Midwest Mathematical Economics and Theory --- Fall 2008

Summary of All Sessions

#Date/TimeLocationTitlePapers
1October 3, 2008
14:15-15:45
Pfahl 330 GE I3
2October 3, 2008
14:15-15:45
Pfahl 302 Auctions I3
3October 3, 2008
14:15-15:45
Pfahl 340 Delegation & Disclosure3
4October 3, 2008
16:15-17:45
Pfahl 330 Macro Theory I3
5October 3, 2008
16:15-17:45
Pfahl 302 Contracts & Mechanisms3
6October 3, 2008
16:15-17:45
Pfahl 340 Industrial Organization3
7October 4, 2008
9:00-10:30
Scott Lab 048 GE II3
8October 4, 2008
9:00-10:30
Scott Lab 245 Game Theory I3
9October 4, 2008
9:00-10:30
Scott Lab 050 Nonlinear Income Taxes3
10October 4, 2008
11:00-12:30
Scott Lab 048 Political Economy3
11October 4, 2008
11:00-12:30
Scott Lab 050 Potpourri I: Mechanism Design Theory & Signaling Experiments3
12October 4, 2008
11:00-12:30
Scott Lab 245 Potpourri II: Cooperative Game Theory & Mechanism Design3
13October 4, 2008
14:15-15:45
Scott Lab 048 Political Agency3
14October 4, 2008
14:15-15:45
Scott Lab 050 Matching Models3
15October 4, 2008
14:15-15:45
Scott Lab 054 Cheap Talk3
16October 4, 2008
16:15-17:45
Scott Lab 054 Dynamic Market Economies3
17October 4, 2008
16:15-17:45
Scott Lab 048 Repeated Games3
18October 4, 2008
16:15-17:45
Scott Lab 050 Decision Theory3
19October 5, 2008
9:00-10:30
Scott Lab 054 Macro Theory II3
20October 5, 2008
9:00-10:30
Scott Lab 056 Auctions II3
21October 5, 2008
9:00-10:30
Scott Lab 105 Contract Theory I3
22October 5, 2008
11:00-12:30
Scott Lab 054 Game Theory II3
23October 5, 2008
11:00-12:30
Scott Lab 105 Contests3
24October 5, 2008
11:00-12:30
Scott Lab 056 Contract Theory II3
 

24 sessions, 72 papers


 

Midwest Mathematical Economics and Theory --- Fall 2008

Complete List of All Sessions


Session 1: GE I

Session Chair: Zaier Aouani, university of kansas
Date: October 3, 2008
Time: 14:15 - 15:45
Location: Pfahl 330
 

On the Robustness of Competitive Equilibrium:Better Response Maps and Equilibrium Points
By Subir K. Chakrabarti Department of Economics IUPUI
   Presented by: Subir Chakrabarti, Indiana Univeristy Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI)
 

The dynamics of partially revealing rational expectations equilibria
By Scott Condie, Brigham Young University Jayant V Ganguli, Cornell University
   Presented by: Scott Condie, Brigham Young University
 

Reduced equivalent form of a financial structure
By Zaier Aouani University of Kansas, USA and University of Paris I, France Bernard cornet University of Kansas, USA and University of Paris I, France
   Presented by: Zaier Aouani, university of kansas

Session 2: Auctions I

Session Chair: Lixin Ye, Ohio State University
Date: October 3, 2008
Time: 14:15 - 15:45
Location: Pfahl 302
 

On the competitive effects of bidding syndicates
By Vlad Mares, Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis Mikhael Shor, Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University
   Presented by: Mikhael Shor, Vanderbilt University
 

On the Value of An Additional Bidder: A Perspective of Ex Post Mechanisms
By Murali Agastya, Economics Department, University of Sydney Jingfeng Lu, Economics Department, National University of Singapore
   Presented by: Jingfeng Lu, National University of Singapore
 

Competition with an Unidentified Bidder
By Yuk-fai Fong, Northwestern University Daniel Garrett, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Daniel Garrett, Northwestern University

Session 3: Delegation & Disclosure

Session Chair: Evsen Turkay, University of Minnesota
Date: October 3, 2008
Time: 14:15 - 15:45
Location: Pfahl 340
 

Selling Authority
[slides]
By Wooyoung Lim, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics
   Presented by: Wooyoung Lim, University of Pittsburgh
 

On the Incentive of Strategic Information Disclosure under Competitive Environment
By Young-Ro Yoon, Indiana University Bloomington
   Presented by: Young-Ro Yoon, Indiana University Bloomington
 

Two Sided Uncertainty in Persuasion Games
By Evsen Turkay University of Minnesota, Department of Economics
   Presented by: Evsen Turkay, University of Minnesota

Session 4: Macro Theory I

Session Chair: Antonio Doblas-Madrid, Michigan State University
Date: October 3, 2008
Time: 16:15 - 17:45
Location: Pfahl 330
 

Counterfeit Money
By Elena Quercioli Tulane University Lones Smith University of Michigan
   Presented by: Elena Quercioli, Tulane University
 

WHY BUBBLE-BURSTING IS UNPREDICTABLE:WELFARE EFFECTS OF ANTI-BUBBLE POLICY WHEN CENTRAL BANKS MAKE MISTAKES
By Guo Kai, Department of Economics, University of Mississippi John Conlon, Department of Economics, University of Mississippi
   Presented by: Guo Kai, University of Mississippi
 

A Robust Model of Bubbles with Multidimensional Uncertainty
By Antonio Doblas-Madrid, Michigan State University
   Presented by: Antonio Doblas-Madrid, Michigan State University

Session 5: Contracts & Mechanisms

Session Chair: Paul Healy, The Ohio State University
Date: October 3, 2008
Time: 16:15 - 17:45
Location: Pfahl 302
 

Competing for Insurance
By Laurence Ales, Carnigie Mellon Pricila Maziero, University of Minnesota and Federal Reserve of Minneapolis
   Presented by: Laurence Ales, Carnegie Mellon University
 

Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
[slides]
By Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University Fuhito Kojima, Cowles Foundation, Yale University
   Presented by: Fuhito Kojima, Harvard University
 

Optimal Shill Bidding in the VCG Mechanism
By Itai Sher University of Minnesota
   Presented by: Itai Sher, University of Minnesota

Session 6: Industrial Organization

Session Chair: Huanxing Yang, The Ohio State University
Date: October 3, 2008
Time: 16:15 - 17:45
Location: Pfahl 340
 

Waterfall versus Sprinkler Product Launch Strategy: Influencing The Herd
By Manaswini Bhalla Department of Economics The Pennsylvania State University
   Presented by: Manaswini Bhalla, The Pennsylvania State University
 

Tie-in contracts with downstream competition
By Sreya Kolay, Paul Merage School of Business, UC Irvine
   Presented by: Sreya Kolay, Paul Merage School of Business,
 

Vertical Integration for Reputation Building
By Meeryung La Department of Economics Seoul National University Jee-Hyoeng Park Department of Economics Seoul National University
   Presented by: Meeryung La, Seoul National University

Session 7: GE II

Session Chair: Yves Balasko, University of York, UK
Date: October 4, 2008
Time: 9:00 - 10:30
Location: Scott Lab 048
 

Club Theory and Household Formation
By Hans Gersbach, ETH Zurich Hans Haller, Virginia Tech
   Presented by: Hans Haller, Virginia Tech
 

Existence of Equilibria in Financial Markets With Restricted Participation
By Bernard Cornet, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS and University of Paris, France Ramu Gopalan, University of Kansas, Lawrence, K
   Presented by: Ramu Gopalan, University of Kansas
 

General equilibrium without utility functions: How far to go?
By Yves Balasko Department of Economics and Related Studies University of York York, UK Mich Tvede Department of Economics University of Copenhagen Copenhagen Denmark
   Presented by: Yves Balasko, University of York, UK

Session 8: Game Theory I

Session Chair: Ricardo Nunes, Federal Reserve Board
Date: October 4, 2008
Time: 9:00 - 10:30
Location: Scott Lab 245
 

ON THE EFFICIENT SITING OF NOXIOUS FACILITIES
By Rudy Santore, University of Tennessee
   Presented by: Rudy Santore, University of Tennessee
 

Using Coupons to Intertemporally Price Discriminate and Collude
By Yuk-Fai Fong, Northwestern University Qihong Liu, University of Oklahoma
   Presented by: Qihong Liu, University of Oklahoma
 

Political Disagreement, Lack of Commitment and the Level of Debt
By Davide Debortoli, UCSD Ricardo Nunes, Federal Reserve Board
   Presented by: Ricardo Nunes, Federal Reserve Board

Session 9: Nonlinear Income Taxes

Session Chair: Lixin Ye, Ohio State University
Date: October 4, 2008
Time: 9:00 - 10:30
Location: Scott Lab 050
 

Strategic Nonlinear Income Tax Competition with Perfect Labor Mobility
By Craig Brett, Mt. Allison University John A. Weymark, Vanderbilt University
   Presented by: John Weymark, Vanderbilt University
 

Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice
By Massimo Morelli, Columbia University Huanxing Yang, The Ohio State University Lixin Ye, The Ohio State University
   Presented by: Lixin Ye, Ohio State University
 

Optimality Non-Linear Income Tax when Highly Skilled Individuals Vote with their Feet
By Laurent Simula, National University of Singapore and Vanderbilt University Alain Trannoy, EHESS, GREQAM-IDEP
   Presented by: Laurent Simula, National University of Singapore and Vanderbilt University

Session 10: Political Economy

Session Chair: David Ahn, U.C. Berkeley
Date: October 4, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:30
Location: Scott Lab 048
 

On the Informational Efficiency of Approval Voting
By Johanna Goertz (University of Guelph and CORE, Universite catholique de Louvain) Francois Maniquet (CORE, Universite catholique de Louvain)
   Presented by: Johanna Goertz, University of Guelph
 

Combinatorial Voting
By David Ahn, UC Berkeley and University of Michigan Santiago Oliveros, Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley
   Presented by: David Ahn, U.C. Berkeley
 

Optimal Remedies in International Trade Agreements
By Mostafa Beshkar
   Presented by: Mostafa Beshkar, Vanderbilt University

Session 11: Potpourri I: Mechanism Design Theory & Signaling Experiments

Session Chair: Andreas Park, University of Toronto
Date: October 4, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:30
Location: Scott Lab 050
 

News from the Informed Principal in Private-Value Environments
By Tymofy Mylovanov, University of Bonn Thomas Troger, University of Bonn
   Presented by: Tymofiy Mylovanov, University of Bonn
 

Signaling in Deterministic and Stochastic Settings: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation
By Thomas D. Jeitschko, Michigan State University and Royal Holloway, University of London Hans T. Normann, Royal Holloway, University of London and University of Frankfurt, Germany
   Presented by: Thomas Jeitschko, Michigan State University
 

Herding and Contrarianism in a Financial Trading Experiment with Endogenous Timing
By Andreas Park, University of Toronto Daniel Sgroi, University of Warwick
   Presented by: Andreas Park, University of Toronto

Session 12: Potpourri II: Cooperative Game Theory & Mechanism Design

Session Chair: Suchan Chae, Rice
Date: October 4, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:30
Location: Scott Lab 245
 

No Profitable Decompositions in Quasi-Linear Allocation Problems
By Camelia Bejan Rice University Geoffroy de Clippel Brown University
   Presented by: Camelia Bejan, Rice University
 

Bargaining among groups: An axiomatic viewpoint
By Suchan Chae, Rice University Herve Moulin, Rice University
   Presented by: Suchan Chae, Rice
 

Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and Negotiations: A Mechanism Design Approach
By Romans Pancs, University of Rochester
   Presented by: Romans Pancs, University of Rochester

Session 13: Political Agency

Session Chair: Marcus Berliant, Washington University in St. Louis
Date: October 4, 2008
Time: 14:15 - 15:45
Location: Scott Lab 048
 

Strategic Delegation in a Legislative Bargaining Model with Pork and Public Goods
By Nels Christiansen, Ohio State University
   Presented by: Nels Christiansen, Ohio State University
 

A Theory of Reform with Politicians' Reputation Concerns
By Qiang Fu Department of Business Policy National University of Singapore Ming Li Department of Economics Concordia University
   Presented by: Qiang Fu, National University of Singapore
 

Dynamic Political Agency with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
By Marcus Berliant, Washington University in St. Louis John Duggan, University of Rochester
   Presented by: Marcus Berliant, Washington University in St. Louis

Session 14: Matching Models

Session Chair: Daniela Puzzello, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champai
Date: October 4, 2008
Time: 14:15 - 15:45
Location: Scott Lab 050
 

Iron Sharpens Iron: Rethinking Dynamic Matching Theory
By Axel Anderson, Georgetown University Lones Smith, University of Michigan
   Presented by: Lones Smith, University of Michigan
 

Matching markets with signals
By Alexey Kushnir, The Pennsylvania State University
   Presented by: Alexey Kushnir, Pennsylvania State University
 

Random Matching and Aggregate Uncertainty
By Robert Molzon, University of Kentucky Daniela Puzzello, University of Illinois
   Presented by: Daniela Puzzello, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champai

Session 15: Cheap Talk

Session Chair: Wolfgang Gick, Harvard University
Date: October 4, 2008
Time: 14:15 - 15:45
Location: Scott Lab 054
 

Expert Advice for Amateurs
By Ernest K. Lai, University of Pittsburgh
   Presented by: Ernest Lai, University of Pittsburgh
 

Communication with Two-sided Asymmetric Information
By Ying Chen, Arizona State University
   Presented by: Ying Chen, Arizona State University
 

Cheap Talk Equilibria - A Note On Two Senders
By Wolfgang Gick, Harvard University
   Presented by: Wolfgang Gick, Harvard University

Session 16: Dynamic Market Economies

Session Chair: Stephen Spear, Tepper School of Business
Date: October 4, 2008
Time: 16:15 - 17:45
Location: Scott Lab 054
 

Coordination Failures in Dynamic Parimutuel Betting Markets
By Dan Levin, Ohio-State University Anthony Ziegelmeyer, Max Planck Institute of Economics
   Presented by: Anthony Ziegelmeyer, Max Planck Institute of Economics
 

Notes on Dynamic Trading in a Durable Good Market with Asymmetric Information and Buyer Heterogeneity
By Santanu Roy, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX.
   Presented by: Santanu Roy, Southern Methodist University
 

Dynamic Suboptimality of Competitive Equilibrium in Multiperiod Overlapping Generations Economies
By Espen Henriksen, University of Oslo Steve Spear, Carnegie Mellon
   Presented by: Stephen Spear, Tepper School of Business

Session 17: Repeated Games

Session Chair: In-Koo Cho, University of Illinois
Date: October 4, 2008
Time: 16:15 - 17:45
Location: Scott Lab 048
 

A Belief-Based Approach to the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Asymmetric Private Monitoring
By Bo Chen Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University
   Presented by: Bo Chen, Southern Methodist University
 

Matching, Repeated Game and Aspiration
By In-Koo Cho (University of Illinois) Akihiko Matsui (University of Tokyo)
   Presented by: In-Koo Cho, University of Illinois
 

Correlation and Private Monitoring
By Josh Cherry, University of Michigan Lones Smith, University of Michigan
   Presented by: Joshua Cherry, University of Michigan

Session 18: Decision Theory

Session Chair: Eran Shmaya, Northwestern University
Date: October 4, 2008
Time: 16:15 - 17:45
Location: Scott Lab 050
 

Impulsive Actions and Agonizing Decisions
By William Neilson, University of Tennessee
   Presented by: William Neilson, University of Tennessee
 

Revealed Consideration and Inconsideration
By Yusufcan Masatlioglu (University of Michigan) Daisuke Nakajima (University of Michigan) Erkut Ozbay (University of Michigan)
   Presented by: Daisuke Nakajima, University of Michigan
 

Experiments on Decisions Under Uncertainty: A Theoretical Framework
By Eran Shmaya, Northwestern MEDS Leeat Yariv, Caltech
   Presented by: Eran Shmaya, Northwestern University

Session 19: Macro Theory II

Session Chair: James Peck, Ohio State University
Date: October 5, 2008
Time: 9:00 - 10:30
Location: Scott Lab 054
 

Production, Hidden Action, and the Payment System
By Chao Gu University of Missouri Mark Guzman University of Reading Joe Haslag University of Missouri
   Presented by: Chao Gu, University of Missouri
 

Financial Institutions Reforms: Political Feasibility and Endogenous Interest Groups
By Madhav Aney, LSE Maitreesh Ghatak, LSE Massimo Morelli, Columbia University
   Presented by: Massimo Morelli, Columbia University
 

Choice and Allocation of a Risky Asset through Markets and Prices
By Leonard J. Mirman, University of Virginia Marc Santugini, HEC Montreal
   Presented by: Marc Santugini, HEC Montreal

Session 20: Auctions II

Session Chair: Sotirios Georganas, Ohio State University and University of Bonn
Date: October 5, 2008
Time: 9:00 - 10:30
Location: Scott Lab 056
 

Auctions with Entry And Resale
By Xiaoshu Xu, Ohio State Univ. Dan Levin,Ohio State Univ. Lixin Ye,Ohio State Univ.
   Presented by: Xiaoshu Xu, Ohio State Univ.
 

Bidding Reversals in a Multiple-Good Auction with Global Reserve Price
By Yuanchuan Lien, Caltech Daniel Quint, University of Wisconsin
   Presented by: Daniel Quint, University of Wisconsin - Madison
 

Auctions with Heterogeneous Entry Costs
By John Wooders, University of Arizona Diego Moreno, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
   Presented by: John Wooders, University of Arizona

Session 21: Contract Theory I

Session Chair: Chifeng Dai, Southern Illinois University Carbondale
Date: October 5, 2008
Time: 9:00 - 10:30
Location: Scott Lab 105
 

Stock Option Compensation and Managerial Fraud: Theory and Evidence from Experiments
By Martin W. Tackie, The University of Tennessee Rudy Santore, The University of Tennessee
   Presented by: Martin Tackie, The University of Tennessee
 

Intermediation, Seller Price Setting Mechanisms, and Random Matching
By Simon Loertscher, University of Melbourne Andras Niedermayer, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Andras Niedermayer, Northwestern University
 

The Preference for Risk in Agency Problems
By Chifeng Dai, Southern Illinois University Carbondale
   Presented by: Chifeng Dai, Southern Illinois University Carbondale

Session 22: Game Theory II

Session Chair: Stephan Lauermann, University of Michigan
Date: October 5, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:30
Location: Scott Lab 054
 

Quantal Response Equilibria with Heterogeneous Agents
By Russell Golman, Department of Applied and Interdisciplinary Mathematics, University of Michigan
   Presented by: Russell Golman, University of Michigan
 

Partial Cooperation in Symmetric Games
By Subhadip Chakrabarti (Queen's University Belfast) Robert P. Gilles (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) Emiliya A. Lazarova (Queen's University Belfast)
   Presented by: Subhadip Chakabarti, Queen's University Belfast
 

Search with Adverse Selection
By Stephan Lauermann, University of Michigan Asher Wolinsky, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Stephan Lauermann, University of Michigan

Session 23: Contests

Session Chair: Huanxing Yang, The Ohio State University
Date: October 5, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:30
Location: Scott Lab 105
 

A GENERALIZED CONTEST STRUCTURE AND THE EXISTENCE OF MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
By Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University Roman M. Sheremeta, Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University
   Presented by: Subhasish Modak Chowdhury, Purdue University
 

Head Starts and Handicaps
By Rene Kirkegaard, Brock University
   Presented by: Rene Kirkegaard, Brock University
 

Incentives and the Structure of Teams
By April Franco, University of Toronto Matt Mitchell, University of Toronto Galina Vereshchagina, Arizona State University
   Presented by: Galina Vereshchagina, Arizona State University

Session 24: Contract Theory II

Session Chair: Isa Hafalir, Carnegie Mellon University
Date: October 5, 2008
Time: 11:00 - 12:30
Location: Scott Lab 056
 

Optimal Managerial Contracting with Earnings Manipulation
By Keith Crocker, Pennsylvania State University Thomas Gresik, University of Notre Dame
   Presented by: Thomas Gresik, University of Notre Dame
 

Nonlinear Pricing with Resale
By Isa E. Hafalir, Carnegie Mellon University
   Presented by: Isa Hafalir, Carnegie Mellon University
 

Uncertainty, Learning and Hierarchy: Dynamic Moral Hazard in Knowledge Production
By Guy Arie, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
   Presented by: Guy Arie, Northwestern University

This program was last updated on 2008-10-02 1:16:15 EDT