

Culturally-Biased Voting in the Eurovision Song Contest: Do National Contests Differ?

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Abstract: Former papers on the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) establish empirical evidence for culturally-biased voting, more precisely biases based on geographical closeness, political relations, ethnical and linguistic affinity. The Bundesvision Song Contest (BSC), a similar contest with principally the same rules but organized on the national level in Germany, offers a unique opportunity to compare international voting bias patterns to national voting bias patterns. Thus, this paper presents an innovative analysis by comparatively analyzing the ESC's historical data from 1998 to 2013 and the BSC's from its beginning in 2005 until 2013 with the same type of data and econometric methodology. Our results show that voting biases do not only matter in international contests but also occur in similarly-organized national contests – despite the cultural differences being much smaller.

JEL-Codes: L82, Z10

Keywords: Eurovision Song Contest, Bundesvision Song Contest, cultural-biased voting, media economics, cultural economics

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1 INTRODUCTION

The annual Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) represents one of the most successful and longest-living international music competitions and television shows worldwide. At the same time, it represents a relevant example for the combination of media-based entertainment and audience involvement – as well as of typical problems that can arise from this combination. While historically expert juries used to determine the ranking of the competing musicians in the ESC, audience voting was introduced in 1997/1998, replacing the votes of the experts. However, soon criticism surfaced that the audience would decide according to other criteria than the talent of the artists and the quality of the music performances. It was claimed that ESC outcomes were determined by informal cartels of country blocs voting for each other. As a consequence, expert jury voting was re-introduced in 2009; since then half of the votes of each country are determined by audience voting and the other by expert judges.

The critique regarding culturally-biased voting triggered an academic discussion in media and cultural economics. Various researchers have recently focused their study on voting patterns and collusive behavior in the ESC. These papers established empirical evidence for culturally-biased voting, more precisely biases based on geographical closeness, political relations, ethnical and linguistic affinity that are allegedly caused by the audience influence in the voting process (*Fenn et al. 2006; Ginsburgh and Noury 2008; Spierdijk and Vellekoop 2009*). In order to contribute to the general research question *‘To what extent are common group characteristics subject to (cultural) bias and how do they affect the outcomes of voting systems?’* we take advantage of some kind of a unique natural experiment that has been undertaken in German TV. The commercial TV broadcasting company ProSiebenSat.1 introduced a copy of the ESC on the national level in Germany in 2005, the so-called Bundesvision Song Contest (BSC). It is held annually and according to virtually the same rules as the ESC with the 16 German states replacing the European nations forming the ESC. Thus, we have a contest that very closely resembles the ESC but with much more homogeneous participants in terms of culture. Accordingly, it is very interesting to analyze how cultural voting bias in the BSC differs from the ESC.

Thus, the paper is structured as follows. The following part in section 2 briefly deals with several earlier studies focusing on voting bias in the Eurovision Song Contest. Section 3 determines background and rules of both the Eurovision and the Bundesvision song contest. Section 4 forms the main part, containing a description of our panel data model, the

econometric analysis and the diverse variables that possibly affect the voting bias. Section 5 discusses the estimation results before section 6 concludes.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

One of the first papers on the Eurovision Song Contest is *Kressly and Konrad (1978)* describing background and general information about the Eurovision Song Contest. *Yair (1995)* provides pioneering work with an exploratory study, analyzing voting behavior in the period 1975-1992 with multidimensional social network programming and finding a three-bloc political structure consisting of the Western, the Northern and the Mediterranean Bloc. Because his study bases on an average number of points each participating country gives over the period of time, *Yair and Maman (1996)* extend the study by using yearly voting patterns between the blocs and explain the hegemony of Western Bloc nations receiving the highest points. *Gatherer (2004)* identifies statistically significant voting partnerships ("the Viking Empire", the "Warsaw Pact", and two smaller blocs) by analyzing and simulating the period between 1975 and 2002.

Fenn et al. (2006) use a dynamic network approach to investigate collusive voting behavior in the ESC throughout the period of 1992-2003 and negate the assumption of a contest with random behavior. By using cluster analysis they reveal nonlinear patterns and infer the existence of informal cliques of participating countries. Counter-intuitively the "voting cliques" are also cliques that were not assumed (e.g. no correlation between Cyprus and Turkey). For this reason the authors conclude that similarities in voting behavior cannot be explained exclusively by geographical proximity. Instead, further explanations such as cultural and historical closeness need to be considered. *Gatherer (2006)* extends this line of research by analyzing collusive voting behavior as a process of development, resulting in the emergence of large geographical blocs since the mid-90s.

Somewhat in parallel to this line of research, several authors dwell into specific alternative explanations for voting results, such as the role of performance order (*Renato and Ginsburgh 1996; Bruine de Bruin 2005*) and its difference between judges by public (via televoting) and judges by experts (jury voting) (*Glejser and Heyndels 2001; Haan et al. 2005*). For the years 1956-1997, *Haan et al. (2005)* find that the order of appearance has a systematic influence on the final points in the Eurovision Song Contest, however, this effect is less pronounced with expert juries than with public juries. Furthermore, others deal with the mere-exposure effect

(Verrier 2012), the role of news factors (Schweiger and Brosius 2003), the role of Turkish emigrants (Christensen and Christensen 2008), and issues of stereotypes (Georgiou 2008).¹

The literature that is closest to our research is motivated by the lack of considering relevant factors influencing voting bias by Fenn *et al.* (2006). Therefore, it significantly extends the set of variables taking into account as possible driving forces for biased (or non-biased) voting. For instance, Ginsburgh and Noury (2008) present an extensive and very detailed econometric analysis for explaining the voting behavior particularly with regard to the importance of the song's quality. The idea behind their study is to show "what may look as vote trading is in fact sincere voting based on 'quality', and linguistic and cultural proximities". Therefore, they distinguish between strategic and cultural voting. While the former describes two countries exchanging votes in the contest, the latter implies that countries' citizens prefer songs from certain countries based on linguistic and cultural closeness. Against this background, they compose a model for explaining the given numbers of points as well as certain other variables. These variables characterize linguistic differences (based on the lexicostatistical distances derived by Dyen *et al.* 1992), performance characteristics (such as gender of the lead singer, if the song is performed in a group, alone or in a duet, order of performance, where the contest is performed and whether the participant countries are from that host country, sung language), and cultural distances based on Hofstede's (1980, 1991) cultural dimensions. For the period 1975 – 2003, Ginsburgh and Noury (2008) test the hypothesis of exchanging the votes in the contest and estimate it by linear as well as non-linear methods. They show that the significance of vote trading is on the one hand only significant in specification and on the other hand very small. However, the quality of the performed song is very significant and plays an essential role in explaining the behavior of voting as well as the sung language.

Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009) (see also *Clerides and Stengos 2006*) present a similar study but in contrast to the study of *Ginsburgh and Noury (2008)* and *Haan et al. (2005)*, they assume that voting bias towards some songs may deviate significantly among the participants. They also introduce a range of variables to differentiate voting based on political issues from preferences based on cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and religious closeness. Their results show that a lot of countries still prefer songs of countries nearby even after correcting for linguistic and cultural aspects. Their study uncovers factors that substantially bias the votes based on

¹ For reasons of completeness, there are also studies analyzing the ESC with special focus put on: ESC used as a lever for economic growth (Fleischer *et al.* 2002), the ESC as a proxy variable for explaining European trade (Kokko and Patrik 2012) or in terms of pure simulations (*Baker 2008, García and Tanase 2013*).

cultural, linguistic, geographical, religious, and ethnical factors. However, religious and patriotic voting grew noticeably stronger since the change to the new voting system in 1997/1998 (*Spierdijk and Vellekoop 2009*). Although *Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009)* find significance for geographical and therefore suggested political (= tactical voting) influence they do not find support for the publicly debated accusations of political voting against certain countries.

Interestingly, there is no research on the role of (culturally-bias) audience voting in national contests. Against this background, this paper aims to contribute to the existing literature by analyzing voting patterns and collusive behavior in national contests. Our study offers a unique opportunity to identify the drivers for audience voting behavior more closely by analyzing voting bias of the Bundesvision Song Contest (BSC), a similar contest organized on the national level in Germany, as well and compare it to the ESC.

3 THE CONTESTS: BACKGROUND AND RULES

3.1 EUROVISION SONG CONTEST

The ESC is one of the longest-live and favorite annual music competitions and television shows worldwide. In 1955, the director of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) Marcel Bezençon raise the concept of introducing an international song contest broadcasted on television. The EBU is founded by 23 broadcasting establishments from Europe and the Mediterranean at a conference in United Kingdom in 1950 with the purpose to build a network in order to exchange news films. Nowadays, it is the world's leading union of public service media organizations consisting of 56 Members of states both within Europe and beyond its borders. The EBU operates inter alia EUROVISION that is not only the producer and distributor of live news and sports but also of music and culture issues.² The first Grand Prix Eurovision takes place in Lugano on the 24th of May, 1956, whereby seven nations participate and supported by their corresponding public broadcasters.³ The main aim of the contest is to “promote high-quality original songs in the field of popular music, by encouraging competition among artists, songwriters and composers through the international comparison of their songs.” (*EBU/UER 2013*). The ESC broadcast throughout Europe as well as

² See <http://www3.ebu.ch/cms/en/about?jsite=c49010fa-a809-4b28-a2c8-7363e32879c5>

³ For comparison, there were 39 participating countries in Malmö last year.

in non-participating countries like Canada, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Korea and the United States.⁴

RULES

All active Members of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) have the possibility to take part in the ESC. Of course, there is no restriction to be a European country of becoming a member. To give an example, Morocco and Israel participated in the contest in years past. The major investors (Germany, France, Great Britain, Spain and Italy) and the title holder, which is the winner of previous contest, receive guaranteed participation in the final of the contest. The other finalist positions are awarded to the ten best participants of the semifinals. In the end, all participating countries vote, even if they are not qualified for the final. The performance order is randomly chosen so far. Since 2013 the order of performance has determined by dramaturgical aspects of the producers of the show. The contest's main format for example regarding the voting system and the number of participating countries was frequently modified in the past years. Thus, the introduction of the current system of scoring was introduced in 1975, where every country creates a ranking of the 10 best placed countries. The participant who obtains the highest number of votes within a country, receives twelve points, the second place will be rewarded with ten and the third place with eight points. The performers of the seven following ranks receive decreasingly seven to one point. Nine and eleven points are not awarded.

An essential modification was the introduction of a televoting system, which was introduced in 1997 partially and 1998 fully. From now on audience votes (via telephone calls and SMS) also decide upon the winning country and influence therefore the final results. After a few improvements, the final receiving points of each country are made up each half of votes of the public audience and an expert jury. The jury of experts consists of five experts in each partaking country. They have to be nationals of the country they stand for and they also have to be in connection to the music industry. At the same time, they are not allowed to have a business relationship with the candidate of their own country or of any other country. The jury of experts and the audience of the participating countries do not have the possibility to vote for their own country.

Another important change was the introduction of two semi-finals in 2004 in order to accommodate more participants. Participating countries have to compete in a qualifying round

⁴ See <http://www.eurovision.tv/page/history/the-story>

for the purpose of reaching the contest's final. All qualified countries vote in final, but, of course, only participating countries in the final contest receive votes. This leads to an increase of the total number of contestants from 24 in 2003 to 36 in 2004.

While the participants have to sing their song in their country's official national languages from 1966 until 1972 and again from 1978 until 1998, the sung language of the song is free to choose for any participating country to the present day. If they want to perform in group, they are not allowed to exceed the number of more than six people. Texts speeches and gestures of political nature are prohibited during the contest.

The lines for the televoting are opened after the last performance for public audience voters via telephone and SMS. The winner of the contest is, indeed, the country with the highest number of points. The total number of points participating countries receive consists of results of the televoting and juryvoting of each country.

3.2 BUNDESVISION SONG CONTEST

The Bundesvision Song Contest (in short: BSC), made up of the prefix "Bundes" in relation to the Bundesrepublik Deutschland and the Eurovision Song Contest, is a German music competition based on the model of the ESC. The first BSC was held on 12 February 2005 in Oberhausen. The Contest was launched by entertainer Stefan Raab, who took the Eurovision Song Contest as inspiration, in which he participated with the song "Wadde hadde dudde da?" and won the fifth place in the year 2000. The winner of the ESC in 2010, Lena Meyer-Landrut, was chosen in the TV-Show "Unser Star für Oslo" for participating with the song "Satellite". The chairman of the jury of the TV Show Stefan Raab is responsible for her success. In this German music competition, 16 performers compete against each other, each representing one of the German states. One goal of the program is – in addition to entertain the recipient nation – to support the German-language music. For that reason there is the rule that at least 50 % of the music lyrics must be sung in German. Therefore, the BSC has the reputation of being a promoter of German talents and German-language music. Musically, there are no further restrictions for the participants.⁵

RULES

⁵ See <http://www.motorvision.de/unterhaltung/tv/bundesvision-song-contest-online-schauen-wiederholung-prosieben-2013-bosse-gewinnt-niedersachsen-308363.html>,
<http://tvtotal.prosieben.de/tvtotal/specials/bundesvision-song-contest/>

All in all, the rules are principally the same. All 16 states of Germany take part in the BSC. In the end, all participating countries vote for their favorite country. As well as in ESC the winning German state of the contest hosts the next BSC. The winner of the contest is determined by telephone calls and SMS voting by public audience. However, in contrast to the ESC, it is also possible to vote for one's own country and there is no expert jury. The votes are summed up separately by country and announced by live circuits in each country. So, the same rules apply as already described with the ESC. Therefore, the participant who obtains the highest number of votes within a country, receives twelve points, the second place will be rewarded with ten and the third place with eight points. The performers of the seven following ranks receive decreasingly seven to one point. Likewise, nine and eleven points are not awarded. The sung language of the song is free to choose with the exception of the rule that at least 50% of the text must be sung in German. The lines for the public voting are opened after the last performance for audience voters via telephone and SMS. Expectedly, the winner of the contest is the country with the highest number of points.⁶

3.3 RELEVANCE OF RULE DIFFERENCES

While the BSC represents an almost perfect copy of the ESC and, thus, offers a near-to-perfect opportunity for comparisons of voting pattern biases in an international versus a national context, the existing differences in the rules may not be completely irrelevant. This predominantly refers to the rule that

- in the ESC, voters must not vote for their own country, whereas
- in the BSC, voters are allowed to vote for their own country.

This may have an influence on the results due to patriotic voting. Therefore, we re-construct the points allocation of the BSC, excluding own-state votes, in order to also look beyond patriotic voting. Therefore, the participant who obtains the highest number of votes within a country, receives twelve points, the second place will be rewarded with ten and the third place with eight points. The performers of the *six* following ranks receive decreasingly seven to two points, the own German State therefore receives zero points. Note, however, that this correction is not perfect as we cannot know what the patriotic voters might have voted for if they were not allowed to vote for their own state. If voting for neighboring states is viewed to be an extension of patriotic voting (in terms of voting motivation), then this may lead to an underestimation of geographical voting bias in the case of the BSC.

⁶ See <http://tvtotal.prosieben.de/tvtotal/specials/bundesvision-song-contest/>

A second important difference is the non-existence of expert juries with voting power in the BSC: while expert juries have enjoyed varying degrees of voting power (currently: 50 per cent of the votes) in the ESC, all votes in the BSC come from audience. It is usually believed in the literature that a higher share of audience voting increases voting biases (*Haan et al. 2005*). To that extent, our analysis may overestimate voting bias when comparing the BSC results to the ESC results. However, we will try to assess this effect by controlling for the effects of the voting regime changes in the ESC (yet-to-come).

We do not think that the other minor differences in the rules exert any influence on our analysis.

4 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSES

4.1 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

In our paper, we perform a comparative empirical study, tracing and comparing voting patterns and biases in the ESC and the BSC. We gather the whole historical voting data set of the ESC from 1998-2013⁷ and collect the BSC voting data from its beginning in 2005-2013⁸. The voting results are all prepared by an official committee of the host country every year, in which the contests take place. These voting results show the number of points each participating country or German state awarded every partaker in the contest. We collect the years 1998-2013 (inclusive) for our data analysis regarding the ESC because there are hardly any changes in rules except the semi-final introduction and we want to focus our analysis especially on voting behavior influenced by public audience.

In each ESC, 23-26 countries participate in the final competition (and a total of 43 countries vote), in each BSC, (the same) 16 German states compete. For the ESC, countries that participated less than three times are not taken into consideration. In total we get 13119 observations for the ESC and 2302 observations for the BSC given by every country within the years. We tabulated, inter alia, the points given from each country A to each other country B for every single year. All participating countries of the final ESC are tabulated in Table 1. Here you can find the number of times each country participated (Year), their total number of received votes (observations) and the mean points assigned per country over all partaking years. Russia, for example, receives the highest number of points on average from all voting countries over a period of 14 years.

⁷ See <http://www.eurovision.tv>; <http://www.kolumbus.fi/jarpen/>

⁸ See <http://tvtotal.prosieben.de/tvtotal/specials/bundesvision-song-contest/>

Country A	Year	Obs.	Mean Points Awarded -All Countries to A-
Albanien	6	235	2.00
Armenia	6	237	3.12
Austria	6	170	1.76
Azerbaijan	6	242	3.12
Belgium	8	228	3.14
Bosnia & Herzegovina	13	447	2.60
Croatia	11	332	2.24
Cyprus	9	269	1.69
Denmark	12	407	3.24
Estonia	10	301	2.85
Finland	9	312	1.73
France	16	532	1.34
Georgia	5	201	2.37
Germany	16	531	2.20
Greece	14	487	3.64
Hungary	6	224	1.72
Iceland	11	369	2.08
Ireland	12	388	1.36
Israel	11	336	2.25
Italy	3	121	3.44
Latvia	8	251	2.58
Lithuania	9	307	1.38
Macedonia	8	262	1.41
Malta	12	369	2.50
Moldova	8	316	1.97
Netherlands	7	189	2.37
Norway	13	426	2.96
Poland	6	170	1.05
Portugal	7	214	1.16
Romania	14	488	2.19
Russia	14	486	4.02
Serbia	5	204	3.92
Slovenia	7	199	1.70
Spain	16	532	1.42
Sweden	15	494	3.45
Switzerland	6	187	1.10
Turkey	14	452	3.27
Ukraine	11	418	3.76
United Kingdom	16	532	1.49

Table 1 Participating countries, year, observations and mean points awarded

The BSC displays always the same structure. Every German state participated at least nine times. Thus, there are 144 observations per German state.

In the beginning, we look at the mean number of given points between dissimilar countries and (dis)similar federal states. We put a special focus on non-standard and unusual voting

results by using the songs quality as a benchmark as *Clerides and Stengos (2006)* do. According to the rules each participating country has to distribute a total of 58 points ($58 = 12 + 10 + 8 + 7 + 6 + 5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1$) and because of the expectation that the songs quality is consistent for all countries each country obtains expectably on average $58/(N - 1)$ points per participant with N participants in the ESC and $58/N$ in the BSC. In our sample the median contest size is 25 for the Eurovision and 16 for the BSC. Assuming the randomness of the songs quality, we undertake that each country will obtain from each other $58/24 = 2.42$ points in the ESC and $58/16 = 3.625$ in the BSC. With our purpose to compare, we determine the mean number of awarded points between every participating country_A and country_B. In tables 2 and 3 we illustrate these country pairs regarding the BSC as well as ESC (table 4). Column - A to B- shows the mean number of points given from country A to country B while column - All to A- presents the mean number of points given by all other participating states or countries throughout all years. As we can see, because German states are allowed to vote for themselves, they systematically award themselves an amount of more points than the 3.625 points we suppose on average.

Country A	Country B	A to B	All to B (exc.A)	„Overvaluation“ A to B
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania	Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania	12.0	1.6	10.4
Bavaria	Bavaria	11.8	1.6	10.2
Saarland	Saarland	11.8	1.6	10.2
Rhineland-Palatinate	Rhineland-Palatinate	10.9	1.0	9.9
Bremen	Bremen	12.0	3.2	8.8
Hesse	Hesse	11.3	3.0	8.3
Thuringia	Thuringia	12.0	3.8	8.2
Saxony-Anhalt	Saxony-Anhalt	10.4	2.3	8.2
Hamburg	Hamburg	12.0	3.8	8.2
Baden-Wuerttemberg	Baden-Wuerttemberg	11.8	4.0	7.8
Brandenburg	Brandenburg	10.4	2.9	7.5
Schleswig-Holstein	Schleswig-Holstein	10.8	3.6	7.1
Saxony	Saxony	10.0	3.0	7.0
North Rhine-Westphalia	North Rhine-Westphalia	10.1	3.7	6.4
Lower Saxony	Lower Saxony	10.9	4.9	5.9
Berlin	Berlin	11.3	6.6	4.7

Table 2 Country pairs vote's for each other in the BSC (1)

Country A	Country B	A to B	B to A	All to B (exc. A)	„Overvaluation“ A to B
<i>Country B is favored by Country A</i>					
Schleswig-Holstein	Hamburg	8.0	7.1	4.1	3.9
Lower Saxony	Bremen	6.6	6.0	2.8	3.7
Hamburg	Schleswig-Holstein	7.1	8.0	3.9	3.2
Brandenburg	Berlin	9.2	5.2	6.8	2.5
Saarland	Rhineland-Palatinate	3.8	2.6	1.5	2.3
Baden-Wuerttemberg	Rhineland-Palatinate	3.8	5.9	1.7	2.1
Berlin	Brandenburg	5.2	9.2	3.2	2.0
Bavaria	Rhineland-Palatinate	3.7	1.3	1.7	2.0
Saxony	Thuringia	5.8	4.1	4.2	1.6
Rhineland-Palatinate	Hesse	5.0	1.7	3.5	1.5
<i>Country B is not favored by Country A</i>					
Saxony	Hamburg	2.6	2.1	4.4	-1.9
Bremen	Brandenburg	1.6	1.8	3.5	-1.9
Saxony-Anhalt	Bremen	1.2	1.1	3.2	-2.0
Rhineland-Palatinate	Thuringia	2.4	0.9	4.4	-2.0
Thüringen	Hamburg	2.4	3.9	4.5	-2.0
Hamburg	Berlin	5.0	3.8	7.0	-2.0
Bavaria	Saxony	1.4	1.9	3.5	-2.1
Saxony-Anhalt	Hamburg	2.1	2.1	4.5	-2.3
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania	Bavaria	0.9	0.9	3.4	-2.5
Lower Saxony	Thuringia	1.9	4.7	4.5	-2.6

Table 3 Country pairs vote's for each other in the BSC, “top 10” (2)

While the upper part of table 3 shows the top 10 German states favor another German state, the lower part illustrates those 10, who awarded points lower than average. It is remarkable that East-German states and West-German states favor each other against their political-historical backgrounds of the countries' separation into East and West.

The systematic biased voting in ESC can hardly be doubted when looking at the ‘friendship’ between Cyprus and Greece, as can be seen in table 4. While each country gave 1.69 points in average, which are 0.73 points less than the supposed average number of points, Greece gave an average of 12 points (the maximal number of points) to Cyprus throughout every year. The difference between 12 points and 1.69 shows the ‘overvaluation’ as a possible bias after controlling for the song's quality. Similarly, Greece received an average of 12.00 points from Cyprus, these are 8.36 points more than the average. While the upper part of table 4 shows the top 20 countries favor another country, the lower part illustrates those 20 who awarded points lower than average. Thus, in addition to the absolute comparison between country pairs, also relative comparisons have to be taken into account.

Country A	Country B	Obs.	A to B	All to B	„Overvaluation“ A to B
<i>Country B is favored by Country A</i>					
Greece	Cyprus	7	12.00	1.69	10.31
Cyprus	Greece	13	12.00	3.64	8.36
Romania	Moldova	8	11.75	1.97	9.78
Macedonia	Albanien	6	11.17	2.00	9.17
Moldova	Romania	9	11.22	2.19	9.03
Turkey	Azerbaijan	5	12.00	3.12	8.88
Azerbaijan	Turkey	4	12.00	3.27	8.73
Andorra	Spain	6	10.00	1.42	8.58
Czech Republic	Armenia	3	11.33	3.12	8.21
Montenegro	Serbia	3	12.00	3.92	8.08
Georgia	Armenia	4	11.00	3.12	7.88
France	Portugal	7	9.00	1.16	7.84
Serbia and Montenegro	Macedonia	3	9.00	1.41	7.59
Serbia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	6	10.17	2.60	7.57
Ukraine	Azerbaijan	6	10.67	3.12	7.54
Greece	Albanien	6	9.50	2.00	7.50
Lithuania	Georgia	5	9.80	2.37	7.43
Lithuania	Latvia	6	10.00	2.58	7.42
Belgium	Netherlands	6	9.67	2.37	7.30
Croatia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	13	9.85	2.60	7.24
<i>Country B is not favored by Country A</i>					
Israel	Serbia	4	0.75	3.92	-3.17
Ireland	Turkey	13	0.08	3.27	-3.20
Serbia and Montenegro	Turkey	4	0.00	3.27	-3.27
Slovakia	Turkey	4	0.00	3.27	-3.27
Latvia	Serbia	5	0.60	3.92	-3.32
Azerbaijan	Serbia	4	0.50	3.92	-3.42
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Italy	3	0.00	3.44	-3.44
Bulgaria	Italy	3	0.00	3.44	-3.44
Netherlands	Italy	3	0.00	3.44	-3.44
Russia	Italy	3	0.00	3.44	-3.44
Sweden	Italy	3	0.00	3.44	-3.44
Czech Republic	Sweden	3	0.00	3.45	-3.45
Italy	Sweden	3	0.00	3.45	-3.45
Switzerland	Ukraine	10	0.20	3.76	-3.56
San Marino	Ukraine	4	0.00	3.76	-3.76
Switzerland	Russia	12	0.17	4.02	-3.85
Estonia	Serbia	5	0.00	3.92	-3.92
Turkey	Serbia	5	0.00	3.92	-3.92
United Kingdom	Serbia	5	0.00	3.92	-3.92
Monaco	Russia	3	0.00	4.02	-4.02

Table 4 Country pairs vote´s for each other in the ESC, “top 20”

4.2 METHOD

Our goal is to explain possible biased votes in the ESC and BSC through our panel data model. Our panel data set consists of three dimensions, which are year = time (t), juries = country (A) and the performed song of another country (B). Because not every country takes part every year in the ESC, our data set is unbalanced and because every German state takes part in the BSC, this data set is balanced. As *Lazarsfeld et al. (1948: 137)* conclude in their study that “voting is essentially a group experience. People who work or live or play together are likely to vote for the same candidates”, we assume homogenous behavior of voting across participating countries and states of Germany. We follow the outstanding idea of *Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009)* and analyze the voting behavior *separately* for each country instead of looking at the average influence of independent variables on the dependent variable -votes-, where the average is calculated over all voting countries. We choose the method by *Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009)* because of the advantage of capturing voting patterns more precisely and the avoidance of possible offsets of voting effects.

Inter alia, *Clerides and Stengos (2006)* define the dependent variable as the number of points awarded by country A to country B. Because pure quality of a song that only based on artistic creation is hard to measure, *Clerides and Stengos (2006)* subdivided the “perceived quality” into objective and subjective quality. While the former describes observable characteristics of a song such as gender, group/solo performance or the song’s language, the latter relies on intrinsic individual preferences for a special type of song. Therefore, *Clerides and Stengos (2006)* concentrate on objective attributes of quality that might exert an influence to the perceived song’s quality (constructed as ”packaging effects”). Because “quality” was ignored in *Clerides and Stengos (2006)* we define our country-specific model following *Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009:410)*. They propose and add a proxy for “quality” of the performed song as follows:

$$'quality'_{tB,-A} = \frac{1}{n_{tAB}} \sum_{k \neq A} S_{tKB}, \quad (1)$$

$$bias_{tAB} = s_{tAB} - 'quality'_{tB,-A}, \quad (2)$$

$$average_bias_{AB} = \frac{1}{T_{AB}} \sum_t bias_{tAB} \quad (3)$$

T_{AB}	= number of years country A and country B participate
n_{tAB}	= number of all participating countries without country A and country B in year t
s_{tAB}	= awarded points of country A to county B’s song in year t, $s_{tAB}=0$, if country A or B does not partake in year t

Thus, we define the bias by Eqs. (1) and (2) as our dependent variable that demonstrates the difference between the given points by country A to song of country B and the number of points assigned by all other countries in average of year t except country A ($quality_{tB,-A}$). The bias leads to an overvaluation (large bias with a positive sign) or an undervaluation (small bias with a negative sign). This has the considerable advantage that we have a continuous dependent variable instead of a categorical one like the final rank or the number of points given from country A to country B in year t (Spierdijk and Vellekoop 2009). Moreover, this model has the advantage that we do not have to control for quality anymore as, for example, Ginsburgh and Noury (2008) do. Therefore, we avoid problems of endogeneity and circularity.

Accordingly, we define $bias_{tAB}$ as our dependent variable (4)

$$bias_{ABt} = \alpha_A + \beta_A X_{ABt} + u_{ABt} \quad (4)$$

and corresponding control variables X_{ABt} ($1 \times V$) for each dimension $t = 1, \dots, T$, $A = 1, \dots, N$, $B = 1, \dots, M$ and V the number of several control variables. Precisely, for our dataset regarding the ESC $T = 16$, $A = 47$ and $B = 41$, regarding BSE $T=9$ and $M=N=16$.

Finally, the estimation equation is shown in (5) in a compressed specification:

$$bias_A = \alpha_A + \beta_A X_B + u_A \quad (5)$$

We consider N equations. Like *Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009)*, we estimate the equations of voting (5) individually per country by linear methods (OLS) by means of robust estimators, because intercepts and slopes vary with the partaking and voting countries.

4.3 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

Our selection of explanatory variables is based on scientific literature in media and cultural economics concerning the ESC (see chapter 2). Because of the extensive discussion about the influence of the *geographical position* (inter alia Yair 1995; Gatherer 2004) and its affect to voting behavior we collect data regarding the geographical closeness of participating countries (ESC) and states of the Federal Republic of Germany (BSC). Inspired by *Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009)* we collect the latitude and longitude of the partaking countries' capital as well as latitude and longitude of the partaking federal states' capital of the Federal German states⁹. In order to capture neighboring countries we include a dummy to show whether

⁹ See <http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/findlatlong.htm>

participating countries share a common border. In contrast to Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009) we not only include a dummy variable neighboring countries, but also the length of common border measured in km. Thus, we assume the longer the common border, the more points participating countries award each other.¹⁰ We also collect the distance between the countries capitals in order to gather geographical closeness. Against the background of BSC we create a dummy for a former Eastern part of Germany and a -Home Bias- Dummy if the country votes for his own German State.

We define independent variables with respect to the kind of performance. These explanatory variables characterize performance characteristics such as gender (male, female) of the performing country and if the song is performed by a group, a (male-) soloist or a duet. Haan et al. (2005) find evidence that the order of appearance has a systematic influence on the final points in the Eurovision Song Contest. Therefore, we defined an order-variable in which acts of the performing countries are viewed by the audience. Because the most winning songs are performed in English, we assume that the sung language equally plays an important role for explaining the voting behavior. Therefore, we define a dummy for the songs language especially if the song is sung in French or English. We also include a dummy if the performing country was the host of the contest in year t .

As in *Ginsburgh and Noury (2008)* we take the distances between the giving countries_A' and receiving countries_B' *languages* as a regressor in our voting analysis. These linguistic differences based on the lexicostatistical distances derived by *Dyen et al. (1992)*.¹¹

In the period 1968 to 1972 Hofstede conduct an extensive cross-cultural investigation by a sample of forty countries. The aim of his study is to show the fundamental differences in how people from different countries experience and interpret their world. The research project is carried out with 116.000 employees by company IBM with a comparable professional position, but from a different nation. Using factor analysis of the received responses, it is possible to construct four "dimensions" to describe the country's culture. For each dimension a country-index of each participating nation is calculated. As in *Ginsburgh & Noury (2008)*, we use Hofstede's four *cultural dimensions*¹² in order to gather the cultural diversity among the partaking countries. Thus, the explanatory

¹⁰ We obtained the length of common border and the neighbor countries from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html>

¹¹ The collection of data regarding the lexicostatistical distances is not yet finished.

¹² also Long-term versus short-term orientation and Indulgence versus Restraint (IND), they are ignored in this study because of high incompleteness

variable is the distances between the countries' index for a Hofstede dimension that votes and the countries' index that receives the points. The four dimensions of Hofstede are Individualism/Collectivism, Masculinity/Femininity, Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance. While Individualism measures the degree of integration into groups of personalities in a society, Masculinity deals with the roles between genders, Uncertainty Avoidance measures the risk of uncertainty avoidance and the Power Distance concentrates on the degree of equality between human beings.¹³ Because not every participating country was considered in Hofstede's analysis, we determine the countries cultural dimensions by the method of *Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009)*.¹⁴

Analyses in the research field of behavioral economics find evidence that economic agents' decisions are often affected by religion (inter alia *Iannaccone 1998; Kuran 1994*). For this reason, we assume countries to give higher amounts of points to countries with the same *religion*. We create a dummy variable for religion if country A and B share at the minimum one major religion. We follow the procedure of *Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009)* and consider a religion if the percentage of individuals belonging to this religion is either the highest percentage among totally religions, or if it is the second largest with not less than 20 percent. We differentiate between Catholics, Orthodox, Jewish, Muslims and Protestants.¹⁵ In table 5 you can see the possible explanatory variables of voting bias in a comprehensible format.

Geographical aspects

Neighb _{AB}	If countries A and B are neighbors = 1 Otherwise = 0
Length_CB _{AB}	length of common border in km of Countries A and B
Capital_Dis _{AB}	Distance between capitals of countries A and B in km
only for BSC: former GDR _B	If Country B was a former Eastern part of Germany =1 Otherwise=0
Home_Bias _{AB}	If countries A and B are the same German States = 1 Otherwise = 0

Language

Lang _{AB}	If Country B and Country A share a common official of primary language = 1 Otherwise=0
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Performance

Male_solo _{Bt}	If Country B's song was sung by a male soloist in year t =1 Otherwise=0
duet _{Bt}	If Country B's song was sung by a female-male duet in year t =1 Otherwise=0
group _{Bt}	If Country B's song was sung by a group in year t =1 Otherwise=0

¹³ see <http://geert-hofstede.com/serbia.html>

¹⁴ We have obtained the cultural dimensions from <http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html>

¹⁵ We have obtained the major religion from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>

$english_{Bt}$	If Country B's song was in English in year $t = 1$ Otherwise=0
$french_{Bt}$	If Country B's song was in French in year $t = 1$, otherwise=0
$order_{Bt}$	Order of Country B's song of in year t (one for the first performing song)
$Host_{Bt}$	If Country B was the host in year $t = 1$ Otherwise=0
<i>Cultural dimensions</i>	
PDI_{AB}	Difference between indices of power distance of countries A and B
IDV_{AB}	Difference between indices of individualism of countries A and B
MAS_{AB}	Difference between indices of masculinity of countries A and B
UAI_{AB}	Difference between indices of uncertainty avoidance of countries A and B
<i>Religion</i>	
$Religion_{AB}$	If Country A and B share at the minimum one major religion =1 Otherwise=0

Table 5 Possible explanatory variables of voting

Because a lot of explanatory variables are time-invariant, we do not take into consideration any temporal changes.

5 ESTIMATIONS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 COMPARING THE ESC RESULTS TO FORMER STUDIES

Our results confirm the results by *Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009)* to the extent the ESC shows biased voting patterns based on geographical proximity (neighbors, see table 7). Since we use a slightly different dataset that, in contrast to *Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009)*, excludes the early years (1975-1997) but adds the more recent years (2004-2013), this can be viewed to support the robustness of their results. Remarkably, Ireland is the only country in our estimation that displays an anti-neighbor bias, a result that could not be found in *Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009: 417)*. In contrast, their prime example of anti-neighbor bias, Macedonia, turns into displaying a pro-neighbor bias in our sample. If this was confirmed by the upcoming estimations, a line of explanation might consider that the newer data of our sample would entail the re-orientation of Macedonia as an independent country in its geographical reason (instead of 'just' being a former Yugoslavian republic).

In terms of the influence of religion, our sample again shows considerable more countries with a respective voting bias than *Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009)*. In line with the literature, most of the biases are in favor of same religions. However, *Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009)*'s only example of other-religion preference disappears in our sample what, if confirmed, again may be due to the newer data. Yet, our sample shows several other cases of other-religion

preference (see table 8). Regarding the cultural dimensions, we get a mixed picture that roughly resembles the results from *Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009)*, confirming that cultural-biased voting plays a relevant role for the contest outcomes.

5.2 COMPARING ESC AND BSC

The first result that we can draw from the BSC analysis is that biased voting patterns also exist in the BSC (see tables 9-12). Thus, biased voting patterns do not only take place among different countries in Europe but also within one of the biggest countries, namely Germany. This conclusion is important because it shows that favoring artists for other than artistic reasons does not depend on nationality and different nations being involved.

Secondly, we can extend this result by demonstrating that geographical proximity also matters with respect to the national contest. Thus, even within one and the same nation, effects of (regional) community closeness affect voting patterns.

The most obvious case of geographical preferences in voting behavior is the effect of patriotic voting in the BSC: in contrast to the ESC, voters are allowed to vote for their own state in the BSC. Expectably, this leads to significant patriotic voting in the case of the BSC (see tables 9-10). This actually represents the strongest case of geographically-biased voting. Furthermore, if the motivational causes for patriotic voting and neighbor-favoring voting are similar, then it must be assumed that many of the patriotic voters would have voted for neighboring states if they were not allowed to vote patriotically. Thus, the occurrence of patriotic voting may lead to an underestimation of voting biases in favor of neighboring states.

Our estimations with the modified points allocation, excluding own-state votes, confirm the existence of neighbor-biases in the BSC voting patterns (see tables 11-12). Nine out of sixteen states show significant voting bias in favor of neighbor states on the three-star level, five more on the two-star level. Saarland and Brandenburg are the only exceptions. Furthermore, there is special and highly interesting effect in the data of the BSC: the former German divide between a Western and an Eastern republic matters for voting behavior (see tables 11-12). Even in the time-span of 15-23 years after the re-unification, the voting audience in the former GDR-states favors acts from other former GDR-states whereas the voting audience from former FRG-states disfavors acts from former GDR-states.¹⁶ The common heritage that

¹⁶ GDR = German Democratic Republic (the former Eastern part of Germany); FRG = Federal Republic of Germany (the former Western part of Germany).

has deviated between west and east during the four decades following World War II appears to be influencing voting behavior until the present day. The inner re-unification, thus, does not appear to be complete in regard to cultural contest events. Finding this effect raises the question if a similar effect for Europe exists, i.e. if introducing a dummy for former “Warsaw Pact” countries is significant.

In terms of religion, the BSC surprisingly shows other-religion biased voting for several of the Western German states (Hesse, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, North Rhine-Westphalia; plus: Berlin). This stands in contrast to the ESC results and constitutes an interesting result in particular in the cases where it relates to non-neighboring states or neighboring states that display no geographical proximity. With reference to the cultural dimensions, the data collection – which is difficult but not impossible – for the German states is not yet finished.

6 CONCLUSION

Culturally-biased voting has been a major point of discussion with respect to the ESC. People ostensibly voting for their neighbor countries instead of according to musical quality triggered a controversy about the audience’s participation in such contests vis-à-vis expert juries who may provide a more neutral assessment. It is a common underlying assumption that the international character of the song contest and, thus, the heterogeneity of the participating countries plays an important role in motivating the biases because neighboring countries often are less ‘different’ than more far-away countries and, thus, voters are more sympathetic to and more willing to vote for them. If the cultural bias is driven by the heterogeneity of countries, then it should not be relevant – or less relevant – in a national contest with considerably more homogenous participants. However, when comparing the voting patterns of the ESC with the BSC, basically an inner-German copy of the ESC, we show that geographically biased voting is relevant for national contests as well. Next to strong patriotic voting, neighboring-favoring biases can be observed as well, even though cultural differences (difference in language, ethnics, musical/cultural traditions, religion, etc.) are considerably less apparent within Germany. This stands in line with the analysis of the ESC as, even there, the measurable cultural dimensions exert less influence on voting biases than geographical proximity. Consequently, there appears to exist a preference for geographical proximity in audience voting that is strongest for acts from the same geographical territory (patriotic voting in the BSC) but, if that is excluded, also significant for the next closest geographical territory – at least, in the vast majority of the cases.

Notwithstanding, a common heritage may add to the geographical proximity preference in particular cases. An example of this is the East-West-German divide which still plays a role in voting patterns even more than a decade after the re-unification (as shown in the case of the BSC). The findings of certain blocs that particularly favor each other in the ESC (Fenn et al. 2006; Gatherer 2006) point to other examples. However, while these special common heritage effects aggravate geographical proximity biases, a preference for neighbors does usually also exist, albeit somewhat less pronounced, without them. Altogether, geographical voting biases are not exclusive to international contests. Instead, they represent a fundamental preference of audiences.

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Appendix

Eurovision Song Contest

Country	Male_solo	Duet	Group	Order
Albania				
Andorra	-1.407047** .5093237			
Armenia		1.748532** .6008339	-1.45123** .4677782	
Austria				
Azerbaijan				
Belarus				
Belgium				
Bosnia and Herzegovina				
Bulgaria				
Croatia				
Cyprus				
Czech Republic				
Denmark				
Estonia			.	
Finland	-1.12999*** .3839933			
France				
Georgia				-.078745* .0386224
Germany				
Greece				
Hungary				
Iceland				
Ireland				
Israel				
Italy				
Latvia		-1.298641* .6256467		
Lithuania				
Macedonia		1.563789* .7242143		
Malta				
Moldova				
Monaco				

Montenegro			
Netherlands			.0486199*
Norway	-1.655879*		.0240102
Poland	.688473		
Portugal	1.505369*		
Romania	.7399722		
Russia	1.688049*		
San Marino	.6556527		
Serbia	-3.411774*	2.186338*	-.135349*
Slovakia	1.514175	1.086539	.0583945
Slovenia			
Spain			
Sweden			
Switzerland			
Turkey			
Ukraine			
United Kingdom			

Table 6 shows the results of estimation for the country-specific model of ESC (1).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ Standard errors below.

Country	Host	English	French	Capital Distance	Neighbour
Albania					
Andorra			1.747576* .7610356		
Armenia					
Austria			-.7154507* .2965729		
Azerbaijan	-1.283203* .5083119				
Belarus		.8094771* .3365233			
Belgium					
Bosnia and Herzegovina			-.5655743* .1817521		6.96754*** .7691388
Bulgaria					
Croatia		- 1.000996** .3461167	-1.271244* .5662913		6.331471*** .5598927
Cyprus					
Czech Republic					
Denmark	2.568599** .946235				
Estonia					
Finland					1.172269* .5603318
France					
Georgia					
Germany					
Greece	-1.19515* .5484127				
Hungary					
Iceland		.7491989** .2859634			
Ireland					-.4608915** .1763732
Israel		.7461848* .329237			
Italy					
Latvia					
Lithuania	-1.441573* .716435			-.0004936* .0002357	
Macedonia					

Malta			
Moldova			4.076998 **
Monaco			1.314158
Montenegro	-1.8699***	-1.60454***	6.871458***
Netherlands	.5557494	.2710128	.6451092
Norway			
Poland			
Portugal			
Romania			
Russia			
San Marino	-2.02215***	1.301121*	
	.5363884	.6302667	
Serbia			4.497527***
			.9878276
Slovakia			
Slovenia			
Spain			
Sweden			
Switzerland		-.8879125*	
		.3738943	
Turkey		.6867321*	
		.3098791	
Ukraine			-.0008167**
			.000264
United Kingdom			2.140469**
			.7300521

Table 7 shows the results of estimation for the country-specific model of ESC (2).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ Standard errors below.

Country	PDI	IDV	MAS	UAI	Religion
Albania					1.555866** .5016426
Andorra					
Armenia					
Austria					
Azerbaijan					
Belarus					
Belgium					1.462746 *** .3597859
Bosnia and Herzegovina					
Bulgaria					
Croatia	-.0287556*** .0072868	.0352918*** .0091939	-.0192851** .00759	-.0150779* .0064805	
Cyprus					1.350131*** .3836555
Czech Republic		.			
Denmark					1.589319*** .3908468
Estonia	.0176338*** .0054465	-.0149311* .0065135		.0117937* .0047001	1.161814*** .3478376
Finland					-1.129994*** .3839933
France					
Georgia			.0783472* .0317381		2.087781*** .6037618
Germany					1.053817** .4266011
Greece					1.30334*** .4295177
Hungary					1.185025* .5191777
Iceland					1.127452** .3529333
Ireland				.	1.625692*** .4157314
Israel					1.48023*** .4017417
Italy	-.0346067** .0121698				
Latvia				-	1.639414*** .4379541
Lithuania					1.815232*** .4646331
Macedonia					1.479491*** .4885504
Malta					1.862844*** .418148

Moldova					2.270086***
					.6243753
Monaco					1.788784*
					.8788451
Montenegro					
Netherlands					1.282388**
					.4123051
Norway					1.889645***
					.4597926
Poland					1.468161***
					.4764395
Portugal					1.314716***
					.471052
Romania	-.0216457*	.0373899***	-.0273273***	-.030097***	2.163325***
	.0087014	.0104888	.0083668	.0083279	.5315263
Russia					1.649321***
					.4622374
San Marino					
Serbia				-.0219509*	
				.0090439	
Slovakia				.0243044*	
				.0115806	
Slovenia		.			1.737785***
					.4070161
Spain					1.313222***
					.3517246
Sweden					.8086344**
					.3591901
Switzerland		.0242073*			1.286665***
		.0094741			.4395492
Turkey					1.450949***
					.363351
Ukraine					2.415535***
					.4944335
United Kingdom		-.0206094**			1.470604***
		.0066002			.3504225

Table 8 shows the results of estimation for the country-specific model of ESC (3).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ Standard errors below.

Bundesvision Song Contest (“home biased” estimation, including own-state votes)

Country	Male_solo	Duet	Group	Order	Host
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania					
Bavaria					
Saarland					
Rhineland-Palatinate					
Bremen	-1.330424** .482166		-1.277578* .4957977		
Hesse					.5021903* .2431537
Thuringia					
Saxony-Anhalt					
Hamburg					-.9102034** .3405754
Baden-Wuerttemberg					
Brandenburg					.5823764* .2911145
Schleswig-H olstein					
Saxony					
North Rhine-Westphalia					
Lower Saxony					
Berlin					

Table 9 shows the results of estimation for the country-specific model of BSC including own-state votes (1).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ Standard errors below.

Country	Religion	East-German Country	Neighbour	Same German State	Distanz
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania				9.971966*** .5607088	
Bavaria			1.023158* .3960474	10.15957*** .7194804	-.0022386 * .0009382
Saarland				9.111117*** 1.006025	
Rhineland-Palatinate			1.686565 * .7515733	9.157893*** .6346514	-.0039756** .001164
Bremen		-1.056094** .3671361		8.53057*** 1.04025	-.0032577** .0010695
Hesse				8.067496*** 1.14425	-.002493* .0012292
Thuringia		1.467386** .5212577		7.920594*** 1.183269	
Saxony-Anhalt		2.017289*** .5162506		7.471148*** 1.381221	
Hamburg	-2.091594*** .5335682		1.422278* .6691877	7.718616*** 1.222981	-.0058881*** .0010832
Baden-Wuerttemberg				7.299195*** .9981183	
Brandenburg				6.63071*** 1.034056	
Schleswig-Holstein	-1.255532 ** .4413905	-2.029895*** .3797536		5.976065*** .9628319	-.0055478*** .0010156
Saxony		1.487144*** .4466366		5.039696*** 1.54811	
North Rhine-Westphalia	-.7287616 * .3011348	-1.370903*** .2814022		7.647746*** .9860926	
Lower Saxony		-1.370903*** .2814022	-.9321554* .4514336	3.817047*** 1.003625	-.0051562*** .0014125
Berlin				4.662105*** 1.013375	

Table 10 shows the results of estimation for the country-specific model of BSC including own-state votes (2).

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 Standard errors below.

Bundesvision Song Contest (excluding own-state votes)

Country	Male_solo	Duet	Group	Order	Host
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania					
Bavaria					.8748787** .2751069
Saarland					
Rhineland-Palatinate					.9976841** .3586643
Bremen					
Hesse					
Thuringia					1.15831** .3638918
Saxony-Anhalt					.9931136** .3383482
Hamburg					
Baden-Wuerttemberg					
Brandenburg					
Schleswig-Holstein					
Saxony	-1.101395*				.7791445* .3893888
North Rhine-Westphalia	.4315858				
Lower Saxony					-1.070427* .457207
Berlin					

Table 11 shows the results of estimation for the country-specific model of BSC excluding own-state votes (3).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ Standard errors below.

Country	Religion	East-German Country	Neighbour	Distanz
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania			1.260692**	
Bavaria		.5866716*	.4666822	1.673558***
Saarland		.2861674	.3808562	
Rhineland-Palatinate			2.338706***	
Bremen		-.9140556*	.6026735	2.95841**
Hesse	-1.797385*** .5255049	.4505547	.9813468	1.502131**
Thuringia		-.7881969*	1.502131**	.4871782
Saxony-Anhalt		1.887807**	1.704478***	.0122512***
Hamburg	-5.114151*** .9230383	.6717712	.4481698	.0037143
Baden-Wuerttemberg		1.75233***	1.828236**	
Brandenburg	1.923326* .9005473	.4969035	.5214991	
Schleswig-Holstein	-2.307101*** .6304572	3.816824***	2.739381***	-.00533***
Saxony		.9397967	.8877351	.0013132
North Rhine-Westphalia	-1.161437** .4120401	-.7805129*	2.698712***	.004643*
Lower Saxony		.3741581	.6442723	.0020011
Berlin	-2.507431* 1.152057	-1.482997***	2.691653***	-.003199*
		.4868266	.6143779	.0013657
		1.730134**	2.567641***	.0078292*
		.5444281	.5762772	.0031573
		-1.996037***	1.603293**	.0067339***
		.3886491	.6068418	.0017707
			2.202689***	
			.5875721	
		5.587277***	6.141291***	.0044419*
		.9865042	1.235737	.0022063

Table 12 shows the results of estimation for the country-specific model of BSC excluding own-state votes (4).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ Standard errors below.