European Unemployment: The Evolution of Facts and Ideas

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Abstract

In the 1970s, European unemployment started increasing. It increased further in the 1980s, to reach a plateau in the 1990s. It is still high today, although the average unemployment rate hides a high degree of heterogeneity across countries. The focus of researchers and policy makers was initially on the role of shocks. As unemployment remained high, the focus has progressively shifted to institutions. This paper reviews the interaction of facts and theories, and gives a tentative assessment of what we know and what we still do not know.

Introduction

From the end of World War II to the end of the 1960s, European unemployment was very low. In the 1970s, it started increasing. It continued to increase in the 1980s, and to reach a high plateau in the 1990s. It is still high today, although the average European unemployment rate hides a high degree of heterogeneity across countries.

This has been a tough learning experience, both for economists and for policy makers. When the 1970s started, the concept of a natural rate of unemployment was just born, and still far from operational. The following quote from Milton Friedman (1968) is revealing: “The natural rate of unemployment is the level which would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided that there is imbedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, including market imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities, the costs of mobility, and so on.”

One might have hoped that, with thirty years of data, with clear differences in the evolution of unemployment rates and policies across countries, we would now have an operational theory of unemployment. I do not think that we do. Many theories have come and—partly—gone. Each has added a layer to our knowledge, but our knowlege remains very incomplete. To use a well worn formula, we have learned a lot, but we still have a lot to learn.

The purpose of this paper is to review the developments, both on the unemployment and the theory fronts, and give an assessment of where we are today. Let me start with two caveats. I have not tried to be encyclopedic.1 And, because the editors unwisely encouraged me to do so, I have certainly focused too much on my own research—one of the results being a Stiglitz–like bibliography. For my defense, I would argue that it is broadly representative of the twists and turns of our theories over the last thirty years.

I review the basic facts, across time and across countries, in Section 1. As

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unemployment increased in the 1970s, the initial focus was on the role of shocks, from oil price increases to the slowdown in productivity growth. This is the topic of Section 2. As, in the 1980s, the shocks receded but unemployment remained high, the focus shifted to persistence mechanisms, from the role of capital accumulation, to the role of insiders in bargaining. This is the topic of Section 3. In the early 1990s, the focus shifted yet again, this time towards the role of labor market institutions, from employment protection to unemployment insurance. This is the topic of Section 4. Since then, research has tried to sort out the respective role of shocks, institutions, and interactions. The main directions of exploration and the open questions are the topic of Section 5. The state of play, and whether we know enough to usefully guide policy and reforms, are taken up in Section 6.

1 Basic Facts

Figure 1 gives the evolution of the unemployment rate for the EU15 as a whole (the 15 member countries of the European Union) since 1960. It shows the steady increase in unemployment from 2% in the 1960s to 8% in the 1980s, and a rough plateau—with cyclical declines at the end of the 1980s and 1990s—since then.
Figure 2 gives the unemployment rates in each of the EU15 countries as of May 2005. It shows the large heterogeneity of unemployment rates across countries. While this heterogeneity has always been present, it may be even more marked today, to the point where talking about “European unemployment” may indeed be misleading. Unemployment is low in many countries: As of mid–2005, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, and Austria all have unemployment rates lower than the United States. And high average European unemployment reflects high unemployment in the four large continental countries, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. Even among these four countries, the differences are striking. Spain’s unemployment rate is down from more than 20% in the early 1990s. Germany’s unemployment rate is instead up from its low pre-reunification level, and shows sharp regional differences between the West and the East. Italy’s and France’s unemployment rates have been high since the early 1980s. But Italy’s rate shows sharp regional differences between the North and the South. France’s does not.

Source: Eurostat

2. In 1994, the official number for the unemployment rate reached 24%. The definition of unemployment and the numbers have since been revised, and the current time series have unemployment peaking at 18.4% in 1994.
Unemployment, Flows, and Duration

As a matter of arithmetic, a high unemployment rate may be the result of high flows in and out of unemployment, or/and of a high average duration of unemployment. Figure 3, which gives the evolution of the unemployment rate and unemployment duration in France (for which data on the composition unemployment by duration exists going back to 1968) shows that the increase in the unemployment rate has come with a large increase in duration. The figure suggests that duration, which was already higher than that of United States in the late 1960s, has more than doubled since then, and now stands as well over a year. The proportion of long term unemployed (unemployed for more than a year) has increased from 20% in the late 1960s, to more than 40% today. From the point of view of the unemployed, being unemployed in Europe has always been a different experience from being unemployed in the United States—where mean duration has remained around 3 months—, and has become increasingly so over time.

**Figure 3. Unemployment rate and duration in France**

Source: Enquêtes Emploi, INSEE, series longues; with adjustment by author for 1968 to 1974.

3. The increase in duration would be even larger, were it not for the increasing role of temporary contracts since the early 1980s, contracts which are typically associated with shorter ensuing unemployment spells.
Unemployment Versus Other Labor Market Indicators

A standard question is whether focusing on the unemployment rate is indeed meaningful. The answer, in the case of European unemployment, is yes. Governments have indeed used various measures to decrease unemployment numbers; these have ranged from training programs, real or perfunctory, to generous invalidity programs (the example of the Netherlands being the best known), to subsidized early retirement programs. One would want to construct a measure which included these workers in these categories in addition to those unemployed. In the absence of such a measure, focusing on the unemployment rate is not misleading. As these programs have typically swelled when unemployment increased, the measure would move in general in the same direction as unemployment, except with larger amplitude. To take one example, the participation rate of men, aged 55 to 59, in France, went from 85% in the late 1960s to below 70% in the mid 1980s, reflecting subsidized early retirement, precisely at the time when unemployment was increasing. More generally, movements in unemployment rates have typically been associated with deviations of participation rates from trend in the opposite direction.

Source: OECD database.
What is not appropriate however is to simply focus, as some do, on the employment rate—the ratio of employment to the population of working age. Here country differences in both the levels and the evolution of the participation rate of women, which are linked to many non economic factors, play an important role. It is not clear, per se, that a lower participation rate of women for example is the indication of a problem in the labor market.

Having laid the basic facts, I now look at the history more closely.

2 The Initial Rise in Unemployment. The Role of Shocks

Along a balanced growth path, the wage consistent with stable employment must grow at the rate of Harrod–neutral technological progress. In addition, if the prices of the other factors of production increase, the wage must decrease so as to maintain zero net profit for firms. Call this wage the “warranted wage.” Call the wage set in bargaining the “bargained wage”. If, for given labor market conditions, the bargained wage grows faster than the warranted wage, equilibrium employment will decline, and the natural rate of unemployment will increase.

This proposition is the key to understanding what happened to unemployment in the 1970s. European countries were hit by a series of adverse shocks, shocks which implied a slowdown in the rate of growth of the warranted wage:

Just like the rest of the world, European countries were hit by two major oil price increases, the first one triggered by the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974, the second by the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war of 1980. By the end of the decade, the real price of oil, in dollars, stood at nearly 4 times its level at the start of the decade. (Figure 5 gives the price of oil, in dollar and in real (U.S.) terms, since 1960)

Another shock, less visible initially but eventually more important, both in terms of its impact on growth and on unemployment, was also at work. Total factor productivity (tfp) growth, which had been high in the 1950s and 1960s, slowed down considerably. By the late 1970s, the rate of Harrod–neutral technological progress (constructed using the Solow residual, and dividing it by the labor share), which had run at more than 5% in the 1950s and 1960s, was down to 2%. In other words, the annual rate of growth of warranted wages had
decreased by 3 percentage points, a dramatic decline. As Figure 6 shows, the decline was largely similar across countries.


These two shocks would have required slowdowns in the rate of growth of actual wages to avoid an increase in unemployment. In fact, both came after a period of labor unrest in many European countries—May 1968 in France, Spring 1969 in Italy, the end of dictatorships in Portugal and Spain in 1974 and 1975—in which workers had asked for increases in wages. Not surprisingly, the joint outcome of lower growth of warranted wages and higher wage demands was an increase in unemployment. By the end of the 1970s, unemployment for the EU15 had increased to 5%, up from 2% at the start of the decade; Spain’s unemployment rate exceeded 10%, France’s and Italy’s exceeded 6%.

The development of a conceptual frame, and the econometric fleshing out of this story, were largely the work of Michael Bruno and Jeffrey Sachs, who put it together in a book in 1983.4 Their book can be seen as a first attempt to put together a working theory of movements in the natural rate. They argued

4. Other researchers share the credit, among them Robert Gordon (for example Gordon 1975) and Franco Modigliani and Tomaso Padoa-Schioppa (1977).
that the rise in unemployment could be explained of shocks interacting with two types of rigidities, real and nominal (Box 1 gives the basic algebra):

- “Real rigidities” captured the speed at which real wages adjusted to changes in warranted real wages, the speed at which, for given unemployment, workers would for example accept a slowdown in actual wages in response to a productivity slowdown. The slower the adjustment, the higher and the longer lasting the effects of adverse shocks on unemployment.

- “Nominal rigidities” captured the speed to which nominal wages adjusted to changes in prices. The slower the adjustment, the larger the decrease in the real wage in response to an unanticipated increase in prices. And by implication, the slower the adjustment, the more the monetary authorities could use inflation to reduce real wages and therefore limit the increase in actual unemployment in response to an adverse supply shock.

Differences in real and nominal rigidities could explain why, despite largely similar shocks, different countries experienced different increases in unemployment. A smaller increase in unemployment could be due to smaller real rigidities, resulting in a smaller increase in the natural rate; or it could be due to larger nominal rigidities, allowing policy makers to achieve, through the use of inflation, an unemployment rate below the natural rate; or it could be due to
a more aggressive use of monetary policy, leading to higher inflation and an unemployment rate below the natural rate.

Where did these differences in real and nominal rigidities themselves come from? Differences in real rigidities were naturally traced to differences in the structure of collective bargaining. Sweden, with an unemployment rate of 2.2% at the end of the decade, was seen as a poster child for the case for corporatism, i.e. centralized bargaining and strong unions. An important contribution here was that of Lars Calmfors and John Driffill (1988), who argued, both theoretically and empirically, that, in the face of adverse supply shocks, countries with either very centralized bargaining or very decentralized bargaining would fare better than those with intermediate bargaining structures. With centralized bargaining in particular, the parties at the bargaining table could see the need for and implement the wage adjustment required to maintain employment.

Differences in nominal rigidities were also traced to collective bargaining, albeit to different aspects of it. The degree of indexation, present in many European countries, played a central role. High indexation in effect prevented the use of monetary policy to limit the increase in unemployment, or required a very high rate of inflation.

Overall, this initial strand of research must be seen as a major achievement. Macroeconomists had entered the 1970s without a model of the natural rate, and had not anticipated stagflation. By the end of the decade, there was a working model of the natural rate, and stagflation was well understood. And the increase in unemployment was explained by adverse shocks interacting with country-specific collective bargaining structures.

3 Continuing unemployment. Sources of persistence

Unemployment continued to increase throughout the 1980s, from 5% for the EU15 in 1980, to 8% at the end of the decade, with a peak of 9.5% in 1986.

The further increase in the first half of the 1980s was still easy to explain. Partly accommodating monetary policy in response to the adverse shocks of the 1970s had led to a large increase in inflation: In 1980, EU15 inflation was 12.5%. Throughout Europe, governments and central banks decided to reduce inflation
through tight monetary policy, starting with Mrs Thatcher in the UK in 1979. By 1986, the EU15 inflation rate was down to 3%. This was achieved however through a large increase in the unemployment rate—reflecting an increase in the actual rate of unemployment over the natural rate.

For the rest of the decade however, inflation was roughly stable, an indication that the actual unemployment rate was now close to the natural unemployment rate, so around 8-9% for the EU15. This high natural rate was more difficult to explain: By the mid 1980s, the sharp increases in oil prices had been largely reversed. The decline in productivity growth was still very much present, and now well understood and documented. But it appeared increasingly unlikely, more than ten years after the decline, that wage setters would not have adjusted to the new reality of lower productivity growth.

This led researchers to focus on persistence mechanisms, on why the initial adverse shocks might have very long lasting effects on unemployment. Research focused mainly on two mechanisms, capital accumulation, and the role of insiders in collective bargaining.

**Capital accumulation** was already one of the themes of Bruno and Sachs. It was the focus of a major project later on, directed by Charles Bean and Jacques Dreze (1986). The basic logic was straightforward: If, in response to a slowdown in productivity growth or an increase in the price of non labor inputs, bargained wages did not adjust fast enough, employment decreased. If employment decreased, so did the profit rate. And as long as the profit rate was below the user cost, capital decreased over time, leading to a further decrease in employment. The dynamics of capital accumulation could therefore lead to a long and deep increase in unemployment.

This had interesting and highly relevant implications for monetary policy:

In that context, expansionary monetary policy potentially played two roles. The first was, as before, to decrease real wages and limit the decrease in employment for a given capital stock. The second was to decrease the real interest rate, and by implication the user cost; by doing so it limited the decrease in capital accumulation, and so the further decrease in employment over time. Both channels had clearly been at work in the second half of the 1970s. Inflation steadily increased; ex-post real interest rates were negative, and—using
forecasts of inflation at the time—so were ex-ante real interest rates in most European countries (Blanchard and Summers 1984).

By symmetry, a monetary contraction, such as that engineered by most central banks in the early 1980s, also had two effects. The first one was to increase real wages, and thus decrease employment given the capital stock. The second was to increase the real interest rate, and thus decrease capital accumulation, and by implication, further decrease employment. Again, both channels were clearly at work in the first half of the 1980s. Inflation was sharply lower, and real interest rates were much higher than they had been earlier.

In short, the delayed reaction of monetary policy, first accommodating and later contractionary, could explain why the effects of the initial shocks were in effect delayed. Under this interpretation, with a more neutral monetary policy, the increase in unemployment would have been higher initially, but shorter in duration.

An interesting twist to the theory was suggested by Hellwig and Neuman (1987), in their study of Germany. If bargained wages were set by looking at labor productivity growth rather than at the underlying rate of technological progress, then a vicious circle could easily emerge. Suppose workers asked for too high wages. Firms would respond by reducing employment, thereby increasing the capital–labor ratio, and thus increasing labor productivity—relative to the underlying rate of technological progress. This might trigger further wage demands, further decreases in employment, further increases in labor productivity, and so on, leading to a potentially very large increase in unemployment.

The second line of research focused on collective bargaining. It was based on the idea that wage bargaining typically takes place between employed workers (or, more specifically, their union representatives) and firms, and that the unemployed are not represented at the bargaining table. This “insider–outsider” theory was developed by Lindbeck and Snower (as summarized for example in their 1985 book), and applied to unemployment, first by Robert Gregory (1985), then by Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Summers (1986) and by Nils Gottfries and Henrik Horn (1987).

The basic idea was straightforward. Suppose that unions set the wage subject to the firms’ demand for labor. And suppose that unions cared only about the employment prospects of the currently employed. Then, they might set the
wage so that, in expected value, employment remained the same. Because of unexpected shocks, employment would be sometimes smaller and sometimes larger than expected. In other words, employment would follow a random walk, and for a given labor force, so would unemployment. There would no longer be a natural rate of unemployment to which the economy would return; unemployment would exhibit “hysteresis”, not returning to any particular value, but being determined instead by the whole history of shocks to the economy.

This extreme form of the theory was provocative, and rightly criticized as too strong:

Empirically, it implied that movements in the labor force would not be reflected in employment; but a strongly established fact is that, even in economies with high unemployment, exogenous movements in the labor force (due to demography, or repatriation, such as the return of European nationals after the independence of former colonies) translate fairly quickly into movements in employment. Empirically also, why would hysteresis be relevant for Europe from the 1970s on, but not elsewhere and at other times?

Theoretically, even if the unemployed do not participate in bargaining, there are at least two reasons to think unemployment will affect the outcome. The first is that, given the positive probability of finding themselves unemployed, employed workers should and will care about the state of the labor market: The higher the unemployment rate, the more careful they will be in setting the wage. The second is that wages are not set unilaterally by unions, but rather by bargaining between unions and firms. And firms can threaten to hire the unemployed; the higher the unemployment rate, the more relevant the threat.

These criticisms suggested that the central role of employed workers in bargaining implied persistence of unemployment in response to adverse shocks, but typically not hysteresis. The effect of unemployment on wages might be weak, but was not zero; even if the unemployed were not present at the bargaining table, high unemployment still led the economy to return to the natural rate, albeit slowly.

An important extension to this line of argument was provided by Richard Layard and Stephen Nickell (1987), focusing on the effects of high unemployment on human capital—following an argument first developed by Phelps in 1972. They pointed out that, in European countries, high unemployment typically
implied very high average unemployment duration (recall Figure 3). Such high
duration was likely to lead to loss of skills, loss of morale, and thus make many
of the long term unemployed in effect unemployable. In that case, the higher
the unemployment rate, the higher the duration, the higher the loss of skills,
the lower the pressure on wages from a given unemployment rate. Separating
the unemployment rate between short–term unemployment (the ratio of those
unemployed less than a year to the labor force) and long–term unemployment,
Layard and Nickell indeed showed that, in Phillips curve type relations, what
seemed to matter was short–term unemployment, not long–term. This provided
a potential explanation for why persistence was higher in Europe than, say, in
the United States (where the proportion of long term unemployed was and is
very low).

Overall, these developments also represented progress. The focus on the joint
movement on employment and capital, on the role of monetary policy through
real wages and the real interest rate, on the implications of collective bargain-
ing, were important extensions of the initial framework. They also made clear a
number of holes, theoretical and empirical, in our understanding of wage deter-
mination. Were wages in collective bargaining set with an eye to TFP growth
(more specifically, the rate of Harrod–neutral technological progress) or labor
productivity growth? As we saw earlier, the answer makes a lot of difference
to the dynamic effects of capital accumulation on unemployment for example.
Looking at bargaining more closely, how did unemployment affect wage bargain-
ing? How did employment protection, which clearly affects the probability that
employed workers will find themselves unemployed, affect the outcome? This
takes us to the next stage, the shift in focus towards labor market institutions.

4 Stubbornly High Unemployment. The Role of Institutions

In the 1990s, average European unemployment remained very high, peaking at
10.4% for the EU15 average in 1993, and ending at 7.6% in 2000 (a cyclical
peak; the unemployment rate stands at 8.6% in mid–2005.) But this average
reflected an increasing heterogeneity of evolutions across countries:

- Unemployment remained high in France, Spain, and Italy. Germany’s
  unemployment rate, which had remained relatively low until the early
1990s, steadily increased after reunification; it now stands (mid 2005) at about 10% (8.5% in Western Germany, twice as much in Eastern Germany).

- Unemployment decreased to under 5% in the UK, Ireland, and the Netherlands, all from high levels in the early 1990s. (Belgium, with an unemployment rate of 8%, is an interesting case; the unemployment rate in the Flemish provinces—those close to the Netherlands—is 5%, while the unemployment rate in the Wallon provinces—those close to France—is 11.0%).

- Unemployment remained relatively low in Austria, Norway, and Portugal. And, while it went up sharply in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, the behavior of inflation suggests that this was mostly a cyclical movement—an increase in the actual unemployment rate over the natural rate—and unemployment sharply declined thereafter; of the three countries, only Finland still has high unemployment.

With these evolutions, a clear shift in focus took place, both among policy makers and among researchers, for two reasons. First, continuing high unemployment in the major continental countries made the earlier explanations, based on adverse shocks and persistence, increasingly implausible: Could shocks in the 1970s and the 1980s still have such strong effects in the 1990s and 2000s? And second, given the continued large commonality of shocks, the differences in unemployment rates across countries pointed to differences in institutions as central to any explanation of unemployment.

The most dramatic evidence of this shift in focus was the 1994 OECD “Jobs Study.” Ill adapted labor market institutions, the OECD report argued, were the source of high unemployment. And the report went on to advocate reforms, from the design of unemployment insurance and employment protection, to a reduction of the tax wedge and the minimum wage, to better training and active labor market policy programs. The report was—and its general line still is—extremely influential. The notion that “labor market rigidities” are at the core of European unemployment has gained wide acceptance among policy makers.

In parallel, on the academic research side, the shift in focus towards institutions was made easier by the emergence of a new and richer framework to think about unemployment, a framework based on flows, matching, and bargaining.
For some time already, Christopher Pissarides, building on earlier work by Peter Diamond on search and bargaining (1981), had explored models of the labor market which explained unemployment in the labor market as a result of a process of creation and destruction, large flows of workers in the labor market, and a complex matching and bargaining process between firms and workers (for example, Chris Pissarides (1985)). His 1990 book (with a second edition in 2000), and the development and extension of the model in a series of articles with Dale Mortensen (for example 1994) made the framework extremely influential, and rightly so. One of its strengths was to allow for a much more specific analysis of the role of institutions, both theoretically and empirically (Box 3 gives a more formal description):

The framework started from a basic fact: The labor market is characterized by large flows—high rates of separations from firms, and high rates of hires by firms. In France for example, 1.5% of all jobs are destroyed each month and roughly as many are created—interestingly, this is about the same percentage as in the United States. As there are many reasons other than job destruction why a worker may separate from a firm, the flows of workers are typically much higher. In France, they are of the order of 4% per month (Pierre Cahuc and André Zylberberg 2004).

In such a labor market, the process of matching workers and jobs is a complex one, and there are always workers looking for jobs (unemployment) and jobs looking for workers (vacancies). From the point of efficiency, there is an optimal rate of unemployment, and this rate of unemployment is clearly positive.

Actual unemployment is unlikely to be optimal however, and depends on the nature of bargaining. Even in the absence of collective bargaining, both the firm and the worker have some bargaining power. The worker can threaten to walk away from the job; but walking away and finding another job is costly, the more depressed the labor market, the higher the unemployment rate. The firm can threaten to fire the worker; but doing so and replacing the worker by another is also costly, the more so the tighter the labor market, the lower the unemployment rate. This has two main implications. First, the bargained wage depends on the labor market prospects of workers and firms: High unemployment weakens workers and strengthens firms. Second, labor market institutions also play a central role in wage determination: The more generous the unem-
ployment insurance, the less costly it is for the worker to look for another job. The higher the level of employment protection, the more costly it is for the firm to fire a worker.

From a methodological viewpoint, this framework led to major progress:

It allowed for a more careful analysis of the implications of complex labor market institutions than could be done before. Take for example employment protection. The framework made three broad predictions. First, employment protection, to the extent that it increased the cost of laying off workers, was likely to decrease layoffs, and thus to reduce the flow of workers entering unemployment. Second, by increasing the costs to firms, and more importantly, by strengthening the bargaining power of workers, it was likely to lead to an increase in bargained wages, and in turn to an increase in the duration of unemployment. Third, given that the unemployment rate is the product of the flows into unemployment and unemployment duration, lower flows and higher duration implied that the effect of employment protection on the unemployment rate itself was ambiguous. All three implications have proven to fit the facts well (for example Olivier Blanchard and Pedro Portugal (2001)). Employment protection is probably one of the main factors behind the long unemployment duration in Europe; differences in employment protection seem however largely unrelated to differences in unemployment rates across countries.

It allowed for a better mapping between the increasingly available panel data microeconomic evidence on firms and households, and macroeconomic models. Take for example unemployment insurance. The framework points to two separate effects of insurance on unemployment. The first is through its effect on search intensity, and thus the matching between unemployment and vacancies. The second is through the reservation wage: Higher unemployment benefits make unemployment less painful and are likely to lead to an increase in the bargained wage. Both effects in turn imply an increase in equilibrium unemployment duration, and thus an increase in the natural rate. Guided by search theory, much empirical work has looked into the effects of the schedule of unemployment benefits on search by the unemployed. The findings in turn allow for a better calibration of our macro models. (There has been however little empirical micro work on the other channel, namely the effects of unemployment insurance on bargained wages. This reflects a more general shortcoming, a still poor
empirical understanding of wage determination in environments such as Europe where both individual and collective bargaining are likely to play a role.

It gave new macro tools to interpret facts and look at the sources of unemployment. In particular, it gave a way to combine the evidence from the Phillips curve with the evidence from the Beveridge curve—the relation between unemployment and vacancies. Conceptually, the Beveridge curve evidence tells us about factors that affect matching in the labor market, whereas the Phillips curve evidence tells us also about factors that affect bargaining. A shift in the Phillips curve not associated with a shift in the Beveridge curve points to factors related to bargaining; a joint shift points to factors related to matching. I initially hoped that the joint use of these two tools would prove powerful (Olivier Blanchard and Peter Diamond 1989), Olivier Blanchard 1990c); I have been disappointed, at least in its application to unemployment in Europe (For a recent examination, and a slightly more optimistic conclusion, see Stephen Nickell et al (2002)). It has proven hard to learn much from the shifts in the Beveridge curve across countries; one reason may be that data on vacancies are often of poor quality.

Did the shift in focus towards institutions give us the key to the evolution of European unemployment, across countries and time? The first systematic look at the data, at the end of the 1990s, led to a substantial puzzle:

Differences in institutions appeared able to explain much of the differences in unemployment rates across countries in the 1980s or the 1990s. This was first shown in a cross-country regression by Stephen Nickell in 1997. Using quantitative indexes for a number of labor market institutions for the mid– and late–1980s, he found that, together, they did a good job of explaining differences across 20 OECD countries. Among the most economically significant variables in his regression were the duration of unemployment benefits (which increased unemployment), and the degree of coordination in collective bargaining (which decreased it).

Changes in institutions did not appear able however to explain the evolution of unemployment rates over time. Even if the initial increase in unemployment was due to shocks rather than institutions, the difference between unemployment today and unemployment in the 1960s should be explained by much less “employment friendly” institutions than 40 years ago. And the first pass at the
time series evolution of institutions, which I undertook with Justin Wolfers in 2000, was not very encouraging:

Figures 7 and 8 reproduces two of the time series we used in that paper, for replacement rates and for employment protection, for each EU5 country, for each five-year period since 1960. The replacement rates shown in Figure 7 were constructed from an OECD data set, which measured the ratio of pre-tax social insurance and social assistance benefits to the pre-tax wage, for various categories of unemployed workers, depending on income, family status, and duration of unemployment. Figure 7a gives an unweighted average of these replacement rates, the summary measure often used by the OECD. What is striking are the different evolutions of the five countries, and the absence of a common trend. Figure 7b provides a different and more relevant angle by showing the maximum replacement rate over all categories for each country and each subperiod. Again, no clear trend emerges. Clearly, some of the maximum replacement rates increased in the early 1980s, but they have declined since then.

![Figure 7. Replacement rates, EU5 since 1960](image-url)
The indexes of employment protection shown in Figure 8 were constructed by combining two sources, the series constructed by Ed Lazear (1990) for the period before 1985, and the indexes constructed by the OECD for the 1980s and the 1990s. Again, what is striking is the absence of a clear trend, and the heterogeneity of evolutions across countries.

A more systematic construction of time varying measures by others (in particular Michele Belot and Jan Van Ours (2001)) suggested roughly similar conclusions. In panel data regressions of unemployment rates on institutions across 20 countries since 1960, and allowing for country and time dummies, none of the labor market institutions appeared significant.

In this context, one variable deserves particular mention because it often comes back in discussions. The “tax wedge,” i.e. the difference between take-home pay for workers and the cost of labor for firms, divided by the wage has steadily gone up in most European countries since the 1960s. In many countries, it stands at above 50%, and in most countries, it is indeed blamed by firms and policy makers as one of the major sources of unemployment. Most economists are more
skeptical (a formal discussion is given in Box 4): On theoretical grounds, taxes or social contributions that treat income equally whatever its source (labor income or unemployment benefits) should not affect the cost of labor to firms, and thus not affect unemployment. The same should be true for taxes or social contributions which come with corresponding benefits, such as retirement contributions, so long as they are not redistributive. On empirical grounds, while the increase in the tax wedge fits the general increase in unemployment, it does poorly in explaining differences in unemployment across countries. Denmark, for example, has one of the highest tax wedges, and one of the lowest unemployment rates in Europe.

To take stock: We ended the 1990s with a much better framework to study unemployment. But we also ended with many questions. Even if the earlier shocks were no longer the main source of unemployment, they clearly were responsible for the initial increase. If institutions were primarily responsible for unemployment at the end of the century, is it because they had become steadily less employment friendly? If so, why was it not reflected in the series we were constructing? One can see the research since then as exploring different answers to these questions. This is the topic of the next section.

5 Institutions and Shocks. Current Directions of Research

Giving a clear description of current research is always harder than giving one of past research; research appears to go in many directions, only some of which will eventually pan out. I see roughly three main directions at this point. The first is an attempt to look not only at unemployment, but at the joint behavior of unemployment, employment, capital, wages and user costs. The second is an exploration of the role of other shocks, other institutions, other interactions. The third is a more careful exploration and measurement of institutions. I take them in turn.

5. Major effects of the tax wedge are likely to be present only for wages which are at or close to a minimum wage floor. In this case, additional contributions by firms cannot be shifted to workers, and thus lead to an increase in cost. For this reason, many European countries have decreased the tax wedge for low wages since the late 1980s, sometimes by substantial amounts.
5.1 Employment, Capital, Wages and Interest Rates

The theories we have discussed so far have testable implications not only for unemployment, but also for capital accumulation, wages, profits, and interest rates. For example, an increase in bargained wages, for given labor market conditions, should lead not only to an increase in unemployment, but also to a decrease in the labor/capital ratio, a decrease in the profit rate, and, for a given user cost, a decrease in capital accumulation over time. Yet, few of these theories were tested using more than data on unemployment and through the estimation of unemployment equations.

This led me, in the late 1990s, to perform a conceptually simple exercise, that of looking jointly at capital, employment, wages, profits, and user costs, and use this information to try to identify shifts in either “labor demand” (the relation giving warranted wages as a function of employment, capital, and the level of technology) or “labor supply” (the relation giving bargained wages as a function of labor market conditions) (Blanchard 1997, 1998). 6 On the labor demand side, I assumed that firms chose capital and labor subject to convex costs of adjusting both investment and factor proportions. On the demand side, I assumed that bargained wages depended on the level of technology, the unemployment rate, with all other factors showing up as shifts in the relation. I then constructed shifts in labor demand and labor supply for 14 OECD countries for the period 1970–1995. My papers were primarily an exercise aimed at organizing the empirical evidence in a simple but interpretable way. A conceptually more ambitious attempt was made by Ricardo Caballero and Mohamad Hammour (1998), who constructed a structural model starting more explicitly from bargaining and institutions such as employment protection, and allowing for endogenous technological progress. Their model was not estimated, but calibrated, and Caballero and Hammour used it to look at the evolution on capital, employment, productivity and factor prices in France.

Both exercises proved interesting, and the evidence more complex than I had expected. On the one hand, many of the dynamics suggested by the early work of Bruno and Sachs and the later work on the role of capital accumulation, were clearly present in the data. The early 1970s were characterized by “adverse

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6. Semantics are not settled here. The relation giving warranted wages is often called the “price setting relation” as it gives the prices set by firms given wages and other variables. The relation giving bargained wages is often called the “wage setting” relation, because it gives the wages set in bargaining, given the price level, actual or expected, and other variables.
labor supply shifts”, increases in bargained wages given unemployment. The effect of profit rates and interest rates on capital accumulation were also clearly visible, with low interest rates delaying the slowdown in capital accumulation to the 1980s. These labor supply shifts were largely reversed starting in the mid 1980s. Countries, such as the Netherlands and Ireland, which had seen a major decrease in unemployment, also showed a large decrease in wages in efficiency units—wages divided by the index of Harrod neutral progress.

The reversal of adverse labor supply shifts should have led to a decrease in unemployment over time. But, the data suggested, something else was at work starting in the early 1980s. At a given wage (in efficiency units) and given capital stock, employment was lower: There was an adverse shift in labor demand. The result was a decrease in the labor share in most European countries, starting in the early 1980s. Figure 9a gives the behavior of the labor share in France, one of the countries where the decline was the most dramatic, for the business sector, from 1965 to 2001. The labor share, which had gone up by 5 percentage points from 1970 to 1981, then went down by 12% percentage points from 1980 to the early 2000s; it has remained roughly at that level since then.7 Figures 9b and 9c show the proximate causes of the evolution of the labor share. Figure 9b shows the evolution of the wage (in efficiency units), and figure 9c shows the evolution of the ratio of employment (in efficiency units) to capital, since 1965.

In the second half of the 1970s, the wage (in efficiency units) went up, and the ratio of employment (in efficiency units) went down over time in response; the result was an increase in the labor share, and this is exactly what we would expect in response to an adverse labor supply shock—an increase in the bargained wage for given labor market conditions. Since then however, the wage has come down; since 1990, it has remained roughly at its 1970 level. The ratio of employment to capital has not recovered however: Lower employment at a given wage is what mechanically explains the lower labor share. (The basic algebra of the labor share is given in Box 5)

7. There are many issues of measurement associated with the labor share. The series used in the figure is adjusted for self employment. Labor income includes not only the wage but also payroll taxes and other social contributions paid by firms. Some of the data have been reconstructed by the OECD since 2000, and the current series for France shows a smaller decrease; the basic evolution is still the same. Some of the evolution of the labor share is due to composition effects, the result of a shift to sectors with lower labor shares. Again, for France, this composition effect is small. (Alain de Serres et al, 2002).
Why is employment lower at a given wage? In my 1997 and 1998 papers, I considered various candidates and converged on a decrease in “labor hoarding”, due perhaps to higher competition and tougher corporate governance, as the more likely one. Under this explanation however, the decrease in excess labor should have led to an increase in profit, an increase in capital accumulation,
and an eventual recovery of employment; so far the increase in capital and employment has not taken place, at least not in France or in Germany, where a similar evolution of the labor share has taken place.

An alternative interpretation was given by Caballero and Hammour. They argued that the decline in the labor share below its initial level reflected instead an increase in the marginal wage relative to the average wage (an increase in the marginal wage for a given average wage will lead to a decrease in employment, and thus a decrease in the labor share.) Caballero and Hammour’s conclusion was therefore that the low labor share reflected the firms’ desire to decrease labor beyond what the average cost of labor would suggest. And, they argued, this reluctance of firms to hire labor could be traced to a worsening of labor market institutions. Their explanation leads to a much less optimistic view of the future: A low labor share does not lead to higher incentives to invest, nor to an increase in employment.

I see the labor share puzzle as largely unsolved. The decrease in the labor share has been much smaller in the UK and the United States than in continental Europe, pointing indeed to factors specific to continental Europe: Institutions are a natural starting point. At the same time, within continental Europe, the decrease in the labor share has taken place both in countries that have reduced unemployment (the Netherlands for example), and in countries that still have high unemployment (France for example). I also see the puzzle as a potentially major piece of the story of European unemployment, and one on which more work should be done.

5.2 Other Shocks, Other Institutions, Other Interactions?

Another line of research has extended the initial panel data examination of institutions and shocks, to look at other shocks, other institutions, other interactions:

- There are potentially many more relevant institutions than those included in the initial regressions by Nickell and Blanchard and Wolfers. Researchers have examined the effects of many others, from measures of product–market regulation, to measures of home ownership—a variable suggested by Andrew Oswald (1997).
- There are potentially many shocks as well. There used to be a sign at train crossings in France that said: “A train may hide another”. It is
not implausible that, in the same way that oil price increases initially hid the decline in productivity growth, the slowdown in productivity growth also hid other shocks. Researchers have looked for example at shifts in labor demand away from low skilled workers, or at increased turbulence—due to higher competition in the world economy, through deregulation of domestic goods markets, the decrease in trade barriers, and globalization. (I return to this particular theme below.)

- There are potentially many interactions between shocks and institutions. Recall that the initial focus of research by Bruno and Sachs was on the interaction between adverse supply shocks and the structure of collective bargaining. Recall that the focus of the research on persistence was on the strength of insiders; this strength clearly depends on institutions such as employment protection and unemployment benefits.

- There are also potentially many interactions between institutions, a theme explored for example by David Coe and Dennis Snower (1997). The effects of taxation may depend for example on the structure of collective bargaining, a theme explored by Francesco Daveri and Guido Tabellini (2000). The effects of employment protection—which reduce layoffs—may be partly offset by collective bargaining focused on reducing wage dispersion—which may increase layoffs, an explanation explored by Giuseppe Bertola and Richard Rogerson (1997) to explain the surprisingly high labor turnover numbers in Europe.

All these and a few more, have been explored through panel data regressions. A partial summary of the results is given in Dean Baker et al (2002). Some correlations are intriguing; the conclusion by Stephen Nickell et al (2002) that time series for institutions do a better (but still mediocre) job of fitting some of the evolutions of unemployment across time than initially suggested by the Blanchard Wolfers series is perhaps the most interesting. It is clear however that the number of potential shocks, institutions, and interactions is sufficiently large that the ability of such panel data regressions to tell us what exact combination matters is limited. Such regressions allow us to check for simple and partial correlations; they are unlikely to tell us about which combination of shocks and institutions is responsible for unemployment (for a similar view, see Freeman 2005).
Of all the hypotheses listed above, one deserves a longer treatment. It is the idea that higher competition in the goods market, lower trade barriers and higher integration of goods markets across countries, higher globalization and outsourcing, are all leading to a more turbulent environment, an environment with more job destruction and job creation. When the environment becomes more turbulent, existing labor market institutions may become dysfunctional and lead to substantially higher unemployment. Employment protection, which was rarely binding before as firms rarely laid off, becomes binding and increases the cost of firms. Unemployment benefits, which were not very costly so long as few workers were laid off, become costly, requiring higher contributions and leading again to higher costs of firms. The general story is appealing, and most of us believe that, indeed, there is more economic turbulence today than there was thirty years ago. There is one catch however. We may all believe it, but the data just do not show it...

This puzzle showed up early on, when European unemployment was just rising in the late 1970s. Increased turbulence already seemed to be a plausible candidate. But it turned out that the measures of reallocation we could construct then—typically measures based on the standard deviation of rates of change of employment, either across sectors or across regions—showed no trend increase. The evidence as of the early 1980s is well summarized in Johnson and Layard (1986), who construct a table of standard deviations by industry or by region for a number of countries: Half of the standard deviations are higher in 1979 than they were in 1960, half are lower. In all cases, the changes are small. I could not locate an update of this table for the 1980s and 1990s, but the series I have seen for a few countries yield the same conclusion: There is no apparent increase.

One may reasonably argue that these measures are too raw. Perhaps, the increase in reallocation is taking place mostly within industries or regions, rather than across industries or across regions. In that respect, measures of job flows based on plant–level data, along the lines of the work by Davis and Haltiwanger (1996) are clearly preferable. The problem is that they typically do not go back far enough in time. But to the extent that they do, they also show little sign of increased turbulence. Figure 10 gives the evidence for France, based on two studies, one by Nocke [1994] for 1985 to 1990, and the other by Duhautois for
1990 to 1996. The lower line shows the evolution of job destruction (the sum of all employment changes at plants with decreasing employment, divided by total employment); the upper line shows the evolution of job reallocation, defined as the sum of job destruction and job creation. The conclusion is clear: At least starting from when data is available, namely 1985, there is no evidence of an increase in turbulence.

Is the argument therefore settled? No, for two reasons, one empirical, the other theoretical:

The empirical reason is that other—admittedly conceptually less appropriate—measures of turbulence send a different message from job flows. For example, the measure of sales volatility constructed by Diego Comin and Thomas Philippon (2005), based on the firms in the Compustat data set, show a steady increase in this measure of variability over time since the late 1960s. Reconciling the evidence on flat job flows and increasing sales variability remains to be done. Until then, the discrepancy is worrisome.

The theoretical reason is that one can construct models in which turbulence is not necessarily reflected in higher job flows. Such models have been explored by Ljunqvist and Sargent in a series of contributions (for example, 1999, 2005). In their formalization, increased turbulence is reflected in an increase in the specificity of skills associated with particular jobs. The implication is that an involuntary job change is thus associated with a larger drop in the wage distribution facing a laid-off worker than was the case in the past. In this case, if unemployment benefits are linked to past wages, the unemployed may have high reservation wages, and remain unemployed for a long time. Furthermore, if skills deteriorate through unemployment, some of them may even become trapped into unemployment. Differences in the generosity of the unemployment insurance system, Sargent and Ljunqvist argue, may therefore explain why Eu-

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8. The juxtaposition of the two series, constructed using slightly different data and methodology, imply that there may be an artificial break in the series between 1990 and 1991.

9. One might argue that, in the case of France, turbulence has increased, but its effects on flows has been offset by increasing employment protection. This suggests looking at data for the United States, where employment protection has not increased. The evidence there is that, if anything, there has been a decrease in flows relative to total employment over the last thirty years (Steve Davis et al 2005, Figure 4 for the private sector since 1990, and Figure 5 for manufacturing since 1947.)

10. The two series differ in their coverage in many ways—plant versus firm level data, manufacturing for the long series for job flows, large firms for Compustat, employment versus sales.
Europe is doing so much worse than the United States in facing the same increase in turbulence—an example of the interaction between institutions and shocks. While the theory is appealing, direct evidence of a larger decrease in skills for laid-off workers is however so far very limited.

Figure 10. Job destruction and job reallocation
France 1985–1996

5.3 A Closer Look at Institutions

Labor market institutions are typically multidimensional. Reducing them to quantitative indexes is not easy: How does one compare for example two unemployment insurance systems, if the first has more generous unemployment benefits, but also more conditionality of benefits on search effort? How does one compare two systems of employment protection, when the first includes higher protection for some workers, and lesser protection for others?

In the process of looking at the effects of institutions, I have become less convinced that our measures fully capture what is going on. This has led me to explore, in on-going work with Daniel Cohen and Cyril Nouveau (2005), the evolution and the determinants of labor market institutions in France since the 1950s. What emerges is a more complex picture than that given by quantitative measures.

11. For an exercise in the same spirit for Germany since 1990, see Conny Wunsch (2005).
What we find is that the increase in unemployment in the mid–1970s led to
major changes in institutions. Under the initial assumption that the shock, and
therefore the increase in unemployment, was temporary, unemployment insur-
ance was made substantially more generous, and employment protection was
sharply increased. As high unemployment turned out to persist, both financial
pressures on the unemployment system, and the realization that some of the
earlier measures probably contributed to unemployment, have led most of the
initial measures to be reversed. But the reversal has not taken the form of a
return to earlier institutions. The decrease in employment protection has come
in the form of the introduction of two types of labor contracts, traditional and
highly protected permanent contracts, and new, less protected, temporary con-
tracts. Whether such a reform actually decreases unemployment is ambiguous;
what is sure is that it has created a dual labor market, with protected and
marginal workers.

So, while existing time series for labor market institutions in France show little
change since the 1960s, a closer look at history suggests that, at least for France,
institutions indeed became less employment friendly in the 1970s and early
1980s. While things turned around starting in the early 1980s, many of the
reforms have had perverse effects, either because of poor design, unanticipated
consequences, or political constraints. Institutions today are less employment
friendly than they were in the early 1970s.

I do not know what conclusions would be reached from similar studies of other
European countries. I suspect that the message is more general: One of the
reasons why the shocks of the 1970s and 1980s have led to high unemployment
in some European countries today is that they triggered a change in institutions,
which has been partly and poorly undone in these countries.

6 Do We Know Enough to Give Advice?

At the end of this tour, one may ask whether we know enough to give advice
to policy makers about how to reduce unemployment. I believe we do—with
the proper degree of humility. In this last section, I summarize what I think we
know and we do not know.
6.1 A General Story Line

Going back over the last thirty years, there is little question that the initial increase in unemployment in Europe was primarily due to adverse and largely common shocks, from oil price increases to the slowdown in productivity growth.

There is not much question that different institutions led to different initial outcomes. Whether collective bargaining led to a decrease in the growth of bargained wages, whether inflation could be used to reduce real wage growth, all played a central role in determining the size of the increase in unemployment.

There is not much question that the increase in unemployment led, in most countries, to changes in institutions as most governments tried to limit the increase in unemployment through employment protection, and to reduce the pain of unemployment through more generous unemployment insurance.

There is not much question that, since the early 1980s, because of financial pressure and intellectual arguments, most governments have partly reversed the initial change in institutions. But this reversal has been partial, and sometimes perverse. The different paths chosen may well explain the differences in unemployment rates across European countries today.

Despite the twists and turns of research, the sediments from the successive theories are nearly all relevant. The role of shocks and the interaction with collective bargaining emphasized by initial theories, the role of capital accumulation and insider effects emphasized by the theories focusing on persistence, the role of specific institutions clarified by flow-bargaining models, all explain important aspects of the evolution of European unemployment.

6.2 Which Institutions?

It is one thing to say that labor market institutions matter, and another to know exactly which ones and how.

Humility is needed here, and there is no better reminder than the comparison between Portugal and Spain. Both experienced revolutions and wage explosions in the 1970s (the Portuguese labor share reached nearly 100% in the mid 1970s...); both have, at least on the surface, rather similar institutions, including high employment protection. Yet, Spanish unemployment has been very high, exceeding 20% in the mid–1990s, whereas Portuguese unemployment has
remained low, with a high of 8.6% in the mid-1980s, and a decrease thereafter. Many researchers, including myself, have tried to trace the differences to differences in shocks or institutions (for a recent attempt, see Olympia Bover et al 2000). I am not sure that our explanations are much more than ex-post rationalizations.  

And the history of the last thirty years is a series of love affairs with sometimes sad endings, first with Germany and German-like institutions—until unemployment started increasing there in the 1990s—then with the United Kingdom and the Thatcher–Blair reforms, then with Ireland and the Netherlands and the role of national agreements, and now with the Scandinavian countries, especially Denmark, and its concept of “flexisecurity”.  

Nevertheless, even if one cannot pretend to have much confidence about the optimal overall architecture, much has been learned about the effects of the various pieces, especially from the large number of empirical micro-studies and natural or designed experiments. As a review of the relevant research would require another survey, let me just mention a few directions of research. We know much more about the incentive aspects of unemployment insurance on search intensity and unemployment duration, be it the length and time shape of unemployment benefits, or the form of conditionality or training programs (see for example the surveys by Peter Fredriksson and Bertil Holmlund (2003) on unemployment insurance, and by John Martin and David Grubb (2001) on active labor market policies). We know more about the effects of decreasing social contributions on low wages (for example Bruno Crépon and Roseann Desplatz (2001) on the French experience). We know more about the effects of employment protection, and the effects on the labor market of introducing temporary contracts at the margin while keeping employment protection the same for most workers (Olivier Blanchard and Augustin Landier (2001) for France).

From both the macro evidence and this body of micro-economic work, a large consensus—right or wrong—has emerged:

12. Along the same lines, the rapid decrease of the unemployment rate in Spain—which has now fallen below 10%—is also hard to trace back to either shocks or changes in institutions. Yet another puzzle is the coincidence of very low productivity growth—zero measured tfp growth in Spain over the last 15 years—and decreasing unemployment.

It holds that modern economies need to constantly reallocate resources, including labor, from old to new products, from bad to good firms. At the same time, workers value security and insurance against major adverse professional events, job loss in particular.

While there is a trade-off between efficiency and insurance, the experience of the successful European countries suggests it need not be very steep. What is important in essence is to protect workers, not jobs.

This means providing unemployment insurance, generous in level, but conditional on the willingness of the unemployed to train for and accept jobs if available. This means employment protection, but in the form of financial costs to firms to make them internalize the social costs of unemployment, including unemployment insurance, rather than through a complex administrative and judicial process.

This means dealing with the need to decrease the cost of low skilled labor through lower social contributions paid by firms at the low wage end, and the need to make work attractive to low skill workers through a negative income tax rather than a minimum wage.

This consensus underlies most recent reforms or reform proposals, for example in the recent Hartz reforms in Germany (for a description, see Conny Wunsch 2005), or the “Camdessus Report” on reforms in France (2004).

These measures are probably all desirable. If they were to be implemented, would they be enough to eliminate the European problem? I see at least two reasons to worry.

6.3 Collective Bargaining and Trust

The first worry is that these reforms deal only with a subset of the institutions that govern the labor market. An early theme of the research on European unemployment was the importance of collective bargaining. And it is a fact that some of the successful countries, the Scandinavian countries in particular, have very different structures of collective bargaining from, say, France or Italy, with much more of an emphasis on national, trilateral, discussions and negotiations between unions, business representatives, and the state.

This raises two questions. First whether countries such as France or Italy need to also modify the structure of collective bargaining. Second whether, even if they
did, the results would be the same as in Sweden or Denmark. I think we do not know the answer to either of the two questions. In work with Thomas Philippon (2004), we explored the hypothesis that differences in trust between unions and firms, perhaps traceable to differences in economic models between unions and firms, explain some of the difference in unemployment rates across countries. We found that various measures of trust, from strike intensity in the 1960s to survey measures of trust between firms and workers, could explain a substantial fraction of differences in unemployment across European countries. Even if this finding reflects causality from lack of trust to unemployment, it is just a start. The question is whether trust can be created. The example of the UK where the unions have not only become weaker but have also changed attitudes, suggests that trust cannot be taken as an immutable country characteristic.

6.4 Low Inflation, the Natural and the Actual Rate of Unemployment

Since 2000, European unemployment has been associated with roughly constant inflation. This would suggest that the current high unemployment rate reflects a high natural unemployment rate, rather than a large deviation of the actual unemployment rate above the natural rate. This is indeed the assumption which justifies the focus on inflation by the European Central Bank: Maintaining constant inflation is then equivalent to maintaining unemployment close to its natural rate; this natural rate can only be reduced by labor market reforms, and this is not the responsibility of the central bank.

One may however question this assumption. Inflation in the EU15 is now running under 2%, and close to 0% in countries such as Sweden or Germany. At these low inflation rates, it is not implausible that nominal rigidities matter more, that workers for example are reluctant to accept nominal wage cuts—a hypothesis explored, for example, by Akerlof et al (1996). In such an environment, it may be that an unemployment rate above the natural rate may lead to low rather than declining inflation. Put another way, it may be that, in fact, an expansion of demand might decrease unemployment without leading to steadily higher inflation. The experience of Spain, where unemployment has steadily decreased without major labor market reforms and without an increase in inflation, can be read in this light.

Another, conceptually different, argument for a more expansionary monetary
policy, is that institutional reforms encounter less opposition when economies are growing and unemployment is decreasing. In other words, a decrease in unemployment below the natural rate may actually help decrease the natural rate itself. This argument is an old one (Blanchard et al. (1985) already argued for such a “two–handed” approach in Europe) but is still relevant today. One issue however is whether, in fact, growth and the decrease in unemployment do not alleviate the political need for reform, and thus delay rather than encourage reforms. The experience of the late 1990s in Europe, where a cyclical expansion often delayed reforms, is not reassuring in that respect. Developing this last point would take us to the political economy of labor market reform, and this should be the topic of another survey.
Box 1. Real and Nominal Rigidities

The purpose of these and the following boxes is to formalize some of the arguments in the text. I have made the choice of presenting simple, related, but ad-hoc models. References to explicitly micro-founded models—which are needed if one wants to derive optimal policy—are given when available.

This box shows the role of real and nominal rigidities in shaping the effects of adverse shocks to warranted wages on unemployment.

Consider firms with constant returns to labor (we leave aside capital for the time being), so, using logs:

\[ y = a + n \]

where \( y \) is log output, \( n \) is log employment, and \( a \) is log productivity (either tfp or labor productivity; the two are the same here). Assuming either competition in the goods market or a constant markup, the wage paid by firms, the “warranted real wage”, is given by:

\[ w - p = a \]

where \( w \) is the log nominal wage, and \( p \) is the price level (constant terms are left out throughout for notational simplicity). Assume further that \( a \) follows:

\[ a = a(-1) + \epsilon \]

so we can focus on the effects of a negative realization of \( \epsilon \), a decrease in productivity.

Assume the bargained wage is given by:

\[ w - p = Ea - \beta u \]

The bargained wage depends on expected productivity \( Ea \) and is a decreasing function of the unemployment rate \( u \). Assume that expected productivity adjusts over time to actual productivity according to:

\[ Ea = \lambda Ea(-1) + (1 - \lambda)a \]

I take the speed of adjustment of expected to actual productivity, \((1 - \lambda)\) as given here. In more explicit models, the \( \lambda \) like parameter has been derived
from learning in a Bayesian environment in which firms and workers have to assess whether shocks are temporary or permanent, or from staggering of wage decisions (a la Taylor (1979) or Calvo (1981)), or both.

Combining the equations for the warranted and the bargained wage gives:

\[ u = -\frac{1}{\beta}(a - Ea) \]

An unexpected decrease in productivity leads to an increase in unemployment. Combining the equation for expected productivity with the equation above gives the behavior of the natural rate of unemployment:

\[ u = \lambda u(-1) - \frac{\lambda}{\beta} \epsilon \]

A permanent decrease in productivity increases equilibrium unemployment (equivalently, the “natural rate” of unemployment) for some time, but not forever. \( \lambda \) and \( \beta \) capture the two dimensions of real rigidities. The higher \( \lambda \), i.e the slower the adjustment of expectations, the longer lasting the effects of the shock. The lower \( \beta \), the larger the effect of the adverse shock on unemployment.

Now introduce nominal rigidities. To do so, replace the equation for the bargained wage by:

\[ w = Ep + Ea - \beta u \]

The nominal wage is set on the basis both of the expected price level and expected productivity. Combining the equations for the warranted and the bargained wage gives:

\[ u = -\frac{1}{\beta}[(a - Ea) + (p - Ep)] \]

(Ignoring the unexpected productivity term and moving terms around gives the conventional expectational Phillips curve, \( p = Ep - \beta u \)). The central implication of this equation is that, in the presence of nominal rigidities, monetary policy can, to the extent that it can increase \( p - Ep \), potentially offset the adverse effects of adverse productivity shocks. Put another way, expansionary monetary policy can offset the increase in the natural rate by maintaining the actual rate below the natural rate. The precise form of monetary policy required to do so depends on the formation of price expectations and the rest of the model; it is not essential to the argument made here.
In short, this box has shown how, in general, the response of unemployment to adverse supply shocks will depend on real and nominal rigidities. (An explicitly micro-founded treatment of these issues is given in Blanchard and Gali (2005)).

Box 2. Persistence Mechanisms

The first persistence mechanism focuses on capital accumulation and its implications for the warranted wage. The second focuses on collective bargaining and its implications for the bargained wage.

Capital accumulation, and the two effects of monetary policy

Assume that, instead of the assumption of constant returns to labor we made in the previous box, the production function is Cobb–Douglas in capital and labor, and constant returns to scale:

\[ y = \alpha(a + n) + (1 - \alpha)k \]

where \( k \) is the log of the capital stock, and \( a \) is the index of Harrod neutral technology (“technology for short). Assuming perfect competition in the goods market or a constant markup, the wage paid by firms, the “warranted real wage” is given by (up to a constant term, that I ignore):

\[ w - p = (\alpha - 1)(n - k + a) + a \]

For a given capital stock, the higher is employment, the lower is the marginal product of labor, the lower is the warranted real wage.

The profit rate associated with a given real wage is given by the factor price frontier relation (up to a constant term, again ignored)

\[ \pi = -\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} (w - p - a) \]

where \( \pi \) is the log of the profit rate.
Let $r$ be the log of the user cost of capital. If $\pi$ is less than $r$, $k$ decreases over time. If $\pi$ is greater than $r$, $k$ grows over time. In the long run, the profit rate must be equal to the user cost, so the warranted real wage is given by:

$$w - p = a + \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} r$$

Assume the bargained wage is given, as in Box 1, by:

$$w - Ep = Ea - \beta u$$

Let $\bar{n}$ the log of the labor force, so $u \approx \bar{n} - n$. Then, using the equation for the warranted real wage in the short run and the equation for the bargained wage gives:

$$p + (\alpha - 1)(\bar{n} - k + a) - (\alpha - 1)u = Ep + Ea - \beta u$$

Or, reorganizing:

$$u = -\frac{1}{1 - \alpha + \beta} [(a - Ea) + (p - Ep) + (\alpha - 1)(\bar{n} - k + a)]$$

In the short run, unemployment depends, as in the previous box, on $a - Ea$, and $p - Ep$. But it also depends on the capital stock. The lower the capital stock, the lower the demand for labor, the higher the unemployment rate.

Now consider a permanent decrease in productivity, leading, initially, to a negative $a - Ea$. For the time being, ignore nominal rigidities and the term $p - Ep$. Other things equal, unemployment will initially go up, and then come down as expectations of productivity adjust to the new lower level. This is what we saw in the previous box. But, now, another mechanism is at work. So long as employment is lower, so is profit, and so is capital accumulation. Thus, unemployment returns to normal, but this may take a long time.

In the context of this model, it is worth returning to the role of monetary policy. First, and as before, expansionary monetary policy, to the extent it can affect $p - Ep$, can reduce real wages and limit the increase in unemployment, by having actual unemployment remain below the natural rate. Second, to the extent that it also reduces the real interest rate and therefore the user cost, it can also reduce the effect on capital accumulation, and thus reduce the increase in the natural rate over time. What happened in the second half of the 1970s can
be interpreted in this light. Had monetary policy been tighter, unemployment would have been higher, and the decrease in capital accumulation larger.

If, however, monetary policy turns contractionary, then both effects work in reverse. Tight money leads to an increase in the unemployment rate over the natural rate. And high real interest rates lead to a decrease in capital accumulation, and to an increase in the natural rate. This can be seen as what happened during the disinflationary episodes of the early 1980s.

**Insider Effects, Hysteresis, and Persistence**

Assume that technology, and so the warranted wage are the same as above. The real wage paid by firms—equivalently the relation between employment and the real wage—is given by:

\[
    w - p = (\alpha - 1)(n - k + \alpha) + a = (\alpha - 1)(n - k) + \alpha a
\]

To focus on the dynamics from collective bargaining, we turn off the other source of persistence, and assume the capital stock is fixed.

Turn to wage setting. Think of wages as being set by a monopoly union that chooses the wage, and then lets the firm decide about employment.

Suppose the nominal wage is chosen so that, in expected value, the membership of the union is employed:

\[
    w \mid En = m
\]

where \( m \) is log membership. Suppose that membership is given by:

\[
    m = n(-1) + \theta(\bar{n} - n(-1))
\]

If \( \theta = 0 \), then membership is just equal to employment last period: The union cares only about the employed. If \( 1 > \theta > 0 \), the union puts some weight on employment of the unemployed, but less than on the employment of those already employed.

Assume that the union chooses the nominal wage, based on the warranted wage relation above, and based on expectations of both technology and the price level, so

\[
    w = Ep + (\alpha - 1)(n(-1) + \theta(\bar{n} - n(-1) - k)) + \alpha Ea
\]
Combining the equations for the warranted and the bargained wage, and reorganizing, using \( u = \bar{n} - n(-1) \), gives:

\[
u = (1 - \theta)u(-1) - \frac{1}{1 - \alpha}[(p - Ep) + \alpha(a - Ea)]
\]

Unemployment adjusts over time to unexpected movements in prices and technology. The lower \( \theta \)—the lower the weight of unemployment in bargaining—the higher the persistence. The initial Blanchard–Summers (1986) formulation assumed \( \theta \) equal to zero. Under that assumption, the process for the unemployment rate has a unit root: The unemployment rate does not return to any particular value, and where it is depends on the history of surprises to both the price level and technology. It exhibits “hysteresis”.

As many pointed out however, the assumption that \( \theta \) is equal to zero is too strong. Even if the union does not care about the unemployed, they care what could happen to their members if there were adverse shocks and some members became unemployed. The higher the unemployment rate, the more careful they will be in their wage demands. Also, unions rarely set the wage unilaterally; to the extent that there is bargaining, firms can threaten to hire the unemployed. The higher the unemployment rate, the stronger the threat. All these factors imply a positive value of \( \theta \), and thus persistence rather than hysteresis.

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**Box 3. Flows, Matching, and Bargaining. The Beveridge Curve and the Phillips Curve.**

The purpose of this box is to present the basic implications of the flow approach for understanding unemployment. I have presented it in a way which makes it most easily comparable to the theories presented in the previous boxes. For a full treatment, see the book by Pissarides (2000).

**Gross Flows**

The starting point of the theory is that relatively stable aggregate employment is the result of large gross flows of job creation and job destruction. Let \( x \) and \( y \)
be respectively the logs of the flows of jobs created and jobs destroyed. Assume that $x$ and $y$ are given by:

\[ x = -\theta_x (w - p) + z_x \]
\[ y = \theta_y (w - p) - z_y \]

$w$ and $p$ are the logs of the nominal wage and the price level respectively. Job creation is decreasing in the real wage, job destruction increasing in the real wage. $z_x$ and $z_y$ are the factors that affect creation and destruction given the real wage (for example, productivity, oil prices, the cost of capital, which we focused on earlier).

In steady state, employment must be stable, so creation must be equal to destruction: $x = y$. This implies that the “warranted” real wage satisfies:

\[ w - p = z \equiv \frac{1}{\theta_x + \theta_y} (z_x + z_y) \]

This in turn determines steady state gross flows $x$ and $y$.

**Matching, Unemployment, and Vacancies**

At any point in time, there are workers looking for jobs (the unemployed), and jobs looking for workers (vacancies). The matching process is characterized by a “matching function”, which relates hires to the stock of unemployed and vacancies. Assume this function is of the form:

\[ h = \alpha U + (1 - \alpha)V + z_m \]

$h$ is the log of hires, $U$ and $V$ are the logs of unemployment and vacancies respectively. The higher the number of unemployed, or the higher the number of vacancies, the more matches, the more hires. $z_m$ captures all the factors that affect the efficiency of the matching process. For example, a decrease in the search intensity of the unemployed, or an increased mismatch between the skills of the unemployed and the skills desired by firms, both lead to a decrease in $z_m$.

The relation between unemployment and vacancies for a given $h$ is called the Beveridge curve. Shifts in the Beveridge curve correspond to changes in $z_m$. 
The relation between \( h, U \) and \( V \) can also be written as:

\[
(h - U) = (1 - \alpha)(V - U) + zm
\]

\( h - U \) is the log of the ratio of hires to unemployment, thus the log of the probability per period of finding a job when unemployed, or, put yet another way, minus the log of average unemployment duration. The relation therefore says that unemployment duration is a decreasing function of the ratio of vacancies to unemployment.

**Bargaining, and the Determination of the Bargained Wage**

If we think of wages as being the result of bargains between individual workers and firms, the outcome will depend on the state of the labor market. The higher \( h - U \), the easier it is for a worker to find a job if unemployed, and so the stronger the worker will be in bargaining. Symmetrically, the higher \( h - V \), the easier it is for a firm is to fill a vacancy, and so the stronger the firm will be in bargaining. This suggests a wage relation of the form:

\[
w - Ep = \beta[(h - U) - (h - V)] + z_b
\]

where the nominal wage depends, as before, on the expected price level, the difference between the labor market prospects of the worker, \( h - U \), and of the firm, \( h - V \). \( z_b \) stands for all the other factors that affect bargaining; for example, the level of unemployment benefits if unemployed—which strengthen the worker in bargaining and increase the wage, or employment protection—which makes it more costly for the firm to replace a worker by another.

Note that the wage equation can be rewritten as:

\[
w - Ep = -\beta(U - V) + z_b
\]

Or equivalently, using the relation derived from the matching function:

\[
w - Ep = \frac{\beta}{1 - \alpha}(h - U) + \frac{1}{1 - \alpha}zm + z_b
\]

Note that this suggests the correct labor market variable in the equation for the bargained wage is not the unemployment rate (the variable traditionally used in such equations), but either the ratio of unemployment to vacancies, or
the probability of exiting unemployment (or its inverse, average unemployment duration).

Combining the first of the two wage equations with the equation for the warranted wage earlier gives a Phillips curve relation:

\[ p - E_p = -\beta(U - V) - z + z_b \]

The Natural Unemployment Rate

Combining this equation and the equation for the warranted wage, and assuming \( E_p = p \), gives a characterization of equilibrium unemployment duration:

\[ h - U = \frac{1}{\beta}[(1 - \alpha)z - z_m + (1 - \alpha)z_b] \]

Equilibrium duration (recall that \( U - h \) is the log of duration) depends on the factors that shift the warranted wage, those that shift the matching function, and those that affect bargaining (some factors may be common to the different \( z \)'s.)

The equilibrium flow \( h \) must be equal to job creation, so \( h = x \) where \( x \) is determined by the warranted wage. This in turn determines the natural rate of unemployment as the product of equilibrium duration and the equilibrium flow.

Note how, in principle, we can learn about the sources of the shifts in the natural rate by looking both at the Beveridge curve relation—which tells us about shifts in \( z_m \)—and at the Phillips curve—which tells us about shifts in \( z \) and \( z_b \).

Box 4. The Tax Wedge and Unemployment

Suppose that there are two types of taxes (Assume both are paid by workers rather than by the firm, but, except in the presence of a binding minimum wage, it does not matter whether these are paid by the worker or by the firm.)
• A tax levied on all income (or consumption; the two are taken to be the same here), be it unemployment benefits or labor income, \( \tau_1 \). (For example, an income tax, or a VAT)

• A tax levied on labor income only, \( \tau_2 \), with benefits (in present discounted value) equal to \( \lambda \tau_2 \). \( \lambda \) may be equal to zero, if the tax is not associated with any benefit to the worker. It may be may be close or equal to one if it goes towards financing a retirement account.

If unemployed, the worker receives \( b - \tau_1 - f(u) \), \( f(.) > 0 \), \( f'(.) > 0 \), where \( b \) is unemployment benefits, and \( f(u) \) captures the private cost of being unemployed, which is assumed to be increasing in the unemployment rate. If employed, the worker receives \( w - \tau_1 - \tau_2 + \lambda \tau_2 \). His surplus from working for the firm is therefore:

\[
V_w \equiv w - b + f(u) - (1 - \lambda)\tau_2
\]

If the firm employs the worker, the firm receives \( y - w \), where \( y \) is the productivity of the worker. If it does not, it receives nothing. Thus the firm’s surplus from employing the worker is:

\[
V_f \equiv y - w
\]

The total surplus from the match is given by:

\[
V = y - b + f(u) - (1 - \lambda)\tau_2
\]

If we assume that workers receive a share \( \beta \) of the surplus, so \( V_w = \beta V \), the wage (and the cost of labor to the firm) is given by:

\[
w = \beta y + (1 - \beta)(b - f(u)) + \tau_2(1 - \lambda)(1 - \beta)
\]

So

\[
d\text{Cost}/d\tau_1 = 0 \quad d\text{Cost}/d\tau_2 = (1 - \lambda)(1 - \beta)
\]

This makes clear that the frequent practice of simply adding all the social contributions together, plus the VAT and/or the income tax to get a “tax wedge” does not make sense. For each tax, we need to know whether it is levied on labor income and other benefits, or just on labor income. For each tax, we also need to know the relevant value of \( \lambda \). In the case of social security for example, some redistribution is typically at work, so \( \lambda \) depends on the wage.
level.

Box 5. The Labor Share

Assume that the production function has constant returns to scale, and Harrod neutral technological progress, so:

\[ y = f(k, an) \]

where \( y, k, n, \) and \( a \) are the levels of output, capital, employment, and technology respectively.

Let \( \tilde{n} \equiv an \) and \( \tilde{w} \equiv w/a \) denote employment and the wage in efficiency units (I shall drop “in efficiency units” in what follows). Then, assuming firms take the wage as given, labor demand is given by:

\[ \frac{\tilde{n}}{k} = g(\tilde{w}) \quad g'(\cdot) \leq 0 \]

The ratio of employment to the capital stock is a decreasing function of the wage. The share of labor is given in turn by:

\[ s \equiv \frac{wn}{y} = \frac{\tilde{w}\tilde{n}}{y} \]

Now consider an exogenous increase in the wage \( \tilde{w} \). Suppose that in the short run, there is no scope for substitution between labor and capital, so \( g' = 0 \). The ratio of labor to capital remains the same, and so does the ratio of labor to output. Thus, \( \tilde{w} \) goes up, \( \tilde{n}/y \) does not change, and the labor share goes up.

What happens over time depends on the long run elasticity of substitution. If it less than one, the labor share decreases from its initial peak, but remains higher than before the increase in the wage; if it is equal to one, the share returns to its initial value; if it is greater than one, the share returns to a lower value than before the increase in the wage.

These dynamics can clearly explain why, after the increase in \( \tilde{w} \), the labor share went first up, and then down over time. But they do not easily explain why the
labor share decreased below its initial level. A permanent increase in $\tilde{w}$, and a long-run elasticity of substitution greater than one would explain it; but as we saw in the text, $\tilde{w}$ decreased back to or below its original value from the mid-1980s on.

Another element is therefore needed to explain the combination of a lower wage and a lower share. One potential explanation is a decrease in labor hoarding. Extend the equation for the demand for labor to be:

$$\frac{\tilde{n}}{k} = g(\tilde{w}, z) \quad g'_z > 0$$

Then, a decrease in $z$, due for example to the reduction of $x$-inefficiency, will decrease labor demand, and decrease the labor share. This is the explanation suggested in Blanchard (1998).

Suppose instead that firms are not wage takers, and that the marginal wage, call it $\tilde{w}_m$, differs from the (measured) average wage. The demand for labor is therefore given by:

$$\frac{\tilde{n}}{k} = g(\tilde{w}_m)$$

In this case, an increase in the marginal wage for a given average wage, will lead to a decrease in employment, and thus to a decrease in the labor share. One can think of a number of institutions which might lead to such an increase in the marginal wage: for example, additional regulations, additional workers’ rights as the size of the firm increases. This is the line of explanation suggested by Caballero and Hammour (1998).
References


[29] Diego Comin and Thomas Philippon. The rise in firm-level volatility:


