difference functions. The blue line is the CDF of revenue differences between auctions and sequential negotiations and
the green line is the CDF of revenue differences between auctions and one-shot negotiations followed by a market-check. The mass of both distributions lies below zero, indicating that expected revenue is higher under negotiations for most targets. Specifically, 75% of targets would obtain higher revenue from sale via a sequential negotiation, and 77% of targets would obtain higher revenue from sale via a one-shot negotiation followed by a market check. At the same time, the revenue differences are extremely small for many firms, particularly for the one-shot negotiation followed by a market check, so in practice for many firms the difference between an auction and this sale mechanism may not be quantitatively important. On the other hand, the revenue difference function for sequential negotiations implies that this sale mechanism would yield a three percent increase in deal premia for almost 40 percent of targets, relative to auctions. At the same time, auctions generate substantially higher deal premia for a very small number of targets. Heterogeneity across firms in relative optimality of auctions and sequential negotiations is thus an important feature of real-world takeover markets, and so a single prescription is not appropriate for all targets.

C. Auctions and Negotiations for Different Targets

In this section we explore how uncertainty and the ability to overcome it explain the relative performance of auctions and negotiations. We begin by regressing the sequential negotiation revenue difference function \( D(X_j, \theta_j, \text{Sequential}) \) on polynomials of target-level estimates of uncertainty and entry costs, \( \alpha_j \) and \( c_j \) that emerge from our structural estimation procedure. The R-squared coefficient in this regression is 43 percent, indicating that pre-entry uncertainty and the and the costs of overcoming it can jointly explain over half of the variation across targets in the relative performance of auctions and negotiations.

To explore this result, we use the estimated takeover market primitives to compute expected revenue differences across auctions and sequential negotiations for different values of \( \alpha \) and \( c \). To do this, we calculate the break-even threshold for auctions as in our estimation algorithm. For sequential negotiations, we solve for the symmetric separating Perfect Bayesian equilibrium by backward induction, following the algorithm of Roberts and
Sweeting (2013). In short, at each step, we first solve a differential equation induced by the first order condition of the bidding problem to find the optimal bid function in the separating PBE, next compute equilibrium expected profit induced by this bidding function, and finally find the break-even signal threshold induced by the continuation play we’ve already determined.

Figure V presents the results. Red circles represent outcomes when expected auction revenue is higher and filled blue circles represent cases where sequential negotiations dominate. Hollow black circles indicate cases where simulation error is larger than estimated revenue differences. This figure reveals several important insights about individual takeover environments. First, expected revenue is generally higher for negotiations when entry costs are very high. This is because the primary mechanism through which auctions generate high prices is through their ability to induce entry and thus to endogenously generate a competitive pool of entering bidders. High entry costs directly reduce entry by lowering expected post-entry bidder revenue, thus impairing the ability of auctions to produce an attractive pool of entering bidders.

Second, in general auctions revenue-dominate negotiations when information frictions are high. This is because the primary mechanism through which negotiations generate high prices is through the incentive they place on a standing negotiating bidder to shade their offer price upward to deter entry by potential competitors. Yet when potential competitors are uncertain about their possible values for the target, such deterrence bidding becomes less effective. Because of this, a standing negotiator engages is less aggressive equilibrium deterrence bidding, thus offering a lower maximal offer to target shareholders.

We now focus specifically on the role played by pre-entry uncertainty in explaining revenue differences by fixing \( c \) in addition to the estimated fundamental parameters and computing expected revenue for auctions and negotiations, for different levels of \( \alpha \). To do this we follow the computational procedure described above and in addition, for the
negotiation followed by go-shop, we first solve the entry equilibrium in the auction stage assuming separating equilibrium play in the first stage (i.e., assuming that the incumbent’s value is revealed by his jump bid). We then solve for the first-stage jump-bidding function that induces truthful revelation by the first-stage incumbent as in the sequential negotiation mechanism.

\[[[ Insert Figure VI About Here ]]]

Figure VI plots the results. The mean revenue difference across sale procedures is represented by the vertical distance between the lines, for each level of takeover environment uncertainty, with the average level of pre-entry uncertainty marked by the vertical dashed gray line. The figure shows that the relative performance of auctions increases monotonically in the average level of potential bidder uncertainty, with auctions revenue-dominating negotiations for highly opaque targets. As discussed above, uncertainty encourages entry in auctions but degrades the effectiveness of deterrence bidding in negotiations, thus reducing the incentive to shade bids upward in the first place.

VII. Conclusion

A common view in the press literature is that auctions yield higher target revenue than do negotiations, since the presence of realized competition in auctions forces more aggressive bidding. Yet recent research has shown that bids in negotiated transactions are shaded upward since additional competition may emerge if the negotiated price is not sufficiently high, which explains the similarity in observed deal premia across negotiations and auctions. The dominant approach has thus been to take the set of bidders as given and to examine how bidding aggressiveness changes across different sale mechanisms and across differently-sized auctions.

This paper in contrast shows that the variation in observed sale prices is largely driven by potential bidders’ access to information, which influences the entry patterns that in turn
determine the size and composition of the realized set of potential bidders in auctions and which influences the efficacy of deterrence bidding in negotiations.

A large literature in finance which studies the degree of information uncertainty in takeover markets and constructs various observable proxies for information exposure (e.g., Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007)), Custodio and Metzger (2013) Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), Dong et al (2006), Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008). These studies provide evidence about the effects of information but do not directly quantify it, since the influence of any such proxy reflects both the impact of information and the impact of other factors that influence the proxy. The structural approach presented in this paper allows us to provide the first quantitative evidence about the impact of uncertainty faced by potential bidders in takeover auctions.

There are papers which show that acquirers often engage in value-destroying mergers, and these have typically focused on the fact that acquirers often conduct value-destroying acquisitions (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (2003)). These studies thus implicitly focus on the fact that the “wrong bidder” often ends up acquiring a target. Our work complements this literature by showing that a high level of pre-entry uncertainty leads to a situation where the “right bidder” fails to enter into competitive bidding, so bidders and targets will thus be matched inefficiently, relative to a world with perfect information.
Appendix A. Obtaining an Expression for Expected Profits Conditional on Entry

Let $Y_{k:n}$ denote the $k$th highest valuation among $n$ entering bidders, let $y_{k:n}$ denote the realization of this random variable, and let $v_0$ denote the realization of the target’s reservation value $V_0$. If $y_{1:n} \geq v_0$, the target is sold at $p = \max\{y_{2:n}, v_0\}$ so conditional on realizations of all random variables, the surplus of bidder with valuation $v_i$ is thus

$$1[v_i \geq \max\{y_{1:n-1}, v_0\}] (v_i - p) = 1[v_i \geq \max\{y_{1:n-1}, v_0\}] (v_i - \max\{y_{1:n-1}, v_0\}).$$

We assume $V_{0t}$ is drawn from a target-specific reserve distribution $F_0(\cdot)$ with $V_{0t} = M_t \exp\{\nu_{0t}\}$ and where $\nu_{0t}$ is normally distributed with parameters $\{\mu_{0t}, \sigma_{0t}\}$. This significantly reduces the dimensionality of the parameter space, and is a natural simplification. Let $F^* (\cdot|N)$ be the CDF of the equilibrium distribution of valuations among entering bidders, and $H^*_n(\cdot|N)$ be the equilibrium CDF of the random variable $\max\{Y_{1:n-1}, V_0\}$:

$$H^*_n(y|N) = F_0(y) \cdot F^*(y|N)^{n-1}.$$

By definition, $H^*_n(v|N)$ is the probability that a bidder with valuation $v$ is the final standing bidder, with the associated density

$$h^*_n(v|N) = f_0(v) \cdot F^*(v|N)^{n-1} + (n - 1)F_0(v)F^*(v|N)^{n-1}f^*(v|N),$$

describing the distribution of the bidder’s outside option in this case, so the expected profit
of an entrant with valuation $v_i$ is thus

$$
\pi^*(v_i; n, N) = H_n(v_i|N) \int_0^{v_i} (v_i - y) \cdot \frac{h_n^*(y|N)}{H_n^*(y|N)} dy \\
= \left[ v_i H_n^*(v_i|N) - \int_0^{v_i} y h_n^*(y|N) dy \right] \\
= \int_0^{v_i} F_0(y) \cdot F^*(y|N)^{n-1} dy,
$$

where the last equality follows from integration by parts.

**Appendix B. Obtaining an Expression for the Likelihood Function**

We begin with equation (0.3) and derive expressions for $\Pr(p_j, sale_j|n_j, N_j; \theta_j)$, $\Pr(n_j|N_j; \theta_j)$, and $\Pr(sale_j|N_j; \theta_j)$. Since these are each conditional on the primitives implied by $\theta_j$, the corresponding probabilities follow directly from our auction model.

We begin by characterizing $\Pr(n_j|N_j; \theta_j)$. To do this, we will make recourse to the signal threshold characterizing equilibrium entry behavior when $N_j$ potential acquirers compete for a target with characteristics $\theta_j$ as $s^*(N_j; \theta_j)$. Equation (0.2) then becomes

$$
c(\theta_j) = \int_0^{\infty} [1 - F_v(s|s^*; \theta_j)] \cdot F_0(y; \theta_j) \cdot [F_s(s^*; \theta_j) + F_v(v; \theta_j) - F_{vs}(v, s^*; \theta_j)]^{N_j-1} dy. \quad (0.6)
$$

Specification of a joint distribution $F_{vs}(\cdot; \theta_j)$ will of course determine the marginal and conditional distributions $F_s(\cdot; \theta_j)$, $F_v(\cdot; \theta_j)$, and $F_v(s|\cdot; \theta_j)$, at which point computation of $s^*(N_j, \theta_j)$ becomes a straightforward numeric exercise.

By construction, potential acquirers drawing signals $S_{ij} \geq s^*(N_j, \theta_j)$ will elect to enter in equilibrium. Signal draws are independent given target characteristics $\theta_j$, so the number
of entrants $n_t$ will follow a binomial distribution based on entry probability

$$q(N_j, \theta_j) = 1 - F_s(s^*(N_j; \theta_j); \theta_j).$$

This in turn implies

$$\Pr(n_j|N_j, \theta_j) = B(n_j; N_j, q(N_j, \theta_j)),$$

where $B(n; N, q)$ is the binomial PDF corresponding to probability parameter $q$.

We now derive an expression for $\Pr(\text{sale}_j \cap p_j|n_j, N_j; \theta_j)$. By construction, a sale occurs when at least one entrant draws a valuation above the seller’s reservation value $v_{0j}$. If only one entrant draws a valuation above $v_{0j}$, the transaction price $p_j$ is the seller’s reservation valuation $v_{0j}$. If at least two entrants draw valuations above $v_{0j}$, the transaction price $p_j$ is the second highest entrant valuation $y_{2:n_j}$. Decomposing likelihoods of these events using properties of order statistics yields the overall probability $\Pr(\text{sale}_j \cap p_j|n_j, N_j; \theta_j)$

$$\Pr(\text{sale}_j \cap Y_{1:n_j} = p_j|n_j, N_j, \theta_j) + \Pr(\text{sale}_j \cap V_{0j} = p_j|n_j, N_j, \theta_j)$$

$$= \Pr(Y_{1:n_j} \geq p_j \cap Y_{2:n_j} = p_j \cap V_{0j} \leq p_j|n_j, N_j, \theta_j)$$

$$+ \Pr(Y_{1:n_j} \geq p_j \cap Y_{2:n_j} \leq p_j \cap V_{0j} = p_j|n_j, N_j, \theta_j)$$

$$= \left[ n_j(n_j-1)F^*(p_j; N_j, \theta_j)^{n_j-2}[1 - F^*(p_j; N_j, \theta_j)]F^*(p_j; N_j, \theta_j) \cdot F_0(p_j; \theta_j) \right]$$

$$+ \left[ n_jF^*(p_j; N_j, \theta_j)^{n_j-1}[1 - F^*(p_j; N_j, \theta_j)] \cdot f_0(p_j; \theta_j) \right];$$

where to streamline notation we let

$$F^*(v; N_j, \theta_j) = F^*(v; s^*(N_j, \theta_j)) = F(v|S_i \geq s^*(N_j, \theta_j))$$

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denote the equilibrium distribution of valuations among entrants at \((N_j, \theta_j)\).

Finally, we derive an expression for \(Pr(\text{sale}_j|N_j; \theta_j)\). By construction, the auction for target \(j\) ends in sale whenever at least one entering bidder draws a valuation above the seller’s reservation value \(V_{0j}\). It follows that:

\[
Pr(\text{sale}_j|N_t; \theta_t) = Pr(V_{0t} \leq Y_{1:N_t}|N_t, \theta_t) = 1 - Pr(Y_{1:N_t} \leq V_{0t}|N_t, \theta_t)
\]

\[
= 1 - \int_0^\infty [F^*_s(N_t; \theta_t) + F_v(v_0; \theta_t) - F_v s^*(v_0, s^*(N_t, \theta_t); \theta_t)]^{N_t} f_0(v_0, \theta_t) \, dv_0,
\]

where (as above) the term in brackets represents the probability that potential acquirer \(i\) either does not enter or enters but draws a valuation less than \(v_0\).

Thus given a specification for the auction-level fundamentals \(\{c(\theta), F_{vs}(\cdot; \theta), F_0(\cdot; \theta)\}\), computing the likelihood components \(Pr(p_j, \text{sale}_j, n_j|N_j; \theta_j)\), \(Pr(n_j|N_j, \theta_j)\), and \(Pr(\text{sale}_j|N_j; \theta_j)\) conditional on \(\theta_j\) becomes a simple numeric exercise. Computation of the overall likelihood function (0.4) then involves integration of these objects over realizations of \(\theta_j\), which we do via simulation, which we describe next.

**Appendix C. Details of the Estimating Procedure**

Estimation based on the likelihood function requires repeated evaluation of the integrals

\[
\int Pr(p_j, \text{sale}_j|n_j, N_j; \theta) Pr(n_j|N_j, \theta) \, g(\theta|X_j) \, d\theta
\]

(0.7)

and

\[
\int Pr(\text{sale}_j|N_j; \theta) \, g(\theta|X_j) \, d\theta
\]

(0.8)

for each target \(j\). In principle, the objects \(Pr(p_j, \text{sale}_j|n_j, N_j; \theta)\), \(Pr(n_j|N_j, \theta)\), and \(Pr(\text{sale}_j|N_j; \theta)\) are known up to \(\theta\), so such evaluation is straightforward in theory, given a form for the heterogeneity distribution \(g(\cdot)\).
Our objective in estimation is then to estimate the deep fundamental parameters \( \Gamma \) governing the distribution of \( \theta_j \) in the population, using the selection-corrected likelihood relationship derived above. Our baseline results employ the truncated Gaussian specification of Roberts and Sweeting (2013), under which the elements of \( \theta_j \) are drawn independently from the following distributions:

\[
\begin{align*}
\mu_j & \sim N(\gamma_{\mu} \cdot X_j, \sigma_{\mu}^2) \\
\sigma_{vj} & \sim TN(\gamma_{\sigma} \cdot X_j, \sigma_{\sigma}^2; \tau, \infty) \\
c_j & \sim TN(\gamma_c \cdot X_j, \sigma_c^2; 0, \infty) \\
\alpha_j & \sim TN(\gamma_\alpha \cdot X_j, \sigma_\alpha^2; 0, 1),
\end{align*}
\]

where \( TN(\bar{E}, \bar{V}; a, b) \) denotes the truncation of a Gaussian distribution with mean \( \bar{E} \) and variance \( \bar{V} \) on the interval \([a, b]\), and \( \tau > 0 \) is a regularization constant which ensures the variance \( \sigma_{vj}^2 \) is bounded away from zero. The vector of parameters to estimate is thus \( \Gamma = \{\gamma_{\mu}, \gamma_{\sigma}, \gamma_c, \gamma_\alpha; \sigma_{\mu}^2, \sigma_{\sigma}^2, \sigma_c^2, \sigma_\alpha^2\} \).

We also explore estimation under several alternative specifications for \( g(\cdot | X_j) \), such as using a Beta distribution for the information parameter \( \alpha_j \), and Gamma or log-normal distributions for the always-positive parameters \( \sigma_{vj} \) and \( c_j \). Results obtained under these alternatives are qualitatively similar to our baseline specification.

Direct evaluation of the likelihood function (0.4) is computationally prohibitive in practice since (0.7) and (0.8) depend on \( \theta \) through the equilibrium condition (0.6), which itself requires solution of an equation involving integrals. We circumvent this challenge by implementing estimation via the simulated likelihood method of Ackerberg (2009), which uses the principle of importance sampling to transform the complicated problem of repeated evaluation of the full likelihood (0.4) into the much simpler problem of repeated evaluation of \( g(\theta | X_j) = g(\theta | X_j, \Gamma) \). To illustrate the main idea of this method, let \( \tilde{g}(\cdot) \) be any fixed
\textit{proposal distribution} over $\theta$, and consider evaluation of the target-level likelihood integral (0.7). By standard importance sampling arguments, we can rewrite this integral as follows:

$$
\int \Pr(p_j, \text{sale}_j|n_j, N_j; \theta) \Pr(n_j|N_j, \theta) \ g(\theta|X_j, \Gamma) \ d\theta
$$

\[= \int \left[ \Pr(p_j, \text{sale}_j|n_j, N_j; \theta) \Pr(n_j|N_j, \theta) \ g(\theta|X_j, \Gamma) \right] \tilde{g}(\theta) \ d\theta \tag{0.9}
\]

\[= \mathbb{E} \left[ \Pr(p_j, \text{sale}_j|n_j, N_j; \theta) \Pr(n_j|N_j, \theta) \ g(\theta|X_j, \Gamma) \tilde{g}(\theta) \right], \tag{0.10}
\]

where the expectation in the last line is taken with respect to the proposal distribution $\tilde{g}(\cdot)$ rather than the true distribution $g(\cdot|X_j, \Gamma)$. If $\left\{ \tilde{\theta}_r \right\}_{r=1}^R$ is a random sample drawn from $\tilde{g}(\cdot)$, it follows that for large enough $R$

$$
\int \Pr(p_j, \text{sale}_j|n_j, N_j; \theta) \Pr(n_j|N_j, \theta) \ g(\theta|X_j, \Gamma) \ d\theta \tag{0.11}
$$

\[\approx \sum_{r=1}^R \Pr(p_j, \text{sale}_j|n_j, N_j; \theta_r) \Pr(n_j|N_j, \theta_r) \ g(\theta_r|X_j, \Gamma) \tilde{g}(\theta_r). \tag{0.12}
\]

If a new sample $\left\{ \tilde{\theta}_r \right\}_{r=1}^R$ is drawn each time the integral (0.7) is evaluated, this importance-sampling procedure will of course do nothing to simplify computation. Note, however, that the parameters $\Gamma$ now appear only in the distribution $g(\theta_r|X_j, \Gamma)$, which itself only affects weights on elements in a sum. This motivates Ackerberg (2009)’s reinterpretation of importance sampling: rather than obtaining new draws each time (0.7) is evaluated, draw a single large sample $\left\{ \tilde{\theta}_r \right\}_{r=1}^R$ from $\tilde{g}(\cdot)$ once at the beginning of the estimation algorithm, and calculate the integrand elements

$$
\Pr(p_j, \text{sale}_j|n_j, N_j; \theta_r) \Pr(n_j|N_j, \theta_r)
$$
and

\[ \Pr(\text{sale}_j | N_j; \theta_r) \]

for each of these. Maximization of the overall likelihood function (0.4) is then (approximately) equivalent to maximization of the simulated likelihood function (0.5) with respect to \( \Gamma \), where \( \theta \) is calculated internal to the maximization problem using the expressions derived in Appendix A.A, where evaluation of the likelihood function at different values of \( \Gamma \) requires only recalculation of the sampling weights \( g(\theta_j | X_j, \Gamma) \). As costs of computing \( g(\theta_r | X_j, \Gamma) \) are trivial relative to costs of recomputing equilibrium, this allows for vastly accelerated estimation even net of higher setup costs, with the added advantage that the simulated likelihood function is automatically smooth in \( \Gamma \). For our purposes, therefore, Ackerberg (2009) simulation is ideal; it mitigates the computational infeasibility that otherwise would be entailed by accommodating sample selection unobserved heterogeneity.
References


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Figure I. Uncertainty and the Composition of the Entering Bidder Pool

Figure II. Uncertainty and the Size of the Entering Bidder Pool
Figure III. Uncertainty and Deal Premium

Figure IV. Comparing Auctions and Negotiations
This figure reports mean expected revenue across takeover environments with different levels of pre-entry uncertainty and entry costs. The graph is constructed by fixing (observables) at their mean values, setting $V_0=1$ and $N=8$, and varying $XX$. Red squares indicate situations where auctions revenue-dominate negotiations, while blue squares indicate situations where negotiations revenue-dominate auctions.
Figure VI. Pre Entry Uncertainty and Expected Revenue

This figure reports mean expected revenue for auctions, sequential negotiations, and one-shot negotiations with market check against pre-entry uncertainty. The graph is constructed by fixing (muv, sigv, c) at their mean values and setting V0=1 and N=8. The red line is mean expected revenue under negotiations, the blue line is mean expected revenue under auctions, and the green line is mean expected revenue under one-shot negotiations with a market check.
Table I. Sample by Year

This table reports the number of takeovers of publicly-traded targets with deal value greater than 1 million U.S. dollars, where the acquirer owns 100 percent of the target as a consequence of the deal, and financial data on the target is available from Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. The sample covers deals that satisfy these criteria and are announced between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2009. We also require that takeover proxy statements for the firms be available from the Securities and Exchange Commission. The number of takeovers is reported for the full sample, for auction sales, and for negotiated transactions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>Auction</th>
<th>Negotiation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
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<td>135</td>
<td>81</td>
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<td>47</td>
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<td>61</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table II. Summary of the Sale Process

This table summarizes the sale processes of 982 takeovers. The first row reports summary statistics for the full sample, while the second and third report data for auctions and negotiations, respectively. The variable Contact reports the average number of contacted potential bidders for each sale mechanism. The variable Confidential reports the average number of invited potential bidders that sign confidentiality agreements with the target. Premium reports the average price paid by the winning bidder, relative to the target’s share price four weeks prior to announcement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<th>Confidential</th>
<th>Prem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
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<td>Full Sample</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auctions</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiations</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table III. Target Characteristics

This table reports mean target characteristics for firms sold via auction and negotiation. Data are drawn from Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses beneath the estimates. Size is equal to total asset value in millions of US dollars. The Market to book ratio is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Cash, leverage, and intangibles to assets are respectively total cash, long-term debt plus short-term debt, and intangible assets all scaled by total book assets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Auction</th>
<th>Negotiation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>1,603</td>
<td>2,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7,305)</td>
<td>(16,669)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market to book</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>3.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.10)</td>
<td>(5.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash to assets</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intangibles to assets</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of takeovers</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table IV. Target-Level Parameters

This table shows moments of the estimated fundamental parameter distributions. Each panel reports parameter estimates at the mean, median, 25th percentile, and 75th percentile of the estimated parameter distribution. Panel A reports moments of estimated parameters for a representative takeover with average observable characteristics (mean X) and median unobservable characteristics (Median Γ). Panel B reports quantiles of the unconditional distribution of auction-level parameters θ across all auctions in the sample, accounting for uncertainty in estimates of structural parameters Γ implied by the estimated posterior distribution.

Panel A: Quantiles at mean \( X_j \) median \( Γ_j \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( \mu_j )</th>
<th>( \sigma_{wj} )</th>
<th>( c_j )</th>
<th>( \alpha_j )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.1852</td>
<td>0.1578</td>
<td>0.0133</td>
<td>0.6409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>0.1854</td>
<td>0.1444</td>
<td>0.0122</td>
<td>0.6856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>0.0384</td>
<td>0.0967</td>
<td>0.0033</td>
<td>0.4446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th</td>
<td>0.3324</td>
<td>0.2954</td>
<td>0.0318</td>
<td>0.8695</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: Posterior quantiles across median \( X_j \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( \mu_j )</th>
<th>( \sigma_{wj} )</th>
<th>( c_j )</th>
<th>( \alpha_j )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.2097</td>
<td>0.1581</td>
<td>0.0243</td>
<td>0.6407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>0.2089</td>
<td>0.1467</td>
<td>0.0120</td>
<td>0.6891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>0.0981</td>
<td>0.0981</td>
<td>0.0030</td>
<td>0.4441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th</td>
<td>0.3786</td>
<td>0.2057</td>
<td>0.0317</td>
<td>0.8720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table V. Unconditional Counterfactual Estimates

This table reports counterfactual estimates comparing auctions with one-shot negotiations after which is a market-check (described in Section 6.A) and a sequential negotiation procedure (also described in Section 6.A). The estimates are constructed using observable characteristics (mean X) and, median unobservable characteristics (Median Γ) and the resulting baseline fundamental parameter estimates Panel A in Table IV. The table reports means, medians, and standard deviations of the distribution of expected revenue for a given target.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Auction</th>
<th>Market-check Negotiation</th>
<th>Sequential Negotiation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Premium</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Premium</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue Std. Dev.</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue Skewness</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>